


15 CANADIAN FIELD REGIMENT. R



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THE HISTORY
of
13 CANADIAN FIELD REGIMENT
ROYAL CANADIAN
ARTILLERY

1940
1945

DEDICATION

This history is dedicated to the gallant officers and men of 3 Canadian Infantry Division who fell in battle so that we might return and make a new world where such devotion and courage may never again be wasted.

FOREWORD

by Lt-Col. J. D. BAIRD

This is a history of a western field regiment of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Yet through the years, because of reorganization and casualties, there could be found within its ranks men from all parts of Canada. Indeed, we had men from many parts of the world. Never, during its history has a political, racial or sectarian issue marred the good fellowship of the 13 Canadian Field Regiment. Approximately seven hundred men from all walks of life, united in a common cause, lived in perfect harmony for about five years.

When the battle came and men died we found, with somewhat of a shock, that it is possible to love another man. There have been examples of self sacrifice, many of devotion beyond the call of duty. In war all such acts cannot be rewarded, nor can this history record them. In the hearts and memories of those of us who survive, shall be remembered all things these pages cannot recollect.

From the early days the regiment was a happy one. It went through difficult times but on the 6th day of June 1944, when the final test came, all those who remember are proud of the gallant, skillfull, and efficient work of the unit. Until the 8th of May 1945, with the exception of a few days, the regiment was continuously in action. Without fear of contradiction I say that the men of this unit had no superiors. They again have added honours and meaning to our motto "Quo Fas et Gloria Ducunt".

Before reading our story, may we acknowledge our gratitude to our British comrades in arms, not only in Britain but

throughout the "Good Fight". In Holland, France and Belgium we met many courageous people. Men and women, undernourished, living almost without hope for years — yet when we came the helping hand and heart were there.

Bravery is evident on the battlefield but courage remains while the heart beats. May we then say to all our friends in Europe, "You owe us no debt — we came because Freedom and Justice are more important than life itself". We owe you much for all you have done for us and when we are gone, think kindly of these rough, noisy Canadians.

4 CANADIAN LAA REGIMENT, RCA

No history of this regiment could be complete without reference to "C" Troop of the 69th Battery, 4th LAA Regiment RCA. From the early days of the invasion until the final knockout blow they lived and deployed with us. Good shooting and fellowship was the keynote, so much so that many new recruits thought we were all of the same regiment; well so we are — the ROYAL CANADIAN ARTILLERY.

STORY

by Lieut W. W. BARRETT

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DRAKE'S PRAYER

"Oh Lord God, when thou givest to Thy servants to endeavour any great matters, grant us also to know that it is not the beginning, but the continuing of the same, until it is thoroughly finished, which yieldeth the true glory; through Him that for the finishing of Thy work laid down His life, our Redeemer, Jesus Christ."

Uttered by Drake, as he sailed into the Harbor of Cadiz, in 1587, to sack 33 Spanish ships, being fitted for the Armada, against England.

By request of the GOC, and endorsed by the Chaplains, to be used by the men of the Third Canadian Infantry Division.

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by *Lieut P. P. F. CLAY*

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RICHARDSON, F. J.: Cpl GILLESPIE, R. H.: L/Bdr
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INTRODUCTION

This is a story of a field artillery regiment; where they went and what they did. It tells how the regiment worked in the infantry support role and with what effect. It is a chronology of events together with an attempt to blend these events into a broader picture.

This story is written with two objects in mind; first, that of providing the men who have served in the regiment with a memento of their army days; second, that of recording accurately a history which will be of use in the future and which will place the artillery branch of the service in its recognized place.

Many humorous stories, and yarns have been omitted as they were of interest only to a small group who initiated them. Many other items have been left out which are outside of the scope of the story but deserve a word here. No attempt is made to portray the life of the man at the guns who scurries to his place at the word "Take post", strains at the orders as they come over the tannoy, goes through the firing drill and curses at the ammunition until the command "Stand easy". Each day at the guns is very much the same, varying only in the amount of firing done or the length of move accomplished. Only a very small handful of the regiment's personnel ever see the shells land or see the results of their efforts. Each man has his job whether it be at the gun, at the command post, slugging ammunition, operating and maintaining radio and line communications, servicing vehicles or at administrative work. The story gives no idea of the telephone "drills" designed to bring down large concentrations of fire at a given time, or the informal "blasts" where the conversation is unprintable. Nor does it tell of the constant vigil necessary on the multitude of radio sets where sometimes only "Report my signals" would come over the crackling airwaves to remind the sleepy sig-

naller that communications were still through. Or again the almighty priority words "Fire orders" would come over the set to shake a quiet gun position into split second activity. No attempt is made to portray the life of a command post which not only is a technical control room operating 24 hours a day but a social centre, a hang out, an administration office and a snackbar. And lastly, little mention is made of the officers at the gun positions who had an undramatic but vitally important role.

PART ONE

MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING IN CANADA

The story of the 13 Canadian Field Regiment, RCA, began at Shilo Camp, Manitoba on October 14, 1940, when four western artillery batteries were brought together under one command. These four batteries were, the 22nd Canadian Field Battery, RCA, mobilized at Gleichen, Alberta; the 44th Canadian Field Battery, RCA, mobilized at Prince Albert, Saskatchewan; the 62nd Canadian Field Battery, RCA mobilized at Duncan, British Columbia; and the 78th Canadian Field Battery, RCA mobilized at Red Deer, Alberta. As a temporary measure the new regiment was organised into two batteries, namely the 22/78 Field Battery under command of Major T. L. SOUNESS and the 44/62 under command of Major E. PICKERING. Lt-Col G. S. HOWARD became the first commanding officer.¹ Shilo 14 Oct 40

The men of the regiment were mostly from farms and rural areas and were imbued with qualities of independence, initiative, clear thinking and hard fighting. These qualities remained with the unit, in spite of the many changes in personnel, and gave the regiment its strength and character so noticeable during later days of action.

After a month in the dust and wind, typical of the camp at Shilo, the regiment moved into winter quarters in the city of Winnipeg. The first inspection was carried out not long after their arrival, by Major-General E. W. SANSON, DSO, Commander 3 Canadian Division of which the regiment was then a part. Winnipeg 4 Nov 40

The following February an advance party from the unit was sent overseas.² This was to prepare the way for the 62nd Light Anti-Aircraft Battery which was, at the time, being mobilized in Duncan. Not long after, the 13th Canadian Field Regiment was reorganised into three batteries, namely; the 22nd Field Battery, 44th Field Battery and 78th Field Battery. The identity of the 62nd Field Battery thereby ended, yet the 3 Feb 41

OFFICERS WHO SERVED IN ACTION. The officers on the opposite page and following page are only a few of the those who served with the regiment in action. It is regretted that more photographs were not available at the time of printing.



Capt W. L. Hogg, MC



Capt W. J. G. Steele



Lieut F. L. Aylward



Lt-Col C. R. Ostrander, ED



Lieut W. W. Barrett



Lieut J. R. Wright



Lieut D. W. Falconer



Brig F. D. Lace, OBE



Lieut W. J. Crocker



Lieut J. K. Roche



Capt E. C. Gothard



Capt W. A. Shea



Major E. A. Olmsted



Capt G. E. Lennox



Lt-Col J. D. Baird



Capt G. A. Rumble



Capt A. L. Campbell



Lieut W. E. Bimm



Lieut G. M. Green



Lieut F. A. Barley



Lieut E. T. Cantwell

PART TWO

TRAINING IN ENGLAND

The regiment disembarked at Gourock, Scotland on Friday, November 13, 1941 and proceeded by train to Aldershot. That night they were quartered in Lille Barracks, Farnborough along with 3 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA. Soon after their arrival the landing leaves commenced. Many officers were sent on courses at the School of Gunnery and as soon as vehicles could be obtained the men were given driving instruction on the English roads. Farnborough
13 Nov 41

The regiment came under command of 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade (7 C.I.B.) for tactics and operations and also went on a Field Ration basis. 25 Pdr field guns were soon drawn and the men set about to familiarize themselves with their new weapons. 24 Nov 41

Major-General PRICE, GOC 3 Canadian Infantry Division, inspected the men towards the end of the month and not long after, the regiment moved to Lindfield and Haywards Heath, Sussex. Lindfield
1 Dec 41

From here they went to the firing camp at Sennybridge, Wales, experiencing enroute all the convoy troubles possible to a new unit in a strange country. At Sennybridge the new guns were calibrated and course shooting carried out in very difficult weather. ¹ After ten days of strenuous training the regiment returned to Lindfield bivouacing en route at Rouvers Camp, Gloucester. 10 Dec 41

Not long after a Corps scheme "Beaver" began, lasting for three days after which the regiment returned again to Lindfield. A number of trips were made with the guns to the Alfriston Ranges where all types of shoots were conducted. These days saw very intensive training, many small schemes, and many special courses outside the unit. ² 28 Dec 41

In April Lieut D. C. CAMPBELL delivered a talk on behalf of the regiment over the BBC, which was transmitted by short wave to Canada. "...Our first winter in England is over,

23 Apr 42 and with six months service over here completed, we feel ourselves seasoned members of the army overseas . . . There has been lots of training to keep us busy lately — tactical exercises, schemes and manoeuvres. In our travels with our vehicles and guns we have seen much of the picturesque countryside. Like all strangers, we have found England attractive and endlessly interesting. The boys enjoy seeing new places and making new acquaintances. The English people have been kind and hospitable."

Denne Park 2 Canadian Infantry Division, which had gone to the Isle of Wight to commence training for the Dieppe assault. At Denne Park, Major J. W. DODDS joined the regiment as 2 i/c.

30 Apr 42 From here the regiment made preparations for exercise "Tiger". The Canadians were under command of Lieut-General MCNAUGHTON with General MONTGOMERY in command of the total operation, which lasted twelve rain-soaked days and involved numerous night moves. This was the largest and the toughest scheme the unit had been on up to that date. To be able to boast of having participated in "Tiger" was the mark of a veteran, and those days provided many a story later on, when the gang gathered in the pubs with their pint of "bitter." ³

24 Jun 42 In June the regiment moved to the firing practice camp at Larkhill (West Down Camp). ⁴ After a strenuous week and a half they returned to new quarters on the South Coast, the 22nd Bty going to Firle Park, the 44th to Seaford, and the 78th to Wilmington. ⁵ From there another wet, exhausting exercise by the name of "Harold" was carried out. Both "Harold" and "Tiger" were designed with the intention of confusing the enemy as to the role of 2 Canadian Infantry Division.

23 Jul 42

During these months the regiment was acting in a counter-invasion role. The 13 Canadian Field Regiment was part of the artillery group under command of 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade, whose task it was to protect the Newhaven sector on the South coast of England against a possible landing from the Continent.

The next move was to Findon, an area previously occupied by 3 Canadian Field Regiment, RCA of 1 Canadian Infantry Division. Not long after, Lt-Col H. A. SPARLING⁶ took over command of the regiment.

Findon
7 Aug 42

29 Oct 42

On 30 November the regiment moved to the firing ranges at Builth Wells, stopping off over night at the staging camp at Cirencester. The men travelled by road while the tractors, guns and carriers moved by train. The operational role of the regiment at Findon was taken over by 8 Army Field Regiment, RCA.

30 Nov 42

The regiment stayed at Builth Wells for ten days carrying out an intensive training programme and tightening up on discipline.⁷ From this exercise the unit moved to new quarters with the 22nd Battery at Brighton, the 44th Battery at Steyning and the 78th Battery at Worthing. Not long after the whole regiment moved to Billingshurst, staying there from December to October of the following year. Shortly after Christmas, Major G. F. RAINNIE arrived to take over as second in command.⁸ From here a few short trips were made to the Alfriston ranges leading up to the famous exercise "Spartan". For this exercise General McNAUGHTON took command of four Canadian divisions with which he pushed the opposition through Southern England and into the Midlands. "Spartan" was a toughening exercise involving twelve days of long marches, short rations and quick deployments. The regiment "fought" through Alton, Newbury, withdrew to Didcot and then advanced again through Abington, Littlemore, Oxford, Oakley, Nash, Little Lindford and Bedford. It was on this exercise that compo ration (a diet which was to become very familiar to the men taking part in the invasion of the Continent) was first used.⁹

Billingshurst
16 Dec 42

28 Dec 42

"Spartan"
1 Mar 43

The following month exercise "Welsh" took place. It was of a different nature, being a competitive scheme between the First, Second and Third Canadian Divisions as well as artillery regiments in other Canadian formations. The artillery of 3 Canadian Infantry Division fired on the ranges at Alfriston, Stockbridge, Gloucester and Sennybridge as the battle of fire and movement proceeded westwards.

"Welsh"
Apr 43

30 May 43 At this time Lt-Col W. S. ZEIGLER¹⁰ took over command of the regiment, while Major J. D. BAIRD¹¹ took over command of the 22nd Field Battery. Action was expected in the fall and the unit went through many weeks of toughening on assault courses, strenuous schemes and short rations. Leaves were cancelled for some time.

10 Jun 43 In September came the first indications to the men that 3 Canadian Infantry Division had been chosen for an assault role when the regiment was sent to the Combined Operations Training School at Inverness on Loch Fyne. As early as July 8, 1943 we find the 3 Canadian Infantry Division included in the plans for the initial assault on the Continent. The 13th Canadian Field Regiment was to be part of this assault force, along with the other two field artillery regiments of the division. Because of technical difficulties and the possibility of fighting at close quarters, the artillery was to be of the self-propelled type with the gun mounted on a heavily armoured chassis. The training programme set down at that time was of an ambitious nature. The preliminary stage involved first, the study in the principles of combined operations and second, the practical use of these principles in embarkation and disembarkation, and similar work special to artillery.

18 Jul 43 The preliminary stage of training was already underway late in July at Billingshurst when conversion courses and Combined Operation lectures were begun, along with lectures in waterproofing, in the use of the American panoramic sight (dial sight) and lessons in swimming.

Inverary The second stage of the training programme took place at Inverary, Scotland and later at Poole Harbour on the South English Coast. It was designed to bring the troops to grips with the actual mechanics of assault landings. At the Combined Operations Training School there were countless lectures by
Sep 43 army, navy and air force personnel and the occasional swims

WARRANT OFFICERS AND SERGEANTS WHO SERVED IN ACTION. The warrant officers and sergeants on the opposite page and following page are only a few of those who served with the regiment in action. It is regretted that more photographs were not available at the time of printing.



BSM "Pappy" Ray



RQMS "Ginger" Harmston



BSM "Bob" Chown



Sgt "Jim" Hartley



RSM "Dugie" MacRae



BSM "Cliff" Atkinson



Sgt "George" Rich



Sgt "Eddie" Kingsmith



Sgt "Art" Porter



Sgt "Curley" Sinkler



Sgt "Moose" Moody



Sgt "Rusty" Cannon



Sgt "W. J." MacRae



Sgt "Mac" Sim



Sgt "Sully" Sullivan



Sgt "Brownie" Brown



Sgt "Hank" Randall



Sgt "Rod" Kenyon



Sgt "Scottie" Scott



Sgt "Bill" Bar



Sgt "Fred" Metcalfe



Sgt "Dick" Titterton



Sgt "Hayhead" Brennand

by the men in full equipment. Here on Loch Fyne the 25 Pdr guns were fired for the first time from waterborne craft. It was hoped that field artillery could be used to produce directed fire from the water, and thereby, assist in shelling the beaches before a landing was made. At that time this novel use was still in the experimental stage and, as yet, it was not known whether it would prove practicable.

Shortly after, the regiment took part in two experimental exercises. One called "Janfu", was designed to practice the movement of craft on a timed basis and also to practice the artillery in firing a timed programme from LCT's. The other called "Wading", was designed to teach waterproofing, the breakdown of personnel on assault scale landings, and the sequence of the actual landing on the beach. "Janfu" "Wading"

After a short stay at Lymington the regiment moved to Bournemouth on the South coast, chosen because of its proximity to Studland Bay and Poole Harbour, where most of the assault practice landings were made. Here the regiment entered the third stage of assault training involving assault landings and deployments by brigade groups. Bournemouth 29 Sept 43

The new S.P. guns and command tanks were beginning to arrive in increasing numbers. The gun was an American make, the 105 mm field gun firing a 35 lb H.E. shell, mounted on a modified tank chassis of the Sherman type. Through the winter it was a familiar sight to see the S.P.'s roaring along the crowded streets of Bournemouth on their way, perhaps, to another of the many waterborne exercises, or to the New Forest area; their seven men crews perched on top beside the gun and among the shell cases or web equipment, all dressed in black coveralls and wearing the new assault type steel helmets. The first large waterborne exercise from this city was "Pirate". This exercise was considered a pattern in miniature upon which all later assault exercises were fashioned. The run-in (as the approach of the landing craft to the beach is called) was made at Studland Bay with the guns on the craft opening fire within sight of the shore. The artillery regiments, including the 13th Field, were still only partially equipped with 105 mm guns and at the last minute the landing on the "Pirate" 17 Oct 43

beach was cancelled. From the army point of view, however, "Pirate" was important, for it decided the much debated point that "firing of artillery from craft is practical for carrying out an area shoot".

More exercises in the same type of training off Studland Bay followed, leading up to the more important "Vidi-Push". The purpose of this exercise was to carry out a complete practice landing of the assault group followed by the reserve brigade who were to go through when the beachhead was gained. The weather was stormy and wet with many men suffering from sea sickness. The regiment made the run-in, landed on the beach and after deploying inland fired on observed targets. The exercise lasted over a week in the most appalling climatic conditions, yet it proved the plan was correct and feasible.

Just before Christmas the regiment moved to Larkhill for seven miserably cold days of training. This time they had their full complement of 105 mm field guns and the men learned much in their use. On their return Lt-Col F. le P. T. CLIFFORD took over command of the regiment, which was back in Bournemouth in time for a happy Christmas with the very hospitable citizens.

It was not all work at Bournemouth. The unit was billeted in a residential section very near the centre of the city. There were many cinemas, theatres and concerts and many places to dance such as The Pavilion, St. Michaels Hall, Woodlands and the Centenary. Some of the more popular drinking spots were the Jolly Sailor, the Grange, and the Half Way House at Poole, the Branksome and Westbourne at Westbourne and the Silver Grill, Queens, Woodmans and Pembroke in Bournemouth.

After Christmas another water scheme "Cordage" began in what might be called the final stage of the assault training where all arms participated. Again, there were many difficulties which came to light and had to be corrected at a later date. Waterproofing of vehicles could have been better. The firing from the craft still lacked the desirable accuracy and dependability. Disembarking on the beaches was still too slow. Yet with each successive exercise the necessary perfection became more complete. After "Cordage" followed another cold week at the Larkhill ranges.

Then started the visits of the D.V.'s (distinguished visitors) called such because their movements were to be kept secret until the time of the actual visit. Major-General KELLER inspected the artillery personnel of the division on February 27, followed next by General MONTGOMERY who said "...We are going to see this thing through, you and I.... I have never seen so many gunners together at one time before. To see so many is good as it is the gunners who win the battles." 28 Feb 44

Another waterborne exercise very similar to the previous ones, called "Prank", was held in March. The following month the regiment left their happy surroundings and moved to the concentration area at Parkgate, Hampshire, where final preparations for the invasion were made. "Prank" 5 Mar 44
Parkgate 2 Apr 44

Exercise "Trousers" was carried out from Southampton and involved an assault landing on Slapton Sands on the South English Coast. Slapton Sands was chosen because, though known only to the senior officers at the time, the area resembled almost exactly the place where the real assault landing was to be made on the Continent. The contour of the shore line, the type of sand, the depth of the water, even the approach inland was the same as the men were to confront later. To make it even more realistic, German defences and traps were set up on the beach to conform to the defence system on that part of the beach on the Continent. One of the officers after D-Day remarked that the similarity between the two beaches "shook him." "Trousers" 2 Apr 44

This was followed later by exercise "Fabius" which was the last full scale exercise before the assault on the Continent. Just before the exercise His Majesty the King inspected the men. "Fabius" 25 Apr 43

All was in readiness for the fateful D-Day. The men were thoroughly trained, their physical condition and morale excellent. Two weeks before D-Day a wire fence was put around the camp area and the regiment was cut off from the world except for official business. Up to now only the Commanding Officer of the regiment, the Second-in-Command and the Battery Commanders had been briefed concerning the impending operation "Overlord", as the Allied attack in Western Europe was to be called. Five days before the antici-

pated D-Day the junior officers and men were given a general picture of the plan and two days before D-Day the officers were briefed in detail but using false names and false grid numbers, giving the suggestion that the landing was to take place farther north in the Calais area.


29 May 44 In the meantime some of the men had already had a taste of action. One night, three days before the scheduled embarkation, at a time when the lengthy preparations had just been completed, a lone German plane flew over the area and scored a direct hit with a heavy bomb on one of the self-propelled guns. The resultant explosions and fire set off the contents of the S.P.'s, including mines, small arms, ammunition, grenades, mortar bombs, and Piat bombs. The equipment was concentrated in the small space available with vehicles parked nose to tail fully loaded, ready to move off. The conflagration soon spread, setting off the deadly explosives in the adjacent vehicles. The men on hand acted quickly. The drivers entered the vehicles even though some were burning and drove them to safety through a wall of fire and exploding ammunition. There is no question that their actions saved over half of the regimental equipment and many lives. Under the direction of Major BAIRD, the men also fought the blaze and explosions with a fire hose working their way from vehicle to vehicle using one vehicle for protection and bringing to bear the stream of water on the next vehicle ahead. The fires were eventually brought under control after three hours of explosions so violent at times that large portions of the armoured equipment were thrown some distance away. A motorcycle was found blown a distance of 800 yards. Besides the equipment, many houses in the district were wrecked, yet no one was killed or seriously injured. The toll of the night consisted of two Sherman tanks, four S.P.'s, a jeep and three motorcycles, all destroyed beyond repair. For their gallant action during the night, Sgt BURKOSKY, BDRS DAVIS, FRANKLIN, MORICE and GNRs SHOEMAKER, WILSON and FORBES received Mention-in-Despatches.¹²

The vehicle casualties, all occurring in the 22nd Battery, were heaviest in Baker Troop. Able Troop was brought up

INTENSIVE TRAINING




INTENSIVE TRAINING — LARKHILL. The schemes at the firing ranges were always attended by the critical and unappreciated instructors of gunnery.



INTENSIVE TRAINING — BILLINGSHURST. Assault courses were used to keep the men in fighting trim.



COMBINED OPERATIONS — THEORY. The captain's cabin on board one of the landing craft where the "combined" part of the operations was most congenial.



COMBINED OPERATIONS — PRACTICE. It took some time before the assault practice landings were able to go according to plan.

to its complement of equipment immediately from the undamaged equipment in Baker Troop. That meant only one troop of the six out of action, yet it was a heartbreaking loss to the regiment, which expected to be fighting within a few days. But happily the planners of the invasion had prepared for such an eventuality and within 24 hours new equipment began to arrive. It was left to the men of Baker Troop to do the rest — the waterproofing, provisioning and testing of their new stores. Some said it could not be done in time, but the men showed them differently. Work that had previously taken 2 weeks took 2 days. Shortly after the loading of the vehicles onto the landing craft commenced at Gosport and Southampton on June 1, Baker Troop was ready for action along with the rest. The loading, done so many times before, was carried out smoothly and, as each LCT was filled, it moved out into the Solent and steamed to its allotted place in Southampton waters to await for the signal to cross the Channel. 1 Jun 44

The weather was bad and exercise "Neptune" (which was the name given to the naval phase of the assault) was postponed one day. Late in the afternoon of June 5, when it appeared that the exercise would be postponed another 24 hours, the fateful code word came through the air indicating that the Second Front was on. To the 12/13 Artillery Group went the order "up anchor" and "take stations". The control motor launch containing Major BAIRD sped in amongst the LCT's of the 13th Canadian Field Regiment giving a last wave and word of encouragement. Over the loud speakers from the launch came the strains of the artillery quick march "The Grenadiers". Moving in line down the Solent, still with its martial music playing, the launch led the regiment to whatever fate had in store. As the line of craft passed the destroyers of the Royal Navy, the sailors ran to saluting stations to honor the army which tomorrow would make history. 5 Jun 44

¹ At Sennybridge the calibration was done by fall of shot, airburst ranging and camera. In course shooting the regiment fired link shoots, area neutralization targets, destructive targets, smoke screens. The batteries carried out anti-tanks shoots and one of the troops fired an air OP shoot.

- ² Some changes in personnel:
 Major T. L. Souness posted to 1 Cdn Med Regt, RCA.
 Major W. R. Dunwell takes over as OC 22 Fd Bty, 27 Mar 42.
 Lieut J. Else posted to 6 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA, 7 Mar 42, later returned to 13 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA as Capt, wounded 6 Jun 44, returned later to 13 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA, served until Mar 45, posted to 6 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA, as Major, killed in action May 45.
- ³ Capt J. D. Southam posted to 7 LAA Regt, RCA.
 Capt H. Harrison and Capt R. W. Thompson both promoted and posted to other artillery regiments.
- ⁴ At Larkhill the regiment practiced fire and movement, advance and withdrawals supplying continuous support, along with usual course shooting and many lectures. During a smoke shoot one gun off line caused a shell to fall into the town of Lavington — no casualties.
- ⁵ Senior Officers 3 Jul 42
 Lt-Col J. W. G. Thompson, C.O.
 Major J. W. Dodds, 2i/c.
 Major W. R. Dunwell OC 22 Cdn Fd Bty.
 Major E. Pickering OC 44 Cdn Fd Bty.
 Major W. J. Tuchtie OC 78 Cdn Fd Bty.
- ⁶ Later Brigadier H. A. Sparling, DSO; CCRA 1 Cdn Corps.
- ⁷ At Bulth Wells the training included battery course shooting, battery fire and movement, tank shooting, Div artillery shoots involving Mike targets on Bty, Regt and Div grids and the Quick Barrage. The new Uncle target procedure was used.
- ⁸ Major G. F. Rainnie later killed on the beaches of Normandy, 6 Jun 44.
- ⁹ Major R. K. Mackenzie from 14 Fd Regt to be OC 78 Bty, 6 Nov 42.
 Major C. R. Ostrom from 14 Fd Regt to be OC 22 Bty, 8 Nov 42.
 Major Hogarth to be OC 44 Bty, 27 Mar 43.
 Major W. J. Tuchtie to 11 Army Fd Regt, RCA, 6 Nov 42.
 Major C. R. Dunwell to 14 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA, 8 Nov 42.
 Major J. W. Dodds to Junior Staff College, Kingston as Instructor, 29 Nov 42.
 Major E. Pickering to 12 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA, 27 Mar 43.
- ¹⁰ Later Brigadier W. S. Zeigler, CBE, DSO, ED; C.R.A 1 Cdn Inf Div.
- ¹¹ Later Lt-Col J. D. Baird
- ¹² Sgt Burkosky, J. (Later killed in action).
 Bdr Davis, A. S.
 Bdr Franklin, J. W.
 Bdr Morice, J. F.
 Gnr Shoemaker, L. E.
 Gnr Wilson, G.
 Gnr Forbes, L. I.

PART THREE

ACTIVE SERVICE

1. THE ASSAULT

On the afternoon of June 5 the great armada of large and small craft headed out into the open channel, guided on their course by an endless series of luminous floating markers.

When the code word had been received that day, giving the order to move, the ship's strong boxes (which up to now had been sealed) were opened and the maps and final instructions distributed.

The Allied assault opening operation "Overlord", the long awaited Second Front, was to be made on the coast of Normandy. The 3 Canadian Infantry Division was to land in the area of Courselles-sur-Mer. The 50 (Northumberland) Division would be on the right, the 3 British Division on the left, and the 6 Airborne Division to the left of them protecting the flank by holding or destroying the bridges on the River Orne. The object of the assault was to establish a bridgehead and hold it. The immediate objectives of the operation were elastic depending upon the resistance offered. The seizure of the bridges on the River Orne followed by a breakthrough to Falaise were hoped for. The cutting of the Bayeux-Caen road at Bretteville and the capture of Carpiquet airport were possible. If the opposition proved too heavy, they would have to be content with the capture and holding of the coastal town of Courselles-sur-Mer. Failing even in that, they were to hold the beach and the sand dunes to the last man and the last round until reinforcements arrived.

The men were told of the known enemy strength, the positions of their guns, the location of element "C" and other beach obstacles,¹ and the presence of minefields in the sea.

They were shown photographs of Courselles-Sur-Mer and adjacent areas and familiarised with the coastal roads, rivers and bridges. The briefing was all inclusive down to the most

minute detail. They were told that 50 pc casualties on the first day would be accepted, and that reinforcements were standing by ready to take their place on short notice. Provision was made to relieve 3 Canadian Infantry Division on D plus 4 if necessary at which time the 51 (Highland) Division would be ready to move in. ²

The Canadian assault was to be made by 7 and 8 Canadian Infantry Brigades (7 & 8 C.I.B.s) with 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade (9 C.I.B.) in reserve. The divisional artillery, consisting of the 12th, 13th, 14th Field Regiments plus the 19th Army Field Regiment, RCA were to support the leading brigades by firing onto the beach and land approaches, prior to the infantry landing, and then, to stand off the coast and await their turn to land, which would be after the reserve brigade had gone in. The 13th Canadian Field Regiment ³ was in immediate support to the 7 C.I.B. which was to land in the first wave, the Regina Rifles of Canada and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were to land first followed later by the Canadian Scottish Regiment. The 13th Field Regiment was to supply four Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) to work with the Reginas and two Forward Observation Officers to work with the Can Scots. The task allotted to the senior officers were as follows: Major BAIRD, fire control officer, was to control the artillery fire of the regiment during the run in; Major YOUNG, the unit deployment officer, was responsible for the deployment of the regiment's guns on shore; Major RAINNIE, the unit landing officer, was to land with the infantry and arrange for speedy disembarkation of the guns.


Lt-Col CLIFFORD was to be with the reserve Battalion Commander and Major MACKENZIE was to act as C.O.'s Rep with the Can Scots. In case of casualties, a successor had been appointed in each case to take over.

The assault force of the 13th Field consisted of 24 guns and personnel essential to the firing and control of the guns for a limited number of days. The remaining personnel, consisting of M.T. staff, clerks, tiffies, ammunition men, storemen and supply men along with vehicles and drivers, making up about 20 pc strength of the regiment, were to be brought over separa-



Reinforcements arriving on the Normandy beachhead — 6 Jun 44.

An LCT on the Normandy beach — 6 Jun 44.





Maintenance on the 105 mm S.P.

Opening cases of 105 mm ammunition in preparation
for a large fireplan on Carpiquet.



tely in groups known as "Thorneforce", and "Bennettforce", a special walking force under RQMS HARMSTON and other groups. These forces had already left the main body by 3 June 45.⁴ The morale of the gunners was terrific. They were tanned, healthy and as hard as nails. They had the air of confidence that could not be denied.

The long awaited day, June 6 found the LCT's in position off the Normandy coast, ready to make the run-in. The craft were formed up in double line, three craft forward and three back in a staggered formation. The 12th Field Regiment on our right was advancing toward the shore in the same formation. The boats tossed and turned in one of the roughest seas the men had ever experienced. The H/Capt H. L. CHAPPELL, the regimental padre, was on one of the LCT's. He conducted a short service and led in the singing of "Abide with Me". In the minds of many were the words of the Supreme Commander, "You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you". These men from the prairies were going into action for the first time. Behind them they had left many dear ones, 147 of the men had wives in Canada and in the last two years 51 others were married in England.

The dawn disclosed a cold gray day of poor visibility and low ceiling. H-Hour had been postponed 10 minutes because of the late arrival of some essential craft due to the heavy seas. The infantry LCA's could be seen leaving their mother ship and approaching the LCT's who were moving forward at a speed of 6 knots an hour. The officers and signallers on the bridge of the LCT's were busily setting their Vickers clocks through radio signals from the motor launch. Major BAIRD was looking hopefully for the airforce who were to lead off the bombardment but they were not to be seen. It was also difficult to tell if the secret D.D. tanks were on their way to the beach ahead of the infantry. And yet the first group of the Reginas were now passing through the artillery craft. It was almost time for the craft to open fire, but the range was still too great for the field guns. And, even so, the prearranged elevation was to be 9000 yards. The minutes seemed

"Neptune"
6 June 44

like hours. The tension was paralyzing. Then the guns from the right front craft opened up with a troop salvo. Major BAIRD, feeling that it was inadvisable to wait any longer had given the order to fire the first ranging rounds at 0705 hours (H-30) at an elevation of 11400 yards. The rounds were observed and line and elevation checked with the control craft of the other regiment. After the initial orders, each craft acted independently, taking their elevations from their Vickers clock, dropping the range 200 yards at a time as the craft approached the shore. At 11000 yards the guns of the regiment went into fire for effect. The line of the guns, once corrected, was held by the captain of the LCT, who steered his craft by compass toward the target. The elevation was set on the sights of the guns which were fired as the sight clinometer bubbles levelled themselves from the roll of the craft. The rate of fire was controlled and changed from time to time by the fire control officer.

The noise on board the craft was deafening as round after round was pumped onto the shore. Each shot was followed by a splash as the cartridge case was thrown overboard. Then, a new round was put in the chamber, a pause, then another shot. At an elevation of 5000 yards with the craft 2000 yards from shore, the order "empty guns" was given. Each craft then swung about and headed back out to sea with the awakening guns of the enemy on shore beginning to churn up the water nearby. The run-in was successfully completed and the guns had finished their work until they could be landed and fired from positions on the shore.

By now the Regina Rifles and Royal Winnipeg Rifles had reached the beach. With the Reginas as FOOs were Capt J. ELSE, Capt W. J. G. STEELE, Capt W. M. DIRKS and Capt A. F. WRENSHALL, each with their able and signaller forming a walking party.⁵ With the Canadian Scottish, as FOOs were Capt E. W. PICKEL and Capt J. DRAFFIN each with an able and signaller.

Capt DIRKS never reached the beach. The small assault boat in which he was riding struck a mine and overturned. It is believed Capt DIRKS met his death by drowning. L/Bdr

Ferguson, his signaller, swam ashore and later joined his battery, while the able in the party, Gnr MOODIE was picked up by the navy and later taken back to England.

Major G. F. RAINNIE and his party, landing on the beach with the first group of infantry, came to grief as their craft touched the shore. In the confusion no one knew whether the party had struck a mine or was hit by a heavy shell. The whole party including Cpl HAUKE, Gnr LEBEL and Gnr HIGGS were killed.

Capt ELSE was hit while crossing the beach at the same time as his able, Gnr ROBINSON, was mortally wounded by his side. Capt ELSE, in spite of his wound, continued to move forward with the Reginas, as they fought their way from house to house through the town of Courselles-sur-Mer. Later he was hit again, this time in the head, and had to be evacuated. His signaller, Gnr HOLTZMAN was now left alone yet he rose magnificently to the occasion. With his 18 set on his back he took over the duties of his officer and remained with the Reginas. Later in the morning the company to which he was attached came under fire of an enemy gun operating from a pillbox, which they were having difficulty silencing. Gnr HOLTZMAN called for fire from the guns of the regiment but they could not comply as they had not yet been deployed on land. Eventually he managed to contact the Centaur guns of the Royal Marines who were firing from positions on the beach. With these guns he successfully directed the fire on the gun emplacement and silenced the opposition enabling the infantry to carry on. For this action he was awarded the Military Medal.

In the meantime the LCT's containing the guns were standing by waiting their turn to land. Many enemy shells were falling around the craft. One of these caught Major J. D. YOUNG and his party as they were transferring from a motor launch to a landing craft. Major YOUNG and his signaller Gnr TAYLOR died soon after as a result of the explosion. Gnr WHITEHEAD was wounded. Shell fire also damaged the landing ramps of two of the craft causing one of them to partially fill with water to a depth of 18". The other craft was so impeded as to delay the landing later.

The remaining FOOs and parties landed successfully though many were pinned down on the beach for a short time by enemy machine gun fire. The same was true of the command post officers Lieut J. M. DOOHAN,⁶ Lieut J. T. R. BROWN-RIDGE,⁷ Lieut R. J. WALDIE,⁸ and the Survey Officer Lieut T. C. GREENLEES, who all landed in the first group. One of the first acts of Lieut WALDIE, after he stepped ashore, was to take charge of an infantry platoon whose officer had been killed and lead them across the exposed beach.


Later in the morning the Can Scots landed on the beach along with Capt E. W. PICKEL⁹ and Capt DRAFFIN and later, Lt-Col CLIFFORD with Lieut G. H. MILSOM and their party came ashore with the battalion headquarters.

The infantry had now cleared their strip of beach and were working inland. The 12th Field had landed first and found it necessary to deploy on the beach, thereby holding up further artillery landings at that spot until they moved on. In order to have some guns on the land ready to fire as soon as possible, Major BAIRD ordered the 44th Battery to proceed separately to an alternative landing area to the East of Courselles-sur-Mer. This was carried out and the guns landed at 1200 hours.

In the meantime the beach occupied by the 12th Field was in the process of being cleared, so the other two batteries of the 13th Field were kept in readiness to land there as soon as possible. At 1500 hours the remaining two batteries disembarked with the exception of Baker Troop which was held up by the damaged ramp on their craft. The vehicles of the other troops splashed through the narrow stretch of treacherously rough water, up onto the beach and then onto the road leading to the pre-arranged gun area, passing on their way the tragic hulks of vehicles of Byng force.¹⁰ Each S.P. dragged behind it a metal sled called a Porpoise containing infantry and artillery ammunition. The contents of the sled were thoroughly protected from moisture by waterproofing yet there was some fear of the ammunition exploding due to the amount of heat created by the metal rubbing along the cobblestone road. As it was the bottoms of some almost were worn through when the guns reached the first regimental position.



D-DAY. The gun group landing after the beach had been cleared.





No. 4 Gun of Easy Troop firing into Carpiquet — 28 Jun 44.

Side view of the same 105 mm S.P. firing from a gun position near Lasson — 28 Jun 44.





Troop command post at Bretteville l'Orgueilleuse.

Capt Thorne standing in front of a Sherman OP tank.



While leaving the beach, "GA" a command tank, carrying Lieut W. M. McNABB and crew hit a mine, causing only slight damage. This was repaired by a special crew under Bdr FRANKLIN, only to go a few hundred yards farther, when it was stopped again by a well placed shot from an anti-tank gun. The crew managed to escape unhurt.

At the concentration area called position "Mary" the CPO's met their respective troops and led them to the gun positions on either side of the road near Banville within sight of the coast. The guns from the 44th Battery were soon brought from their exposed position to the flank (which they took up after their early landing) and placed along with the others. Late in the day Baker Troop was able to land following the second tide and regained the regiment soon after. Because of the delay the troop had to run the gauntlet of the bombs dropping on the beach. In the meantime, the special force of RQMS HARMSTON had landed with the guns. The craft they were in struck a mine and foundered near shore in about five feet of water forcing the men to swim or wade ashore. At that time the German planes were very actively dive-bombing and strafing the beach where they landed. Nevertheless, the force safely reached position "Mary" and rejoined the regiment.

Lt-Col CLIFFORD spent the night at the Regina Rifles headquarters in the town of Reviere. The objective of cutting the Bayeux-Caen road was not accomplished but the troops were deployed in such a way that it could be effected the next day. Capt WRENSHALL and Lieut DOOHAN were both wounded that evening.

The first night on shore proved a sleepless night for most of the men. As dusk closed in and hid the German airforce from the Allied fighter planes, the beachhead became a nightmare with the German planes bombing and strafing everywhere. Yet, the first fierce crust of enemy resistance had been broken and there was little opposition that night from ground forces to the front. On the flanks the enemy was still holding some of the beach defences and, throughout the night, as the men were digging trenches or trying to sleep, the rattle of

machine guns and small arms fire was clearly audible from those sectors.

Casualties caused by mines and coastal guns — 6 officers and 8 OR's — were the 13th's sacrifice in this historic operation. All the guns of the regiment were in action. The men had acquitted themselves nobly.

¹ The men were not told of the presence of minefields on the beach.

² 51 (H) Division did come in on H plus 4 but relieved the 3 British Division which was having a more difficult time.

³ Officers in regiment on D-Day.

				<i>RHQ</i>		
Lt-Col	F. le P. T. Clifford	C.O.		Major	G. F. Rainnie	2i/c.
Capt	J. C. Dale	Adjt.		Capt	G. S. Griffith	M. O.
Capt	G. C. Langille	Q.M.		Capt	A. K. Poussette	T.A.
Capt	W. S. Warwick	P.M.		Lieut	T. C. Greenlees	R. S.O.
Lieut	G. H. Milsom	O.O.				
				<i>22nd Bty</i>		
Major	J. D. Baird	B.C.		Capt	J. Else	Tp Comd
Capt	W. J. G. Steele	Tp Comd		Capt	H. L. Thorne	Bty Capt
Lieut	J. A. Crutcher	A/CPO		Lieut	J. M. Doohan	GPO
Lieut	R. A. Fraser	Tp Ldr		Lieut	W. M. McNabb	GPO
Lieut	T. J. O'Brennan	GPO		Lieut	W. Simcock	Tp Ldr
				<i>44th Bty</i>		
Major	J. D. Young	B.C.		Capt	W. M. Dirks	Tp Comd
Capt	W. T. Wilson	Bty Capt		Capt	A. F. Wrenshall	Tp Comd
Lieut	F. L. Aylward	Tp Ldr		Lieut	P. P. F. Clay	A/CPO
Lieut	F. J. Davis	GPO		Lieut	R. F. Gibson	GPO
Lieut	F. O. Sexsmith	Tp Ldr		Lieut	R. J. Waldie	CPO
				<i>78th Bty</i>		
Major	R. K. MacKenzie	B.C.		Capt	J. W. Bennett	Bty Capt.
Capt	J. Draffin	Tp Comd		Capt	E. W. Pickel	Tp Comd.
Lieut	R. D. Baugh	A/CPO		Lieut	J. T. R. Brownridge	CPO.
Lieut	W. I. L. Brock	GPO		Lieut	W. L. Hogg	GPO.
Lieut	F. R. Holmes	Tp Ldr		Lieut	R. J. MacDonald	Tp Ldr.
				<i>Attached</i>		
H/Capt	H. L. Chappell	CCS		Lieut	S. G. Penoyer	RCCS.
Mr.	J. R. Ryan	Aux-Serv				

⁴ Total Vehicle strength of regiment when equipped with SP guns.

24 S.P.s	13 Sherman tanks	16 carriers.
43 motorcycles	24 15 cwt H/T	27 15 cwt GS.
8 5 cwt (jeep)	4 15 cwt water	3 8 cwt HUC.
1 60 cwt Medical	1 8 cwt HUP	25 60 cwt GS.
Dental Corps	1 60 cwt FFD.	
RCCS		
2 15 cwt H/T (wireless)	11 5 cwt (wireless).	
2 60 cwt GS	11 5 cwt GS.	
4 motorcycles	3 5 cwt (jeep).	
LAD		
1 wrecker	2 60 cwt.	
2 15 cwt	2 motorcycles.	
Vehicles which landed on D-Day.		
24 SPs	13 Sherman tanks.	
12 carriers	14 motorcycles.	
8 15 cwt	9 5 cwt (jeep).	

⁵ Walking parties with the Reginas.

Able Troop:

Capt J. Else, Gnr Robinson, J. F., Gnr Holtzman, J.

Baker Troop:

Capt W. J. G. Steele, Gnr Barton, E., Gnr Allen, J. N.

Charlie Troop:

Capt A. F. Wrenshall, Gnr Brown, R. W., Gnr Hamilton, W.

Dog Troop:

Capt W. M. Dirks, L/Bdr Ferguson, D. H., Gnr Moodie, W. J.

⁶ Later Capt J. M. Doohan with Air O.P.

⁷ Later Capt J. T. R. Brownridge with 23 Field (SP) Regiment, RCA. Taken prisoner in the Scheldt.

⁸ Later Capt R. J. Waldie.

⁹ Later killed in Air O.P. training in England.

¹⁰ A special force of armoured cars and light tanks made up from the Inns of Court Regiment.

2. THIRTEEN GUN POSITIONS

The day after the assault on the beach the infantry pressed forward against little opposition, crossing the Caen-Bayeux road and moving in the direction of Norrey-en-Bessin. The regiment moved at the end of the morning to a position east of Amblie, and in the afternoon moved again to an area near the town of Bray. Enemy resistance, which seemed to have disappeared completely, became noticeable again. The men on the gun position were being constantly annoyed by snipers, mortars, 88 mm airburst and occasional spent rounds of machine gun fire.

2
7 Jun 44
3
7 Jun 44

Amblie
Bray

In order to ascertain the strength and location of this opposition, a patrol was sent out consisting of men from the 12th and 13th Field Regiments¹ with two officers of the 12th Field in charge. The patrol went through Rots on the left flank as far as a large chateau on the other side, travelling in vehicles and stopping, from time to time, to obtain information from French civilians. The patrol was able to give the location of a number of enemy ack-ack batteries, which they observed firing from close quarters, and found that the chateau was occupied by the enemy. At that time the front was very fluid, consisting of a series of fortresses formed by each brigade with enemy annoyance on all sides. The regiment provided its own local defence with almost the entire regimental personnel standing-to at night. Local observation posts (OPs) were established on the left flank of the regimental area which was exposed to any infiltration coming down the long valley toward the sea.

The War Diary notes that the gun position was most satisfactory and defensively ideal, with a good killing ground forward. However, the 12th Field were deployed there.

Late in the evening BSM MACRAE.² arrived in the regimental area with half of "Bennettforce". He had an exciting story to tell. "Bennettforce" under command of Capt. J. W. BENNETT³ had arrived off the beach at Courselles-sur-Meer at noon on D-Day. The force was in a LST which held the equipment and personnel of 35 units besides that of the 13th

Field. Capt W. T. WILSON was in charge of the regiment's equipment. Rhino ferries were to have assisted in the landing, but, of the 10 ferries supplied, 8 had been put out of commission through enemy action. After two attempts to run up on shore and unload, the ship was forced to go in at high tide and wait until the tide had receded sufficiently to dry out the standings. They had a considerable amount of trouble unloading the ship, using a bulldozer and then a crane, and at all times being harassed by the German air force bombing and strafing the beach. BSM MACRAE then took charge of the first group of vehicles belonging to the regiment which had been off loaded and, after a harrowing trip in the dark, was able to find the regiment. The rest of "Bennettforce" unloaded the following morning and proceeded to their units.

BSM MACRAE was then put in charge of the hauling of ammunition for the regiment, a difficult task for, it must be remembered that at that time, and for the next few weeks, the bridgehead of 3 Canadian Infantry Division was narrow and deep, with the enemy stubbornly holding ground on either flank, right down to the beach. A few wrong turns, while travelling to the forward positions, would quickly take the unfortunate map reader into enemy territory.

The ammunition drivers did a tremendous job. The enormous expenditure of ammunition in those early days kept the trucks on the move day and night over the narrow dusty roads leading from the beach. ⁴

Bdr McDONALD, signal NCO of Fox Troop was killed by enemy infantry who had infiltrated behind our troops in the evening. He was returning from the OP in Putot-en-Bessin to lead his line crew forward and establish line communications.

Later came the warning that enemy armour was on our left flank, a foreboding of what was to come. At 0100 hrs the next morning "C" Company of the Reginas was attacked by enemy tanks and infantry and the guns of the regiment replied constantly the rest of the night with emergency defensive fire (DF—SOS) and defensive fire (DF) tasks. The shells provided a curtain of fire around the Regina's position. The morning light disclosed many enemy casualties.

8 Jun 44

The FOOs out with the infantry were Lieut R. J. MACDONALD with "D" Company, Lieut T. J. O'BRENNAN with "B" Company and Capt W. J. G. STEELE with "C" Company of the Reginas.

During the day of June 8 the counter attacks became a threat to the whole battalion, as the enemy constantly kept prodding the defences of the Reginas.

"Thorneforce" under command of Capt H. L. THORNE⁵ landed on the beach at 0700 hrs and reported to the regiment later in the day along with the remainder of "Bennettforce". It is interesting to note that "Thorneforce" embarked from England at Tilbury leaving the coast a day before the main force.

During the day the guns were constantly employed on the whole front, firing in an arc of 340 degrees down to the beaches on either flank, making it necessary for the troop command posts to use two artillery boards to plot the line and range.⁶ The guns fired many Mike (regimental) and Uncle (divisional) targets. Lieut T. J. O'BRENNAN brought fire to bear on a concentration of tanks in the Carpiquet area.

Gnr SCHAUER of the 78th Battery showed particular courage that day, while in the OP at Putot-en-Bessin as a signaller. The OP was established in a slit trench on an exposed flank of the company area with the tank parked about 50 yards to the rear under cover. At the time, the FOO and Able were manning the OP while Gnr SCHAUER with two other members of the crew were at the tank. The company position came under heavy mortar and artillery fire, during which time the enemy attacked and succeeded in infiltrating in and around the position. As the OP was in an exposed position, the enemy subjected it to heavy machine gun fire. Gnr SCHAUER saw the predicament and on his own initiative crawled out from underneath the tank, climbed up on the turret and with the help of Gnrs BRAHAM and TOY brought down direct fire with the 75 mm gun of the tank onto the enemy, succeeding in completely neutralizing the fire from this sector.

He then provided further covering fire for the OP officer, who was able to direct artillery fire on other enemy troops.

For this action Gnr SCHAUER was awarded the Croix-de-Guerre.

One of the line crews of the 78th Battery, while laying line with their carrier from the guns to the OP struck a mine destroying the carrier and wounding Bdr K. WILSON and L/Bdr ROBERTSON. The driver, Gnr VARCOE, was badly shaken up but uninjured.

At 1800 hrs the 33 Light Aid Detachment consisting of Capt DUNCAN⁷ and 38 men, landed on the beach and later came into position behind the regiment. That evening the attacks of the enemy became more vigorous and stronger. A force of enemy tanks broke through "D" Company of the Reginas causing enormous casualties to the stubborn Canadians who fought it out rather than pull back. Lieut MACDONALD and his Able, Gnr JEFFRY, were killed by machine gun fire as the tanks passed by. The signaller, Gnr GRANDY, missed detection and returned to the regiment three days later. The armoured thrust penetrated as far as Bretteville in strength and some tanks infiltrated as far as the gun position. "Prepare for tanks" was given and Sgt KENNEDY on No. 1 gun of Able Troop engaged a tank over open sights, but, in the darkness, it was difficult to know whether he had scored a hit. There was no sleep that night for anyone. Those who were not manning the artillery were deployed to the flanks with Piats, Bren guns and small arms. The Winnipegs had had two companies overrun while the Can Scots were fiercely trying to regain ground they had lost. Some thought that Hitler's promise of annihilating the beach-head was about to come true, that it was only a matter of time until the persistent attacks of the enemy would push them all back into the sea. Yet when dawn broke the artillery was still firing and the Reginas were still stubbornly fighting off the enemy. Two squadrons of tanks of 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade arrived at the gun area and spent the rest of the day pursuing stray enemy tanks which had not been knocked out. What remained of "D" Company was drawn back and Capt A. K. POUSSETTE and his party were sent up to take over the work of Lieut MACDONALD. Meanwhile Lieut O'BRENNAN was still having trouble with the tanks to his front. The communications were very difficult as the line was being continually

9 Jun 44

cut by track and wheeled vehicles and the radio frequencies were being jammed by German stations.

Signallers for the 44th Battery ran into trouble too when laying line by hand in the direction of Bretteville. They lost their way near the Carpiquet airport and drove into an enemy machine gun position. Gnr R. C. CASSLEMAN was killed and L/Sgt Fox was wounded.

In the afternoon "B" Company of the Reginas was cut off by enemy tanks for a short while, but well placed fire of the artillery, directed by Lieut O'BRENNAN temporarily relieved the situation. L/Bdr LEARMOUTH distinguished himself at the time by remaining at his radio set in Lieut O'BRENNAN's OP, though wounded in the foot, and continued to pass on fire orders, until relieved at the end of the day.

Gnr BARTON also distinguished himself that day while acting as observation post assistant to Capt W. J. G. STEELE. The FOO was away from his wireless equipped tank, establishing an OP in an area to the right flank of "C" Company when a determined enemy counter attack supported by armour threatened to overrun the company position. Gnr BARTON immediately acted as the FOO and called for fire over the radio set to the guns, and thus completely routing the enemy attack by resultant artillery fire. In order to observe this fire Gnr BARTON had to occupy a portion of high ground exposed to heavy mortar and direct small arms fire. For this and subsequent acts of initiative and courage, Gnr BARTON was awarded the Croix-de-Guerre.

While these fire orders were being given the remote control cable to the set was cut by shell fire. Gnr B. J. BOHN, the signaller, ran the gauntlet of enemy machine gun fire to reach the radio set and send the fire orders given by Gnr BARTON.

Enemy shelling of the gun area continued. One airburst shell went off beside the 22nd Battery command post killing Gnr MOWBRAY, Gnr ROY, Gnr HUNTER and wounding Lieut CRUTCHER,⁸ L/Sgt WALDREN and Gnr WILLWAY. In those early days the well dug in command post with a strong roof was yet to be popular.

Sgt DRUMMAN of the L.A.D. was wounded the same day

by a shell fragment and Gnr REID, was shot by an enemy sniper. Dog Troop took four enemy prisoners in their area.

That day the regiment, with the exception of RHQ, moved back a short distance to alternative positions to escape the shelling from hostile batteries.

4
Sequeville-
en-Bessin
9 Jun 44

In the evening L/Sgt R. G. SEBASTIAN⁹ (NCO Sigs) of the 22nd Battery drove into an enemy machine gun nest while on his way from the gun position to his OP. Though thrown from his motorcycle and wounded he stalked the machine gun position, working his way forward until he was near enough to throw a grenade into the group. After the hand grenade was thrown and he was assured there would be no further trouble from the gun, he continued on foot to the OP.

Capt STEELE, who had previously been relieved by Lieut GIBSON at "C" Company, set out in a tank to relieve Lieut O'BRENNAN at "B" Company, but was intercepted by enemy tanks which were firing into "B" Company's area. The turret of Capt STEELE's tank was hit by a shell and he was forced to return to the gun position.

The night was another busy one at the gun position and forward infantry positions.¹⁰ Enemy tanks and infantry continued their pressure on the Regina front. The fighting was at close quarters, particularly in "D" Company where hand grenades were thrown from the OP into the enemy positions.

In the morning Lieut R. J. WALDIE and his party relieved Lieut GIBSON. Enemy shelling continued, killing Gnr FREDERICKSON and wounding Lieut SEXSMITH, Gnr COOKSON, Sgt MCFARLANE and Gnr TURNER. Gnr MALONEK was wounded the same day at the OP.

10 Jun 44

Lieut O'BRENNAN had his busiest time that day when "B" Company was again surrounded by tanks. At the time, he was about 200 yards in front of the leading infantry group and was forced to bring down a regimental concentration of artillery fire upon his own position. Our guns were firing steadily all day.¹¹

The guns moved back again to alternative positions to escape the full weight of the enemy's shells.

5
Camilly
10 Jun 44

By evening the enemy's offensive thrusts seemed to be

subsiding. Capt PICKEL and Capt DRAFFIN at the Can Scots were relieved by Lieut BROCK and Lieut BROWNRIDGE. Another tank was sent forward to them that day, but, on its way to the OP, it struck a mine and subsequently caught on fire.

11 Jun 44 On the morning of June 11 Capt STEELE relieved Lieut O'BRENNAN at this OP allowing the latter to get his first sleep in many days. The day was quiet at the gun position with only a few targets being engaged. The enemy artillery was now concentrating its fire more on the forward infantry and, as a result, Lieut WALDIE, and Gnr HAMILTON were wounded at the OPs.

Major BAIRD, now the Second-in-Command, relieved Lt-Col Clifford at battalion headquarters for a few days.

12 Jun 44 The Canadians now took the offensive in an attempt to gain more advantageous defensive positions. A two column armoured thrust, towards Granville-sur-Odon was planned using the 1st Hussars and the Fort Garry Horse along with "D" Company of the Queens Own Rifles of Canada (Queens Own) who were to ride on tanks. Capt THORNE, Capt POUSSETTE and Capt BENNETT were to be with the Fort Garry Horse. FOOs of the 12th Field were with the 1st Hussars. The first column of the Hussars started off but was soon chewed up by anti-tank guns and automatic weapons half way to their objective. The second column never started. Because of the confused situation, the guns of the regiment did very little firing. No fire plan was laid on ahead of time, which possibly accounted for the unfortunate results. In the afternoon Capt STEELE and his party came under heavy shellfire from 88 mm guns wounding the OP signaller Gnr BOHN.

The gun positions continued to be under enemy shellfire, though by now the men knew better how to cope with it by digging deep narrow slit trenches and deep command posts with solid roofs. The morale of the men was particularly good. A very difficult period had been passed and everyone had time to get some well earned rest.

15 Jun 44 The gun position was quiet the next few days but the FOOs experienced much harassing fire from enemy artillery and mortars.

L/Bdr FERGUSON and Gnr MORGAN were wounded at the OP by a Moaning Minnie bomb, and the following day Lieut AYLWARD was wounded by a piece of shrapnel penetrating through his steel helmet. 16 Jun 44

On June 17, Lieut O'BRENNAN, Bdr CALDER and Gnr BARTON were out on a fighting patrol of the Reginas. The patrol encountered overwhelming opposition and was forced to retire. Bdr CALDER had his 18 set shot off his back by machine gun fire. That evening the guns moved to a new area near Bretteville l'Orgueilleuse. The first target fired was 1080 yards away. The position was carefully prepared and well dug in. As a result, in spite of the heavy shelling, the casualties were light. 17 Jun 44 6 Bretteville l'Orgueilleuse 17 Jun 44

On June 21 the Paymaster, Capt W. S. WARWICK landed and joined the regiment with his party made up of "B" Echelon. They not only had a rough crossing, but their boat was forced to stand offshore for two days before being able to land. 21 Jun 44

On June 23 Bdr THORBURN was killed and Gnrs HANNAY and STEPHENS wounded while they were repairing the OP line. The latter two had just arrived half an hour previous as reinforcements. 23 Jun 44

On one occasion when a company of the Reginas was moving back for a rest, passing the guns of the 44th Battery, a weary sergeant stepped out of the ranks, climbed up on the front of the nearest S.P. and kissed the barrel of the gun saying "Baby, if it was not for you I wouldn't be living now."

Although the batteries had been moving from one alternative position to another in the last short while, it had not been found necessary to move RHQ. Thus, as the batteries had fallen back, RHQ was left in a forward position to the left flank which was exposed to the enemy. As a protective measure, a local OP had been sent out to a position about 200 yards away from the enemy located in the woods. Half way to the OP a machine gun post was set up and manned every night. Nearby, was another OP which was controlling and observing the fire from the guns of the battleship HMS Rodney on the town of Carpiquet.

25 Jun 44 On the morning of the 25th the guns fired two barrages to support the advance of 15 (Scottish) Division followed by heavy firing in the evening to repel a counter-attack.

The expenditure of 150 rounds per gun that day seemed exceptional but next day the record was more than doubled.

The attack this time was on the Canadian front. It marked the end of the holding role and the beginning of the offensive. One of the Germans taken prisoner that day remarked that he did not like the shelling as it did not give them a chance. Bdr WILEY was hit by shellfire and died a few days later in hospital.

At the conclusion of the battle which ended in the Scots attaining all objectives, although suffering heavy casualties, a hair-raising order came over the air. Brigadier TODD personally, calling all stations, gave Carpiquet map reference, "Fire by order, one hundred rounds gunfire" Ninety-six, Canadian guns in 20 minutes reported "Shot". In that short time 144 tons of high explosive was directed to a target in preparation for the assault by 8 C.I.B. on Carpiquet itself.

7
27 Jun 44 Lasson After engaging many targets in the Carpiquet area, the regiment moved to an area near Lasson. The move was designed to get in position so as to be able to support an attack by 9 C.I.B.

Gnr HADLEY was wounded by shellfire while laying line to the 44th Battery OP.

The day, following the move, was busily occupied in the necessary digging as a protection against enemy shelling.

28 Jun 44 Capt POUSSETTE took over as adjutant and Major J. C. DALE became Battery Commander of the 44th Battery. During the lull in fighting, as reserves, reinforcements and equipment were being built up for the coming offensive, the battery commanders conducted course shooting for instruction of the junior officers using operational OPs.

The anticipated attack by 9 C.I.B. was cancelled and 8 C.I.B. was assigned the task. The object of the operation, called "Windsor," was to capture Carpiquet village and airport. The general artillery plan involving 428 guns was as follows:

- (I) A barrage to be fired on a 1750 yard front.
- (II) Concentrations to be fired on known enemy gun positions.
- (III) A protective screen to be laid down on capture of objective.
- (IV) A medium regiment to be allotted for the protection of each flank.
- (V) D.F. tasks laid on to meet the probable counter-attack during the reorganization period.

The 13th Field Regiment was to participate in three of the phases.

The barrage opening operation "Windsor", commenced at 0500 hours, and by 0740 hours the first enemy counter-attack "Windsor" was launched and repulsed due largely to artillery DF fire. 4 Jul 44
During the day and the following night the guns were continually engaging targets. By the following morning, Carpiquet had been captured but constant artillery support was needed 5 Jul 44 to harass the enemy's frantic counter-attacks.

Capt CRAIG and Capt PICKEL at their OPs were almost over-run by tanks and infantry. Before the attack began Bdr BAILEY was seriously wounded by a mortar bomb and died the next day. His companion, Gnr TOY, tended to his wounds, tried to make him more comfortable, and at the same time kept open the vital radio communications to the guns, without regard to the presence of the enemy, who had almost surrounded his position. Enemy shelling was very heavy. For this act Gnr TOY received Mention-in-Despatches. At the end of the day Major THORNE and Capts MACNABB, DRAFFIN and THOMPSON relieved Major MACKENZIE and Capts CRAIG, PICKEL and BAUGH at the OP.

The guns were very busy on July 6, with an even more hectic pace of 330 rds per gun the following day, preparatory to 6 Jul 44 Operation "Charnwood". This operation was designed to clean out the enemy around Caen up to the River Orne. The 8 C.I.B. had only a minor role this time, being that of mopping up the area of Carpiquet airport, and, at the same time, preparing to exploit to Bretteville-sur-Odon if required. The 13th Field Regiment was to give artillery support with a fire plan, follo-

wed as in "Windsor" by concentrations and DF tasks on call. The evening before the operation opened, the air force gave Caen a terrific pasting.

"Charnwood"
8 Jul 44 At this time the tremendous concentration of 704 artillery guns opened up at 0420 hours in the morning of July 8, with the barrage commencing after dawn. The 13th Field Regiment did not complete their part of the fire plan until 1630 hours in the afternoon. Following the attack of 9 C.I.B. and 9 British Infantry Brigade from the north, the enemy retreated in panic and disorder toward St Germaine having been outflanked and outfought. At this time two FOOs of the regiment, giving accurate information and control, through RHQ command, arranged and brought down several Victor targets and guided onto their objective a squadron of Typhoons. The damage to the enemy was colossal. While waiting for the Victor target the regiment fired continuously to hold the enemy in the army target area. The elapsed time from the first call to the Brigadier for the Victor target was 17 minutes. The scale was 10.

The recce party had already gone forward into the Gruchy area, where there had been heavy fighting, and recce'd the new gun position, with the distraction of snipers, mines, booby traps and the smell of rotting human and animal flesh.

By the evening the enemy had been driven far back. Capt PICKEL observed a large group of Germans retreating and brought a battery target down on them with heartening results.

8 The evening of the following day the guns moved to the
Gruchy new area amid the stench of the battlefield overlooking Caen
9 Jul 44 and the area beyond. But the enemy were moving back quickly,
9 and the next day saw another move to an equally desolate
Carpiquet position near Carpiquet. Enemy shelling here was very heavy.
10 Jul 44 Gnr COLLIER was killed while digging a slit trench and Gnr BROWN was wounded by the same shell. The Reginas were now fighting in the streets of Caen.

It was during this time that the line crews had one of their most difficult assignments. An eight mile line of communications was laid by the 22nd Battery through Carpiquet airport over very exposed ground. For a week the men under

L/Sgt KANE labored over the line, mending it when torn by shell fire or ripped out by careless vehicles. During that week it was impossible to keep the line in working order longer than 15 minutes at a time. Sgt ROBERTS, H.E.R., 22nd Battery NCO Sigs, and Sgt VAN AGGELEN, C.H., 78th Battery NCO Sigs were both awarded the Military Medal (Periodic) for their exemplary work in keeping open communications during these difficult days.

Gnr BAIRD of 44th Battery was wounded while mending a stretch of line in the same area. The same day at the OP the 44th Battery lost Gnr HENDERSON and Gnr MALONEK through wounding by shellfire.

The 2 Canadian Infantry Division were coming through the rear areas all day of the 11th, raising a continuous trail of dust. The men thought that they were to be relieved for a rest, but soon learned that the new arrivals were to fill in on the right and take over some of the commitments of 51 (H) Division. Shelling was heavy all day and the German airforce became particularly bold during the afternoon. Five enemy planes were shot down over the area by Third Division artillery. The .50 inch machine guns mounted on the S.P.s were also used with very stimulating effect on the morale of the gunners. Our 4 LAA Troop had the happiest day of their life. 11 Jul 44

The next day the guns moved to a position near Cussy. The regiment was now given a rest from firing so that they could clean up and catch up on sleep. 10 Cussy
12 Jul 44

The 44th Battery was situated on an exposed hill and caught the worst of the shelling. An 88 mm gun ranging on the battery treated it with plenty of airburst, wounding Gnr BROOKS, Gnr DESGAGNE and Bdr IRELAND. The battery was not long moving off "suicide hill", as the men called it, and taking up a prepared alternative position one mile to the rear. When the battery ammunition vehicles returned that evening, to pick up some of the ammunition left behind, the gun opened up again, scoring a direct hit on one vehicle and setting another on fire. Gnr MACCLELLAN was killed while Gnrs HALL and WILSCAM were wounded. The same day Gnr ISBISTER was wounded at RHQ which was situated just below the fatal 14 Jul 44

hill. This was one of the busiest days at the Regimental Aid Post. The constant shelling made medical care difficult as Capt GRIFFITHS, the M.O., Bdr DAVIS, and Gnr TAYLOR handled the casualties. The same day the 14th Field had many casualties.

Shelling was also bad the next day, so, in an attempt to alleviate the situation, permission was given to Fox Troop to take up a sniping position at night and fire on observed targets. Capt THOMPSON successfully directed the fire by standing on the back of one of the S.P.s, and aiming the gun at the flashes of enemy artillery in the distance.

11
Lebisey
16 Jul 44 On the 16th, the regiment moved to a place near Lebisey where the shelling eased up considerably because the position was not so exposed. On the 17th of the month, Gnr OWEN was wounded when an enemy shell knocked down a wall behind which he had sought protection. That day, too, was the first NAAFI day for the regiment in action; a happy day, which usually came once a month, brought chocolate, soap, toothpaste, one handkerchief and (how can one forget) whiskey, gin and beer.

Preparations were now underway for operation "Atlantic". This operation was designed to clear the Caen area east and south of the River Orne, and, at the same time, to draw enemy formations from the First U.S. Army front so as to clear the way for an attempted breakthrough in that sector. The 3 Canadian Infantry Division was to attack and mop up the area south and south-west of the Odon from Fauberge de Vaucelles to Columbelles. The attack was to be made by the 8 C.I.B., followed by 9 C.I.B. The artillery support was to consist of the three field artillery regiments of the division supplemented by 19 Canadian Field (S.P.) Regiment, RCA, two medium artillery regiments, and 2 Canadian AGRA.

The general fire plan was as follows;

- (I) Artillery concentrations on known enemy strong points.
- (II) Barrage to cover advance of Regiment de la Chaudiere and Queens Own Rifles of Canada against certain objectives.
- (III) A series of DF tasks to form a protective screen, beyond the objectives when captured.




Enemy 'Movement'

ENEMY MOVEMENT. In the early days in Normandy large concentrations of fire were brought down on any sign of enemy movement.




"F" SECTION SIGNALS, RCCS.

These are only a few of the men who served with the regiment.



REORGANIZATION. The men did not welcome the change-over from the 105 mm (S.P.) to the 25 pdr towed gun.



The 13th Field Regiment was to take part in all the phases. The concentrations were fired early in the morning, and at 0745 hours the barrage opened up, lasting 90 minutes. The spirits of the men were high, and everyone hoped that, once Caen had been taken the fighting would be easier. "Atlantic" 18 Jul 44

When the offensive opened, the enemy replied with one of the heaviest shellings yet experienced. It was during these shellings that Gnr BEAUDOIN was wounded.

Major J. C. DALE was wounded the same day when he climbed a wall to observe the enemy positions. Capt DRAFFIN and Capt THOMPSON were with him at the time.

During "Atlantic", marvellous coordination was achieved between the Queens Own, the artillery of the regiment ¹² and five tanks of 2nd Armoured Brigade. Two 88's opening up on the tanks at close range were quickly silenced by well placed troop targets fired by Lieut SIMCOCK and Capt McNABB from exposed positions which had to be defended by their crews with Bren guns and rifles. The same day artillery fire caught and practically annihilated a company of enemy infantry crossing open ground.

As our infantry pushed across the Orne and secured the land on the other side, the now familiar order "prepare to move" came down, and reconnaissance (recce) parties went out, followed in the evening by the guns. This time, the gun position was in the outskirts of battered Caen, with some batteries located in a cherry orchard. Gnr HALLIDAY of the 22nd Battery line crew was wounded when a bomb landed near his carrier as he was laying line. The line crews again had a very difficult time here, laying and maintaining line under shelling and bombing through Caen and over the Orne ¹². 12
Caen
19 Jul 44

The guns were in the Caen position only overnight, moving across the river at dawn to take up a position in the open plain, away from obvious military objectives. This gun position was peculiar for the fact that, though exposed to direct observation by the enemy from the high ground to the right of the regiment, it experienced only moderate shelling. The explanation of this must be that the targets 13
Vaucelles
20 Jul 44

were now so numerous for the enemy, that they could not shoot at everything. Most of the hostile battery fire was falling in a crossroads to the left front of the guns, named by the soldiers "Hellfire Corner".

24 Jul 44 Fox Troop had some trouble on July 24 when an enemy bomber dropped phosphorous bombs beside one of the guns. No casualties or damage resulted. The burning phosphorous was controlled by covering it with earth.

25 Jul 44 The next day enemy bombers returned, this time dropping many heavy bombs among "A" Echelon vehicles situated in Caen itself. The water truck and kitchen trailer of the 78th Battery received direct hits, and three partially loaded ammunition vehicles were hit and set on fire.

This day marks the beginning of the offensive down the Falaise Road. The operation was called "Spring" though, now it is better known as "The Abortive Offensive" because it was a costly failure. The object was the creation by the infantry of a gap through which the armour was to "break" and seize the high ground south of Caen. The Infantry phase of the attack was to be carried out by 2 Canadian Infantry Division and 3 Canadian Infantry Division. The artillery programme was not great. Harassing fire had been kept up for a number of days, against enemy guns, mortar and other defensive positions, on a plan whereby the targets farthest away would be engaged first, gradually moving closer until the fire was falling on May-sur-Orne, Verriers and Tilly. At "Spring" 0300 hours in the morning the regiment opened up with a 25 Jul 44 barrage. The infantry moved forward soon after, under artificial moonlight supplied by searchlight batteries.

The searchlights were unsuccessful as, at that time, their use in such a role was not properly applied. Cloud conditions were adverse and our own troops were silhouetted.

The first objective of Tilly was captured, but the advance was stopped there, and was only held with heavy casualties to the Canadians. The artillery now became very busy once again, firing Uncle targets and other types of concentrations so as to ease the blows upon the infantry. The guns continued their heavy firing for the next five days. Here a

new type of harassing fire was developed and used by our Brigadier.

The area to be harassed was divided off as on a barrage trace with lines denoting lifts and other lines marking off the unit areas. Using such as a trace, a task table of each unit, was made out directing the guns to fire on certain lines at odd intervals. This resulted in a very large area systematically denied the enemy with the least fatigue and expenditure of ammunition by the artillery.

A shell from an 88 mm gun hit Sgt EVANS' gun in Charlie Troop and wounded L/Bdr WAGNER, Cnr GAMELIN and Gnr HAYES. Sgt FOX, also of the 44th Battery, was wounded when an anti-personnel bomb came through the roof of the command post. Gnr JONES of the 78th Battery was also wounded at this position. The L.A.D. suffered two casualties about the same time — Cfn ESSEN was killed and Cfn HUMPHRIES wounded. On July 28th one of the S.P.s of Dog Troop was hit by an anti-personnel bomb wounding Gnr MUNKHOLM. The S.P. caught fire and blew up.

July 30 the regiment was withdrawn to Thaon, preparatory to proceeding to the reorganization area at Bayeux. The Canadian Field (S.P.) Regiment, RCA of 4 Canadian Armoured Division took over commitments of the regiment.

Bdr PORTER¹³ wrote in the 78th Battery War Diary about the first night behind the lines:

"It is hard to realize there is a war on back here. When we pulled in around midnight, the sky was clear with a half moon and it was warm and quiet. You couldn't hear a gun. This was strange to us who, for 55 days, had heard the continuous firing of hundreds of them. All that told us that the fighting was going on, was the continual flash of guns on the horizon. Otherwise, it is quiet and peaceful beyond the hopes and imaginations of all of us. But I don't have to add that it is welcomed. Everyone slept out on the flat ground, while hardly anyone even bothered last night to dig a hole to jump into. Ah sweet life. But I suppose it won't last long."

The regiment had occupied thirteen gun positions through-

hout the fifty-five days of intense fighting. The heavy casualties had severely taxed the fighting efficiency of the unit,¹⁴ yet, at no time were they unable to put down effective artillery fire when required. The need for self-propelled guns in the present type of fighting as part of an infantry division had passed. The division had been drawn out of the battle and the regiment now proceeded to change over to the 25 pdr towed gun.

¹ Members of the regiment on this patrol.

RQMS Harmston.

Sgt Jones.

S/Sgt Ladwig.

Bdr Brown.

L/Bdr Dear, and others.

² Later RSM MacRae.

³ Later Major J. W. Bennett after posting to 12 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA.

⁴ Some of the ammunition personnel:

Bdr Foreman J. A., Gnr Brown W., Gnr Stewart W. E., Gnr Malott O. E., Gnr Stairs O. S., Bdr MacDougald T. L., Gnr Cross B. W., Gnr Hall R. G., Gnr Nattrass S. D., Gnr Patterson, Bdr Cartwright R., Gnr Steele A. L., Gnr MacLean A. A., Gnr Blair J. I., Gnr Andrews L., Gnr Debruyne J. G.

⁵ Later Major H. L. Thorne, MC.

⁶ Later large switches were so common that it became a practice to use one artillery board with two plots for the pivot gun and two sets of grid numbering.

⁷ Later Capt W. T. E. Duncan, OBE.

⁸ Later Capt J. A. Crutcher.

⁹ Later Sgt Sebastian, R.G.

¹⁰ At this time the regiment had 14 officers detailed as FOO's or Reps in the following capacities.

With 8 C.I.B. — 2 C.O.'s Reps, 1 CRA's Rep.

With 7 C.I.B. — 6 FOO's, 1 CRA's Rep.

With 9 C.I.B. — 2 C.O.'s Reps.

With Centaur Tanks 1 FOO.

With 2 Armoured Bde. 1 FOO.

¹¹ The FOO's with the infantry were now: —

In the 22nd Battery: Lieut W. M. McNabb (later Capt W. M. McNabb, MC) Lieut R. D. Baugh (Later Capt R. D. Baugh, MC) Lieut O'Brennan with Lieut Simcock relieving them;

44th Battery: Lieut Gibson and Lieut Aylward with Lieut F. J. Davis (now Capt Davis) relieving them occasionally.

78th Battery: Capt W. E. Pickel and Capt Draffin.

¹² Men of "F" Sec RCCS who did outstanding work around Caen; L/Cpl McNeill, C.H., Sgmn Sherstone, J. W. C., Sgmn Vandergrift, L.

¹³ Now Sgt Porter, A.L.

¹⁴ *Strength Increase*

Capt	R. H.	Craig	17 Jun
Capt.	J.	Greenblatt (RCAMC)	19 Jul
Capt	V. A.	Thompson	8 Jul
Lieut	W. J.	Brennan	18 Jul
Lieut	J.	Carswell	31 Jul
Lieut	W. J.	Crocker	17 Jun
Lieut	W. D.	Cook	17 Jun
Lieut	N. M.	Cheater	17 Jun
Lieut	D. W.	Falconer	16 Jun
Lieut	J. P.	Grenier	10 Jun
Lieut	C. E.	Lavallee	10 Jun
Lieut	G. C.	MacLean	17 Jun
Lieut	J. R.	Milani	8 Jul
Lieut	R. D. P. E.	Poirier	16 Jun
Lieut	J. E.	Powell	17 Jun
Lieut	J. K.	Roche	17 Jun
Lieut	R.	Rierson	17 Jun

3. THE FALAISE ROAD

The reorganization and re-equipment centre situated between Ryes and Bayeux was a busy place in the next week. 1 Aug 45 The 105 mm S.P. guns, command tanks and other equipment necessary to run an S.P. regiment were turned in.¹ These were replaced by 25 pdr towed field guns, which the regiment had used in the early training days in England. Additional ancillary equipment such as Field Artillery Tractors (FAT) to draw the guns and ammunition trailers, and 15 cwt HUFFW ("gin palace") as command vehicles,² were also obtained. The men were sorry to see the S.P.s go. The American gun had given an excellent performance. When the regiment first took over the gun, much difficulty was experienced in getting used to the American type dial sight and in overcoming the maintenance problems on the tank suspension and the Wright Whirlwind airplane engines. But all these difficulties were mastered.³

Now, even though the 25 pdr ammunition was easier to handle, and even though it would no longer be necessary to start up the engine in order to effect a large slew of the gun, everybody was sorry to see their friend of those difficult days taken from them.

There was plenty to do in this area. Somebody started the rumor that this period was to be a rest, but they soon found out differently. A short period of training with the new equipment was necessary. Radio equipment had to be tuned up and vehicles thoroughly overhauled. Then there were the endless parades including bath parade, dental parade, pay parade, and clothing parade. The complete change took 4 days.

As soon as the S.P.s were turned in, the Royal Ordnance Corps converted them into troop carrying vehicles by removing the field pieces. These Kangaroos as they were called, were to be used in the coming operation "Totalize" to transport infantry of the 51 (H) Division, the original drivers of the regiment staying with the vehicles a short while.

On August 8, after stopping a day at Thaon, the regiment

went back into action at a position on the Caen-Falaise road near Hubert-Folie, and then in the evening moved again down the road to a position around the Roquancourt railway station. Operation "Totalize" (the Nightmare Offensive) was already underway. This operation was effected at the time the U.S. forces had cleared the eastern seaboard of Normandy and were pouring into Brittany, where enemy opposition appeared to be light. The intention of the operation was to break through the enemy positions astride the Caen-Falaise road. The first phase of the attack, starting on the night of August 7, was to be proceeded by the airforce giving close bombing support, and by the artillery putting down a heavy barrage fifteen minutes before zero hour. After that 2 Canadian Infantry Division and 51 (H) Division were to move forward. The second phase was to be that of exploiting to Falaise by 4 Canadian Armoured Division and 1 Polish Armoured Division. The third phase involved 3 Canadian Infantry Division, which was to go through to Hautmesnil and Bretteville le Rabet. "Totalize"

Roquancourt
8 Aug 44

The regiment arrived too late to take any part in the initial phase of the operation but the drivers of the old S.P.s saw plenty of action with 51 (H) Division.

These drivers saw their first action in their new role on the night of August 7. Gnr SYREN was one of the drivers⁴ that night. He moved off under the cover of darkness at 2330 hours, his Kangaroo loaded with infantry. The troop carriers travelled nose to tail at a walking pace in a series of long columns with tanks and flails in front. No one was on foot. When the column met heavy enemy resistance they would fan out and fire at it with all the fire power they had available. Then, when the resistance had been crushed, the column would reform and move on.

On one occasion, when Syren's vehicle had fanned out to a flank and came to a halt, the unhappy group found themselves beside an enemy post which was ineffectively engaging them with machine gun fire, the bullets merely bouncing off the armour plate. Hand grenades were thrown. One grenade landed against the front of the Kangaroo causing a severe

blast through the driver's window, and another grenade, lit inside the cockpit, injuring one of the men who picked it up and tried to throw it back. The enemy post was eventually disposed of by some of the infantry jumping out of the vehicle and rushing at it. The vehicle casualties, through mines and artillery fired at point blank range, were heavy but the terrific weight of armour, moving relentlessly forward, succeeded in penetrating the enemy defences to a depth of about 4000 yards. The objective reached, the infantry descended from the Kangaroo and proceeded to dig in and consolidate. The hapless driver was left to return to his lines alone, back through the minefields and past the many pockets of enemy resistance still left behind, guided on his return journey by two search-light beams. Gnr SYREN made many return trips in the next few days carrying supplies and reinforcements. Later he was in two other attacks with the Kangaroo. Once, when he took the Chauds in on a daylight offensive a few days later under cover of a smoke screen, and again when he transported the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in a night attack on high ground north-east of Falaise.

8 Aug 44 Back at the regiment on August 8, Gnr DANN was wounded by a bomb fragment from one of our own bombs which fell short of the target.

Hautmesnil 9 Aug 44 Operation "Totalize" was proceeding satisfactorily and the regiment was able to move the next day to an area near Hautmesnil. A position near Bretteville-le-Rabet had been recce'd but shelling was too heavy and it was found necessary to place the guns farther back on an exposed hill. Lieut MILANI, ⁵ the CPO 22nd Battery, did particularly good work while in the recce party that day. For this action, and for subsequent acts of initiative, resourcefulness and courage in the endless number of recces across France, Lieut MILANI was awarded the Croix-de-Guerre. Soon the medium artillery drew into positions behind and started to attract enemy attention with their sharp bark and noticeable muzzle flash. The enemy's counter battery policy at this stage seemed to be to leave the field guns alone and give their attention to heavier guns.

Sgt SMITH was wounded when a shell landed in one of the




RATION SUPPLEMENT. "Enemy shelling" was often turned to advantage.



NW-EUROPE CAMPAIGN

D-Day - VE-Day

Reptl Route
in Red



'Crash Action'



CRASH ACTION. Sometimes this did not work as smoothly as intended.

44th Battery's gun spits. Gnr CURLISS, signaller with Capt BAUGH was killed the same day at the OP. 10 Aug 44

The shelling kept up for a number of days. On August 11 the regiment received eight reinforcements. Just as they stepped off the truck, a shell hit a tree nearby, wounding Gnr CALDER and Gnr LANTZ and several others. 11 Aug 44

The next day Sgt BURKOSKY, the 22nd Battery M.T. sergeant who was mentioned-in-despatches for his gallant work at Parkgate was killed by an enemy shell. 12 Aug 44

Major BAIRD and the adjutant (Capt POUSSETTE) were able to observe from RHQ command post the area from which the most troublesome enemy guns were firing. They gave a call to the 660 Air OP Squadron and "Skip." Wilson⁶ took off in his Auster air OP. Major BAIRD standing on top of the command post directed the plane by radio in the direction of the guns which were now firing, "They just fired — did you see that one — over", was shouted over the set. A pause and then the familiar English voice came over the air, "I see the bawstards". The guns of the regiment did the rest.

The artillery were now back to their old performance of firing day and night, mostly on DF tasks, as reports had been received that the enemy were preparing for a counter-attack. Gnr BIRNEY of the 22nd Battery was killed by enemy shelling, while operating a radio set. Gnr WILLET of the same battery was wounded, while at the gun position. 13 Aug 44

The 2 Survey Regiment calibrated the guns during the day. ⁷

About this time the indefatigable ammunition men were bringing up ammunition from "A" Echelon situated in Vaucelles. Their experience, one day, is typical of the difficulties with which they had to contend. The ammunition vehicles of the batteries, travelling together in convoy, moved off just at dusk. The nightly visit of enemy planes had already commenced. They swept down the road dropping bombs as they went. When they came close the drivers of the vehicles would halt and head for the nearest ditch. One bomber glided in and dropped a bomb at the head of the convoy before the men had time to take cover. Fortunately the lead vehicle was only slightly damaged and no one was hurt. The convoy was forced

to halt six times that night to escape enemy bombing. When they arrived at the gun position they proceeded to unload the ammunition while the enemy were dropping anti-personnel bombs nearby.

The fateful August 14 marked the opening of operation "Tractable" "Tractable", made necessary by the failure of "Totalize" to effect an armoured breakthrough to Falaise. The first step was to seize the high ground about Versainville, and then push into Falaise.

A daylight attack was decided upon. Instead of using the conventional method of a long bombardment, which had the disadvantage of warning the enemy ahead of time of the impending attack, and giving him opportunity of putting down defensive fire and moving up reserves, it was more practical to lay enormous smoke screens to blind the enemy from his targets, until these targets were outflanked or the positions overrun. The 1 Polish Armoured Division and 4 Canadian Armoured Division with infantry riding in Kangaroos were to be the spearhead of the attack. The artillery plan was as follows: —

- (I) A smoke barrage on the frontage of advance which was to move forward at 300 yards a minute, a tank's pace.
- (II) An impenetrable smoke screen on both flanks of the advance.
- (III) A front smoke screen in advance of the barrage of the density of thick mist.
- (IV) Some medium and heavy guns to be used on known enemy gun positions and counter-battery tasks.

The 13th Field Regiment was to fire smoke for the thick screen on the left flank of the attack. One troop of guns was to be left free to fill in any holes which occurred in the screen. To control this screen Lieut SIMCOCK and Capt. O'BRENNAN, with their signallers and ables, were to move with the tank spearhead and be prepared to alter the fire where necessary. For this purpose, two tanks were provided from outside the regiment.

The fateful day started off with the guns firing the smoke

screen as required for the operation. The wind was ideal, blowing the smoke down the line of the screen toward the enemy. Not long after the attack started the regiment lost communication with Lieut SIMCOCK's tank and, it was subsequently learned that his tank had been hit and set on fire, badly burning Lieut SIMCOCK, Gnr NICHOLSON and Gnr CICERI.

Then, in the afternoon, the airforce bombers came over to blast a path through the German defence line. The initial wave of bombers, coming over at 1400 hours in the afternoon, successfully bombed the first target, Quensey Wood. The men of the regiment stood and admired the work. At 1430 hours the second wave came over, and started to drop their bombs short of the target among our troops in front. The following wave dropped their bombs shorter still. Now the bombs were landing in our own gun area. For an hour and a half, the gun positions became a living hell, as wave after wave of Lancasters, flying low in a steady stately procession, dropped their bombs in the area. Orange smoke was fired and yellow markers displayed, but to no avail. The men could plainly see the bombs leave the bomb-bays, tried to wave at the pilots as they went by, but still, the earth shook and erupted dirt and flames, as each bomb cracked into the ground. The regiment was considered lucky that day, compared to other units, who had suffered very heavily indeed. The 22nd Battery bore the brunt of the onslaught. Besides the casualties to personnel the battery lost 1 motorcycle and 1 FAT. It took a long time for the men to regain their admiration for the airforce.

The next day was quiet. In the evening the guns moved, to arrive at the new position after dark. The attack was going well. The following day, the guns moved again down the Falaise axis past much burnt out equipment. The position taken up was on a height of land near Olendon, which the enemy had used as a defensive artillery position. As they had retreated hurriedly, most of their guns were left behind. The infantry were now successfully following through, fanning out before Falaise so that the town was almost encircled.

The strategy of the allied armies was reaching a climax. The

St. Sylvain
15 Aug 44

Olendon
16 Aug 44

Americans had swung around the right flank and were coming toward Trun from the south, thereby, forming a pocket containing the bulk of the German army which had been facing the Canadians so long.

17 Aug 44 The closing of the Falaise pocket was not a dramatic or sudden meeting of the two armies on either side. For days the situation was confused. The exact location of the Americans coming up from the south was uncertain. The front outside the Falaise pocket had become fluid and targets for the guns had become difficult to find. The trace, showing firing restrictions, looked like a jig-saw puzzle and each day saw more amendments. Falaise had fallen and the FOOs were situated overlooking the possible escape route in the direction of Trun, occasionally firing Mike and Uncle targets at enemy columns who were attempting to escape.

18 Aug 44 Sassy On August 18 the regiment moved off the high ground through Sassy, to a position preparatory to crossing the River Dives in the morning. The axis of movement was now swinging east. The traffic situation had become a problem, as the tempo of the advance quickened. Night moves came into importance for the first time, because of the necessity to spread out the amount of traffic on the road at one period. The regiment crossed the river before dawn the next morning, and stopped temporarily on the other side to let the infantry go through. Then, about noon, they moved to a position overlooking the Falaise-Trun road.

Le Marais La
Chapelle
19 Aug 44

The fighting had reached a very dramatic stage for the artillery. Once again, like the days near the beach, the enemy targets involved switches of over 300 degrees. The Canadian salient was shaped like a long finger touching Trun with small pockets of resistance on the sides. It was not uncommon to see the regiment engaging targets in one direction, with medium artillery nearby, firing in the opposite direction. During the night, there was an alarm about a threatened enemy breakthrough but nothing happened. The FOOs had moved from their position on the Trun-Falaise road and were now facing the enemy at Grand Mesnil and to the east of Montreuil la Cambe.

On August 20 the regiment moved to a position beyond Trun, turning their backs on the Falaise pocket which was left to other troops to mop up. 20 Aug 44

By this time Major G. F. COLCLOUGH was Battery Commander of the 44th Battery filling in the vacancy left when Major DALE was wounded, and Major W. B. HANCOCK was Battery Commander of the 78th Battery, taking over from Major R. K. MACKENZIE who went to the 14th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA, as Second-in-Command.⁸

¹ Sgt Wheeler, J.N.B., the technical sergeant of the regiment, who had often travelled as far as the American front to obtain replacements on damaged or destroyed equipment of the S.P.'s, did excellent work in effecting the smooth change over to the new organization.

² Total vehicle strength of the regiment equipped with 25 pdr guns.

24 guns	48 Trailers Arty	16 carriers
26 motorcycles	9 15 cwt H/T	16 15 cwt G.S.
16 5 cwt (jeep)	4 15 cwt water	3 8 cwt HUC
1 60 cwt Med	1 8 cwt HUP	25 60 cwt G.S.

Dental Corps and RCCS remained the same (see page 54)

LAD	1 wrecker	1 60 cwt G.S.
	1 15 cwt	1 5 cwt (jeep)
	2 motorcycles.	

³ Replacement of barrels was found necessary due to the excessive damage to the lands, caused by the metal returning disks in the bottom of the cartridge cases, which sometimes lodged in the barrels between rounds. These barrel replacements were picked up in the salvage dumps from damaged tanks of armoured units. It is estimated that during the time in action with the 105 mm guns a total of 8 barrels were replaced.

⁴ The drivers temporarily attached to 51 (H) Division:

Gnrs Black, J. A., Braham, P. L., Corrigan, P. J., Evans, A., Forbes, L. R., Guard, H. D., Hoyle, G. R., Hull, L. W., Kindopp, J., Landry, E. J., Langton, B. O., Lawson, W. F., Mayer, J. A., Pepler, R. D., Ranson, R. W., Stromquist, J. R., Syren, I. J.

⁵ Later Capt J. R. Milani.

⁶ Capt "Skip" Curtis-Wilson was killed in March 1945 while on a photographic flight. He worked with the regiment from 8 Jun 44 to the time of his death.

⁷ Camera Method.

⁸ *Strength Increase*

Lieut W. W. Barrett	16 Aug 44
Lieut G. R. Stretton	16 Aug 44
Lieut J. Carswell	13 Aug 44
Lieut D. J. Struthers	18 Aug 44
Lieut G. W. Taylor	18 Aug 44
Lieut J. R. Wright	19 Aug 44

Strength Decrease

Lieut W. I. L. Brock	to HQ RCA 3 C.I.D.	7 Aug 44
Lieut F. J. Davis	to 4 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA	6 Aug 44
Lieut J. T. R. Brownridge	to 23 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA	11 Aug 44
Lieut R. F. Gibson	to 23 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA	14 Aug 44
Lieut G. C. MacLean	to 6 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA	15 Aug 44.

4. CHASING THE ENEMY

20 Aug 44 An orders group was called by Lt-Col CLIFFORD soon after arriving on the position. The German army had been beaten, but it depended upon our ability to exploit the victory, whether or not, the past work could be turned to full advantage. The enemy, who had escaped from the Falaise pocket were retiring quickly in an orderly fashion. Our role was to keep up to them and push them hard so that they would not have sufficient time to consolidate in strength and make any positive stand.

The First Canadian Army would advance to the Seine and cross it. 4 Canadian Armoured Division on the right, 3 Canadian Infantry Division and 2 Armoured Brigade in the centre, and 2 Canadian Infantry Division on the left.

For this operation the brigades of 3 Canadian Infantry Division were organized into mobile fighting brigade columns. The 8 C.I.B. column was formed somewhat as follows; one infantry battalion in front with one field artillery battery of the regiment directly behind. Following that came the recce parties (including artillery) one infantry battalion, brigade headquarters, two batteries of field artillery and, lastly, the reserve infantry battalion. Interspersed in the column were engineers, tanks, anti-tank guns, and sub units of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa.

For the artillery, it would be an operation of fire and movement very similar to those practiced so often at Larkhill and Sennybridge. The regiment must be prepared to move quickly and over large distances. Four days reserve rations were to be carried on the vehicles, as well as extra jerry cans of petrol. "F" Echelon was to contain only essential vehicles and any vehicles picked up on the way from the coast, which were not on the War Establishment, were to be left behind. This last ruling was hard to take. Each troop had two or three and sometimes more German army vehicles picked up on the way through the country. Bdr FRANKLIN of Able Troop, for example, had a very useful motorcycle with side car. Bdr MORICE of Baker Troop was driving a beautiful sports roadster. Gnr SLYTER of the 78th Battery astonished everyone by success-

fully controlling a half-track personnel carrier, whose front wheels rarely stayed on the ground. BSM HILLMANN, L.M. drove an amphibious jeep. Others had 60 cwt trucks, light vehicles or enormous trailers where that extra kit bag or unwanted great coat found a home. But it all had to go. For the new type of fighting ahead, where mobility was of importance, these encumbrances were definitely not required.

The regiment was in the position beyond Trun for three days, preparing for the next move and providing direct support to 8 C.I.B. The role called for little firing, because of the many firing restrictions and limited activities of the brigade. However, nearby, the 12th, 14th Field Regiments and various other artillery regiments had a regular field day, firing continuously into the valley, where the harassed enemy were trapped. Prisoners of war were plentiful. The regiment's 60 cwt vehicles were employed all one day transporting them to the rear areas. 22 Aug 44

The weather was particularly bad, with plenty of rain to flood the command posts and make the gun pits awkward. Some difficulty had been encountered by the fact that the guns had been engaging targets on two sets of grids. Now, the trouble ended with a change into the new grid system by a slew of 4°08' and with the cessation of engaging targets to the south and west into the previous grid system.

On August 23 the regiment moved off, with the 44th Battery starting off as the vanguard along with the North Shores. RHQ and the two batteries moving with the main force, were under the control of Capt WILSON. "A" Echelon (ammunition and petrol), which travelled under brigade control behind "F" Echelon (fighting group), was under command of Capt STEELE. "B" Echelon (rations and quarter stores) travelled under divisional control anywhere from 7 miles to 100 miles behind "F" Echelon. It was in command of Capt LANGILLE, the Quartermaster. The axis of advance was in a north-easterly direction across La Vic River and La Togue River. The regiment stopped periodically during the day, to take up gun positions just off the road, while traffic ahead was held up.


The 44th Battery went into a crash action when the North Shores encountered their first opposition. Then, when this

was crushed, the Queens Own passed through followed by the 22nd Battery. Farther along the road, as the vanguard moved through the strangely silent countryside there was a crack of an 88 mm gun fired from a concealed position ahead. Confusion followed for a few seconds, a scout car was hit, the FOOs tried to spot the gun. Capt BAUGH identified it as an enemy S.P. "Fire orders, M.R. —" The 22nd Battery deployed under direction of the CPO, Lieut MILANI, and successfully engaged the target. Twenty minutes after the opposition was encountered the vanguard was on the move forward again.

Orbec
23 Aug 44 The road was littered with burnt out vehicles, dead horses and groups of dead Germans, the work of the Allied air force. The regiment came to a halt for the night 2 miles south-west of Orbec, where the enemy were putting up a small resistance beyond the river. Enemy shelling of the main road was heavy, and occasionally rounds fell on the gun positions.

24 Aug 44 Late the following day the regiment crossed the Orbec River and twisted and crawled for hours in the dark over congested roads, finally occupying a gun position early the next morning
Bernay
25 Aug 44 6 miles west of Bernay. The men were warned to be on the lookout for snipers. The main bulk of the enemy were about 24 hours ahead of the guns but, the recce party, in the vanguard, were then often within sight of the enemy.


Shortly after breakfast the regiment was on the move again, travelling faster now over better roads. What a change in the scenery from that witnessed in the last two months. Gone was the unforgettable white dust which covered everything and everybody living or dead. Gone were the wrecked houses and piles of brick, which indicated where houses had once stood. This country looked fresh, as if it had been sprinkled with a light rain. It was a picnic country with tree-lined highways and green fields. Gone, too, was the sight of sad-eyed war-weary civilians. These people stood on either side of the road and cheered and shouted, and passed out calvados, and bread and home-made butter and tomatoes and apples — in fact anything they could get their hands on quickly. Such was their gratitude. Many were the officers who looked the other way, as a vehicle slowed down to take advantage of a





Boulogne. No. 1 gun of Baker Troop during a lull in firing.

"Rate intense". Firing down the Falaise road — 16 Aug. 44.



quick cup of cider, or develop engine trouble as a basket of tomatoes appeared outside the vehicle window.

Great difficulty was experienced during these weeks in supplying the regiment with rations and petrol.¹ As firing was very limited, the ammunition was not such a problem. The rations were drawn near "B" Echelon, split into four vehicles² and brought up either under regimental arrangement or in brigade or divisional convoy. Once, the vehicles set out with rations and took 40 hours to catch up to the guns. When they did eventually arrive there, the meat had rotted.

The guns of the regiment went onto a position south-west of Brionne in the early afternoon, and moved again just as it was getting dark. The recce party again went on ahead. The guns moved slowly, as they descended a hill to cross the bridge over the river. An order came from division headquarters to get off the road for fear of enemy air attack. But, the vehicles could neither go forward or backward because of the congested traffic. As was feared, enemy airplanes flew over, first dropping flares and then following with bombs. Had the planes spotted the vehicles, the results would have been serious, as the regiment was in a very vulnerable position. As it was, the bombs fell beyond the convoy and did no damage.

In the meantime, it was learned from our recce party that the proposed gun position was still in enemy hands so, as soon as the guns had crossed the river, they were harbored for the night in a series of fields. The recce party had bedded down with the forward infantry.

The next morning the regiment was rounded up and deployed for a few hours in a position a half mile east of Brionne. From there the batteries moved one at a time, leap-frogging short distances, until they reached an area just north of St Pierre-des-Fleurs. During the day Able Troop engaged two targets, the first rounds fired by the regiment for a number of days.

St Pierre des-
Fleurs
26 Aug 44

Recce parties went out early the next morning and the guns followed in the afternoon to a position three miles south of the River Seine in a south-easterly direction from Elbeuf.

Elbeuf
27 Aug 44

The enemy was tenaciously making a stand south of Rouen

and the regiment was to stay in this position for a few days. There was little firing because few targets were within range and the guns could not come within range until they crossed the river. The 12th Field were first across, moving with 7 C.I.B., while 8 C.I.B. took a less active part. 2 Canadian Infantry Division on the left were to take out Rouen while 3 Canadian Infantry Division would by-pass it to the right. These days provided an opportunity for all to catch up on sleep.

30 Aug 44 On the morning of August 30 the regiment crossed the Seine river over a pontoon bridge at Elbeuf. During the day the guns covered thirty-five miles and occupied three positions, the final one being about 4 miles east of Rouen. During the night the guns fired HF tasks.

31 Aug 44 The next day was a confused one, with a change in the axis of advance after the regiment had received their orders and were on the move. The change in plans was made, in order to by-pass an enemy pocket of resistance, so that our advance would not be held up. That night the guns took up a position on the Cailly-Neufchatel road. Everybody was very tired from travelling all day. The pace of the advance was now faster. The next day after the regiment had passed through Neufchatel, the vehicles halted and picked up one company of Chauds to save them a long walk. Most of them found places to ride on the guns and ammunition trailers. The regiment took up three gun positions that day, the last one being a night occupation just beyond the town of St Remy-Bosrocourt, where the side road to the gun area was mined and booby trapped. None of our troops had been in the area before, nevertheless the policy was then, as it had been throughout the advance from Falaise, to move quickly into an area and take the chances. Such a policy was necessary when fast movement was required. In this position the result was very unfortunate. Seven men were wounded of which Gnr MITCHELL, Gnr MACLEOD and Cfn HILDER were evacuated. The same day, back at "B" Echelon, BQMS BRAKEWELL was killed and his driver Gnr HILLIER wounded, when their vehicle ran over a mine. The mines and trip wires were originally part of the

St Remy
Bosrocourt
1 Sep 44

anti-invasion defences of the Germans which extended along our axis of advance.

As the regiment entered that position, news had come through that 2 Canadian Infantry Division had taken Dieppe.

Another long move through Eu across Bresle River the next day took the regiment to the banks of the Somme. Here they deployed for a short while, but found it necessary to withdraw in the evening because 1 Polish Armoured Division had departed from the axis laid down and were in our area. A very perilous situation was averted, by a perfect example, by senior officers who took immediate and effective action. Brigadier TODD personally came forward to get our artillery out to a new position to cope with any possible counter-attack. The regiment took up an area near the village of Hymneville. The occupation of the new position under most difficult conditions was a credit to the training of the unit.

Hymneville
2 Sep 44

Then followed a day of rest where the guns were virtually out of action. There were no targets within range and the FOOs and Reps had been recalled. The padre conducted short church services in each troop and the men caught up on their correspondence and washing.

On September 4, the FOOs left in the early morning to join their battalions and the guns moved off soon after. Major BAIRD temporarily went to Bde HQ while Lt-Col CLIFFORD went to the unit. The Somme Canal was crossed at a place north-east of Abbeville, after many hours of stopping and starting in a long line of traffic. The 78th Battery and recce party was moving separately with the Chauds while the remainder of the regiment moved by a different route with the balance of 8 C.I.B. One position was occupied by the regiment (less 78th Battery) in the late afternoon, but it moved again, hoping to cross the River Le Canche during the night. This was found impossible because the bridges were blown, consequently the guns made a night occupation on the south side. The 78th Battery on their route found a narrow bridge, and, by manhandling the guns some distance over boggy ground, were able to complete a crossing by dawn the next morning. The rest of the regiment followed across in daylight and moved

4 Sep 44

Samer through Montreuil, past the 78th Battery to a position near
5 Sep 44 Samer. The 22nd Battery and recce party then went ahead
with the Queens Own to form the vanguard with the remainder
of the regiment staying behind on the ground to cover the
advance. Ahead lay the Pas de Calais and the channel ports
of Boulogne Calais and Dunkirk.

¹ At "B" Echelon — Capt Langille, BQMS Stanbeck, W., BQMS Morton, R. W., BQMS
Brakewell R. (later killed), BQMS Carter A.L. (succeeded BQMS Brakewell).

² Done by: — Pte Nile A. J., Cpl Gates A. G., Cpl McRann W., Cpl Mason H. D.

5. BOULOGNE AND CALAIS

This phase of the regiment's story began at the gun position north of Samer. The position was occupied for part of the day while the 22nd Battery and recce party under Lt-Col CLIFFORD moved ahead to cover the advance of the Queens Own. The remaining batteries were not in the position long before the German lookouts caught sight of the vehicles and sent over two artillery concentrations from twenty to fifty rounds each. A number of men were wounded of which L/Bdr SULLIVAN, Gnr DURRELL and Gnr PERRY were evacuated. Gnr PERRY died later in hospital. Samer
5 Sep 44

In the meantime the 22nd Battery and regimental recce party were moving steadily north. Near Weirre-Effroy a battery map-reference target on Mont Lambert was engaged, the guns pointing back down the road in the direction in which they had come. Everyone soon realized that they had taken the wrong route and were in the wrong area. As it subsequently turned out this area was then still considered to be enemy territory, enemy troops having been reported there. After firing two more targets the battery and recce party were ordered to withdraw, which it lost no time in doing, moving back down the road behind Foret de Boulogne. The civilians who had waved frantically when the column passed on the way up did not know quite what to do on the return journey. That evening the regiment took up a gun position beyond Cremarest.

The following day Able Troop went out in sniping role designed to deceive and confuse the enemy. It occupied a position at the northern edge of the Foret de Boulogne, fired a number of rounds registering the zone, moved two miles farther north and engaged enemy flak guns situated on Mont Lambert. Capt BAUGH, directing the fire from an OP, achieved a direct hit on one enemy gun with the third ranging round. Typhoons were very active, firing rockets close to their position, making it necessary for the troop to set off yellow smoke canisters beside the guns as a safety measure. 6 Sep 44

In the meantime the remainder of the regiment moved to a

Foret de position in the forest itself, taking advantage of the numerous
Boulogne clearings there. The guns were close together but well dug
7 Sep 44 in as hostile battery fire was anticipated. Able Troop rejoined
the regiment in the evening.

Lt-Col F. D. LACE¹ took over the command of the regiment here, Lt-Col CLIFFORD becoming GSO 1 RCA at First Canadian Army Headquarters. Lt-Col CLIFFORD had taken over the regiment in time to complete its final grooming for D-Day and he had commanded the regiment on that fateful 6 June 1944 and carried it through the difficult days from the coast. He was not large in stature. In fact many large, strong in the back infantrymen found certain amusement in our artillery colonel who sometimes seemed a wee bit smaller than his Canadian assault helmet. On D-Day and the following days of continued counter attack this amusement soon vanished as the "ball of fire" showed that he had a firm grasp and knowledge of fire control and application of fire. His actions gained the admiration and respect of all who served with him and under him.

The weather had turned wet and cold after so many days of sunshine and warmth. The guns took part in a programme of harassing fire around the outer perimeter of Boulogne and a few map reference targets were engaged.

The plan of attack on Boulogne had by now been decided upon. The 3 Canadian Infantry Division was to attack and destroy the Boulogne garrison. The assault was to be made frontally by the 8 and 9 C.I.B.s. During the attack the perimeter about Boulogne was to be maintained in the northern sector by part of 7 C.I.B. and in the southern sector by the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. The main road from Boulogne through la Capelle was to be the boundary between the 8 and 9 C.I.B.s. The North Shore Regiment on the right flank would capture le Tresorerie and Wimille and then Wimereux. The Regiment de la Chaudiere was to fight through Rupembert, Denacre, Bon Secours, and take out Fort de la Creche. The Queens Own Rifles of Canada on the left was to attack by way of l'Ermitage, La Haute Cluse, Wicardenne and occupy the northern end of the city. The air force were to carry out

an extensive plan before the attack. The artillery consisted of 51 (Highland) Division artillery, 3 Canadian Infantry Division artillery, 2 British AGRA, making a total of over 300 guns. The artillery was to assist the air force by engaging flak defences of Boulogne during their bombing. The artillery was also to support the infantry attack with a short timed fire plan of concs and stonks (pin point and linear concentrations)² on known enemy strong points, followed by the firing of targets or groups of targets when called for.

This last phase, involving targets on call, required a flexible plan of such a nature that a sufficient volume of fire for the varying types of targets could be brought down accurately, quickly, and yet with a simplicity easily understood by both the FOO and the infantry. It was on this operation that such a flexible plan was perfected and used successfully. The system involved elaborate traces and lists of stonks and concs on all likely places where artillery fire might be needed. These targets were given numbers and groups of targets given names. Each group was designed to support a specific phase of the infantry attack. Before the attack, all the details were completed. Each troop had all the targets worked out, within reach, with data of the line, range, angle of sight and allowance for meteorological conditions ready to be given to each gun. The infantry were thereby given neutralizing fire when and where they wanted it and for as long as they wanted. It merely remained for them to call for the fire. Thus a company commander would say he was ready to start the next phase of the attack in half an hour and the targets or groups of targets needed would be laid on by saying, *eg* "Maria at 1800 hours". The amount of artillery employed, the rate of fire and duration of fire would all have been arranged before hand. The fire could be prolonged by saying "Maria twice" or "Maria repeat".

The 13th Canadian Field Regiment was to take part in this general artillery plan as well as provide intimate support to 8 C.I.B. The 15 Medium Regiment, R.A. was also to provide intimate support to 8 C.I.B.

The first stage of the operation was to redistribute the

8 Sep 44

battalions and supporting arms in their brigade areas. As part of this, the recce party set out on September 8 to find a new area farther north. During the day a Mike target using medium artillery was successfully carried out through the regimental net and rear link. The target was a shallow earth works. That night, after a digging party had been sent ahead, the regiment moved to the new position beyond Belle where camouflage was emphasized.

The following eight days, before the main attack commenced, were spent by the infantry in tightening the ring around Boulogne without bringing about a major engagement. Several small company and platoon operations were carried out for which the artillery laid down small fire plans. During the period while Capt BAUGH was registering ack-ack gun sites and firing on troublesome guns, the tenacity of this FOO involved himself and his crew in a moving OP where, using the carrier as the OP, he would direct artillery fire on the enemy guns. When the area began to draw fire they would dash down the road a distance, stop and carry out the drill again. Yet the artillery role during these days was small, because ammunition expenditure was reduced in order to build up supplies for the final assault, and intensive patrolling by our infantry limited the amount of harassing fire during the night. In addition it was felt desirable to keep the enemy in the dark as to the true strength of our artillery.

Enemy field artillery fire at this stage was moderately active, putting down harassing fire on the main road junction above Bellbrune behind the woods. There were one or two enemy guns at Cap Gris Nez of heavy calibre which could be brought to bear on the gun positions. Fortunately the big guns at Boulogne could only swing inland as far as Samer.

The air force bombers came over many times in the next few days and pancakes (counter flak programmes) were fired with great success. Wimille, Mont Lambert, Fort de la Creche, le Tresorie were some of the targets. Typhoons were also very active, assisted by the artillery firing red smoke into the targets as an indicator for the planes. Propaganda leaflets were fired a number of times. In a few cases they preceded a Typhoon





RELAY STATION. Day and night the men remained at their radio sets relaying messages.

FALL OF THE CHANNEL PORTS

CALAIS

REGTL ROUTE IN RED

REGTL POSITIONS







GHENT. A week of high spirited relaxation.

SCHELDT POCKET

clearing approach to Antwerp

Rept'l Route in Red

Rept'l Positions 



attack. Possibly the idea of this was to entice the Germans out into the open by the sight of some reading material and then to let go with a rocket.

On September 13 the regiment made another night move forward to a position at Pernes-les-Boulogne. The move was made to give some of the medium and heavy regiments room to come in behind. By September 15 the task tables and traces necessary for the operation arrived at the command posts and the gun data was worked out. There was little shooting by the OPs due to the divisional policy of keeping the artillery passive at this stage.

Pernes-les-
Boulogne
13 Sep 44

15 Sep 44

The battery commanders for this show were Major THORNE of 22nd Battery, Major COLCLOUGH of the 44th Battery, and Major HANCOCK of 78th Battery. The FOOs out at the commencement of the attack were Capt McNABB and Capt BAUGH, Capt THOMPSON and Capt STRUTHERS, Capt ELSE³ and Capt BENNETT.⁴

Before the main attack started the North Shores had put in a small attack to gain some high ground overlooking le Tresorerie. Capt THOMPSON established an OP there, since it was felt at the time that le Tresorerie was the key to the whole attack.

The attack started on the morning of September 17. The guns of the regiment fired the time programme, then switched to the grouped targets of which many were fired and repeated. Many shellreps were received from the FOOs. Besides passing the information on to the counter battery staff, the regiment tried to neutralize the guns with their own fire. Regimental headquarters had at their disposal one heavy, two medium and another field regiment for targets on call. The attack started off well but soon slowed down against a stubborn enemy position stiffened by extensive minefields and concrete strong points. By the end of the first day the North Shores had taken le Tresorerie, and the Chauds had taken Rupembert against heavy shelling from Cap Gris Nez. The Queens Own had moved about the same distance through difficult obstacles. The regiment fired 340 rounds per gun of H.E. as well as some smoke. No. 3 gun of Baker Troop had a premature in the barrel during

17 Sep 44

the initial intense firing. The gun crew ⁵ had a miraculous escape from the flying metal. As the gun was no longer serviceable it was immediately taken out of action and replaced the following morning by a new one.

18 Sep 44 The second day of the attack the progress was tougher. The FOOs with the Chauds and their parties were now moving through exposed country, heavily mined, and so had left behind all vehicles.

Communications were by means of 18 sets carried on the signallers' backs. The Chauds advanced through Denacre towards Bon Secours, under heavy enemy shellfire directed from the top of the monument. In their first attempt to take the monument they were repulsed. Gnr SIDDONS died of wounds from the shelling that day, while several other members of the same OP were hit, but not seriously.

The Queens Own had more success, and penetrated to the city of Boulogne itself. Many single gun destructive shoots were carried out with excellent results, the regiment firing 100 rounds per gun that day. Gnr DARNELL was killed when the carrier, he was driving over exposed ground, struck a shell hole and turned over. The same day Sigmn Allison was killed by shellfire while repairing a broken communication line. Major COLCLOUGH was wounded in the face and evacuated.

19 Sep 44 The third day of the attack the Regiment fired about 60 rounds per gun in support of the advance of the Chauds and Queens Own. The advance was slow and by the end of the day parts of Wimille, Wimereux, the monument, Fort de la Creche and portions of Boulogne were holding out. Germans who had been taken prisoner were astonished to learn that only two brigades were being used for the attack. (As it turned out later the enemy force was about twice as large as anticipated).

20 Sep 44 The fourth day of the attack saw the cleaning up of the town and the capture of Wimille. Fort de la Creche and the monument were still holding out. The guns fired a 30 minute fire plan in the afternoon, followed by some troop smoke screens.

The Queens Own had now swung towards Fort de la Creche

to assist the Chauds. Capt BAUGH, the FOO for Baker Troop, occupied an OP ahead of the infantry to the flank of the strong point about 300 yards from a group of enemy guns. The guns soon spotted him and attempted to dislodge him from the OP. Notwithstanding, Capt BAUGH with great skill brought down field and medium artillery on the enemy guns and succeeded in putting out of action four 88 mm guns and two LAA guns, Capt BAUGH returned to the Queens Own that night with a thorough picture of the ground and defences opposing the advance, and was able to assist materially in planning the attack the next day. Before the attack began in the morning, Capt BAUGH took command of a group of infantry Bren guns which he positioned in the vicinity of his OP. Throughout the subsequent attack he directed the fire of this group against the crews of the remaining guns. By the effectiveness of this fire, and the artillery support fire, which he also controlled, the attacking company of Queens Own was able to reach the objective and capture the remaining guns. Late in the day Capt BAUGH with his signaller, Gnr PERKINS, proceeded to put one of the captured 88 mm guns into action. With Capt BAUGH aiming and firing and Gnr PERKINS loading, they put a trial round into the sea and then swung the gun around, proceeding to fire rounds into the fort itself at point blank range.

The following day the Chauds captured the monument which had given them so much trouble. After the attack Lieut HOGG relieved Capt BENNETT, who had had a particularly difficult time. By the end of the day Wimereux had been captured by the North Shores and Fort de la Creche had been captured by the Queens Own, ending the defence of the Boulogne garrison north of the river Laine. At 1710 hrs the order to "cease fire" was sent down to the guns.⁶

The actions of Capt BAUGH⁷ in this attack materially contributed to the saving of many lives and assisted in the speedy capture of Fort de la Creche. For this work he was awarded the Military Cross.

Bdr SULIS and Gnr GINGELL were both awarded the Military Medal for their contribution in the battle. As OP able and

signaller to Capt BENNETT they accompanied the leading infantry company for thirty six hours under the most adverse conditions on foot with signal equipment, cut off from water and supplies, under almost continuous shell and mortar fire. During that time they continually maintained signal communications with the regiment.

Before the battle ended Capt POUSSETTE wrote in the regimental War Diary:

"Major J. D. BAIRD was absent during part of the afternoon (21 Sep) intending to inspect three 88 mm guns captured in the forward area, with a view to forming an extra troop in the regiment. However the guns are still uninspected as certain persevering Jerry snipers and machine gunners took a violent dislike to our party, thereby causing them to perform wierd and snakelike movements on the ground — the resultant disengaging process was quite slow, cautious and profane on the part of Major BAIRD and company."

The following day fire plans and traces arrived for the new area. The 8 C.I.B. were to take out the Sangatte battery preparatory to the 7 C.I.B. attack on Calais, so advance parties set off early with a digging party to prepare the new positions. The regiment pulled out soon after and headed for Calais. Shelling of the roads from large coastal guns was heavy, particularly around Marquise at the time the regimental convoy passed through. By 1445 hours the regiment was in position near the cross roads beyond Hauteville. The cross roads were under constant harassing fire all day and many shells fell in the 22nd and 78th Battery positions. The shells were coming from the direction of Calais skimming the crest of the hill in front and landing with the mighty "crump" of a large calibre gun. The work of digging in the guns and building command posts was carried on during the lulls in shelling. Sgt MUIR of the 78th Battery was killed that afternoon while digging a pit for his gun.

Hauteville
23 Sep 44

In the new operation around Calais, 3 Canadian Infantry Division was to assault areas Escalles, Noires Mottes, Bellevue, Coquelles and Calais, and to capture or destroy the garrison there. Of this task 8 C.I.B. was to capture or destroy the

garrisons in area of Escalles and Noires Mottes. The brigade was to attack on a two battalion front, with the North Shore Regiment taking out the Sangatte battery and the Regiment de la Chaudiere capturing the observatory and monastery.

The artillery was to fire targets or groups of targets on call after the initial fire plans were fired. The 13th Canadian Field Regiment and 9 Medium Regiment, RA were to be available for intimate support of 8 C.I.B. An attempt was made to obtain a LAA battery to fire in an open role but it was impossible to find a suitable spot which was not too exposed. The shooting of the artillery had to be particularly accurate in this show because the troops were attacking up hill. The danger was that changes in range sent down to the guns would not move the fire forward the amount anticipated by the infantry.

Major O'SHEA was now commanding the 44th Battery.⁸ He and the two FOOs, Capt THOMPSON and Capt STRUTHERS, were with the North Shores during the attack. Major HANCOCK of the 78th Battery with Capt ELSE and Lieut HOGG were with the Chauds.

The day of September 24 was quiet as preparations were being made for the attacks.

The attacks started September 25 preceded by heavy bombers giving the defences a thorough pounding. The artillery then put down a short fire plan to soften up the defences, followed by targets fired on call as the infantry moved forward. The attacks on the strong points themselves were not difficult but trouble was experienced through the countless enemy mines and heavy artillery fire. Capt THOMPSON's OP carrier hit a mine as it was advancing with the infantry. Though the carrier was a total loss only the driver Gnr BEAUPRE was injured sufficiently to be evacuated.⁹ 25 Sep 44

Capt STRUTHERS had trouble with three 17 cm guns on the coast near Calais. The regiment took them on several times before they were persuaded to stop. However, most of the counter battery work in and around Calais was carried out by our medium artillery. Communications were difficult because of the hilly nature of the ground.

By the next day the 8 C.I.B. were firmly on their objectives.

- 26 Sep 44 At dusk the R.A.F. made a bombing attack on Calais. The men on the gun positions witnessed the waves of heavy and medium bombers penetrate the enemy flak screen, drop their bombs and continue through, making a wide turn over the gun area as they headed back to the channel. About six of the planes were hit and burst into flames. One of these fell near the gun area and exploded. Everybody wondered why the guns had not been called upon to fire a counter flak programme like the one which had worked out so well at Boulogne.
- 27 Sep 44 The next morning the guns did fire a counter flak programme as heavy bombers took on Cap Gris Nez.

The planes over their target this time encountered little opposition. Recce parties went out in the afternoon to prepare the gun position which was to be occupied that night. The approach to the gun position was by way of an exposed road overlooking Calais. This meant that the occupation would have to be carried out with great care as the batteries were to be in a very vulnerable position on a forward slope. The batteries moved one at a time that night, the whole regiment being ready about 0200 hours the next morning. The guns were tucked in behind hedges and houses around the village of Peuplingue. The 22nd Battery command post was very happily situated in a farm house which possessed all the comforts of home including four pretty daughters. RHQ (you might have guessed it) was located in a tremendous concrete German command post, complete with running water and electric lights.

Peuplingue
28 Sep 44

Very little firing was needed from this position, as the enemy opposition proved lighter than expected. Many of the FOOs were called in, as the 8 C.I.B. had completed their task. By the evening of September 28 the 7 C.I.B. had penetrated the outskirts of the city. At the same time 9 C.I.B. were preparing to take out Cap Gris Nez. Everybody would be glad to hear that that place was silenced. Not only were they giving Dover many bad days but they were also throwing inland some of their "express trains", which passed the gun position with the throttle wide open. Two of these heavy calibre shells

landed in the 78th Battery area but caused no casualties.

On September 29 a twenty-four hour truce was declared to permit civilians to leave Calais. As soon as this truce ended the regiment opened up with a fire plan of 65 rounds per gun H.E. and 70 rounds per gun smoke. This was followed by red smoke for Typhoon attacks. Very soon after the air force had completed their job white flags appeared in the city and word came over the air that the town had surrendered. 29 Sep 44

The first day of October is a memorable one of relaxation, cleaning, celebrating and moving. The celebrating was promoted by the latest NAAFI issue and supplemented by some of the German supplies of beer, schnaps and cognac which had been seized in the heat of battle (or shortly after). The various OP crews also took time off to display souvenirs which they had obtained the last few weeks. Business was tremendous. That same afternoon, much to everyone's surprise, the regiment was ordered to move. Somehow this was accomplished, the convoy travelling for about an hour and a half over country roads to a concentration area where the guns were harbored for the night. 1 Oct 44

The next day the regiment crossed the border into Belgium and harboured in the little settlement of Watou not far from Poperinghe. 2 Oct 44

¹ Later Brig F. D. Lace, OBE — C.R.A. of 2 Cdn Inf Div.

² Conc is the abbreviation for a concentration of fire. At this date it was a concentration of all guns on one point. Later it became a concentration of all guns on a troop frontage unless otherwise ordered. The exception to this was C.B. tasks.

³ Capt J. Else taken on strength 12 Sep 44.

⁴ At this time all the officers in the regiment above the rank of lieutenant were of an acting rank with the exception of Major Baird, Capt Steele, Capt Bennett and Capt Else.

⁵ No 3 gun Baker Troop — Sgt J. C. Hartley, L/Sgt J. C. Kilcup (later Sgt) Bdr R. J. Langton, Gnr A. Chadwick, Gnr McInnes.

⁶ Major H. L. Thorne was evacuated 23 Sep 44 through a broken ankle sustained while in the forward area that day.

⁷ Capt Baugh's OP crew:

Gnr Richardson (OP able), Gnr Perkins (OP Sig), Gnr Lahd (Driver).

Both Gnr Richardson and Gnr Perkins took turns in assisting Capt Baugh at the O.P. during the two days mentioned.

⁸ Major J. O'Shea taken on strength 19 Sept 44.

Strength Decrease

Capt E. W. Pickel to Air O.P. 12 Sep 44 (later killed in training accident).

Lieut F. P. Wilson to HQ First Canadian Army.

⁹ Capt Thompson's carrier crew at Boulogne:

Gnr Beaupre, G. E., Gnr Brown, R. W., Gnr Hamilton, D. P., Gnr Callaghan, P. W.

6. THE SCHELDT

The regiment stayed three days at Watou. They were days of rest and cleaning up with a minimum of parades. The men were very favorably impressed with the Belgian people and saw a noticeable difference in them from their French neighbors. Eggs were plentiful and easy to obtain. Beer could also be bought in the local "pubs". A few sightseeing trips were made to Ypres, so that the men could see how and where the Canadian soldiers of the last war fought.

3 Oct 44 On October 3 recce parties left for the new area where the next campaign was to begin. The guns were to move in a few days. The move was clouded in secrecy. Everyone had to take down their French grey divisional shoulder patches to conceal their identity when they reached the new area. Few people knew the destination of the regiment, though the strongest rumors indicated it might be Dunkirk.

Maldegem
5 Oct 44 On October 5 the main body of the regiment moved north and went into gun positions beyond Maldegem very close to the Leopold Canal and the Dutch-Belgian border. The area from the first proved rather a warm one, with shells landing close by and spent enemy machine gun bullets falling beside the guns. There were plenty of houses, most of which had been evacuated by the civilians, so that living quarters were fairly comfortable. The 78th Battery had their guns placed in the back yard of a group of buildings. Many of these homes still held civilians who lived in the cellars. However this did not bother the men, who readily gave up a bit of safety to live upstairs in the well furnished rooms. Later on it was interesting to note the perseverance of some civilians who replaced the tiles on the roofs of sheds and houses every day, even though the guns would "take" them off again on the next shoot.


Operation "Switchback" was to start on October 6. It was called "Switchback" because it was originally intended that 3 Canadian Infantry Division turn back to Dunkirk after the stop at Watou. The change in the plan was dictated by the necessity to remove the strong enemy force which was effectively blocking the Antwerp approaches through the West



NIJMEGEN SALIENT — AT THE OP. The small allotment of ammunition during this period led to a strange reversal from the usual 'treatment' of targets.

"Nijmegen Salient"

DID YOU SAY SYLLABUS, SIR?



NIJMEGEN SALIENT — AT THE GUN POSITION. Warfare in a winter static position where a training programme was attempted.

Scheldt, and it was imperative that this be cleared as soon as possible, so as to permit the passage of supplies through the port.

The enemy had chosen a good defensive area which was almost entirely contained by water. The 4 Canadian Armoured Division had been on the southern perimeter of the area for some time, but had been unable to successfully assault the stronghold because of their small complement of infantry and the fact that their armour had only a limited use in that type of country.

The area to be assaulted by the 3 Canadian Infantry Division was bounded on the east by Savojaard Plaat, a muddy bay opening off the West Scheldt, on the south and west by a 25 mile stretch of the Leopold Canal, and on the north by the Scheldt Estuary itself. The ground was ideal for defence, being flat, almost at sea-level, and intersected by countless dykes and drainage ditches.

The operation was prepared quickly as there was need for speed in clearing the approaches to Antwerp. The plan called for an assault by 7 C.I.B. with the North Shore Regiment under command to ferry the assault troops across the Leopold Canal, north of Maldegem, and to establish a bridgehead there. On completion of this phase the 8 C.I.B. would then pass through to take Aardenburg and then Sluis. The next phase involved an assault landing by 9 C.I.B. across Savojaard Plaat and the establishment of a bridgehead south-east of Hoofdplaat. Following this, all brigades were to work across the "island", ending with the capture of the Knocke area.

The artillery support was to consist of 3 Canadian Infantry Division artillery, 4 Canadian Armoured Division artillery with 19 Canadian Field (S.P.) Regiment under command, 9 British AGRA, 2 Canadian AGRA and other artillery units which were to join later. The 13th Canadian Field Regiment was to support the assault of 7 C.I.B. with a fire plan, provide intimate support for 8 C.I.B. when they were committed, and also be prepared to engage all targets within range when called on throughout the battle.

On the afternoon of October 5 a myriad of traces and task

5 Oct 44 tables arrived, which called for many hours of work. The data for each target was worked out at the battery command posts and passed on to the troops for additional figuring. The command posts were kept busy on these until early morning and the final work was barely completed when the opening fire plan "Switchback" went into effect at 0300 hours. From then on throughout the day the fire was almost continuous, mainly on stonks and concs "on call", repeating the same group of targets time after time in an endeavour to reduce the opposition which 7 C.I.B. was encountering against their small bridgehead. 135 rounds per gun were fired during the day. The guns quietened down somewhat towards the end of the day when only occasional harassing fire tasks were engaged. However at midnight activity resumed again, with the guns of the regiment firing continuously until 0500 hours to assist the infantry in beating off enemy counter attacks. The entire regiment was on "stand-to" as there was a suspicion that counter attacks might penetrate across the Leopold Canal. The regiment was in a vulnerable location with no infantry between themselves and the canal.

The day passed with the guns periodically engaging targets. That night there was another alarm about patrols having crossed the Canal. There was a stand to again, with machine guns sited in strategic positions and the men placed around each gun pit ready to fight it out if necessary. Again nothing happened. The artillery kept up their spasmodic firing during the night using flashless charges to conceal the location of the guns.

The next two days were very much the same with 7 C.I.B. vainly attempting to enlarge the bridgehead which was never much over 100 yards in depth.

On October 10 the guns were moved through Eecloo to a position near Doorentje to support the crossing of 8 and 9 C.I.B.s. Because of the difficulty encountered by 7 C.I.B. the plan had altered and now 8 C.I.B. was to follow 9 C.I.B. across the Savojaard Plaat, and extend their bridgehead to the south, clearing the Bouchaute-Biervliet road so that the artillery could be brought onto the "island". The artillery of 4 Cana-

dian Armoured Division was to support the 9 C.I.B. from the area east of Savojaard Plaat. It was envisaged at the time that the same artillery would also be the sole support for the crossing of 8 C.I.B. The location of 3 Canadian Infantry Division artillery, though within range, was in effect in front of the advance and would be firing towards the advance of our own troops. However Lt-Col LACE felt that the fire of the divisional artillery could be successfully controlled to provide effective fire, even though firing towards our advancing troops. As it subsequently turned out, this novel use of artillery proved particularly effective, because it caught the enemy from behind, thereby diminishing the protection of the dykes, and it was a very demoralizing factor to their defence.

The assault of 8 C.I.B. across Savojaard Plaat was speedily planned. Lt-Col LACE had been allotted no specific amount of artillery except, of course, the guns of the 13th Field. It was arranged that when more artillery fire was required, divisional artillery headquarters would be notified, and they would obtain what artillery was available. No elaborate fire plan of targets or groups of targets was immediately available for this phase of 8 C.I.B.'s attack. There was not sufficient time to duplicate the system used at Boulogne and Calais. For the first period a day by day requirement would have to suffice until there was sufficient time for other arrangements. In usage this hand to mouth system worked out very well, though it entailed additional work for the artillery Reps. The method was as follows. Each night while the 8 C.I.B. was advancing, Lt-Col LACE would send in to the regimental command post a list of targets which the infantry might need for the operation the following day. These targets would be chosen after studying a map of the area and using the information available about the enemy strength and defences. These targets were numbered, encoded, and passed over the air. When received at the regiment they would be decoded and phoned through to each battery which would immediately commence to work out the data for the guns. Then later, when the plan of the infantry attack was more specifically known, the targets would be grouped into small fire plans and allotted names, rates and

timings. This information would then be passed on to the regiment and the targets would be grouped. Occasionally infantry requirements called for an additional fire plan not previously foreseen, but over ground which had been thoroughly "taped" with targets. If such a case arose, a fire plan could be quickly laid on over the radio by giving a name to the fire plan, listing the targets and stating the rate and duration of fire required. For example:

"Fire plan TANGO

H-5 to H engage 240, 241, 242 HE one battery each rate slow.

H to plus 10, 247 Smoke, one troop, rate very slow.

Plus 10 to plus 20, 250, 253, 256 HE one battery rate normal".

Then later on over the air would be sent down "Tango 1530 hours" These emergency plans worked out well, were continually used in the first week of the attack and occasionally came in useful in the areas beyond Oostburg.

11 Oct 44 On October 11 and 12, the 8 C.I.B. crossed the Savojaard Plaat to assault the island below Hoofdplaat. The battery commanders and FOOs were as follows: The 22nd Battery — Major J. D. ROSS¹, Capt W. M. McNABB, and Capt E. C. GOTHARD. The 44th Battery—Major T. O'SHEA, Capt D. J. STRUTHERS and Capt V. A. THOMPSON. The 78th Battery — Major W. B. HANCOCK, Capt R. J. WALDIE and Capt J. ELSE.

The crossing, though made under the fire from Flushing coastal guns, was uneventful for most of the forward artillery groups. They travelled in Buffalos with their carriers as part of the cargo. Once on shore they dug in, as the bridgehead was under heavy shelling. Capt THOMPSON and his crew had a close call when their Buffalo ran aground near the shore. While they were trying to clear the boat from the sandbar, a heavy German gun began ranging on them. Soon it scored a direct hit on the Buffalo and carrier, completely wrecking and burning both of them. The crew fortunately had moved away from the Buffalo when the shells started landing close by.

The 8 C.I.B. once established on shore, swung south to contact 4 Canadian Armoured Division. The North Shores were on the left along the water, the Queens Own on the right and the Chauds in the centre. On October 13 the gunners had

a hectic day as target after target was fired to clear a path for the infantry. The fire was very effective, the enemy being shelled by the 13th Field from the rear, by the 14th Field from the right and by the 15th and 19th Field in the orthodox manner from the front. The enemy infantry had little protection.

Capt McNABB did particularly good work at this time under very difficult conditions. For his work here and throughout the rest of the Scheldt operation as well as his outstanding record as the FOO for Able Troop since shortly after D-Day, he was awarded the Military Cross. His able, Gnr PECK V.L. showed extreme skill and coolness during this phase of the battle.

Capt THOMPSON was wounded that day when Typhoons fired rockets near the leading infantry company. Lieut HOGG took his place as FOO for Charlie Troop late the same day, Gnr D. P. HAMILTON acting as Foo in the meantime, and doing a good job. As 8 C.I.B. progressed south and turned west, the artillery support given them was limited because of the report that a battalion of 4 Canadian Armoured Division was advancing up from the south and its location was not exactly known. Yet the guns were busy providing support elsewhere and fired 189 rounds per gun during the day. 14 Oct 44

Able Troop had what they thought was an ideal command post in the centre of a hay stack. Perfect camouflage. Then it caught fire.

By October 15 the contact from the south was firmly established, with Watervliet in our hands and the Bouchaute-Biervliet road open so that the artillery could be brought up to give closer support. 15 Oct 44

The following day the 8 C.I.B. were moving towards the town of IJzendijke, encountering heavy opposition as they advanced forward. The guns were again busy on a multitude of "on call" targets, with the added confusion of a move through Bouchaute to the new gun position near Biervliet. As the regiment was continually engaged on targets, the batteries moved one at a time, the first battery moving at 1420 hours and the last battery coming into position and 16 Oct 44

reporting ready by 2248 hours that night. 180 rounds per gun were fired that day.

The push towards Ijzendijke was difficult for the artillery, as the advance was on a three battalion front. The individual attacks had to be planned so that the guns could give their support to each one because the North Shores and Queens Own were moving forward so close together, it was difficult to obtain permission to fire until the location of their forward companies was definitely known.

17 Oct 44 On the night of October 17 a line crew of the 78th Battery left battalion headquarters to lay line to their OP. They took the wrong turning in the road, passed through a town, up to the forward infantry positions and beyond. Enemy mortar fire and machine gun fire were falling close, so they left the driver and the carrier in a protected position and continued forward on foot, laying line as they went. Next morning Gnr RASMUSSEN, L.C., the carrier driver, returned to report nothing had been seen of the other four members of his crew. When the advance of the infantry cleared the forward area the next day, men of the regiment were able to follow the line to its end. They found their rifles and some kit with a spool of wire opposite a German dugout. They had laid line right up to a German stronghold. Subsequently it was found that of these four men, Gnr RENAULT had been killed and L/Bdr HILTZ, Bdr PORTER and Gnr SPENCER taken prisoner.

These men displayed remarkable courage and tenacity in that they continued forward with their task regardless of the seemingly impossible situation, feeling that they were carrying out their orders correctly. Their qualities brought out by this incident, are found in all the line crews of the regiment. These crews work as separate independent groups in all sorts of weather, in areas which are constantly shelled, laying and maintaining line communications.

At about this time Lt-Col T. A. LEWIS, who was acting commander of 8 C.I.B., disappeared. He had gone forward to the Chauds' start line for an attack just south of Ijzendijke. His body was found close to that of Gnr RENAULT. He had

apparently taken the same wrong turning and driven into the same enemy strongpoint.

These days were most difficult for Lt-Col LACE. The many changes in brigade commanders meant that the bulk of the decisions, work and responsibility fell on his shoulders. In normal times an artillery colonel plays a very important role at brigade headquarters. Throughout the Scheldt his work was even more important and more exacting. Each attack and counter attack were his concern. Each demand and problem of the battalions were his worry. "What a swell man to work for", was the attitude of the gunners under him.

Ijzendijke was heavily shelled by the artillery and then taken by the Queens Own. After Ijzendijke had fallen the 8 C.I.B. continued west, the North Shores moving in the direction of Schoondijke, and the Queens Own and Chauds passing through Waterland Kerkje, towards Oostburg. The targets were now very limited as many were out of range for the guns.

The infantry were approaching the strong enemy defensive area extending from Breskens, through Schoondijke, Oostburg and Aardenburg. The area about 1000 yards deep on each side of the road, was heavily mined and well defended.

On October 19 the regiment moved to a gun position near Ijzendijke. The 22nd Battery and 44th Battery moved first. They had just reported ready on the new position when a target was called for. From then on to midnight the guns were kept busy. Most of the fire was for the Chauds who had been subjected to a vicious counter attack and who had lost some ground.

Ijzendijke
19 Oct 44

On the following day the guns moved forward to Waterland Kerkje² the batteries moving one at a time so that a minimum of two batteries were "on the ground" ready to engage targets. During this move a force of "Conga" tanks stopped near RHQ position. In the process of refilling with TNT an accident occurred causing an explosion which pretty well reduced the area. Fortunately RHQ was preparing to move and was out of action except for regimental radio sets. All targets called for were engaged. There were about 200 casual-

Waterland-
kerkje
20 Oct 44

ties in the general area, including several civilians. When the adjutant arrived at the new position his records were in a very jumbled state, many cut and torn. The regimental War Diary notes that prior to the move, the regimental net was functioning well, with the traffic of four regimental shoots and deployment orders coming over the air with surprisingly little conflict. 48 hours leave to Brussels and Antwerp commenced that day with the regiment sending its allotment of personnel.

Lieut N. M. CHEATER took over from Capt WALDIE as Fox Troop FOO. While at the OP, Lieut CHEATER experienced very heavy shelling during which his able, Bdr SULIS, was wounded and the next day another able, Gnr WEBB, was wounded. For the last week of the operation Lieut J. P. GRENIER acted as Fox Troop FOO. About the same time Gnr HARRISON, Capt STRUTHER's able, was wounded by a shell fragment.

The 9 C.I.B. moving forward along the top of the "island" captured Breskens a few days later, with the support of the airforce and a heavy artillery fire plan. During that day the regiment fired 205 rounds per gun, making a total ammunition expenditure for the past eight days of 1146 rounds per gun. In the afternoon an enemy mortar bomb landed beside a 44th Battery gun wounding most of the detachment of which L/Bdr McDONALD, Gnr MAYNARD, Gnr PATTERSON and Gnr AUGER were evacuated.

23 Oct 44 The next day the Highland Light Infantry of Canada captured Schoondijke and enabled the North Shores to pass through them. From this position south of the town the North Shores worked down the dyke parallel to the Schoondijke-Oostburg road with the intention of coming at Oostburg from behind. The plan was changed however and the North Shores swung around to the right to clean out the key stronghold of Marolleput.

It was while the North Shores were securing the approaches to Oostburg that L/Bdr SHAW won the Military Medal. As a signaller of Dog Troop OP crew³ with Capt STRUTHERS he showed remarkable courage and initiative on this occasion, when radio communications between the FOO, who had procee-

ded ahead on foot, and the carrier had broken down at a very critical stage in the attack. L/Bdr SHAW realizing the situation, took the carrier with batteries and spare parts and worked his way forward passing over a route uncleared of mines until he was blocked by the wrecks of another carrier and by an M 10. From thence he proceeded on foot over a road swept by heavy enemy shell, mortar and small arms fire, reached the forward observation officer and restored communications. Artillery fire was immediately brought down eliminating the machine gun positions and the North Shores were able to successfully advance.

The Queens Own were left to capture Oostburg which they did on October 25 and 26, "A" Company entering the southern half of the town with a bayonet charge down the main street to take out a troublesome anti-tank gun. Supporting this attack on Oostburg the regiment fired a record of 250 rounds per gun, a figure only excelled in the old days before Caen when the regiment used 105 mm S.P.s. The targets were mostly concs and stonks on call. One Oboe smoke screen was fired which in itself required 100 rounds per gun. 25 Oct 44

Pushing through beyond the town a company of Queens Own was pinned down by heavy small arms and artillery fire and had to pull back under cover of a smoke screen put down by the regiment.

An attack was then "teed up" with artillery support and the Chauds pushed to Zuidzande with the aid of Crocodiles (flame throwing Churchills) and Crabs (flails).

In the meantime the North Shores were working toward the hamlet of Marolleput. "A" Company approached and quietly walked in, without any artillery support, under the cover of darkness. They caught the Germans asleep and took many prisoners against some light opposition. It was not until dawn that they encountered trouble from a German 75 mm gun and a light flak gun in the vicinity of a house about 300 yards distant, and by small arms fire from a nearby dyke. This enemy fire was preventing consolidation of the position by "A" Company and the area was rapidly becoming untenable. Under heavy observed enemy small arms fire and with complete

disregard for his own personal safety, Capt HOGG, accompanied by his able, Gnr HAMILTON, worked his way forward to a house from which he obtained observation over the enemy guns. He was directing fire on the guns from an upstairs window, when a shell from the flak gun penetrated the room and wounded him in the legs. However he continued to direct fire until a second shell from the 75 mm gun scored a direct hit, and threw him out of the house and at the same time wounded his able. Although badly bruised and shaken he succeeded in re-entering the house and extricating his wounded able from the rubble. During this operation a third shell hit the house, and it was ultimately necessary to knock a hole in the wall to gain entrance. After assisting his signaller to safety, Capt HOGG again made his way forward to a dyke overlooking the enemy guns, which were still active. In spite of his wounds and constant enemy small arms fire, Capt HOGG directed the fire of the artillery at his disposal onto the enemy guns until they were put out of action. The company was then able to mop up the enemy snipers and consolidate the position.

The gallant conduct and persistent efforts of Capt HOGG were undoubtedly responsible to a great extent for the success of the entire battalion operation, since the capture of the company's objective was vital to the successful advance of the other companies. For this action Capt HOGG was awarded the Military Cross.

As no stretchers were available Gnr HAMILTON was evacuated on a rug from the OP to company HQ by members of the North Shores. Here he was attended by a captured German medical officer, and, as soon as the road was cleared of mines, was evacuated in a stretcher fitted jeep. This marked the end of service for an efficient and courageous OP assistant and signaller who had served in this capacity since D-Day and had been commended on several occasions by his officers for his actions under fire.

That same day the Typhoons and Spitfires were very active. The regiment fired red smoke to indicate some targets for them.

With the loss of Oostburg the main hinge of the German defence line was broken and once Zuidzande had been taken

the enemy started falling back quickly. Recce parties went out from the gun area, and in the evening of October 29 the regiment less the 22nd Battery moved to a new area below Oostburg. The following day the whole regiment took up a position beyond Zuidzande.

Oostburg
29 Oct 44
Zuidzande
30 Oct 44

At this time the majority of the artillery regiments, with the exception of the artillery of 3 Canadian Infantry Division, was being withdrawn to the Schoondijke area for the forthcoming operation against Walcheren and South Beveland.

On October 30 the regiment temporarily came under command of the 14th Field for the night attack of 9 C.I.B. across the canal at Retranchement. The firing for this attack started at 2230 hours and lasted almost incessantly throughout the night.

30 Oct 44

The next day was quiet at the gun position. The regimental War Diary notes that the gunners were starting to feel the strain imposed on them by all the firing of the past couple of weeks. The Chauds had advanced to Sluis and on November 1 the North Shores entered the town. The artillery fire plan laid down here is worth mentioning. The North Shores had at the time only two field regiments with which to call on for support — the 12th and 13th Field Regiments. Because of this the most economical and effective use of artillery was imperative. Harassing fire, consisting of five targets, was put into the town during the night. This stopped at 0500 hours. At 0600 hours a short fire plan was carried out, consisting of stonks on the front and back of the town. The infantry came up to the first line of fire, waited for it to lift, and then walked in with little resistance. 350 prisoners were taken with a minimum of casualties. Capt STRUTHERS entered a communications trench and personally brought out 27 prisoners.

31 Oct 44

1 Nov 44

The artillery proved effective also on the last objective of the North Shores — St Anna ter Muiden. There a 75 mm gun and a 20 mm flak gun commanded the approaches. The regiment shelled the gun area until the infantry could enter the town. Then an infantry patrol went out, and captured the gun crews on their way from the dugouts to the gun sites.

Opposition was now decreasing rapidly. With little trouble

the final objective of 8 C.I.B. at Westcappelle was reached.

Knocke
2 Nov 44 In order to be in a better position to support the infantry, the guns made one more move, this time to the outskirts of Knocke-sur-Mer.

3 Nov 44 The following morning the regiment, along with the 14th Field, fired in support of the attacks on Zeebrugge and also in support of the 9 C.I.B.'s attack on Heyst. The attack on Zeebrugge was made by 7 Recce Regiment. Capt STEELE was the FOO from the 13th Field. After the artillery fired, the recce regiment moved in on foot and the small group of enemy quickly surrendered. The attack on Heyst marked the close of the Scheldt campaign. That evening the cease fire order was given and the guns were taken out of action. The FOOs and their parties returned to the gun area and most of the radio sets were shut down.

Thus ended one of the most strenuous of operations. It was strenuous for the FOOs and their parties because of the continuous engagement of their battalions and the fact that they were not taken out, during the operation, for a rest. It was strenuous for the gun groups because of the continuous heavy programme of fire carried out day and night, and because of the poor gun positions and difficult weather. It was strenuous for "A" Echelon, who for awhile had a distance of 60 miles from the ammunition supply point to the guns to travel. The only way this was possible with such a large expenditure of ammunition was for the drivers to take shifts so that they could get enough sleep.

The deployments of the regiment were particularly far forward in this operation, because so many artillery regiments had to find space in the small area and because suitable command posts were needed in buildings protected from the weather.

"Relax" When the regimental convoy moved off for the operation "Relax" in Ghent, everyone was glad of the promised rest.

¹ *Strength Increase*

Major J. D. Ross	5 Oct 44	Major J. O'Shea	14 Sep 44
Capt E.C. Gothard	8 Oct 44	Capt R. J. Waldie	17 Sep 44
Lieut E. F. Carey	26 Sep 44	Lieut D.W. Henderson	(RCCS) 24 Sep 44

Strength Decrease

Capt R. D. Baugh 7 Oct 44 to War Gunnery Staff Course.
 Capt T. W. E. Duncan (LAD) 27 Aug 44 to 1 Cdn Army'd Pers Carrier.
 Capt W. T. Wilson, through illness.

² *Strength Increase*

Lieut G. D. Bendickson	16 Oct 44
Lieut F. L. Aylward	19 Oct 44
Lieut J. A. Crutcher (Later Capt)	19 Oct 44
Lieut R. K. Code	19 Oct 44
Lieut H. G. Timms	19 Oct 44

³ Dog Troop OP Crew: Capt Struthers, L/Bdr Shaw, O, Gnr Harrison, A. J., Gnr Myers G. A., Gnr Smith, L.K.

7. NIJMEGEN

The regimental convoy entered Ghent in the evening of November 4. A last minute change in arrangements, and the failure of the guides to meet the vehicles at the designated place resulted in one of the greatest snafus of the regiment's history. Night time in a strange city of many canals and winding streets, made billeting difficult. By morning most of the men were in the right houses and very few vehicles were missing.

The following is an extract from the regimental War Diary:
"By last light today, from reports received, the entire regiment is in agreement that Ghent is a fine place for an operation like "Relax". The homes we have been allotted are very comfortable, with one or two men billeted in each. Our mess halls are in a large modern factory building, which is turning out to be the center of activity. RHQ is located in a beautiful big house (you might have guessed — Ed) quite a distance away from the general billeting area. The day has been spent in making numerous and varied administrative arrangements which are essential to the operation."

The people of Ghent were the hosts and hostesses for the Third Division. Their hospitality and kindness will always be remembered by the men of the regiment. At first they were a little bewildered by the rough, boisterous, breezy habits of the Canadians who had just come out of a tough battle. But as they got to know them better they understood them and liked them. And the soldiers liked the Belgian people too. "So much like our people" they would say. Letters still travel back and forth to friendships made during that time, to the lady running the pub on the corner, the old couple who had lost their son in the war, the wealthy merchant who was nightly confronted with the scene of his intoxicated guests crawling up the stairs, and to the young couple who won the men's hearts with delicious food.

On November 10 the regiment left these happy surroundings and moved to the Nijmegen area. The entire move took about 16 hours. The area was taken over from 153 Field Regi-

ment, RA, who had been supporting 101 American Airborne Division. That day Capt GOTHARD with his OP crew¹ crossed the German border to establish an OP overlooking the flats beside the Rhine, thereby claiming themselves as the first Canadian soldiers of the war to step on German soil.

The gun positions were, on the average, very good. The 78th Battery had the most comfortable quarters, with a large house for each troop. Fox Troop were fortunate enough to be able to add a piano to their comfortable home. Its acquisition is a story in itself. It is sufficient to say here the credit goes to a group of aggressive, quick thinking and slightly dishonest gunners.

As the line crews had to be in a central position between the guns and the OP, the latitude on location allowed them to pick out some of the better homes in their districts. For example the 22nd Battery crews were well set up in a completely furnished home in shell battered Bergendal about 500 yards from the front line. The officers and men would often drop in there in the evening on their way back from the OP to get a cup of coffee and relax on the chesterfields.

The men of the gun detachments as a general rule lived in dugouts near the guns. The decoration of some reached fantastic proportions. Able Troop, for example, boasted a two room underground home, which accommodated the six men of the detachment and contained a carpeted floor, a chesterfield, many chairs, wall drapes, framed pictures, and a coal stove. Add to this a radio and the electric lights found in all dugouts and houses, and you have a picture of what existed under a foot or two of snow, or beneath the sagging roof of a pup tent. It was rumored that a gun had been fired from inside one of these homes using a long rope, but this has not been confirmed.

The regiment had three OP's deployed at all times, the troop commanders, battery captains and subalterns taking turns at occupying them. For the first period the OP's covered the front from the Rhine to Zijfflich and Wyler Meer. The one on the left was in a factory beside the Rhine, the one in the centre in the top story of a house, the one on the right

was a slit trench on the high ground and commanded a good view of the area. It was from this latter OP that many instructional shoots were carried out.


For the last period the OP's covered the area from Wyler Meer to Groesbeek. The one on the right in Groesbeek was in a house from which the observer looked through a hole in the roof. The others were merely slit trenches.

All OP's were connected by line and very little radio communication was used throughout the winter, except when attacks were made or when fighting patrols were sent out.

17 Nov 44 On November 17 Lt-Col C. R. OSTRANDER took over command of the regiment, Lt-Col LACE taking over the duties of CRA 2 Canadian Infantry Division. Lt-Col OSTRANDER came to the regiment from the 23 Canadian Field (S.P.) Regiment, RCA. Before his service there he had been with 1 Canadian Field Regiment, RCHA during its brief period of action in France in 1940, and with the beach group of 2 Canadian Infantry Division at Dieppe. For his service at Dieppe he was awarded the Croix de Guerre.

The regiment was in the Nijmegen salient for almost three months. During that time two gun positions were occupied, five alternative positions surveyed and another three positions were surveyed for future operations. A limited amount of firing was done. The allotment of ammunition would vary from a few rounds per day to periods when there was no restriction. The OPs fired troop and battery targets, but the largest portion of firing was done firstly on bombards, where every gun in the area would fire one round or a few rounds at the same time and secondly on harassing fire at night, which would either take the form of bombards, or troop targets from sniping positions. Although the OPs were overlooking an area occupied by some 2000 Germans it was very seldom any movement could be observed. All possible targets in the area were registered. Enemy movement was effectively engaged by observed shooting on moonlight nights and by sound on dark nights when the target was close and well known to the OP officer.

This period in Nijmegen proved beneficial to the regiment



Troop command post in winter quarters near Nijmegen.

25 Pdr gun firing from position near Nijmegen — 1 Feb 45.





Voting in the Alberta election. Gnr Casson of Baker Troop
being instructed on how to vote.

Digging a gun pit near the Hochwald forest.





AMMO RETURN. The ammunition report each day *had* to be correct.


NIJMEGEN SALIENT



Constant vigil.



"Gin palace".



Winter quarters.



Infantry in the regimental area.



Limbered up ready to move.



The daily visit of the ration truck.

and the artillery in general. It was an opportunity to do some reviewing of artillery work and to learn the new changes in procedure. The junior officers also received very valuable OP training in the static OPs.

The period was good from a social point of view. The regiment had had no breaks from the battle since they landed in France except for a busy time at the reorganization area near Bayeux and the few days at Ghent. Now the officers² and men had the chance to become acquainted with those in the other batteries. This was particularly beneficial to the officers who, in most cases, had not been with the regiment during the training days in England. Many liberty trucks were sent into Nijmegen and the men had a chance to meet the civilians of the town. Battery and regimental dances were held throughout the winter and at Christmas time each sub-unit had Christmas dinner complete with turkey, oranges, Wehrmacht cigars and plenty to drink. The first regimental dance got out of hand, when the men proved a little too boisterous, but as they became more used to the formalities and customs of mixed company they subsided into recognized behavior.

The period at Nijmegen also gave the regiment a chance to check the guns and polish up on artillery practice. The guns were accurately calibrated and then checked from time to time by observed shoots. The static type of warfare, where occasional raids into enemy territory called for small fire plans and perhaps cooperation of a FOO with the raiding party, gave the opportunity to talk over practices, notice mistakes and give or take criticism.

This period also helped to build up confidence among infantry personnel in the use of artillery. Exchange of infantry and artillery officers for short periods was effected to enable the infantry officer to see just how the artillery functioned and vice versa. Too often casualties among the infantry would be blamed upon the artillery when there was a very good chance it was due to other causes. These days were an opportunity to prove the boast of accuracy.

On December 19 the batteries moved to a new gun area near the monastery where RHQ was situated. Gun and ammunition 19 Dec 44

pits were dug and ammunition was dumped on the position in preparation for the big attack. The details were very secretive but everyone knew that this was the beginning of the much talked of push across the Rhine. About this time the Germans put in the offensive around the Ardennes and its early success suspended progress around the Nijmegen area. The plans for the operation were called off and after three days the guns returned to their old positions where they stayed for another month.

Military intelligence revealed that the Germans intended to make a thrust from the north in the direction of Antwerp following the success of their operation farther south. This would threaten the Nijmegen salient and might even cut it off. In preparing stronger defences switching of troops followed and part of 2 Canadian Infantry Division came under operational command of 3 Canadian Infantry Division Headquarters whose responsibility was the defence of the Nijmegen salient from the Rhine to the Reichswald forest.

The regiment was situated about 1500 yards from the front line in a strategically important area where heavy fighting would likely take place following an enemy penetration. But, although there were many alternative positions prepared, it was felt inadvisable to move the guns to any of these for fear of revealing to the enemy the plans for our future break out from the salient, which had merely been postponed until the German offensive had been broken. There was also the necessity of deep harassing fire only possible from this area.

Eventually it was decided to strengthen the regiments forward gun positions so that they would be a small stronghold in themselves. Infantry were positioned beside the guns and dug in. Anti-tanks guns were sited and some of the 25 pounders were moved to a better position in an anti-tank role. Barbed-wire was erected and the engineers placed mines in areas to the front and flanks. In addition to these precautions, tank hunting teams were formed from the men of the regiment in order to deal with the enemy tanks at close quarters if they broke through. These teams each consisted of a Piat section of two men and a mine section of three men. Two handled a

bracelet of No. 75 grenades to be pulled in front of the tank as it passed. Each team was in charge of an officer who was to see that it was strategically positioned when required. The orders were to hold the gun position to the last man and last round; there was plenty of artillery and small arms ammunition available for the job.

Throughout the winter there was considerable patrol activity by our infantry in order to obtain prisoners. Most of these patrols were aided by the artillery with some sort of fire plan or harassing fire programme. Enemy patrols did, at least on one occasion, penetrate to the gun positions but none were caught.

The most noteworthy operation of the winter from an artillery point of view was operation "Plum". This operation was a daylight raid of company strength by the North Shore Regiment. Its purpose was to obtain prisoners for interrogation. A large scale raid was decided upon instead of the usual patrol, because of the difficulty in the past of obtaining prisoners by patrolling methods. A company was to penetrate the enemy forward defence lines at Wyler and sweep the area in a circular movement to the left, driving the enemy before it back into our own lines. 8 Jan 45

The artillery support allotted to the task was the largest support any single infantry company had received. Their role was:

- (1) To neutralize the enemy mortars and small arms fire.
- (2) To cut off the approaches to the area by shell fire so that reinforcements could not be brought up during the raid.
- (3) To engage enemy artillery which might open up during the raid. As enemy artillery activity had to date been small, and as the raid was to last only an hour, it was felt the enemy artillery was not likely to hamper proceedings and so this phase was considered of minor importance.

The artillery allotted was as follows. Three field regiments (including 13th Canadian Field Regiment) and two medium regiments were to fire in counter mortar and counter small arms role. The field regiments would each fire a stonk on parallel lines with the medium regiments bringing down concs

behind and among the stonks. The 13th Canadian Field Regiment was to fire on the stonk closest to our own troops in case something went wrong and it had to be changed quickly. The problem was how to alter this large volume of fire simply and quickly so that a FOO would have complete control readily available in the heat of battle. Lt-Col OSTRANDER met this by devising a plan whereby, with a cardinal point correction, the entire artillery fire could be altered accordingly. This was made possible by having the fire of these regiments fall into a definite area which was designed to cover the enemy opposition and yet not interfere with the raid. Thus, as the attack progressed, this block of artillery fire was moved back by saying "SE 200" or "SE 400" while, as the attack returned from its objective the block of fire was brought forward by saying "NW 200" or "NW 400" etc. The rate of fire for this reversible barrage was to be intermittent, both because of the limit of ammunition available and because of the effectiveness of such fire in deceiving the enemy and keeping them quiet.

In addition to these tasks, two squadrons of tanks were to harass the routes to the area with HE and AP fire, and the LAA were to do the same with airburst ammunition. Our mortars and medium machine guns were allotted targets for neutralization on the flanks. All known enemy positions were harassed throughout the raid. Most of our casualties during the raid were caused by two enemy mortar bombs making lucky hits on sections of infantry.

Capt A. PENNIE was to be the FOO with the infantry company making the attack with Lieut J. A. CLARK acting as a second observer from a static OP on the high ground behind. The raid was carried out in the afternoon of January 8 over ground freshly covered by snow. The infantry wore white snow suits and used flame throwing carriers for the first time. Five minutes after the operation started all line communications of the regiment had been cut by enemy mortar fire, but the radio sets were operating to carry the necessary orders. Sgt KYLE, Bdr BROWN, and Gnr LEICHT were wounded while working on the line that day.

The raid from an artillery point of view was conducted very

well, the fire plan being well controlled giving effective protection. As a whole however it was considered to have been only partially successful although it did achieve its objective of taking prisoners of war.

Most of the days at the gun positions were very similar. The daily visits of the ration trucks with the mail were always an important event along with the nightly issue of rum to the men. Occasionally German airplanes would fly over and give the gun crews of the ack-ack guns something to shoot at. Sometimes a few shells would land on or near the gun positions. Then too the flights of the buzz bombs over the area and the occasional sight of a V2 being fired are worthy of mention. In the command posts there were targets, shellreps and administrative problems to keep things interesting. The regiment went through the usual phases of such things as a training programme, a health programme, a "keep smart, salute and wear your hat properly" campaign. For awhile the batteries were taking turns at being out of action for 24 hours, at which time many of the lads would head for Nijmegen and the hamburger stand, etc.

This front line city played a strange part in the life of the Nijmegen salient. The city, already much battered by an allied air raid which was made during the German occupation, was still subject to shelling and buzz bomb attacks. It is estimated that the area was within range of about 200 enemy guns which were well coordinated from a high level so that large concentrations of fire could be brought down at one time. Under this constant threat entertainment for the soldiers was carried on. There were theatres, stage shows and clubs for all ranks. It was here that the regimental dances and Christmas parties took place amid very comfortable surroundings. And yet many of the streets of the city were in full view of the enemy. It was possible for personnel of the regiment to be in an OP on the front line during the day and be dancing that evening at a party given at a private home.

On November 21 Capt J. R. MILANI took over as adjutant, Capt A. K. POUSSETTE going to 2 Canadian Infantry Division as I.O. New Years Eve was celebrated in a gunner's way

by adding to the crescendo of shells which decended on Jerryland at midnight.

30 Jan 45 On January 30 the batteries moved back to the gun positions by the monastery in preparation for the offensive which had been postponed in December. The stage was being set for operation "Veritable" — the clearing of the approaches to the Rhine.

¹ Baker Troop OP crew:

Capt E. C. Gothard, Gnr Richardson, F. J. (now Bdr), Gnr Lahd, O. L., Gnr Perkins, R. B., Gnr Germscheid, D. J.

² *Strength Increase*

Major	E. A. Omsted		9 Dec 44
Capt	W. C. Miller		4 Jan 45
Capt	A. Pennie		16 Nov 44
Capt	G. B. Robinson	(CDC)	10 Dec 44
Capt	C. M. Russel		10 Dec 44
Capt	W. A. Shea	(RCAMC)	2 Nov 44
Lieut	A. A. Adams		24 Dec 44
Lieut	F. A. Barley		8 Nov 44
Lieut	E. T. Cantwell		2 Feb 45
Lieut	G. M. Green		8 Nov 44
Lieut	D. W. Murray		2 Feb 45

Strength Decrease

Capt	G. C. Langille	HQ 2 Cdn Cps	2 Dec 44
Capt	A. K. Poussette	HQ 2 Cdn Inf	
		Div RCA	21 Nov 44
Capt	R. J. Waldie	Air OP Course	8 Dec 44

8. THE PUSH FOR THE RHINE CROSSING

Operation "Veritable" was the name for the offensive of 30 British Corps, attacking through the Reichswald forest with the intention of pushing the enemy from the east bank of the Rhine between Nijmegen and Wesel and if possible effecting a crossing of the Rhine in the area of Wesel.

3 Canadian Infantry Division was under command of 30 British Corps for the operation. Their task was to attack and destroy the enemy in the flats below Nijmegen. Of this 8 C.I.B. was to attack and destroy the enemy in the towns of Leuth, Zandpol, Kekerdom, Zyfflich and Millingen.

The artillery for the commencement of the operation consisted of 1040 guns, not counting the ack-ack regiments which were to be deployed in a ground role. This was the largest concentration of artillery ever to support an attack.

They were to work together for about 12 hours, firing on all known enemy gun positions and strong points within range. A number of smoke screens were laid on, designed to screen the attack, to confuse the enemy and to draw their fire, but the feature attraction was to be a tremendous barrage supporting the attack of the 2 Canadian Infantry Division, and two British divisions. This barrage was to fall on the opening line for 40 minutes, at which time the attack would commence and the fire lift forward.

The 13th Canadian Field Regiment was to take part in the initial artillery preparation in immediate support of the 8 C.I.B. attack in the evening. After that it would be necessary for the regiment to deploy forward to continue to support the brigade as it advanced across the flats to Millingen.

The artillery available for the immediate support of 8 C.I.B. attack scheduled for 1800 hours (H hour) consisted of the 13th Canadian Field Regiment with another field regiment and a medium regiment on call. A total of 4 field regiments and 3 medium regiments (less 1 battery) were to take part in the fire plan from H-60 to H-150. The divisional artillery plus 3 field regiments and 3 medium regiments were made available, after this time, to all attacking units in 3 Canadian Infantry Division.


In December of the previous year, gun positions had been prepared out on the flats with gun and ammunition pits ready to be occupied before 8 C.I.B. began the attack. Subsequently the Germans cut the dykes and this area was soon under water. Occupation there was impossible. Then early in February another position had been prepared for the same purpose. 7,000 sandbags were brought into the new area and concealed in buildings ready to be placed around the guns and command posts when the signal was given. Sandbags were necessary because gun pits if dug soon filled with water.

A few days before the operation began more dykes were cut by the Germans. The whole area of 8 C.I.B.'s attack and the newly prepared gun position started to flood. A day before the attack it became evident that another gun area had to be prepared so alterations had to be made in the artillery plan in support of 8 C.I.B.

To find another gun position was a problem. The only areas which field guns could use and still be within range for the final phase of the 8 C.I.B. attack were now under water. The only alternative was for the regiment to deploy in the Wyler area being both within range of Millingen and on high ground not subject to flooding. The disadvantages of such an occupation were that: (1) It was necessary to wait until the area was captured by 2 Canadian Infantry Division and thereby possibly leave the 8 C.I.B. without artillery support for some time. (2) The area was situated in what had been the German forward defence line during the winter and was heavily mined and booby trapped by them. (3) In addition the American troops of the 101 Airborne Division had occupied the area and had planted there many uncharted mine fields. These had already given trouble in operation "Plum". The regiment had been offered dogs to run over the minefield but as speed in occupation would be essential the work of dogs among men inexperienced in their use would be useless. Hand operated mine detectors would also be useless because the area contained so much wire and pieces of shrapnel. It was eventually decided to occupy the position in the normal manner and take the risks. It might have been argued that the risks were



WYLER, GERMANY. The gun area was lousy with schu-mines.



13 Fd. Regt, B.C.A.
Wyler, Germany.

B. L. Montgomery
Field-Marshal

10 Feb 45



OPERATION "VERITABLE"



Opening barrage in operation "Veritable",
8 Feb 45.



Daily maintenance.



Troop command post at Nijmegen.



Troop gun position at Wyler.



The Reichswald forest

too great to warrant the use of artillery here but then, on the other hand, to refuse to give the infantry artillery support in their attacks would put them in a much more dangerous position.

The last minute changes in the fire plan of the regiment, dictated by flooding, consisted of moving the bulk of the allotted fire plan from the villages to be captured onto the dykes where most of the opposition was now expected since they were now the only unflooded portions of the area.

Before the attack the regiment had over 40,000 rounds of ammunition dug in, ready to be used. The briefing was completed and the Reps and FOOs departed to their battalions. With the Queens Own Rifles of Canada were Major J. D. ROSS, Capt A. L. LEE, and Capt W. C. MILLER all of 22nd Battery. With the Regiment de la Chaudiere were Major W. B. HANCOCK, Lieut J. P. GRENIER, and Capt E. A. OLMSTED¹ of the 78th Battery. All the FOOs and Reps were equipped with Weasels² in place of carriers, and were accompanied by their crews of ables, signallers and drivers.

At 0500 hours February 8 the artillery opened up. With the guns of the many artillery regiments so close together the noise was terrific. Field, medium, heavy, super-heavy, light ack-ack and heavy ack-ack were firing in unison on a timed programme. At 1000 hours the regiment had finished firing in the pre-bombardment phase and were employed in counter battery fire for the next 30 minutes. At 1115 hours the regiment commenced a smoke screen firing one round a minute for six hours. The screen, which was put down by many other regiments as well, was 4000 to 5000 yards long stretching across the entire front. Immediately after finishing this, the regiment switched to targets in preparation for the 8 C.I.B. attack. A total of 4 medium regiments and 4 field regiments fired periodically into a stretch of dyke 600 yards long and 20 yards wide (across which the advance was to go) for an hour switching from time to time to fire into Zandpol and Leuth and the other key villages.

As the zero hour drew near the rate of fire was increased. In addition the attack was postponed in order to put down more artillery fire.

"Veritable"
8 Feb 45

Such a thorough preparation showed results when the attack of the North Shores and Chauds was launched. The regiment fired 500 rounds per gun during the day. The infantry moved forward in Buffalos and canoes with most of the FOOs and Reps in Weasels. The initial landing on the dyke was made by the North Shores from Buffalos with Charlie Troop OP crew³ moving in with the leading company. There were numerous casualties from mines but few from small arms. The North Shores swung right up the dyke along the Rhine towards Zandpol. The Chauds landed after the North Shores from canoes and attacked up the road and dyke to the right towards Leuth. The strong current from the Rhine, through the gap in the dyke blown by the Germans, caused difficulties in navigation by canoes and Weasels, but these were surmounted. By the time the units had crossed the open stretch of water and reached their part of the dyke, their strength had been greatly depleted by the loss of boats which either had broken down, run on obstacles in the water or were temporarily lost in the darkness. Yet in spite of the attackers strength being weakened by stranded boats etc., a position which the enemy could have made well nigh impregnable was taken without serious casualties. In some cases the enemy were so dazed they had no fight left in them. 36 hours after the original dyke position was taken, four Germans were found in a dugout near the landing stage. When opposition was met at Zandpol (at that time a small island with some twenty houses and a partly submerged road leading to them) artillery fire was called down which was very effective enabling "B" Company of the North Shores to overrun the position before the Germans got out of the cellars.

Wyler
9 Feb 45 The attack progressed favorably during the night and by morning, after an impatient period of waiting, the town of Wyler had been cleared and the regiment moved to the new area. The deployment in the mine-studded fields and among shell torn houses was both unusual and tragic. Major BAIRD led the recce parties in with his typical boldness and brevity. The command post officers and ables ran back and forth across the minefields and past booby traps, trying to find suitable places for the guns which were following up behind

them. A number of Germans were taken prisoner by the party as it spread out over the area. Then the guns arrived. Dog Troop immediately had trouble moving onto their position when an FAT ran over a mine. Bdr McLEOD and Gnr STONE were both injured. At Charlie Troop L/Sgt HAYS and Gnr CARTER were killed when one of them stepped on a mine on their gun position. BSM CHOWN standing nearby was slightly wounded. Able Troop was in such a bad area they had to deploy alongside the road, making it necessary to stop traffic when the guns were being fired. At Baker Troop the FAT's brought the guns onto the position but they stuck in the heavy mud before they reached their gun markers. They were forced to drop their trails and fire from where they were. Regardless of all the difficulties experienced, when the attack of the Queens Own went into Millingen the regiment was ready in their new position to support them. The unit had been the first Canadian artillery regiment to deploy in Germany.

The work of the forward artillery parties in the two day amphibious operation was excellent. The Weasels in which they travelled gave considerable trouble. Capt MILLER's Weasel sank when its hull was punctured by a fence post and the crew were forced to swim for it.⁴ Capt LEE's vehicle developed engine trouble and had to be abandoned with the rising water.⁵ Major O'SHEA's carrier⁶ fell into a shell hole in a foot and a half of water, could not be dislodged and also had to be abandoned with the rising water. Major HANCOCK's⁷ carrier broke and had to be abandoned. Capt OLMSTED's Weasel was punctured by the top of a submerged telephone pole and barely managed to reach a high piece of ground near Leuth. There he and his crew⁸ were stranded for 48 hours until rescued by a passing Buffalo. Lieut GRENIER's vehicle also broke down making it necessary for himself and his signaller⁹ to move forward in water up to their waist carrying the r8 set and keeping communications open.

Gnr OWEN, J. S. of the 44th Battery showed great coolness during the battle by maintaining communications in the face of heavy German shelling from an exposed position. Gnr LACEY of the 44th Battery, though wounded in the mouth by a mine

fragment in the early phase of the attack, carried on through the night with his duties until the objective was reached. Gnr WISE of the 78th Battery, and Gnr BROWN of the 44th Battery, also did excellent jobs throughout the attack. At this time Capt ELSE was acting as a Rep with the 15 (Scottish) Division.¹⁰

Following the capture and consolidation of the 8 C.I.B. area the FOOs and Reps were withdrawn with the exception of Major Ross and Capt MILLER and their parties who established themselves in Millingen and directed artillery fire on the far bank of the Rhine.

Tac Brigade Headquarters also moved to Millingen along with the Queens Own Headquarters. The flooded condition of the town created a strange situation where transportation from one house to another was by means of boat. The air OP plane dropped mail to the artillery group a number of times with varying success.

For days the regiment occupied the gun position at Wyler firing a large programme every night onto the far bank of the Rhine. As the position was the best one available in the area, the regiment was left there while the remainder of 3 Canadian Infantry Division moved on beyond Cleve and 43 (W) Division took over the patrolling of the Rhine.

As day after day passed by at the same position, the men came to call themselves the forgotten regiment. All the fighting was now beyond Cleve. Occasionally shells would land in the gun area but no damage was done. As the Germans had a view of the gun positions on clear days from across the Rhine smoke screens were put down by smoke companies.

Many casualties were caused to the British engineers who started to clear the mines out of the area. H/Capt CHAPPEL, the regimental padre, with typical disregard for his own safety walked out into the minefield to bring out a dead engineer for burial.

Luisendorf Reichswald forest and deployed beyond Cleve near the village
23 Feb 45 of Luisendorf.

Preparations were now being made for Operation "Blockbuster". The 3 Canadian Infantry Division, now directly

under 2 Canadian Corps, was to attack and destroy the enemy in the area of Keppeln and Udem, following an advance by 2 Canadian Infantry Division on the left and preparatory to a follow-up by 4 Canadian Armoured Division and 11 British Armoured Division. 8 C.I.B. was to attack the Keppeln area and allow 9 C.I.B. to go through to take out Udem. The artillery problems brought out in this attack were as follows:

- (1) The 2 Canadian Infantry Division barrage extended over the brigade front by 800 yards. This barrage was followed by Kangaroos and, as it was feared that some Kangaroos might have broken down in this area, the regiment's Reps were not allowed to engage targets until the battle was well underway.
- (2) It was to be a three battalion attack and therefore artillery resources would have to be coordinated to assist each of them in the best possible way.
- (3) The nature of the ground before each battalion was different. The Queens Own on the left were to advance through groups of farm buildings surrounded by trees; each group was held by the enemy and had to be taken individually. The North Shores were to attack over a 2000 yard open stretch to Keppeln, broken only by a farm house in the centre of the area. On the right the Chauds were confronted with individual farm buildings, each one a stronghold.
- (4) The brigade and regiment had arrived upon the scene late in the preparatory period and had little time to get ready for the attack.

The artillery available to 8 C.I.B. for this operation was the largest yet. It included in addition to 6 field and 4 medium regiments the use of 7 heavy artillery batteries.

A timed fire plan, including counter mortar fire and preparatory fire, was laid on to get each battalion on its objective using all the artillery resources. For the remainder of the time the support from the artillery regiments was divided into two parts. First, the seven heavy batteries, two medium regiments and two field regiments (all in other formations) were given a fire plan for one hour. This plan, was designed to cover the final objective as well as known enemy mortar positions beyond

the brigade objective and all escape routes. The Reps at brigade could call for this support with a single code word for as long as was needed. This turned out to be very successful, since communications through higher formations were difficult and the battle lasted all day instead of three hours. The fire discouraged the enemy from falling back to the strongly prepared defences of Udem and kept them in the Keppeln area until they were either killed or captured. The second part of the artillery plan, that of close support, was provided by two medium regiments and field regiments of the division which were also controlled throughout the operation by the Reps at brigade headquarters. Infantry attacks and artillery support were arranged and coordinated by them throughout the day as the need arose.

24 Feb 45 On February 24 the gun positions were subjected to continuous enemy harassing fire. An English medium artillery regiment to the flank suffered heavy casualties and were forced to move to another area. Many shells fell in the 22nd Battery area damaging a number of vehicles but causing no casualties. At the 44th Battery area an enemy shell hit an ammunition lorry being unloaded on the gun position. The lorry was set on fire. Gnr FILSINGER was killed and Bdr STROMQUIST and Gnr YOUNG were wounded. Bdr STROMQUIST, although seriously wounded in the neck, called for a stretcher to evacuate the other wounded case and jumped into the truck and by throwing out cartridges cases and beating down the flames he was able to put out the fire. This action saved the explosion of many rounds of ammunition with the almost certain result of more casualties on the troop position. During the whole time the enemy continued to harass the gun position with shell fire. When the fire was put out Bdr STROMQUIST collapsed and was then found to be seriously wounded. For his timely and gallant action he was awarded the Military Medal.

"Blockbuster" The attack of the brigade went in on the morning of February
26 Feb 45 26 with the strong artillery support under the control of Lt-Col OSTRANDER. Baker Company of the North Shores had what turned out to be the most difficult assignment. They encoun-

tered strong opposition in the group of buildings half way to Keppeln and suffered heavy casualties. The situation called for the Wasp flame throwers which were standing by with the reserve company. As infantry communications to the Wasps had at this time broken down the company commander asked the FOOs to pass the message through the artillery radio set, but it had been smashed by shell fire. As L/Sgt R. D. BUSWELL had the only available motorcycle, he volunteered, above his line of duty as signal NCO with the FOO, to go back to fetch the Wasps. This he did by moving over open country on his motorcycle, in spite of the fire which had pinned down the infantry. As he returned, leading the Wasps, the speedometer of his motorcycle was shot away by machine-gun fire and as he neared the forward company, an AP shot hit his machine immediately behind his legs. On foot he directed the Wasps to the company commander who in turn directed the Wasps against the two buildings, thereby silencing the opposition. As L/Sgt BUSWELL was removing his motorcycle from the road one of the returning Wasps struck a mine two yards away which threw him to the rear of the FOO's carrier. Though shaken he continued on with his duties, through the attack. For his actions this day he was awarded the Military Medal. The artillery officers with the North Shores in this battle were Major T. O'SHEA, Capt A. PENNIE and Lieut W. J. BRENNAN.

The Queens Own on the left, with Major W. L. LAWSON, Capt G. E. LENNOX, and Capt W. C. MILLER, and their crews ran into heavy opposition as they worked their way from house to house behind our artillery fire. The shells landed 100 yards and sometimes 50 yards in front of the infantry who became accustomed to walking right up to the fire and waiting for it to lift. It was in this engagement that Sgt COUSENS of the Queens Own won the Victoria Cross. Capt MILLER was wounded in the first half hour of the battle. L/Sgt HOLTZMAN NCO of Able Troop signals and Gnr DAVIDSON were both wounded when their carrier ran over a mine.

The Regiment de la Chaudiere, with Major W. B. HANCOCK, Capt D. F. BURROWS, Capt J. M. R. ETHIER and their crews

also had a difficult time. L/Bdr KERR, one of the artillery signallers responsible for maintaining line communications to a FOO with the Chauds, was awarded the Military Medal for his gallant action here. The Chauds, after seven hours of bitter fighting, were held up short of their objective. All communications to the left forward company had broken down. It was essential that this objective be taken before the second phase of the operation could be launched. To do this communications had to be opened to this forward company and a new artillery fire plan prepared. L/Bdr KERR, on foot, crossed a field swept by enemy machine-gun and mortar fire to lay a line to this company which he established just 25 minutes before the zero hour set for the attack. At times during this daring action his jacket was pierced in several places by shrapnel. However, with utter disregard for his own personal safety, L/Bdr KERR continued on foot and established the all-essential communications. Capt BURROWS was slightly wounded by a shell fragment but carried on, the wound not being serious enough to warrant evacuation. After 8 C.I.B. had consolidated on their objective 9 C.I.B. had little difficulty pushing on through.

27 Feb 45 On the evening of February 27 the regiment moved in the direction of Udem along congested roads. As there was only one available road for the deployment of the attack the regiment went into a concentration area during the night as close to Udem as possible. The next morning the guns moved on to positions at Udem. There was little firing from here so the
28 Feb 45 Udem gunners were able to catch up on their sleep. Major BAIRD left for a two day visit to School of Artillery, Larkhill.

Following the success of 2 Canadian Infantry Division and 3 Canadian Infantry Division, the 4 Canadian Armoured Division had pushed through between the Balberger Wald and the Hochwald forests on a narrow front following the railway track. As the enemy in these forests had shown no sign of falling back there was a possibility that the armoured division would be cut off. To offset this the two infantry divisions were quickly thrown into the gap to clear the threat on the flanks. The Chauds were to open the attack for 8 C.I.B. from the rail-



RECCE PARTY. A typical recce jeep. The "gin palaces", when used, found difficulty in keeping up.




COMMAND POST FASHIONS

OR THE GOOD EARTH


By BETTER DUCK



LARKHILL MODEL
RECOMMENDED - FOR LARKHILL.



MK III DELUXE MODEL - REQUISITIONED
FROM WEHRMACHT - TENDENCY TO
DEVELOP INTO FLOPHOUSE - POKER DEN.
MAYBE SHARED BY RATS (NOT WATER).



MK IV - MODERN, UP-TO-DATE...
ALL THE COMFORTS OF HOME...
WITH THAT ADDED TANG
OF DANGER....



MK IV *
SAME, AMENDED.

NIX IN DE WINKEL
ALLES IN DE KELDER!

(WITH APOLOGIES FOR
THE SPELLING)

LAY



Slow progress in flooded areas near the Scheldt.


Infantry passing a Buffalo while moving up for the attack
near Nijmegen — 8 Feb 45.





Pontoon bridge across the Rhine at Emmerich, used by the regiment — 1 Apr 45.

Crossing the Ijssel River. An FAT, limber, and gun of another field artillery regiment.



road working south through the Balberger Wald. The attack was quickly teed up, Lt-Col OSTRANDER being informed of the plan only four hours before the attack began. The list of targets was passed on to the Reps simply from a single marked map.

At this time Major HANCOCK was temporarily acting as second in command and Capt OLMSTED was acting as BC of the 78th Battery.

The Chauds started the attack at night preceded by a small fire plan of artillery. From then on the artillery could do very little. The FOOs had difficulty in seeing their targets before they were right up to them, and it was impossible to fire accurately in the woods where the trees would stop a shell short of its target and create a dangerous airburst. The Chauds made little progress during the night attack, the battle developing into a hand-to-hand fight, with the Germans using infiltration tactics in the darkness. 1 Mar 45

The Queens Own and North Shores pushed through the forest the next day, making better headway in the daylight. That day Lieut TIMMS and Lieut BRENNAN were both wounded in the attack. The news of Lieut TIMMS' casualty came down over the air as "Our commander has just gotten six points". Lieut BRENNAN was hit while he was trying to bring fire on a troublesome German S.P. gun which was shelling them over open sights. 2 Mar 45

The regiment was busy that day with harassing fire. It was found that if the FOOs could give accurate locations of the forward infantry positions, it was possible to put down effective artillery harassing fire by adding 100 yards to the elevation on the guns for any error and adding an additional 300 yards for crest clearance troubles. Towards the end of the battle in the woods the artillery was used very little because of the difficulty of accurately locating the infantry.

Capt HOGG took over from Lieut BRENNAN after he was wounded.

The following day the guns moved to the edge of the Hochwald near the town of Udemerbruch. The RHQ kitchen truck and the M.O., Capt SHEA got lost in the confusion of 3 Mar 45 Udemerbruch

traffic and started wandering into no Man's Land when an alert OR stopped them just in time. Firing became busy and continuous for the next few days as the FOOs came out into the open on the far side of the forest and found more targets. The ammunition haul was long and slow due to the road traffic and the ammunition men were a weary looking group.

Capt HOGG had a ticklish time for a while when a German S.P. tried to dislodge him from his OP. Capt BURROWS had a strenuous night with the Chauds near Sonsbeck when our artillery circled their position with fire to prevent an expected counter attack.

On March 5 Gnr W. J. MAYNES of the 78th Battery, a driver, distinguished himself under enemy fire by driving away from a burning tank two carriers and a jeep. He tried to drive away another jeep but the fire had gained too much headway. He was only able to escape before it blew up. For this action Gnr MAYNES was awarded the Military Medal. Heavy vehicle casualties had recently been suffered in the forest fighting. The saving of the two carriers was of immediate assistance to the operation, one of them containing the FOOs communication for artillery support.

7 Mar 45 Dog Troop command post had an accident through fire when someone started to fill an oil lamp with what they thought was oil. Unfortunately the jerricans were mixed up and they put gasoline in the lamp by mistake. Lieut CLAY, Gnr D. GREEN and Gnr LAMARCHE were burned about the hands and face and the command post equipment including arty board, tannoy and gun programmes for the next day's attack on Xanten were all destroyed. Lieuts BARLEY, LAVALLEE and RIERSON with the command post staff got together enough equipment and by morning they were able to take part in the fire plan. The attack on Xanten was made by 2 Canadian Infantry Division, the regiment taking part in the 19 line barrage followed by concs. A total of 412 rounds per gun were used. The regiment was standing by ready to move across the Rhine in case of a break through at this point, but it did not materialize.

On March 10 the regiment went out of action and moved to Cleve where they were to rest, clean up and wait for the next operation.

Cleve
10 Mar 45

-
- ¹ Later Major E. A. Olmsted.
² Tracked vehicles equipped to travel over water.
³ Charlie Troop OP crew:
 Capt W. L. Hogg, Gnr Lacey, Gnr Brown, Gnr Callaghan.
⁴ Baker Troop OP crew:
 Capt W. C. Miller, L/Bdr Bohn, B. J., Gnr Richardson, F. J., Gnr Germscheid, D. J.
 and Gnr Lahd, O. L.
⁵ Able Troop OP crew:
 Capt A. L. Lee, Gnr MacMullen, J. T., Gnr Peck, V. L., Gnr Ferguson, D. A., and
 Gnr Blance, R. S. J.
⁶ Major T. O'Shea's crew:
 Gnr Gunnell, F. C., Gnr Owen, J. S., Gnr Tuley, J.
⁷ Major W. B. Hancock's crew:
 Gnr MacFarland, J. G., Gnr MacDonald, D., Gnr Strang, A.
⁸ Easy Troop OP crew:
 Capt. Olmsted, Gnr Mayes, W. J., Gnr Lochart, and Gnr Brandon, A. B.
⁹ Fox Troop OP crew:
 Lieut J. P. Grenier, Gnr Dayman, J. A., Gnr Wise, W. F., Gnr Britton, Gnr
 Shepherd, N. W.
¹⁰ *Strength Increase:*
 Major W. L. Lawson 15 Feb 45
 Capt D. F. Burrows 17 Feb 45
 Capt G. E. Lennox 15 Feb 45
Strength Decrease:
 Major J. D. Ross 5 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA
 Capt J. W. Bennett 12 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA 14 Feb 45
 Capt A. L. Lee H.Q. RCA 16 Feb 45

9. CROSSING THE RHINE

Cleve
11 Mar 45 The rest at Cleve was one of those affairs typical of the army where everybody talks about a rest, no one has a rest and at the end of the time everyone feels much better for the change. The typical line of conversation at the time went like this "What, sleep in that rubble heap? Give me a hole in the ground any day" or "Did you hear that, the goon wants the mud scraped from the *underneath* part of the vehicles. What will they think of next," or again "Rest area? Why, there are more shells going by here than at the front lines."

Yes, everyone was busy at Cleve; washing the vehicles, painting them with anything and everything of a reputed khaki shade; cleaning out from inside all the junk that had accumulated. All grass growing on the tops of vehicles had to be removed. It was amazing what was found underneath the tarpaulins and camouflage nets. Even a spare tire turned up in one of the troop quads.

During the period at Cleve the guns of the regiment were comparatively calibrated by fall of shot with two standard guns of 21 Army Group.

14 Mar 45 Brigadier ROBERTS, Commander 8 C.I.B., held an inspection of the regiment and thanked the men for the work they had done in support of the brigade.

There were hundreds of small things that had to be done. Blankets were exchanged for clean ones. The shortage of jerricans was at last remedied. Bath parades were frequent. New uniforms were given out and new and old kit shortages replaced.

Preparations were now being made for operation "Plunder". Recce parties had gone out to the new area. The location of the new area and the plans of the operation were kept very secret. Only a few officers knew the plans until the regiment had completed the move.

The operation involved the crossing of the Rhine. 51 (H) Division was to make the assault in our sector, crossing the river at Rees. 9 C.I.B. was under command 51 (H) Division for the assault, with the North Shore Regiment temporarily

attached to 9 C.I.B. The rest of 8 C.I.B. was to cross at Rees later and join the North Shores on the left flank of the bridgehead working towards Emmerich. After the capture of Emmerich 8 C.I.B. were to push on and take the Hoch Elten feature. This feature was the high ground north of Emmerich which commanded the approaches to the Rhine in that area. It was essential that this be made untenable for the enemy. The artillery was to support the crossing of the river and then to harass the enemy on the Hoch Elten feature. The 13th Field Regiment had this in addition to their usual task of providing close support for 8 C.I.B. Once Emmerich and its approaches had been secured, a bridge would be built opposite the town where the guns of the regiment would cross.

To support the crossing at Rees the regiment was to take up gun positions at Wissel. As secrecy was desired the ammunition was taken there a few days before occupation and concealed in barns and against sides of buildings out of aerial view. Then at night on March 21 the guns were taken down to the area with skeleton detachments and skeleton command post staffs. The surplus vehicles moved to the gun area two days later. During the move Sgt HENDERSON of the 44th Battery had an accident while riding his motorcycle. After setting out that night with the convoy he disappeared and was not heard from until a week later when a hospital in England notified the regiment he was there recovering from a motorcycle accident. Sgt HENDERSON had apparently run into something on the move.

Wissel
21 Mar 45

The guns and vehicles were concealed in and beside buildings and camouflaged as well as possible. The whole area was screened off from the enemy by a smoke screen which extended along the Rhine for 30 miles. The gun area was surveyed and mathematics completed down to the necessary target data for each gun. All that remained was for the gun pits to be dug, the guns rolled into them and put on their zero line.

"A" Echelon, which in this case included the regimental wagon lines, was situated on a street of very up to date and comfortable homes. The civilian owners had "left" and the

men were right at home in the generous accomodation. Such novelties as china dishes, beautiful silverware, white sheets, pyjamas, dressing gowns, slippers, civilian radios and victrolas were plentiful and used freely. Breakfast in bed had been considered but somehow the high-priced help did not understand.

23 Mar 45 On March 23 at 1200 hours digging on the various gun positions commenced. Simultaneously in the whole area men began digging slit trenches and weapon pits. In the small fields flanked by the houses of Wissel the dirt started to fly as everyone worked feverishly to be ready to fire ahead of the others. In the middle of the afternoon as if the enemy had caught sight of our activities, the German artillery started to shell the area. The German guns on the far side of the river were only 1200 yards away. One round landed on Able Troop's position wounding Sgt MOFFAT and Gnr MANNING. Another round wounded Gnr PANKOSKI on Charlie Troop gun position.

At 1700 hours our guns opened up in the initial firing of the pre-assault artillery preparation. Counter battery targets were engaged for an hour and five minutes. At 2030 hours the fire plan was fired in support of the assault of 51 (H) Division. The closeness of the guns in the small gun positions, the fast rate of fire and the many incoming shells contributed to a very noisy and unpleasant evening.

It should be mentioned here the difficulties under which the regiment was working due to the shortage of personnel. This was caused both by the number of officers and men away on leave and by the lack of reinforcements. This condition had been prevalent since Operation "Blockbuster". Cases of four men in a gun detachment instead of six and one officer at a command post instead of two were frequent. Many deployments, much firing and a 24 hour working day were putting the men under strain.

Gnr HARRIS, the Fitter Gun of Dog Troop was seriously wounded by enemy shell fire. Not long after, the regiment received the report that two battalions of 51 (H) Division were across the river. The guns were very busy for the next few days as the bridgehead was expanding. The North Shores

crossed at Rees with Major O'SHEA as Rep and Capt CAMPBELL as the only FOO. Capt ELSE was occupying a static OP ¹ at the time near Warbeyen to observe enemy activity around Emmerich and the Hoch Elten feature and to direct artillery fire on it if necessary. This was Capt CAMPBELL's first experience as full fledged FOO. The crew with him boasted that this was the sixth officer under whom they had served in action at the OP. ²

The North Shores pushed through towards Millingen on the far side of the Rhine assisted by a large artillery lifting barrage flanked by "boxes" of smoke on either side. Once the town was taken, 43 (Wyvern) Division came through and made a break to the north. Capt OLMSTED had been serving as Rep with 43 (W) Division until they went through 9 C.I.B.

On March 28 the regiment moved to a gun position north of Cleve so as to be able to support the infantry as they moved through Emmerich. Cleve
28 Mar 45

Now the rest of 8 C.I.B. was crossing the Rhine. With the Queens Own were Major LAWSON, Capt WARD, Capt LENNOX and their crews. With the Chauds were Major HANCOCK, Capt BURROWS, Capt ETHIER and their crews. The battalion crossed the river by ferry at Rees and swung left towards Emmerich. The static OP near Warbeyen was now occupied by Capt GOTHARD, ³ as Capt ELSE was proceeding to 6 Canadian Field Regiment, RCA, with the rank of Major. Capt GOTHARD was able to observe the infantry as it fought its way towards Emmerich and the effect of our artillery concentrations on Hoch Elten. This OP was very unusual in as much as observation was down the Rhine watching our attack come up the other side towards it, thus looking at the backs of the Germans. Most of the firing from the gun position north of Cleve consisted of Victor Targets. On March 29, Victor targets were fired on this feature every 10 minutes throughout the day. 29 Mar 45
The next day the guns put on a fire plan for the capture of Emmerich and by evening the town was practically cleared. 30 Mar 45

8 C.I.B. then pushed on to Houtoum which the Queens Own and Chauds took on and then advanced towards the Hoch

Elten feature with the Chauds attacking from the south and the North Shores and Queens Own attacking from the east. Little opposition was encountered due to the terrific weight of artillery which had been fired into the hill. So heavy was the shelling that in some places the contour of the feature had been noticeably changed, and little but stumps and shattered trunks remained of the heavy growth of trees which had covered the hill. Over a period of a few days the area had approximately four million rounds fall on it. The few snipers who were left were taken on by our artillery with success. The 1st Canadian Rocket Battery firing on this feature proved its effectiveness and efficiency.


Early in the morning of April 1, after most of the regiment had been up all night expecting the order to move, the guns took up position close to the Rhine near Emmerich to be in readiness for crossing the river as soon as the bridge was built. The recce parties started out for the new gun area by way of Rees.

That evening under cover of darkness the regiment moved across the Rhine. As if the thrill of crossing the mighty barrier was not sufficient in itself, the German airforce took the occasion for a hurried visit so that the crossing was made with the active assistance of searchlights and ack-ack guns. Over the rocking pontoon bridge, through the battered ruins of Emmerich and out into the country on the far side, the convoy groped its way. It was a great feeling to be across the river which had been an obstacle to victory for so long. There had been many changes in personnel since the time when the Falaise pocket was closed and the regiment was dashing up the coast of France but the same feeling was with the men now, the sense of relief, the spirit of hope, the contemplation of an early victory.

Once across the river 8 C.I.B. had their last use of large groups of artillery with exception of a few fire plans on Zutphen. From now on they would have to rely entirely upon their own divisional artillery. Capt OLMSTED temporarily took over command of the 44th Battery while Major O'SHEA went on leave.



LEAVING THE GUN POSITION. The men had accumulated so much "personal kit" that they often forgot the original purpose of the Field Artillery Tractor.



NORTHERN HOLLAND

REGT L. ROUTE IN RED

REGT L. POSITIONS

0 1 2 3 4 5 10
Miles



"Targets were engaged...." Gun at full recoil while firing from Wissel
on targets across the Rhine.

"Harassing fire was carried out during the night".
Muzzle flash of gun while firing from Wissel.



Late that night the regiment went into a concentration area in the forest beyond Zeddam; back into Holland and everyone was glad of it.

Zeddam
1 Apr 54

The following morning the guns moved again. The news of the fighting was good. The enemy were withdrawing quickly. Our infantry, artillery and reconnaissance regiments were passing each other in their eagerness to push ahead. Then contact was regained by the infantry and the guns went into position at Kilder to support the advance. The Queens Own were now engaged, with Capt LENNOX and Capt WARD calling down targets as they moved through Wehl on the road to Laag-Keppel. On one occasion here Capt LENNOX called for his carrier which was some distance behind relaying the fire orders from the 18 set over the more powerful 19 set to the guns. The carrier coming up missed the road turning and drove past the forward infantry. A German S.P. fired at them three times before they had a chance to swerve off to the right behind a building. That building was to have been the objective of the forward platoon. The Queens Own continued the push forward against heavy enemy shelling and consolidated south of the Laag-Keppel bridge, which had been destroyed. The guns moved next day by batteries near the town of Achterwehl in sight of the church tower of Doesburg.

Kilder
2 Apr 45

Achterwehl
3 Apr 45

The Chauds came across the river on the flank by an unbroken bridge and took Laag-Keppel. At this time Lieut TIMMS relieved Capt LENNOX who was due to go on leave.

The North Shores pushed on to Doesburg followed by the Chauds and Queens Own who deployed in preparation for an attack. The 22nd Battery OPs were in the vicinity of Rade and Oldburgen overlooking the well-fortified positions of the enemy. Capt BURROWS and Capt ETHIER had a good OP overlooking Doesburg.

Preparations were made for an attack but at the last minute it was called off as it was felt its capture was not worth the costly fight. Instead the enemy were left there, to be outflanked later on, with the Chauds remaining behind for a short time in a containing role.

The axis of advance was now north along the Keppel-

Zutphen road, the guns moving by batteries to positions near Baak. From here the regiment fired many Mike targets on the enemy across the river near Doesburg and took part in a large harassing fire programme in support of 9 C.I.B. who were advancing to Zutphen. A great amount of firing was done from this position. Enemy artillery was active too, making the 44th Battery position, which was located near a church, a very hot spot. L/Sgt THOMPSON, Gnr GURSKY and Gnr PUGH were wounded by a heavy calibre shell while walking from dinner. The battery recce'd an alternative position but did not use it.

On April 7 the regiment moved to gun positions near Joppe and started off the firing with many battery targets taking in an arc of fire from 80 to 360 degrees. The battery positions were widely spread out with the 22nd Battery at the rear of the area. The 44th Battery command post here was particularly comfortable being situated in the literary atmosphere of a private library. It was at this town that contact was made with 1 Canadian Infantry Division who were coming into action for the first time in North-West Europe.

In the meantime the 8 C.I.B. had gone through 9 C.I.B. on the outskirts of Zutphen preparatory to making the attack. It was to be a two battalion attack by the Chauds coming in the southern part of the town and the North Shores taking out the northern section above and along the railway tracks.

The fire plan started at 0400 hours and consisted of three lifts, stopping at the approaches to the town. Only the Third Division artillery took part. The Infantry then moved in. The Chauds encountered bitter hand to hand fighting among the closely packed houses. The use of artillery was difficult on such close targets. However tanks were able to take over and were very effective, firing at close quarters into the houses. The German artillery was very active, firing indiscriminately into the town and killing many civilians. About 20,000 civilians remained in the town during the battle and their presence made fighting difficult.

The North Shores advancing beside the railway track over

exposed ground ran into heavy fire and had part of a company cut off for sometime. Capt RUMBLE, advancing with the leading company, came upon a soldier of the North Shores fighting desperately in a hand to hand tussle with a German who was trying to get his pistol into position to shoot the Canadian. Capt RUMBLE ran to his assistance and ended the fray by shooting the German.

The North Shores pushed ahead a short distance aided now by two medium, three field and one heavy regiment. L/Bdr SHAW and his line crew, having laid three miles of line by hand from the forward exchange along the disused railway to the North Shores battalion headquarters maintained excellent communications to brigade headquarters enabling effective artillery support and providing the brigade with up to date tactical information.

After minor advances, it was decided to withdraw the North Shores from that position, as a further advance would involve unnecessary risks. They then moved into the town by the route the Chauds had used and pushed into the northern section across the railway track.

As ammunition was scarce due to Third Division's low priority the FOOs employed one and sometimes two guns in destructive shoots with good effect. Two medium artillery FOOs assisted the 8 C.I.B. artillery support and effectively engaged many single gun targets.

By the third day of the attack on Zutphen the town, including the factory area, had been cleared. The OP's then moved up to the edge of the Ijssel River and engaged targets on the far bank. Capt CAMPBELL and Capt RUMBLE had an OP in the top of a five story warehouse on the water's edge. Entry into the building was made by running down the street for about 300 yards in full view of German snipers who did some very effective shooting. Many targets were out of range to the guns of the regiment.

During the attack on Zutphen the regiment had to engage targets on the Queens Own front below the town as the Germans attempted to dislodge them by small attacks. 9 Apr 45

Lt-Col OSTRANDER went to England on course at this time,

Major BAIRD temporarily taking over command of the regiment.⁴

10 Apr 45 Later the Queens Own put in an attack which called for an artillery fire plan and harassing fire tasks fired by one and sometimes two guns. That night Gnr BARTON and Gnr McNALLY were wounded at the OP by shell fire.

11 Apr 45 The attack of 1 Canadian Infantry Division across the Ijssel River was made on April 11. The regiment took part in the initial stages of their fire plan but were limited in the targets they could fire because of the long range. The gun area had been chosen primarily so as to be able to engage targets at Zutphen and Deventer rather than on the 1 Canadian Infantry Division front. Just before the attack Major BAIRD had conducted a diversionary fire programme near the river below Zutphen using anti-tank guns, mortars and light ack-ack guns. Late in the afternoon of the following day, with the targets now out of range, the regiment moved to a village below Wezeppe. The enemy had pulled back quickly and the chase was on again.

¹ Dog Troop OP crew:

Capt J. Else., Sgt Buswell, R. D., Gnr. Meyers, G. A., Gnr Smith, L. K., Gnr Smart, D. B., Gnr Jackson F. B.

² Charlie Troop OP crew:

Capt A. L. Campbell, Gnr Lacy, G. F., Gnr Callaghan, P. W., Gnr Beaupre, J. E., Gnr Varcoe, C., Gnr. Brown, R. W.

Strength Increase:

Capt J. M. R. Ethier from 12 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA 17 Mar 45.

Capt E. A. Ward from 14 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA 23 Mar 45.

Capt A. L. Campbell from 14 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA 2 Mar 45.

Strength Decrease:

Capt J. A. Crutcher 34 Air O.P. course 10 Mar 45.

³ Capt Gothard OP crew:

Gnr Hunt, W. E., Gnr Siddals, A. E., Gnr McMullen, D. A., and Gnr Charbonneau, M. A.

⁴ *Strength Increase:*

Capt G. A. Rumble, 2 Cdn Med Regt, RCA 4 Apr 45.

Lieut H. J. Timms, 6 Apr 45.

10. NORTH OF THE IJssel MEER

Recce parties had gone ahead on April 12 to the allotted gun area near Heino, only to find it occupied by 12 Canadian Field Regiment which had been following 7 C.I.B. all day. The 12th Field Regiment had deployed a number of places along the route to bring down fire in support of the advance. By the time a new area was allotted, it was dark so the move of the 13th Field was postponed until early the next morning. In the meantime, the weary recce party flopped in a group of abandoned houses for the night, and recce'd the new positions nearby in the morning. The regiment arrived soon after, but, as their targets were by now out of range, it was not necessary to fire.

12 Apr 45

Heino
13 Apr 45

The same afternoon the regiment moved again to position themselves for the attack on Zwolle. This place was expected to offer resistance, as it was a key town in the German escape route from the south. Late in the evening, just in time to record zero lines before darkness fell, the regiment deployed near Wytmen. Again there was no firing.

Wytmen
13 Apr 45

Early the next morning the Chauds sent two scouts into the town to find out the strength of the opposition. On the way in one scout was shot by a German sniper, but the other managed to enter Zwolle and contact civilians there, returning with the report that the enemy were evacuating the town. Soon afterwards, the Chauds moved into Zwolle and "consolidated" among the happy, cheering people. In the afternoon, the regiment skirted the north end of the town moving slowly up the wide road, while the infantry, not far ahead, took on the small groups of resistance. Late in the evening, the guns halted and went into positions south-east of Meppel. Again the guns did not fire, as the resistance was not large enough for artillery work.

Meppel
14 Apr 45

The guns moved next morning beyond Meppel and parked along the side of the road many hours, while the infantry moved forward. When the regiment finally did get under way, the convoy travelled quickly going through Heerenveen to gun positions near Joure.

Joure
15 Apr 45

8 C.I.B. was given the area to the west of Heerenveen up to the causeway to clear out of enemy. Reports, received from the Dutch underground, indicated that the area contained small groups of enemy with a limited supply of artillery and no tanks. The Brigadier called together the senior officers. The next objective was to be Joure. "One moment sir", said Major BAIRD. "That will not be necessary. The 13th Field has already taken up gun positions there." Later on the regimental ration truck made a slight map reading error near Joure. The party arrived at a bridge well covered by Jerry small arms fire and when the enemy opened fire the 60 cwt truck went through evolutions which would shame a jeep, and left there forthwith. Seeing the same road some days later one of the ration party exclaimed "That driver couldn't have turned the truck there." It just shows what training and a little encouragement can do.

8 C.I.B. was in possession of the most recent plans of the defences of Sneek, as well as information as to the telephone communications and water supply. This valuable information, which was provided by the Dutch underground, is only one example of the assistance given by them to the unit throughout the fighting in Holland.

For the manoeuvres, the battalions were to operate separately with the artillery splitting up into batteries, each battery moving with their battalions along with tanks and engineers. The Regiment de la Chaudiere, moving with the 78th Battery under command of Capt OLMSTED, were to capture Sneek and clear the enemy from the area south of Sneek inclusive of Lemmer. The North Shore Regiment, with the 44th Battery under command of Major O'SHEA, would then move through Sneek to Bolsward. Once this place was secured, they were to swing south to clear out the enemy down to the Ijssel Meer. Following close behind, would be the Queens Own Rifles of Canada, with the 22nd Battery under command of Major LAWSON. They were to push through Bolsward to the causeway connecting Friesland and North Holland. The enemy was expected to make a stand somewhere along the route.

That night the Chauds sent out a fighting patrol to Sneek,

consisting of three 60 cwt vehicles, 2 flame throwers, 2 machine-gun carriers and an OP carrier. As they reached each bridge, along the road, personnel were dropped behind to guard it from being blown up. The patrol successfully reached the outskirts of Sneek, found no opposition there, but the Dutch underground in control. The remainder of the battalion soon followed. Shortly after midnight the guns of the 78th Battery were ordered to move forward approximately five miles to the eastern outskirts of Sneek. It was a pitch black night, no daylight recce had been made. Yet the battery was able to advance, take up position and within three hours of the receipt of orders consolidate the Chauds in Sneek.

By this time the North Shores were on the move along with the 44th Battery. They pushed on in daylight through the cheering populace of Sneek towards Bolsward, the artillery taking up positions outside the town to cover the entrance of the infantry. Again the enemy fled and Dutch underground were in control.

By this time the Queens Own, with the 22nd Battery placed in column in front of the reserve infantry company, had caught up to the North Shores just as the latter were leaving Bolsward for a sweep towards Koudum. The time was now approximately 1100 hours. Under the bright warm sky the picturesque town of canals and simple buildings was a pleasant background to crowds of happy citizens.

RHQ moved into Bolsward late in the morning and quickly swamped the cigarette market.

Bolsward
16 Apr 45

The forward elements of the Queens Own, moving beyond Bolsward along the wide highway towards the causeway, encountered enemy opposition at a road block, which was covered by machine gun fire and a 37 mm gun. The gun knocked out the leading two infantry carriers while the remainder of the forward patrol, including Capt WARD's party, took to the ground. Able Troop of the 22nd Battery was immediately ordered into action. With the speed which accompanies a crash-action, the troop deployed at a cross road, leading down to Longerhou, with the guns staggered across the highway. The unfortunate civilians who had gathered at the cross

roads to witness the passing parade scrambled in all directions to get out of the way.

Capt WARD had a sticky time for a while, as the enemy gun was too close to our infantry for the artillery to engage. Soon, however, it was knocked out by other means and the battle settled down to slow advances against a stubborn enemy. The rest of the day the guns were very busy. As soon as the extent of the opposition could be determined, Baker Troop was deployed in a nearby field. Capt WARD and Lieut TIMMS were able to occupy good OPs, thus the artillery fire was very effective.


Nearly all the guns positions had a similar story to tell about the crowds of people who invaded their area to look in wonderment at the equipment, to ask for cigarettes and chocolate or just to be near activity. It was the people's first day of liberation, and they made the best of it. Baker Troop was a typical example. Here the crowds around the guns and the command post were so great that BSM HOOPER was forced to rope off restricted areas so that the troop could function properly. Even at that, some pretty "young thing" was sure to trip over the tannoy wire and break communications to one of the guns. Of course, the kitchen was a great attraction. To see what the men ate and, perhaps, obtain some of it! Many had never seen white bread for five years, nor tasted the wierd and wonderful dishes which were just another monotonous meal to the soldiers. Two of the feature events for the spectators were the firing of the guns and the rides in the exchange crew carrier. The firing of a gun meant a chance for the braver ones to pull the firing lever and, also, meant another cartridge case for a souvenir hunter to take home. The rides in the carrier were shared by all the teen age "kids" of the district. With flags flying and arms waving, the carrier would run regular trips along the road to the nearest town.

In the meantime, the North Shores were moving down towards Koudum with the FOOs in the forward recce patrols, and the guns of the 44th Battery still deployed in the position east of Bolsward. The battery sent out a recce party to look

MUSEUM OF THE REGIMENTS
4520 CROWCHILD TRAIL S.W.
CALGARY, AB T2T 5J4



RHINE CROSSING. An important milestone for the regiment.



WITH THE FORWARD OBSERVATION OFFICER.
And then there was RHQ who wished to be "put in the picture".

for another gun position in case it was needed. Capt CAMPBELL, with one of the infantry patrols, met the recce party coming back from the area the patrol was advancing towards. The recce party had not been worried, as their feminine interpreters and guides who accompanied them were well informed as to the location of the enemy.

The Chauds had moved south from Sneek in the direction of Woudsend, with the guns of the 78th Battery trailing along the road ready to go into action. They were held up by a blown bridge and forced to turn around. Capt ETHIER, who had parked in his carrier near the destroyed bridge, had quite a going over for a few minutes by machine gun fire from across the river. He reported the carrier to be absolutely bullet proof. That night the battery deployed in the old position at Joure, while the infantry crossed the Schrasterbuig canal supported by very effective observed artillery fire, which caused many German casualties. During the night most of the Germans in the area had left by boat from Lemmer.

In the morning the Chauds moved down towards Lemmer accompanied by engineers to construct bridges where necessary. The guns of the 78th Battery were no longer needed there, and moved from Joure to join the 22nd Battery near Longerhou. Capt ETHIER and Capt BURROWS were commended by Lt-Col TACHEREAU for the effective close support they had provided the Chauds during this most hectic period. Brigadier ROBERTS sent his compliments to the 78th Battery for their good work. The North Shore that day had extended their patrols farther south, this time the guns of the 44th Battery, moving with them and carrying the weary men forward. On reaching Koudum, the battery deployed to cover the patrols working to Stavoren and the stretches of land south-east. No enemy was encountered, so the column turned back, the infantry stopping at Exmora to be in position to advance towards Makkum the next day, the artillery moving up late that night to rejoin the other two batteries. The batteries again came under the immediate control of RHQ.

These few days had been particularly noteworthy, because it was one of the few occasions when the artillery work took

Longerhou
17 Apr 45

on a semblance of artillery practice, as written in the well known pamphlet 2B. The junior officers, getting away from being a small cog in the big wheel of Mike, Victor and Yoke concentrations, large barrages and fire plans, were now part of a more intimate battery show. Here the gun areas were selected, zero lines chosen, and administration carried out on a battery level. The fighting, too, became a battery and battalion affair, and information, received as to the progress made, was easier to obtain and more enthusiastically received.

18 Apr 45 The following day the resistance in the area was ended with the capture of Makkum and the approaches to the causeway. The artillery, which had been supplemented by a battery from 3 Canadian Medium Regiment, RCA had been used extensively on both places. Near the causeway were the remains of one 75 mm and twenty-six 20 mm enemy guns which had been destroyed by our gun fire. The enemy had retreated to fortifications out on the causeway and the artillery engaged them a number of times during the night. At midnight, operation "Plunder" which began with the crossing of the Rhine, officially ended.

II. THE APPROACHES TO EMDEN

On April 19 the regiment went out of action, and moved to a concentration area at Gorredijk where maintenance and general cleaning was to take place. The town was a marvellous spot, because of the friendliness of the people, who did everything to make the short stay pleasant, and, because of the picturesque location on either side of the canal. It was not long before the men were comfortably billeted. They had made themselves "at home", which included wiring the houses for electricity, supplied by the army chargers, and installing radios in convenient places. 19 Apr 45

The happy prospects of an indefinite stay at Gorredijk were quickly quashed when word came through that the brigade was needed to relieve elements of 1 Polish Armoured Division which had been held up in Germany in an area unsuitable to the use of heavy armour.

Recce parties moved off early in the morning of April 21 and the guns followed soon after. The journey was a long one, going through Leeuwarden, Groningen, Winschoten, across the border into Germany below Rhede. Owing to a change in plans the concentration area which had been laid on was not occupied, the regiment instead taking up gun positions at the end of the day in Brual about 1000 yards from the FDLs. Harassing fire was immediately laid on and engaged as battery targets. Brual 21 Apr 45

The plan was to clear the enemy out of the area flanked on the north and east by the Ems river and on the west by the stretch of water known as the Dollard. This was to be done by the 8 C.I.B. with the artillery support of the 13th and 14th Field Regiments. In the last phase the 12th Field Regiment were to add their support. The battle was strictly a delaying action by the Germans as was the rest of the fighting until the end of the war. The enemy effectively used airplane bombs to blow large craters in the road slowing up the advance considerably. Most craters were so large bridges had to be erected before vehicles could get through. Throughout the advance the FOOs worked on foot with their carriers moving

forward as each crater was bridged. The infantry part of the battle was difficult because of the heavy shelling to which they were subjected both from field guns and from heavy artillery (including ack-ack in a ground role) from gun emplacements around Emden.

23 Apr 45 The advance began on April 23. The North Shores moved forward first, then the Chauds and Queens Own went through advancing up parallel roads. Just as the attack of the Chauds had started a concentration of heavy enemy shells landed near Major Olmsted and his crew.¹ Two of the party L/Bdr JOSEPHSON and Gnr MACDONALD were killed and the others knocked down by the blast but unhurt. The vehicle was badly damaged and communications disrupted for some time. The Queens Own were assisted by a fire plan in the morning and reached the approaches of Weener late that afternoon. Then the North Shores proceeded to go through them. Their leading company was held up by heavy fire at the road block guarding the entrance. They were forced to pull back and call for artillery support. The artillery shelled the position for 10 minutes after which the North Shores were able to walk in with few casualties. Recce parties of the regiment were not long in following into the town to pick out suitable gun positions. In the meantime the Chauds had pushed into a wood farther to the west. Late that evening, after taking circuitous routes to by-pass the large craters, the guns moved into position around Weener and reported ready shortly after midnight.

24 Apr 45 The next day the Chauds took Bunde and moved through it, striking heavy opposition on the far side of the town. The 78th Battery moved up in the morning to support this advance while the remainder of the regiment stayed behind to give support to the Queens Own and North Shores. A number of shells landed on the 22nd and 78th Batteries' positions. Sgt SCOTT of the 22nd was wounded.

Capt BURROWS and Capt ETHIER with the Chauds were under shell fire the entire day. Capt BURROWS was observing from one window when a shell came in the other window and took away the side of the house.

The North Shores were now moving up the west bank of the Ems River towards Kirkborgum. Capt RUMBLE and his crew had a close call when they ran up against two 88 mm guns. They were travelling with the first infantry group in carriers but quickly dismounted and deployed when the enemy guns opened up. Here the artillery was not able to silence the opposition so Capt CAMPBELL, who was working forward alongside the dyke, marked the target with red smoke fired by Dog Troop and the Typhoons came in and finished the job. All the batteries were kept busy most of the day with the numerous targets.

In the evening the 22nd Battery moved into position below the cross roads, marked as Bunder, in preparation for the night attack of the Queens Own. The Queens Own moved past the gun position after dark and took over from the Chauds at the cross roads near the area marked "hammerick" and, in a silent attack without vehicles, advanced to a group of buildings below Ditsumer Verlaat. At dawn many enemy troops were seen working in the field as if preparing for a counter attack. Observed fire was brought down by Capt LENNOX. This fire was switched from place to place as the running soldiers tried to get away from the shell bursts. Later it was learned that the fire had caused 38 enemy killed and 26 wounded.

Bunder
24 Apr 45

25 Apr 45

Early that morning the guns of the 44th Battery moved up into the area of the other two batteries and the regiment began functioning again as a unit after 0800 hours. During that day, as the Queens Own advanced from house to house up the road, enemy shelling was very heavy. About noon the OP of Capt LENNOX received a number of direct hits covering the crew² with rubble as they lay on the ground while their carrier nearby, and the barn they were in, caught on fire. As they were leaving the flaming building an enemy airburst exploded nearby wounding Gnr DONAHUE and Gnr PECK. The OP carrier and all its equipment were a total loss.

In the meantime the Chauds were working through Holtgas and Jemgun. A strong enemy force was situated at Hatguin but it quickly surrendered after the artillery had put down

5 rounds of gun fire on a number of places in the town. The remainder of the opposition on the road to Ditzum soon surrendered when it was learned of the force against them.

The North Shores were now firmly established in the towns of Bingum and Bingumgaste which had been taken after a short fight. Capt CAMPBELL had an OP in Bingum overlooking the town of Leer. A day before the attack across the river, all the high ranking officers of 9 C.I.B. were observing from the OP when the enemy opened up on it with machine guns. Many people bit the dust in a hurry. The party soon left.

Mariencher
25 Apr 45 That evening the guns moved by batteries to Mariencher. The men of the 78th Battery immediately proceeded to round up twenty German soldiers from nearby barns and haystacks and marched them off to the PW cage. The regiment was now within the area subjected to German harassing fire. The 44th Battery received the worst shelling being close to a cross roads. The following day one of their comfortable glassed in command posts was completely wrecked forcing the command post staff to set up office in the cellar — where they should have been anyway.

Midlum
26 Apr 45 That day the guns moved closer to the Ems River at Midlum. The area was under considerable harassing fire. From this position the regiment prepared to support the 9 C.I.B. in their attack across the Ems River to Leer. Guides were despatched to bring up 750 rounds per gun HE and smoke, which was dumped on the troop positions with much difficulty due to the narrow approaches to the fields and wet, boggy nature of the ground, thoroughly soaked by the heavy rains.

27 Apr 45 Shortly after midnight the report came through from one of the FOOs that a dyke had been blown causing the water to rise rapidly and forcing some sub units of the Chauds to leave the area. As a precaution the regiment was put on 30 minutes notice to move and a patrol was sent out to see if the water was approaching the regimental area. Fortunately the water level was not affected back at the guns. If the regiment had to leave that night in a hurry some equipment would have been lost as evidenced by the difficulty experienced next day

when some of the troops had trouble getting out and had to winch their guns onto the road.

During the afternoon the gun area was heavily shelled with the 22nd Battery receiving the worst treatment. Able Troop command post received a hit but the flying shrapnel only managed to scratch one of the men. Another shell made a direct hit on the battery signal exchange and ripped out communications. The padre was soon seen in the area as was his custom whenever shelling was heavy, giving a smile and a few words of encouragement. Several vehicles were hit during the day by airburst and ground burst shrapnel but repairs were quickly made. Capt PENNIE, who had been with 7 Recce Regiment as a FOO, returned and was sent to 4 British AGRA as the CRA's Rep.

Mine detectors were put to a new use in this area. It was soon realized that the Germans had hidden many small arms under the ground, in haystacks or around buildings. The hand operated mine detectors were employed to search for them. Soon many rifles, revolvers, to say nothing of the odd pair of binoculars, cameras and watches were uncovered.

The following day enemy shelling on the gun position continued to be heavy. Baker Troop received a direct hit on one of the gun pits. The detachment, who had just completed firing the gun, had witnessed shells falling close all day and they were taking no chances. They returned to the safety of their slit trenches immediately after the stand easy order following the engaging of the target. Only the dial sight of the gun was damaged by the explosion. 28 Apr 45

A fire plan was engaged in support of 9 C.I.B. in their attack across the river Ems through Leer. In addition to this, many counter battery tasks were engaged to ease the enemy shelling on the gun positions.

During this time Lt-Col OSTRANDER was on course in England and Major BAIRD acted as the Arty Rep at 8 C.I.B. headquarters from early April until the end of the campaign. Major OLMSTED was now temporarily acting as Second-in-Command of the regiment and continued to do so for the same period.

29 Apr 45 On April 29 the battle was quieter. Church parades were held which attracted a large turnout. Two guns of the regiment had to go out of action for repacking of the buffer and recuperator system and a new gun was received by Easy Troop to replace one of theirs which was out of action due to a faulty buffer and recuperator system.³

The next day targets were engaged supporting 9 C.I.B. across the Ems and during the night a large counter battery programme was fired totalling 165 rounds per gun. While this was going on an enemy patrol was reported to have crossed over the river just north of the gun area. The men were put on a 50 pc stand to but the enemy did not approach the gun positions. The regiment here, was in an area very vulnerable to attack as the infantry had now left in preparation for crossing the river at Leer. Anti-tank units operating in an infantry role were situated in strategic positions of defence, but there was little to prevent an enemy patrol crossing the river and penetrating into the regimental area. For this reason local OPs were established and extra guards were posted by the guns and vehicles.

The 78th Battery lookouts on the dyke manned Bren guns which were fired at enemy infantry across the river. When these did not seem very effective a .50 Browning was mounted on its tripod and fired over the dyke. No direct hits were observed.

Some members of the regiment came close to a Court Martial when they ordered two German women, who were residents of the house in which they were billeted, to wash dishes for them. The women, mistaking their intentions because of the language difficulties, proceeded to hang themselves. Fortunately they were not successful in ending their lives and assistance arrived in time to cut down the misguided individuals from their suspended position.


The North Shores, who had followed the 9 C.I.B. into Leer had now pushed into Hesel to be followed soon after by the Chauds and Queens Own.

On the evening of May 1, the regiment pulled out of the area and crossed the Ems River, moving by way of Bunde,



PREPARE TO MOVE. In the Lowlands the moves were frequent and disrupting.

OPERATION "PLUNDER"



Crash action position of Able Troop near Longerhou.



Gun position in Friesland.



One of many.



Change of clothing at the mobile bath.



A familiar scene.



FRIESLAND. The gun'position, during a lull in fighting, sometimes took on the aspect of a Sunday picnic.



Weener and Leer. It was late at night by the time the regiment had taken up position near Brinkum. DF and SOS tasks were laid on as usual but no firing was done during the night. Every one was tired after the move and were glad of the rest. Brinkum
1 May 45

The following morning the regiment moved to Hesel. The 78th Battery moving first and reporting ready before the other two batteries moved. The North Shores were meeting some opposition on their way to Bagband and a number of targets were fired. Once Bagband was captured the Queens Own moved slowly up the Bagband - Aurich road and the Chauds swept the area to the left, being held up by craters in the road and by machine gun posts which effectively controlled a large area of the flat ground. Hesel
2 May 45

The next day the guns of the regiment moved to Bagband, the batteries again moving one at a time. ⁴ More targets were fired, chiefly in support of the Queens Own. Bagband
3 May 45

The previous night a civilian had come through the Chauds outpost stating that he had been sent from Aurich to talk of surrender and asking that the town of Aurich, which had received little damage so far, be spared any more destruction. The civilian was taken to Brigadier ROBERTS, commander of 8 C.I.B., and next morning they both went to Aurich to meet the local commander. The latter expressed his willingness to surrender his small force. Arrangements were then made to meet the commander of the area at Norden whose jurisdiction included Emden, Aurich, Wilhelmshaven and Fresian Islands. On May 4 negotiations for the surrender of North-West Germany were completed, Brigadier ROBERTS acting for 3 Canadian Infantry Division in conjunction with arrangements being made on the right flank by 2 Canadian Infantry Division. 4 May 45

At 1040 hours all firing by the regiment ceased and at 0800 hours on May 5 all resistance in North-West Germany terminated. 5 May 45

On that day Lt-Col OSTRANDER returned to the regiment from leave, winning a bet with a number of officers that he would return the day "cease fire" was ordered.

Three days later all enemy resistance in Europe officially ended.

The cessation of hostilities was an anti-climax. It was difficult to realize it was all over, that the guns would no longer be needed, that the soldiers who were the enemy yesterday were but harmless individuals today. The feeling of most of the men could be summed up in the words "I made it". Many of the old timers, who had fully realized the extent of the task before them which involved the establishment and holding of a beachhead against a well organized and disciplined enemy, and the subsequent "slugging" it out until the enemy was crushed, had earnestly felt that they would not survive to the finish. To the feeling of exultation was the deeper emotion of thankfulness.

On May 5 the officers and men of the regiment gathered together in the village church at Bagband for a talk by the commanding officer. Lt-Col OSTRANDER spoke from the pulpit flanked by many wreaths commemorating German soldiers who had died in battle. He thanked the men for the work they had done; warned them about being too optimistic concerning an early return to Canada, and told them briefly of the tasks ahead in Germany.

¹ Major Olmsted, L/Bdr Josephson, A. H., Gnr MacDonald, D., Gnr Knight, W. E., Gnr Jeffries.

² Able Troop OP crew:

Capt C. E. Lennox, Gnr Peck, V L., Gnr Donahue, J. L., Gnr Labile.

³ The 25 pdr gun had continually given trouble in the buffer and recuperator system; at least one gun in the regiment was out of action for repairs all the time.

⁴ *Strength Increase:*

Major J. L. Etherington	30 Apr 45
Capt D. G. Struthers	2 May 45
Lieut J. A. Clark	5 May 45

Strength Decrease

Major W. B. Hancock	Cdn School of Arty	29 Apr 45
Major W. L. Lawson	rotation leave	1 May 45
Lieut G. D. Bendiksen	rotation leave	8 May 45
Lieut H. J. Timms	rotation leave	5 May 45

PART FOUR

THE LAST DAYS

On May 7 the regiment moved out of the crowded position at Bagband and drove north through Aurich to take over an area for our role in operation "Eclipse". This operation covered the early post-hostility commitments of the Allied armies in North- West Europe. Westerloog
7 May 45

The role of the 13th Field Regiment in this phase was to garrison the area and control the German forces and displaced persons.

Recce parties preceded the convoy and arranged for accommodation in private homes along the main Aurich-Wilhelms-haven highway near the town of Westerloog. The civilians were ordered out of the houses needed for billeting and were only allowed to return to look after livestock which had been left in some of the requisitioned farms. Some of the civilians proved "friendly" and helpful in the process of requisitioning, but the majority merely carried out the orders passed on to them by the aged burgomaster. RHQ and the 78th Battery were concentrated in a built up area, but the other two batteries were spread out in farmhouses along the highway.

The first task, after the men were comfortably established, was the cleaning of equipment. The vehicles and guns received a thorough overhauling. Other equipment was checked and repairs made if necessary.

The next task was to search for enemy weapons. Orders were issued for all firearms belonging to Germans in the area to be collected and turned into the unit. Many weapons were collected this way. In addition a number of parties combed the area with mine detectors and metal prodders following the discovery of a number of rifles which had been buried by the civilians. The men went at the job with great enthusiasm and efficiency having had much experience at this type of work in the past.

During this time, German soldiers, sailors and marines were

using the main highway as they moved on foot from one part of the country to the other. Some travelled alone or in small groups. They were rejoining their units or going to their homes. Others moved by large units under control of their officers. They were well dressed and well disciplined.

Also on the highway was the continual sight of small groups of displaced persons, commencing the long journey back to their homeland. These people were all moving in one direction — back through Aurich to Leer.

The fact that hostilities had ceased was vividly brought home to the men when they were informed there were to be a number of parades and inspections. There is nothing the men dislike more than these. First, the commanding officer put the lads through their paces on May 12. That day L/Bdr KERR was presented the Military Medal and Gnr SCHULTZ presented the Oak Leaf for Mention-in-Despatches. The following day a divisional artillery church parade was held near Aurich with H/Capt LEWIS, the new padre of the regiment, officiating. Then on May 14 the divisional artillery was inspected by Lt-Gen SIMMONDS. He gave a short talk and took the salute during the march past.

On May 15 the regiment moved out of Germany, which no one was sorry to leave, and travelled in convoy through friendly Holland to the pleasant little farming town of Lunteren. The regiment, along with the rest of 3 Canadian Infantry Division, had now come under command of 1 Canadian Corps.

The Lunteren area was already occupied by 49 (WR) Infantry Division — The Polar Bears, so that accommodation for our men was limited. The inspired diarist wrote in the War Diary on May 16: "Officers have been very busy completing reallocation questionnaires for all ranks. The form permits every member of the overseas army to express his desire for service in the CFEF, the COF, or return home to be demobilized. Only a small percentage have volunteered for the CFEF, and they are mainly officers and NCO's. ¹ The majority of course, wish to return home as soon as possible under the point priority system. All ranks have carefully perused the pamphlet "After Victory in Europe." "

On May 20 the regiment moved to Zeist where everyone was comfortably billeted in private homes, most of which had been taken over by German soldiers during the occupation. The latter were found in filthy condition and badly damaged. The batteries were well spread out making it necessary for the officers and sergeants to have sub-unit messes. Zeist 20 May 45

Privilege leave had now been extended to 11 days in the United Kingdom and 9 days on the Continent. The unit was also allowed to have 25 pc of their personnel away on leave. Both concessions boosted morale considerably.

The regiment now settled down for a long stay in the area.² An educational programme and troop recreational programme were "laid on". Liberty trucks were periodically sent to Utrecht, Hilversum, and Amsterdam. Cleaning and painting of vehicles was commenced in preparation for the final march past of the regiment with its equipment.

Lt-Col OSTRANDER was temporarily put in charge of a force guarding convoys and staging camps of German units on their way back to Germany by way of Holland, across the causeway into Friesland. The Commanding Officer had under his control 250 all ranks taken from the 13 Canadian Field Regiment, Canadian Scottish Regiment, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, and 7 Recce Regiment. The force was responsible for guarding staging camps at Abcoude and Halfweg and providing escorts along the entire route from Abcoude to IJmuiden where the German regiments were handed over to 1 Canadian Infantry Division. Lt-Col OSTRANDER established his headquarters at Halfweg. The entire force under his command was strung out over approximately 40 miles of road. The first unit to pass through their hands was 6 Parachute Division followed by 61 Infantry Division. The men patrolled the road, kept the marching columns of soldiers closed up and made sure they did not take any stolen property with them. This last task was the biggest. When the units had passed through our lines they had in their possession little but their own personal equipment. These duties of guarding and patrolling lasted a week being completed on May 29. By that time the Canadian force under Lt-Col OSTRANDER had removed from the German 22 May 45 29 May 45

soldiers 260,000 gulden which was turned over to the Netherlands Government.

6 Jun 45 June 6, the anniversary of the Third Canadian Infantry Division's landing on the beaches of Normandy, was marked in Utrecht by a mounted parade and final march past of the units which took part in this historic event. Many of the old original men were not there. Some had been battle casualties, others had left through illness or accidents. Many officers had been transferred to other artillery units with promotions or had been accepted on the Air OP course. A few personnel had returned to Canada on rotation leave or on the Repatriation Drafts.

Of the 38 officers who landed on D-Day with the 13th Field, 4 were now still in the unit. Of the 63 sergeants and warrant officers who were with the unit at the beachhead, only 35 remained.

The streets of Utrecht were crowded that day with soldiers and civilians watching the "Water Rats" go by in revue for the last time.

The 7 Recce Regiment came first, followed by the 12th, 13th, and 14th Field Regiments followed in turn by other units of the division. The parade was not spectacular from the point of view of the men who knew the division or had served with it. The vehicles and guns of the 13th Field were "stunning" with their new khaki paint, blackened tires and cleaned tarpaulins. But that was not how they had been in action. There was something about the thin coat of dust or mud on the metal surfaces of the equipment that was a part of the memories. As the guns filed by there were other familiar sights missing too. The gun detachments were not sitting on the roofs of the F&AT's now, waving and passing out cigarettes. Nor did the tops of the vehicles contain the innumerable necessities such as bed rolls, camouflage nets, compo boxes, stoves, petrol tins and the innumerable luxuries such as beds, mattresses, chairs and radios all hidden beneath the massive tarpaulins. Nor did the jeeps look quite right without the many bed rolls in the back, the directors and gun markers strapped on the front, and a "reserved" sign protruding from one corner of the compartment.

As the vehicles moved up the narrow street at Utrecht to the market square where General CRERAR was taking the salute, the familiar swaying and bouncing of the guns and limbers must have reminded the sergeants of the hundreds of times they had looked back from their position at the hatch of the FAT and witnessed the same scene amid the white dust of the Falaise road, the long straight stretches of highway beyond Rouen or on the wet narrow roads in the Lowlands.

The leading vehicles of the regiment in the parade were two jeeps of RHQ. There, was Lt-Col OSTRANDER, who the men liked so much, and congenial RSM MACRAE. Those two jeeps symbolized the nerve centre of the regiment; the place where orders originated; where troubles were directed. To the officers in the batteries, RHQ was symbolized in the words "Peter ready, Queen a half, hurry up Roger" (or vice versa), "Ammunition report" and "Give us a sitrep".

Following the leading jeeps came the guns of the 22nd Battery; Able Troop with BSM CHOWN, R.K. This was the senior troop of the regiment—right of the line. A1 was the first gun of the unit to pass the saluting stand. Sgt KENNEDY brought A1 ashore as an S.P. on D-Day. His was the only gun of the regiment to engage tanks over open sights. Sgt REIF took over the gun until the "Nijmegen incident" and then Sgt TEMPLETON brought it through to the end of the war. Close behind was A2. This was Sgt MOFFATT's gun until he was wounded at Wissel, when Sgt HOOPFER took over. Next came A3, with first Sgt HOOPER, who would often be seen wearing derby hats and red handkerchiefs, then Sgt SCOTT, until he was wounded at Weener. Now Sgt ROBERTS is the No. 1. A4 was under control of Sgt MOORE until Nijmegen when Sgt NICHOL took over.

Next came Baker Troop. This troop distinguished itself at Parkgate when an enemy bomb destroyed almost all its equipment. It was through the efforts of the men in the troop that the guns were ready to fire on D-Day. Even at that, their S.P.s landed without their heavy armour side plating. This troop was under BSM HOOPER during the latter days. First, passed B1 of Sgt GILBERTSON. This was originally the gun of

Sgt POWELL, who established a record by firing two thermometers and an ejector projectile. He was injured at Emmerich in a motorcycle accident. B2 followed; it was originally under Sgt CUNNINGHAM, who left on OCTU to be succeeded by Sgt HOCKIN and then Sgt METCALFE. This gun received a direct hit at Midlum damaging the superstructure and igniting some of the ammunition. Then followed B3 and B4 under Sgt HARTLEY and Sgt KINGSMITH, both of whom brought their guns all through the fighting. Sgt HARTLEY and his detachment at Boulogne had a narrow escape when their gun fired a premature round. The gun was destroyed and had to be replaced. Sgt KINGSMITH took out the church tower with his gun at Norrey by firing over open sights. The tower had contained enemy snipers.

There were others in the 22nd Battery who should be mentioned such as BSM MATHESON, BSM MCINTYE, BSM KAUFFMAN, Sgt HUGHES the battery able, and Sgt ROBERTS, H.E.R., MM. Also Sgt KYLE, Sgt HALL and Sgt SEBASTIAN who sweated over the signals, and Sgt BLACKWOOD the battery MT sergeant.

Then followed the 44th Battery under BSM ATKINSON. This battery seemed to receive the most shelling. "Queen's getting it again" the lads of the other batteries would often say. The battery was the first to land on D-Day coming in west of Courselles-sur-Mer and deploying independently.

There was Charlie Troop with BSM CHOWN, L. J., as the senior NCO. Sgt EVANS was with the first gun, C1. It had previously been Sgt MCFARLANE's gun until he was wounded at Camilly. Following close behind was C2 with Sgt RICH. Then C3 with Sgt PORTER at the controls. This gun had suffered nine casualties, the most of any gun in the regiment. Men were hit at suicide hill in Normandy, Waterland Kerkje in the Scheldt, Wyler and Wissel in Germany, all with Sgt HENDERSON as the No. 1. Sgt HENDERSON was himself a casualty at Wissel through a motorcycle accident. Then Sgt "IKE" THOMPSON took over until he was seriously wounded at Baak. The last gun of the troop was C4 with Sgt KENYON in the front seat. Previously Sgt DOBIE and then Sgt HUMPHRIES had been in charge of it.

Next in line was Dog Troop with BSM MORRIS at the controls. This troop fired the red smoke as target indicators for aircraft. First to pass was D1, also known as "the flame thrower". Sgt MACRAE was in charge, taking over from Sgt GILMAN. Then came D2, at first under command of Sgt SMITH and now under Sgt KENNEDY. At the end of the troop was D3 with Sgt SINKLER, whose detachment fired on an enemy patrol near Udem only to find next morning they had killed a stray pig. Then came D4 with Sgt BULL. It was Sgt BULL's S.P. which was destroyed by anti personnel bombs near Caen. Other men to be remembered in the battery are Sgt DAVIDSON, Sgt BUSWELL, MM, Bdr SCHELL, L/Bdr SHAW, MM, and L/Bdr CROSLAND, all of whom looked after signals, Sgt SOMERS the battery MT sergeant, Sgt HOLMES a' Court the battery able and BQMS BRAKEWELL, killed near Eu and succeeded by BQMS CARTER.

Bringing up the rear, but by no means in the rear during action, was the 78th Battery with BSM TURNER who succeeded BSM HILLMAN and MACRAE as senior NCO. Sgt Fox and Sgt VAN AGGELEN, MM, of battery signals, L/Sgt MOORE the battery MT sergeant, L/Sgt BROWN the battery able and BQMS STENBACK, well known for his generous servings of rum, were all with the 78th.

First came Easy Troop with BSM JONES at the helm, chief scrounger of the troop. The gun E1, with Sgt DALE in charge until wounded at Lasson and now with Sgt HOSKIN in the front seat. Then came E2 with Sgt KIVISTO who took over near Emmerich from Sgt SIM. Next were E3 with Sgt CANNON and E4 with tall Sgt MILLER, who dug some of the deepest slit trenches in the troop's history.

Then Fox Troop, better known as BSM RAY's gang because of their popular troop sergeant major, passed by. The gun F1 was first, under Sgt CHOWN until he was promoted, then Sgt MOODY took over. He was noted for his use of machineguns on passing ducks and other forms of wild life. On the shield of this gun could be seen the holes made by shrapnel on the fateful August 14. Close behind was F2, with Sgt CAMPBELL in control, who had taken over from Sgt BROOKS at Caen.

Next was F3 which Sgt MUIR had until killed at Calais, when Sgt KILCUP took over. Last gun of the regiment to pass the saluting stand was F4 with Sgt GAFFNEY in charge, who succeeded Sgt MORRIS when the latter was promoted.

And so the parade of the 13th Canadian Field Regiment passed by. The 24 guns of the regiment had done their job. The detachments, who had cursed everything about them from the firing pin to the drag ropes were now a little wistful about the departure.

On June 10 all the guns FAT's and the carriers were turned in. Other stores such as radio equipment, rifles, Bren guns, etc were to be turned in soon after. The 2/13 Canadian Field Regiment was in the process of forming at the time with the assistance of our personnel. Much of our equipment, particularly vehicles, were signed over to them.

Lunteren
13 Jun 45 On June 13 the regiment moved back to the area at Lunteren. No one was anxious to leave Zeist, where the men had made many friends, but the move was necessary because the area was to be taken over by permanent occupation troops. The regiment was now the only unit in Lunteren and so were able to make themselves comfortable. This was to be the last move before the unit broke up and returned to Canada.

Life continued on in Lunteren as the men waited for repatriation. The sports and educational programmes were continued. Repat drafts for high point men took many of the old timers. In turn, men from military districts 12 and 13 joined the unit from other formations for repatriation with the batteries.

16 Jun 45 Meanwhile the 2/13 Canadian Field Regiment continued to grow. By June 16 they had taken over their own administration and moved to their own area in preparation for the occupation of Germany as part of 3 Canadian Infantry Division, CAO.F. ³

During the stay at Lunteren relations between the civilians and soldiers were very good. The local swimming pool, called by the men Lake Louise, was put into operation, using military equipment, and opened for public use. The regiment also assisted Dutch farmers by supplying vehicles and personnel

for hauling hay to distribution centres. Then, on August 31 when the community celebrated the birthday of their Queen, 31 Aug 45 the officers and men of the regiment joined whole heartedly in the celebrations, providing gifts, assistance, and enthusiastic participation.

On September 7 Lt-Col OSTRANDER relinquished command of the regiment to return to Canada for repatriation, handing 7 Sep 45 over to Lt-Col J. D. BAIRD. Lt-Col BAIRD had served with the regiment in action, first as Battery Commander, when the unit landed on D-Day, and subsequently as the Second-in-Command. He had been the Commanding Officer of 4 Light Anti Aircraft Regiment for a short term before coming back to us as CO. Though all ranks were sorry to see Lt-Col OSTRANDER leave, it was fitting that "the 2 i/c", who was so much a part of the 13th Field, should return to be our commanding officer in the final days of the regiment.

¹ *Strength Decrease* — to Pacific Theatre


Major J. L. Etherington	8 Jun 45
Capt D. F. Burrows	19 Jul 45
Capt J. R. Milani	8 Jun 45
Capt. A. Pennie	15 Jun 45
Capt D. G. Struthers	4 Jun 45
Lieut R. H. Carswell	21 Jul 45
Lieut J. P. Grenier	14 Jun 45
Lieut J. E. Powell	8 Jun 45
Lieut G. W. Taylor	11 Jun 45

² *Strength Increase*

Lieut L. Bedford	28 May 45
Lieut B. L. Bowman	28 May 45
Lieut R. H. Carswell	22 May 45
Lieut G. A. DelMedico	31 May 45
Lieut E. C. Garrett	23 May 45
Lieut C. W. A. MacLean	3 Jun 45
Lieut P. E. Paillard	23 May 45

³ *Strength Decrease*

Capt J. M. R. Ethier	2/12 Cdn Fd Regt, COF	22 Jun 45
Capt E. A. Ward	2/13 Cdn Fd Regt, COF	10 Jun 45
Lieut L. Diller	2/13 Cdn Fd Regt, COF	10 Jun 45
Lieut M. V. Mailloux	2/14 Cdn Fd Regt, COF	22 Jun 45
Lieut C. W. A. MacLean	2/13 Cdn Fd Regt, COF	22 Jun 45
Lieut R. Reiersen	2/13 Cdn Fd Regt, COF	10 Jun 45



APPENDIX

COMMANDING OFFICERS

REGIMENTAL SERGEANT MAJORS

CASUALTIES

HONORS AND AWARDS

CITATIONS

NOMINAL ROLLS

1. *Disembarkation England, November 1941*
2. *Embarkation United Kingdom, disembarkation France, June 1944*
3. *Cessation of hostilities, 8 May 1945*
4. *Officers—in addition to those on other three nominal rolls.*

BATTLE SONG OF 44 CANADIAN FIELD BATTERY, RCA.

COMMANDING OFFICERS

Lt-Col G. S.	Howard, ED	Oct 1940 Jun 1941
Lt-Col J. W. G.	Thompson, MM	Jun 1941 Oct 1942
Brig H. A.	Sparling, DSO	Oct 1942 May 1943
Brig W. S.	Zeigler, DSO, ED	May 1943 Dec 1943
Lt-Col F. le P. T.	Clifford, OBE	Dec 1943 Sept 1944
Brig F. D.	Lace, OBE	Sept 1944 Nov 1944
Lt-Col C. R.	Ostrander, ED	Nov 1944 Sept 1945
Lt-Col J. D.	Baird	Sept 1945 Nov 1945

REGIMENTAL SERGEANT-MAJORS

RSM Steinhauer	W. B.	Oct 1940 May 1941
RSM Harman	A. E. V.	Jun 1941 Jul 1944
RSM MacRae	D.	Jul 1944 Nov 1945

CASUALTIES

Through Enemy Action, 2 Jun 44 — 8 May 45

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

Killed

Major	G. F.	Rainnie		6 Jun 44 ¹
L 26291	Gnr	Fredericks	V. L.	10 Jun 44
H 59534	Gnr	Higgs	W. A.	6 Jun 44
D 7194	Gnr	Lebel	S.	6 Jun 44

Wounded

L 26236	Gnr	Isbister	D. K.	15 Jul 44
K 9071	Gnr	Reid	E. L.	9 Jun 44

22 CANADIAN FIELD BATTERY, RCA

Killed

L 61769	Gnr	Birney	J. F.	13 Aug 44
L 26241	Sgt	Burkosky	J.	12 Aug 44
M 28390	Gnr	Curliss	F. B.	10 Aug 44
L 26404	Gnr	Ford	L. G.	14 Aug 44
M 63885	Gnr	Hunter	J. F.	9 Jun 44
M 29059	Bdr	McDougall	H. G.	14 Aug 44
M 43516	Gnr	Mowbray	W.	9 Jun 44
M 100165	Gnr	Robinson	J. F.	6 Jun 44
D 7774	Gnr	Roy	J. R. A. A.	9 Jun 44
M 43404	Bdr	Thorburn	L. R.	23 Jun 44

Wounded

Lieut	J. A.	Crutcher ²		7 Jun 44
Lieut	J. M.	Doochan		6 Jun 44
Capt	J.	Else ²		6 Jun 44
Capt	W. C.	Miller		26 Feb 45
Lieut	W.	Simock		14 Aug 44
Lieut	H. J.	Timms		3 Mar 45
M 43929	Gnr	Bohn	B. J.	11 Jun 44
L 18470	Bdr	Brown	W. M.	8 Jan 45
K 14081	Gnr	Barton	E.	9 Apr 45
H 54753	Gnr	Calder	W. N.	11 Aug 44
F 77444	Gnr	Chaisson	G.	11 Aug 44
E 119628	Gnr	Chevalier	M. P.	16 Aug 44
A 28121	Gnr	Ciceri	E. C.	18 Aug 44
M 43999	Gnr	Davidson	R. W.	26 Feb 45
C 33345	Gnr	Donahue	J. L.	25 Apr 45
H 12073	Bdr	Farrell	N. G.	9 Jun 44
M 3409	Gnr	Halliday	J. F.	18 Jul 45

Wounded (Continued)

M 43916	L/Sgt	Holtzman	J.	27 Feb 45
L 6296	Sgt	Kyle	R. J.	8 Jan 45
D 12537	L/Bdr	Learmouth	W. A.	9 Jun 44
L 18466	Gnr	Leary	A. L.	2 Jun 44
M 43541	Gnr	Leicht	H. F.	8 Jan 45
A 102696	Gnr	Malott	O. E.	15 Aug 44
U 1787	Gnr	Manning	H. W.	23 Mar 45
B 110285	Gnr	Mitchell	G.	1 Sep 44
M 3778	Gnr	McMullan	J. T.	1 Mar 45
M 3407	Sgt	Moffatt	J. O.	23 Mar 45
C 1224	Gnr	McNally	L. C.	9 Apr 45
B 21652	Gnr	Nicholson	F. R.	14 Aug 44
B 1444410	Gnr	Payson	D. J.	8 Jun 44
M 65867	Gnr	Peck	V. L.	25 Apr 45
K 92120	Gnr	Pudsey	D. A.	16 Jun 44
K 73340	Sgt	Reif	M. H.	11 Jan 45
M 44001	Sgt	Scott	J. R.	24 Apr 45
M 43575	L/Sgt	Sebastian	R. G.	8 Jun 44
M 3875	Bdr	Sommerville	A. R.	12 Nov 44
C 18684	Gnr	Stephens	S. E.	23 Jun 44
M 43479	Bdr	Templeton	J. A.	17 Sep 44
M 43923	L/Sgt	Waldren	C. C.	9 Jun 44
F 89665	Gnr	Willett	L. C.	13 Aug 44
L 6284	Gnr	Willway	F. E. E.	9 Jun 44

44 CANADIAN FIELD BATTERY, RCA

Killed

Major	J. D.	Young		6 Jun 44
Capt	W. M.	Dirks		6 Jun 44
L 26269	BQMS	Brakewell	R.	1 Sep 44
B 45377	Gnr	Carter	J. R.	9 Feb 45
C 50792	Gnr	Casselman	R. C.	8 Jun 44
L 26272	Gnr	Darnell	R. V.	18 Sep 44
A 33102	Gnr	Filsinger	R. G. F.	24 Feb 45
M 43915	L/Sgt	Hays	M. C.	9 Feb 45
K 46155	Gnr	MacLellan	A. A.	15 Jul 44
L 26256	Gnr	Taylor	R. F.	6 Jun 44
L 65264	Gnr	Waynert	E. T.	15 Mar 45

Wounded

Major	G. F.	Colclough		18 Sep 44
Major	J. C.	Dale		18 Jul 44
Capt	V. A.	Thompson		13 Oct 44
Capt	A. F.	Wrenshall		6 Jun 44
Lieut	F. L.	Aylward		16 Jun 44
Lieut	W. J.	Brennan		2 Mar 45

Wounded (Continued)

Lieut	F. O.	Sexsmith	10 Jun 44
Lieut	R. L.	Waldie	11 Jun 44
D 118362	Gnr	Auger E. V.	21 Oct 44
F 86904	Gnr	Beauprie J. E.	25 Sep 44
L 26520	Gnr	Bird C. H. A.	11 Jul 44
M 495	Gnr	Brooks S.	14 Jul 44
B 98041	Gnr	Cookson G. P.	10 Jun 44
H 35393	Gnr	Dann A. E.	8 Aug 44
B 118386	Gnr	DesGagne L.	14 Jul 44
K 7119	L/Sdr	Ferguson D. H.	15 Jun 44
K 19022	L/Sgt	Fox C. R.	8 Jun 44
L 26276	Sgt	Fox E. L.	27 Jul 44
L 26509	Gnr	Gamelin H. J.	26 Jul 44
M 7799	Gnr	Gursky D. q	5 Apr 45
L 26264	Bdr	Hadley J. A.	27 Jun 44
L 18438	Gnr	Hall R. G.	15 Jul 44
K 41446	Gnr	Hamilton D. F.	28 Oct 44
K 15191	Gnr	Harris D. A.	23 Mar 45
M 56462	Gnr	Harrison R. A.	27 Oct 44
H 67364	Gnr	Hayes W. J.	26 Jul 44
L 26238	Gnr	Henderson O. J.	10 Jul 44
L 26260	L/Bdr	Hendry W.	9 Jun 44
L 102675	Gnr	Hillier D. S.	1 Sep 44
L 26215	Gnr	Ireland K. W.	14 Jul 44
M 379	Gnr	Kushnieryk P.	18 Jul 44
L 103159	Gnr	Lacy G. F.	9 Feb 45
L 18207	Gnr	Lantz A. B.	11 Aug 44
L 26274	L/Bdr	McDonald T. C.	21 Oct 44
K 9114	Sgt	MacFarlane T. D.	10 Jun 44
L 26324	Bdr	McLeod R. S.	9 Feb 45
M 59073	Gnr	Malonek G.	10 Jun 44
A 32051	Gnr	Maynard B. A.	21 Oct 44
B 47560	Gnr	Morgan I. A. R.	15 Jun 44
M 520	L/Bdr	Munkholm L. E. E.	26 Jul 44
K 21124	Gnr	Owen J. S.	17 Jul 44
L 59722	Gnr	Pankoski A.	23 Mar 45
C 860	Bdr	Patterson D. A.	21 Oct 44
M 43531	Gnr	Pugh G. R.	5 Apr 45
L 26241	Sgt	Smith C. H.	10 Aug 45
L 10533	Gnr	Stone I. H.	9 Feb 44
L 26281	Gnr	Stromquist J. R.	24 Feb 45
M 43499	L/Bdr	Tisdale S. G.	11 Aug 44
L 26531	Gnr	Turner A. E.	10 Jun 44
L 26262	L/Sgt	Thompdon W. A.	5 Apr 45
M 43997	L/Bdr	Wagner L. E.	26 Jul 45
M 100219	Gnr	Whitehead C. G.	7 Jun 44
D 6967	Gnr	Wilscam F. G.	14 Jul 44
L 26315	Gnr	Young W. C.	24 Feb 45

78 CANADIAN FIELD BATTERY, RCA

Killed

Lieut	R. J.	MacDonald		8 Jun 44
H 67408	Gnr	Bailey	H. E.	5 Jul 44
B 44954	Gnr	Collyer	K. R.	10 Jul 44
L 26273	Gnr	Edwards	R. E.	10 Jun 44
H 54823	Gnr	Jeffrey	J. K.	9 Jun 44
M 3411	L/Bdr	Josephson	A. H.	23 Apr 45
L 26396	Bdr	MacDonald	C. A.	7 Jun 44
M 59315	Gnr	McDonald	D.	23 Apr 45
K 9067	Sgt	Muir	J.	24 Sep 44
C 100420	Gnr	Perry	A. J.	6 Sep 44
B 138968	Gnr	Renault	S. E.	17 Oct 44
M 43572	Gnr	Siddons	F. H.	18 Sep 44
B 96386	Gnr	St. Louis	J. A. E.	13 Aug 44
M 60899	Gnr	Varcoe	R. W.	24 Jul 44
G 49280	Gnr	Whitney	J.	14 Aug 44
M 59186	Bdr	Wiley	J. W.	26 Jun 44

Wounded

C 1725	Gnr	Beaudoin	O. E.	10 Jul 44
L 103123	Gnr	Brown	L. J.	10 Jul 44
M 3770	L/Bdr	Cipperly	L. S.	6 Jun 44
M 3789	Sgt	Dale	D. C.	5 Jul 44
L 6298	Gnr	Debruyne	J. G.	26 Jul 44
K 62698	Gnr	Durrell	G.	6 Sep 44
M 3796	Gnr	Jones	H. G.	26 Jun 44
F 10211	Gnr	Lamond	J.	14 Aug 44
K 13024	Gnr	MacLeod	A. A.	2 Sep 44
M 613	Gnr	Munger	H. O.	25 Nov 44
B 98118	Bdr.	Parker	R. C.	26 Feb 44
G 3766	Bdr	Sulis	H. W.	20 Oct 44
M 43975	Gnr	Ranson	J. W.	8 Aug 44
H 67348	L/Bdr	Sullivan	F. T.	6 Sep 44
M 65749	Gnr	Thompson	I.	12 Jun 44
H 60073	Gnr	Webb	A. J.	21 Oct 44
K 9100	Gnr	Wise	W.F.	18 Dec 44
M 43446	Bdr	Wilson	K.	8 Jun 44
M 3418	L/Bdr	Robertson	W. L.	8 Jun 44

Prisoners of War

L 26254	L/Bdr	Hiltz	P. J.	17 Oct 44
L 26311	Bdr	Porter	J.	17 Oct 44
L 423	Gnr	Spencer	V. A.	17 Oct 44

33 LIGHT AID DETACHMENT, RCOC (attached)

Killed

M 65797	Cfn	Essen	V. A.	26 Jul 44
B 53507	Cfn	Humphries		21 Jul 44

			<i>Wounded</i>	
B 76198	Sgt	Drinnan	J.	9 Jun 44
K 45822	Cfn	Hilder	B. F.	1 Sep 44

"F" SEC 3 CDN INF DIV, RCCS (attached)

			<i>Killed</i>	
L 27470	Cpl	Hauk	N. A.	6 Jun 44
H 38590	Sgmn	Allison	C. E.	17 Sep 44

			<i>Wounded</i>	
L 26007	Sgmn	Dutton	E. R.	9 Jun 44

¹ Date casualty occurred

² Rank held at time casualty occurred.

³ Later killed with 6 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA

HONORS AND AWARDS

Received while serving with 13 Cdn Fd Regt, RCA.

29 May 44—8 May 45.

Military Cross

Capt R. D. Baugh
Capt W. L. Hogg
Capt W. M. McNabb
Capt H. L. Thorne¹

Military Medal

M	43906	Sgt	Roberts	H.E.R.
K	20028	Sgt	Van Aggellan	C. H.
L	17062	L/Sgt	Buswell	R. D.
G	3766	Bdr	Sulis	H. W.
M	44012	L/Bdr	Kerr	R.D.
L	26315	L/Bdr	Shaw	O.
M	3426	Gnr	Gingell	H.D.
M	34916	Gnr	Holtzman	J.
B	18610	Gnr	Maynes	W.J.
L	26281	Gnr	Stromquist	J.R.

Croix de Guerre Avec Etoile de Vermeil

Capt J. R. Milani

Croix de Guerre Avec Etoile de Bronze

M	59085	L/Bdr	Schauer	E.
K	14081	Gnr	Barton	E.

Mention in Despatches

Major W. B. Hancock
Major T. O'Shea
Capt J. R. T. Browdnridge
Capt A. K. Poussette
Lieut R. J. Waldie
L 26241 Sgt Burkosky J. (Since died of wounds)

Mention in Despatches (Continued)

L	26376	Sgt	Fox	E.L.
L	6296	Sgt	Kyle	R.J.
K	9112	S/Sgt	Wheeler	J.N.B.
H	59684	L/Sgt	Hall	G. A.
M	633	L/Sgt	Hughes	G.
M	43951	Bdr	Cartwright	R.
L	26329	Bdr	Davis	A.S.
M	43476	Bdr	Franklin	J.W.
M	43908	Bdr	Morice	J.F.
M	59085	L/Bdr	Schauer	E.
H	102003	Gnr	Buhr	H.
H	37019	Gnr	Forbes	L.I.
M	59315	Gnr	McDonald	D. (Since died of
M	43424	Gnr	Schultz	L.E. wounds)
M	43976	Gnr	Shoemaker	L.E.
L	59716	Gnr	Toy	D.G.
M	43983	Gnr	Wilson	G.

Commander in Chief's Certificate for Gallantry

L	26257	Bdr	Callaghan	T.R.
M	44012	L/Bdr	Kerr	R.D.
K	21124	Gnr	Owen	J.S.
M	3419	Gnr	Perkins	R.B.

Commander in Chief's Certificate For Good Service

Major J. D. Baird

Capt W. S. Warwick

M	43490	RSM	MacRae	D.
P	7500	RQMS	Harmston	N.J.
M	44015	S/Sgt	Ladwig	F.C.
M	3751	Bdr	Foote	C.E.
M	43451	L/Bdr	McQuillan	R.C.
B	32467	L/Cpl	Cook	N.E.
L	26375	Gnr	Brown	R.W.
L	26513	Gnr	Davies	J.T.

¹ All ranks mentioned are those held at time award won.

CITATIONS

CAPTAIN WILBUR MILTON McNABB Military Cross (immediate)

On 12 Oct 44 during the operation of 3 Cdn Inf Div between the SCHELDT ESTAURY and LEOPOLD CANAL, Captain Wilbur Milton McNabb was detailed as a Forward Observation Officer for 13 Fd Regt, RCA with the Queens Own Rifles of Canada. This battalion was ordered to attack in a southerly direction to gain contact with the Algonquin Regiment. During the attack Captain McNabb constantly established observation posts well ahead by working forward under heavy mortar and machine gun fire to effectively engage the enemy guns and enabled the Queens Own to successfully make contact. He remained with the leading companies throughout the operation and provided outstanding artillery support under very difficult conditions. Due to the many mines and road blocks he was seldom able to get his carrier forward but went ahead on foot with his No. 18 set to vantage points where, often without food or sleep, he continuously directed the artillery fire despite many enemy efforts to dislodge him by artillery, mortar and small arms. For fifteen days under constant fire and in most difficult country and weather, this officer maintained a very high standard of efficiency, courage and devotion to his duty.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM LIVINGSTON HOGG Military Cross (immediate)

During the operation carried out by 3 Cdn Inf Div to clear the enemy pocket between the LEOPOLD CANAL and the SCHELDT ESTUARY in October Lieutenant (Acting Captain) William Livingston Hogg was acting as forward artillery observing officer with the North Shore Regiment. On 28 October at 0500 hrs The North Shore Regiment with two companies up attacked the small hemlet of MAROLLEPUT. Captain Hogg was moving with "A" Company which was the right forward company. After a short sharp fight "A" Company reached its objective but was pinned down by heavy enemy fire emanating from a 75 mm gun and a light AA gun in the vicinity of a house about 300 yds distant, and by small arms fire from a nearby dyke. This enemy fire was preventing consolidation of the position by "A" Company and the area was rapidly becoming untenable. Under heavy observed enemy small arms fire and with complete disregard for his own personal safety Captain Hogg, accompanied by his signaller, worked his way forward to a house from which he obtained observation over the two enemy guns. He was directing fire on the guns from an upstairs window when a shell from the AA gun penetrated the room and wounded him in the legs. However he continued to direct fire until a second shell from the 75 mm gun scored a direct hit and blew him out of the house, at the same time wounding his signaller. Although badly bruised and shaken he succeeded in re-entering the house and extricating his wounded signaller from the rubble. During this operation a third 75 mm shell hit the house and it was ultimately necessary to knock a hole in the wall to gain entrance. After assisting his signaller to safety Captain Hogg again made his way forward to a dyke overlooking the enemy guns which were still active. In spite of his wounds and constant enemy small arms fire Captain Hogg di-

rected the fire of the artillery at his disposal onto the enemy guns until they were put out of action. "A" Company was then able to mop up the enemy snipers and consolidate the position.

The gallant conduct and persistent efforts of Captain Hogg were undoubtedly responsible to a great extent for the success of the entire battalion operation, since the capture of the company objective was vital to the successful advance of the other companies.

CAPTAIN RUPERT DON BAUGH

Military Cross (immediate)

On the operation to capture BOULOGNE carried out by 3 Cdn Inf Div, 17-22 Sept., Captain Rupert Don Baugh was acting as a forward artillery observing officer attached to the Queens Own Rifles of Canada. Throughout the entire five days of the operation this officer continually established observation posts in advance of the leading elements of the Queens Own Rifles and was responsible for directing accurate and effective fire on enemy strong points which were impeding the advance.

In particular, on the afternoon of 20 Sep the advance of the Queens Own Rifles, and Regiment de la Chaudiere on their right was held up by small arms, LAA and 88 mm fire from a very strong and well prepared enemy position. Captain Baugh volunteered to go forward alone on foot and establish an observation post in rear of this strong point with a view to destroying the enemy guns. He occupied the OP and remained there under constant enemy fire throughout the remaining hours of daylight. He was able to direct the fire of medium and field artillery which put out of action four 88 mm guns and two LAA guns. Before the position was attacked the following morning, he took command of a group of infantry Bren guns which he positioned in the vicinity of his OP. Throughout the subsequent attack he directed the fire of this group against the crews of the remaining enemy guns and by the effectiveness of this fire the attacking company of the Queens Own Rifles was able to reach its objective and capture the remaining guns. As a result of this particular action, the attack of FORT DE LA CRECHE, which ended the defence of the BOULOGNE garrison north of the river LIANE, was made the following morning without being subjected to any flanking fire.

Throughout the whole operation the cool courage and initiative of Captain Baugh exposed as he was to heavy fire in an OP, sited well forward of our own troops, had a very material influence on the success of the operation.

M 3426 GUNNER HAROLD DAVID GINGELL Military Medal (immediate)

On 17 Sep 44, during the assault on BOULOGNE, Gunner Harold David Gingell was artillery Observation Post Signaller with a Forward Observation Officer supporting a leading company of the Regiment de la Chaudiere.

At one time the advance was held up by mines and booby traps and vehicles could not be taken forward. The infantry were coming under heavy and accurate enemy fire and the artillery Forward Observation Officer determined to take his party forward to find an observation point where observation would allow neutralization of the enemy fire.

This advance necessitated going forward on foot, under fire and observation

by the enemy. It was also apparent that such a party with its special R/T equipment would be subject to the special attention of the enemy.

During this advance, which was made under heavy enemy fire, Gunner Gingell carried and operated the R/T set. On completion of the move this party was cut off for thirty-six hours from our own infantry without protection sleep, food or water. During this period Gunner Gingell carried on coolly and efficiently under constant fire, and maintained communications. His work under most hazardous conditions enabled accurate fire to be brought down on the enemy and allowed the momentum of the 8 Cdn Inf Bde attack to be maintained thus materially assisting in the successful reduction of the BOULOGNE garrison.

M 43916 GUNNER JACK HOLTZMAN Military Medal (immediate)

Gunner Jack Holtzman was signaller to his captain on the assault wave. After his captain was wounded he carried on and called forward the tanks of the RAMS to knock out an enemy pillbox which had opened up on the rear of the Regina Rifles. He directed fire successfully and neutralized the enemy, thus enabling our own infantry to engage the enemy frontally with confidence and energy. Gunner Holtzman's actions, under heavy fire and most difficult conditions played an effective part in the success of the operations.

M 44912 LANCE BOMBARDIER ROBERT DONALD KERR
Military Medal (immediate)

During operation BLOCKBUSTER, on the 26 Feb 45. L/Bdr Robert Donald Kerr was one of the artillery signallers responsible for maintaining line communication to a Forward Observation Officer with the Regiment de la Chaudiere.

At 1500 hrs 26 Feb 45 the Regiment de la Chaudiere after seven hours of bitter fighting were held up short of their last objective. All communications to the left forward company had broken down. It was essential that this objective be taken before Phase II of Operation BLOCKBUSTER could be launched. To do this communications had to be opened to this forward company and a new fire plan prepared. L/Bdr Kerr, on foot, crossed a field swept by enemy machine gun and mortar fire to lay a line to the company which he established just 25 minutes before the zero hour set for the attack.

At times during this daring action his jacket was pierced in several places by shrapnel. However, with utter disregard to his own safety L/Bdr Kerr continued on foot and established the all essential communications.

Due to his gallant action, the artillery plan involving two field regiments, one medium battery and two heavy batteries was co-ordinated with the infantry attack, the final objective taken, enabling Phase II of the operation to be launched.

B 18610 GUNNER WILLIAM JOHN MAYNES Military Medal (immediate)

At 1500 hours 5 Mar 45 in BALBERGEWALD forest an enemy mortar concentration blew up a Kangaroo tank and a 6 Pounder anti-tank gun. Two carriers and two jeeps were adjacent to these two vehicles. Although mortar fire was continuous, a tank was burning, ammunition was exploding

in all directions, Gunner William John Maynes was able to drive to a safe distance the two carriers and one jeep. The second jeep was burning when he tried to drive it away. He was unable to start it and was only able to escape before it blew up.

Heavy vehicle casualties on carriers had recently been suffered in the forest fighting. The saving of these two carriers was of immediate assistance to the operation, one of them containing the Forward Observation Officer's communications for artillery support. By his disregard for his own safety and by his skilful driving, Gunner Maynes saved vehicles which contributed successfully to the operation south of the BALBERGEWALD forest.

L 26318 LANCE BOMBARDIER OLIVER SHAW

Military Medal (immediate)

On 29 October the task of "C" Company North Shore Regiment was to secure the approach to OOSTBURG. The company was pinned down by heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. It was necessary that immediate artillery fire be brought down to eliminate the machine gun positions. The artillery Forward Observation Officer had gone forward on foot maintaining communications with a No. 18 set. At this critical time the 18 set failed to function and communication between the Forward Observation Officer and his carrier were non existant.

L/Bdr Oliver Shaw realized the situation, took the carrier with batteries and spare parts and worked his way forward passing over a route uncleared of mines until he was blocked by the wrecks of another carrier and by an M10. From thence he proceeded on foot over road swept by heavy enemy shell, mortar, and small arms fire, reached the Forward Observation Officer and restored communications. Artillery fire was immediately brought down eliminating the machine gun positions, and "C" Company North Shore Regt were able to successfully advance.

L/Bdr Shaw, by his quick action, determination and total disregard for his personal safety, was solely responsible for providing communications which enabled the artillery to knock out enemy machine gun posts enabling "C" Company North Shore Regt to achieve their objective.

L 26281 BOMBARDIER JOHN RILEY STROMQUIST

Military Medal (immediate)

On the afternoon of 24 Feb 45 at KEPPELN an enemy shell hit an ammunition lorry that was being unloaded on a gun position in preparation for operation BLOCKBUSTER. The lorry was set on fire, one man was killed and two wounded. Bdr John Riley Stromquist although seriously wounded in the neck called for a stretcher to evacuate the other wounded case, jumped into the truck and by throwing out cartridges cases and beating down the flames he was able to put out the fire.

This action saved the explosion of many rounds of ammunition with the almost certain result of more casualties on the troop position. During the whole time the enemy continued to harass the gun position with shell fire.

When the fire was put out, Bdr Stromquist collapsed and was then found to be seriously wounded. By his initiative and courage he ensured that this

troop was able to provide artillery support in the opening of operation BLOCK-BUSTER and set an example to all ranks of the regiment of a high fighting spirit.

G 3766 BOMBARDIER HAROLD WILLIAM SULIS

Military Medal (immediate)

On 17 Sep 44 during the assault on BOULOGNE Bdr Harold William Sulis was Observation Post Assistant to a Forward Observation Officer supporting a leading company of the Regiment de la Chaudiere.

On reaching the first objective, due to mines and booby traps it was impossible for the armoured carrier to proceed. The infantry came under heavy observed fire. The artillery Forward Observation Officer determined to take his party forward across open country to find an observation point so that our own artillery could be brought down to neutralize the enemy fire.

The party advanced under fire, secured a good observation point and proceeded to call down effective fire on the enemy.

For thirty-six hours this artillery party was cut off from our own infantry without protection, food or water.

During this period Bdr Sulis assisted in keeping open radio communications and materially assisted the Forward Observation Officer in bringing down effective fire on prearranged targets. Under constant fire he carried on cheerfully and coolly.

His effective work, under most hazardous conditions, assisted in maintaining the momentum of the attack of the 8 Cdn Inf Bde thus materially effecting the successful reduction of the BOULOGNE garrison.

NOMINAL ROLL — I

Disembarkation England, November 1941

Lt-Col	J. W. G. Thompson,	Lieut	D. C. Campbell
	MM, ED.	Lieut	F. A. H. Carberry
Major	F. J. Gilmour	Lieut	J. Else
Major	T. L. Souness	Lieut	W. G. Findlay
Major	W. L. Tuchtie	Lieut	R. A. Fraser
Capt	H. E. Bowes	Lieut	C. H. Gillis, MM
Capt	F. U. Brown	Lieut	H. S. Hodgins
H/Capt	H. L. Chappell	Lieut	J. G. Kidd
	(CCS)	Lieut	P. A. Mahon
Capt	T. E. Dale	Lieut	W. M. Markamn
Capt	W. R. Gilchrist	Lieut	J. L. Martin
Capt	G. F. Hamilton	Lieut	C. E. Morris
Capt	H. Harrison	Lieut	W. M. McNabb
Capt	J. E. Moore	Lieut	T. J. O'Brennan
Capt	L. W. H. Randall	Lieut	C. E. Robinson
Capt	W. L. Pickering	Lieut	W. T. Wilkinson
	(RCAPC)	2/Lieut	F. J. Davis
Capt	J. D. Southam	2/Lieut	J. S. O'Neil
Capt	R. W. Thompson	Spvsr	H. G. Wright
Capt	G. Wright		(Aux Ser)
Lieut	J. T. R. Brownridge		

K 9027	RSM Harman	A. E.V	L 26221	Sgt Henderson	P. W.
M 43936	BSM Blades	R. N.	M 43549	Sgt Hiner	J. T.
K 9029	BSM Chown	L. J.	L 26332	Sgt Jones	A. E.
L 26201	BSM Crawford	W. B.	M 43484	Sgt Kauffman	P. R.
L 26305	BSM Cuthbert	H. H.	K 9064	Sgt MacRae	D.L.R.
M 44000	BSM Harvey	G. N.	L 26205	Sgt Macsynic	S. M.
K 9022	RQMS Johnston	J. P.	M 43917	Sgt Matheson	D.
M 43493	BSM Joslin	R. W.	M 43907	Sgt Meeres	A. J.
M 43490	BSM MacRae	D	M 44011	Sgt Morris	R. A.
K 9025	BSM Matterson	W.R.K	M 43971	Sgt Morton	R. W.
M 43494	BQMS Discher	P. B.	M 43409	Sgt Murray	W. E.
K 9036	BQMS Gilman	R.G.A.	M 44026	Sgt Murray	W. L.
M 43992	BQMS Stenback	W.	K 9067	Sgt Muir	J.
L 26210	S/Sgt Wallace	D. G.	M 44016	Sgt McIntyre	E. E.
L 26206	Sgt Atkinson	C.	M 43925	Sgt Ray	K. E.
M 44006	Sgt Beattie	G. S.	L 26224	Sgt Russell	L. M.
K 9042	Sgt Bennington	A.	M 43994	Sgt Saunders	R. J.
K 9055	Sgt Chown	R. K.	K 9032	Sgt Shelley	R.
M 43403	Sgt Clifford	C. R.	L 26204	Sgt Turner	J.
K 9050	Sgt Craig	R.J.A.	L 26240	L/Sgt Blackwood	R. D.
K 9037	Sgt Cox	J. L.	L 26241	L/Sgt Burkosky	J.
K 9001	Sgt Dirom	A. M.	M 43480	L/Sgt Campbell	W. R.
P 7500	Sgt Harmston	M. J.	M 44030	L/Sgt Cunningham	H.G.

M 3789	L/Sgt	Dale	D. C.	M 43919	L/Bdr	Brown	A.L.C.S.
M 53525	L/Sgt	Dewar	J. C.	M 43457	L/Bdr	Brown	S.
M 43938	L/Sgt	Hillman	L. M.	L 26247	L/Bdr	Campbell	K. T.
M 44015	L/Sgt	Ladwig	F. P.	M 3767	L/Bdr	Cannon	R. J.
M 3190	L/Sgt	Huff	L. M.	M 43951	L/Bdr	Cartwright	R.
K 9094	L/Sgt	LeCren	L. W.	M 43542	L/Bdr	Chessor	G. B.
K 12047	L/Sgt	Murrell	G. L.	L 26329	L/Bdr	Davis	A. S.
M 43559	L/Sgt	Nelles	R. H.	L 26538	L/Bdr	Falstead	G. M.
M 43973	L/Sgt	Parkinson	G. A.	M 43989	L/Bdr	Farrow	S. F.
M 44004	L/Sgt	Parsons	W. V.	K 19022	L/Bdr	Fox	C. R.
K 9074	L/Sgt	Stanhope	A. W.	L. 26208	L/Bdr	Fragle	K. S.
M 43571	L/Sgt	Stephenson	A. M.	K 19015	L/Bdr	Friel	W. T.
K 20028	L/Sgt	VanAggelen	C. H.	M 43956	L/Bdr	Gautier	B.
L 26268	L/Sgt	VanHeel	T.	K 9020	L/Bdr	Gook	R. E.
K 9112	L/Sgt	Wheeler	J.N.B.	M 43551	L/Bdr	Haney	H. T.
L 26203	Bdr	Baudais	A.J.L.	M 43942	L/Bdr	Hannen	R. M.
M 43926	Bdr	Bell	J. T.	M 43960	L/Bdr	Harris	C. N.
L 26269	Bdr	Brakewell	R.	M 44027	L/Bdr	Huscroft	W.
L 26207	Bdr	Brooks	R. M.	L 26216	L/Bdr	Jones	R. M.
M 44027	Bdr	Burton	H.	L 26307	L/Bdr	Joubert	J. G.
M 43411	Bdr	Clenell	J. P.	L 26267	L/Bdr	Kealy	C. G.
K 62698	Bdr	Durrell	G.	M 43422	L/Bdr	Kingsmith	E. G.
K 9086	Bdr	Frost	H. A.	L 26230	L/Bdr	Lavers	R. J.
M 43469	Bdr	Gates	A. G.	L 26306	L/Bdr	Lyons	J. G.
M 43544	Bdr	Gilchrist	H.	M 43532	L/Bdr	Miller	E.
M 43961	Bdr	Hartley	J. C.	M 43993	L/Bdr	Montgomery	C. J.
L 26239	Bdr	Humphrey	G. E.	M 43969	L/Bdr	Moore	A. K.
L 26215	Bdr	Irland	K. W.	M 43908	L/Bdr	Morice	J. F.
M 43420	Bdr	James	T. E.	L 26335	L/Bdr	Olson	L. E.
L 26296	Bdr	Jeffrey	W. G.	M 3607	L/Bdr	Powelson	R. L.
L 26251	Bdr	Kettlewell	J. D.	M 43514	L/Bdr	Raymer	B. V.
M 43401	Bdr	Kilcup	J. C.	L 26371	L/Bde	Rich	G. B.
M 43489	Bdr	MacRae	W. J.	M 43906	L/Bdr	Roberts	H.E.R.
L 26321	Bdr	O'Brennan	M. T.	M 43424	L/Bdr	Schultz	L. E.
L 26231	Bdr	Porter	A. L.	M 44001	L/Bdr	Scott	J. R.
M 43416	Bdr	Powell	F. T.	K 9072	L/Bdr	Service	S.
L 26263	Bdr	Reid	A. W.	M 43911	L/Bdr	Sim	M.
K 73340	Bdr	Reif	M. H.	L 26227	L/Bdr	Sinkler	E. G.
M 44021	Bdr	Rosehill	J. R.	M 43979	L/Bdr	Stillwell	T. E.
K 9002	Bdr	Rutherford	F.	M 43474	L/Bdr	Twiss	H. A.
L 26337	Bdr	Somers	D. W.	L 26315	L/Bdr	Young	W. C.
M 43404	Bdr	Thorburn	L. R.	L 26218	L/Bdr	Yuill	D. F.
P 7510	Bdr	White	R. A.	M 43566	L/Bdr	Vars	B. A.
M 43485	Bdr	Whitehead	A. W.				
K 9123	Gnr	Agnew	G.A.T.	K 9041	Gnr	Anderson	T. A.
L 18467	Gnr	Allen	J. N.	L 18420	Gnr	Andrews	E.
K 852	Gnr	Allingham	R. J.	L 26326	Gnr	Andrews	L.
M 43947	Gnr	Anderson	H. P.	L 18423	Gnr	Achibald	H. G.

M 44006	Gnr	Armstrong	W. R.	M 3741	Gnr	Carter	E. J.
D 118362	Gnr	Auger	E.	M 3758	Gnr	Chadwick	A.
L 26380	Gnr	Backus	J. J.	L 26366	Gnr	Chalus	L.
K 73411	Gnr	Baldwin	G. R.	M 44034	Gnr	Champion	E.
M 3404	Gnr	Ball	B. B.	M 3684	Gnr	Charleston	H.
M 66036	Gnr	Ball	R. S.	L 26360	Gnr	Chernik	J. W.
M 43413	Gnr	Barabash	S.	L 26297	Gnr	Chester	L.
M 3884	Gnr	Barbee	E. F.	M 43564	Gnr	Chisholm	J. L.
M 43528	Gnr	Barker	E.	M 3815	Gnr	Chong	S.
K 14081	Gnr	Barton	E.	M 3770	Gnr	Cipperley	L. S.
M 43483	Gnr	Baumann	T.	M 43417	Gnr	Clarke	E. G.
L 18419	Gnr	Bear	S. F.	L 18447	Gnr	Collier	V. A.
C 821	Gnr	Beaver	A. A.	M 43562	Gnr	Conaty	L. M.
L 26532	Gnr	Belfry	F. R.	M 43931	Gnr	Connon	W.
M 3415	Gnr	Bell	S.	L 26322	Gnr	Corrigal	D. M.
K 35410	Gnr	Bennett	S. E.	M 43547	Gnr	Corrigan	P. J.
M 3828	Gnr	Benson	L. R.	M 3688	Gnr	Cotterill	D. J.
B 11243	Gnr	Beswick	M. C.	C 9515	Gnr	Cousineau	D.
M 43913	Gnr	Bevan	J. N.	M 35716	Gnr	Cowan	F. H.
L 26520	Gnr	Bird	C.H.A.	L 18443	Gnr	Cowx	T.
L 18430	Gnr	Bird	J. E.	M 43560	Gnr	Crawford	A. J.
M 44018	Gnr	Bjorkeland	H. H.	L 26228	Gnr	Crawford	C. E.
L 18402	Gnr	Black	J. A.	M 43950	Gnr	Crawford	V. S.
L 26334	Gnr	Blake	A. E.	L 26222	Gnr	Crosland	J. R.
M 43929	Gnr	Bohn	B. J.	L 26523	Gnr	Cross	B. W.
M 44033	Gnr	Bos	W. H.	M 29053	Gnr	Crossman	D.
D 118383	Gnr	Bouchard	A.	M 24022	Gnr	Crowe	M. W.
B 16693	Gnr	Bouchard	W.	L 18485	Gnr	Curiston	P.H.S.
L 26536	Gnr	Boulding	J. A.	L 26506	Gnr	Currie	J. K.
M 43561	Gnr	Bowyer	H.E.	F 891	Gnr	Currie	M.
K 47687	Gnr	Braham	P. L.	L 26255	Gnr	Dahl	H. C.
L 26512	Gnr	Bremner	D. M.	M 43577	Gnr	Dankwerth	W. L.
M 43937	Gnr	Brothers	R.	L 26272	Gnr	Darnell	R. V.
M 3750	Gnr	Brown	C. R.	M 43407	Gnr	Davenport	L.
L 26259	Gnr	Brown	L. M.	L 26312	Gnr	Davidson	G. T.
L 26375	Gnr	Brown	R. W.	M 43999	Gnr	Davidson	R. W.
M 3784	Gnr	Brown	W.	L 26325	Gnr	Davidson	W. R.
L 7164	Gnr	Buckingham	T. A.	L 26513	Gnr	Davies	J. T.
L 17062	Gnr	Buswell	R. D.	M 43535	Gnr	Davis	M.
M 43534	Gnr	Butcher	T. T.	L 2633	Gnr	Dawson	R. T.
M 43538	Gnr	Butcher	W. L.	L 18347	Gnr	Dean	F. S.
M 29093	Gnr	Byttnen	A.H.A.	M 632	Gnr	Dear	F. J.
M 59317	Gnr	Cairns	R.	L 6298	Gnr	De Bruyne	J. G.
M 43536	Gnr	Calkins	J. R.	M 43953	Gnr	Duchermé	M. E.
L 26211	Gnr	Callaghan	P. W.	M 29094	Gnr	Demenuk	W.
L 26257	Gnr	Callaghan	T. R.	L 18373	Gnr	Diewold	A. W.
C 5524	Gnr	Carmichael	J. P.	M 43921	Gnr	Dragon	E. A.
K 5020	Gnr	Carswell	R. H.	D 116099	Gnr	Drake	H. A.
M 43521	Gnr	Carter	A. L.	M 43955	Gnr	Duchering	V.H.L.

M 43902	Gnr	Duffy	M. F.	L 18388	Gnr	Grenacher	J.
M 43518	Gnr	Edgar	L. M.	L 26328	Gnr	Griffen	R. E.
K 9085	Gnr	Edgett	E. E.	M 43958	Gnr	Griffiths	W. M.
L 26534	Gnr	Edmondson	J.	M 43995	Gnr	Guard	H. D.
L 26273	Gnr	Edwards	R. E.	L 26367	Gnr	Haatvedt	L. M.
M 3745	Gnr	Einarson	I.	L 26264	Gnr	Hadley	J. A.
H 59723	Gnr	Elder	L. M.	H 56984	Gnr	Hall	G. A.
M 3783	Gnr	Elliott	R. W.	L 26514	Gnr	Hall	H.
M 43408	Gnr	Engstrom	O. S.	L 18438	Gnr	Hallj	R. G.
L 26331	Gnr	Espeseth	G. O.	M 3959	Gnr	Hall	R. D.
L 26504	Gnr	Evans	A.	M 3409	Gnr	Halliday	J. F.
K 25583	Gnr	Evans	W.	M 65820	Gnr	Hamaliuk	F.
M 65800	Gnr	Farquharson	D.W.	M 29103	Gnr	Hansen	R. E.
L 26395	Gnr	Fehr	D.	L 26309	Gnr	Harper	H. E.
L 18404	Gnr	Ferguson	W.G.H.	M 43990	Gnr	Harris	W. O.
M 3751	Gnr	Foote	C. E.	M 61653	Gnr	Harrison	A. J.
N 37019	Gnr	Forbes	L. R.	M 3771	Gnr	Hawick	J.R.S.
L 26404	Gnr	Ford	L. G.	M 61651	Gnr	Hayes	J. H.
M 44025	Gnr	Foreman	J. A.	M 43915	Gnr	Hays	M. C.
M 45138	Gnr	Forment	G. L.	L 26323	Gnr	Henderson	C. F.
M 55787	Gnr	Foster	L. N.	M 3726	Gnr	Henderson	D. H.
M 44024	Gnr	Foster	H. M.	L 26238	Gnr	Henderson	O. J.
C 10547	Gnr	Foubert	S. E.	L 26271	Gnr	Hendricks	A. J.
L 26276	Gnr	Fox	E. L.	L 18455	Gnr	Henry	J. H.
L 26234	Gnr	Fox	L. W.	L 26260	Gnr	Hendry	W.
M 43475	Gnr	Franklin	J. W.	L 26302	Gnr	Heyer	J. H.
K 73374	Gnr	Fraser	E. D.	M 43914	Gnr	Hilker	A. P.
M 43529	Gnr	Frystro	K. K.	C 859	Gnr	Hill	R. T.
K 13143	Gnr	Gaffney	J. R.	L 26279	Gnr	Hiltz	P. C.
L 26590	Gnr	Gamelin	H. J.	L 26254	Gnr	Hiltz	P. J.
M 65735	Gnr	Garford	F.J.C.	M 3769	Gnr	Hirsche	R.
M 29101	Gnr	Genereux	D.	M 3705	Gnr	Hnatuk	I.
L 18425	Gnr	Gernscheid D. J.		L 26387	Gnr	Hnatow	W.
L 18428	Gnr	Gernscheid H. C.		M 43508	Gnr	Hobbs	D. C.
M 3814	Gnr	Gervais	L.	K 73285	Gnr	Hobbs	S. D.
L 18451	Gnr	Gettis	D. G.	M 43912	Gnr	Hockin	J. E.
E 20202	Gnr	Giguere	A.	M 34991	Gnr	Hockin	R. E.
M 35543	Gnr	Gilbertson	A. E.	M 65571	Gnr	Hoidn	R.
K 22030	Gnr	Gillman	D. L.	L 26244	Gnr	Holmes A'Court	W.C.
M 3426	Gnr	Gingell	H. L.	M 43916	Gnr	Holtzman	J.
D 106961	Gnr	Glick	I.	M 3735	Gnr	Hooks	R.
L 18441	Gnr	Glover	L. S.	M 43920	Gnr	Hoopfer	J. F.
M 43957	Gnr	Goldby	F. E.	K 42070	Gnr	Hopkins	E. A.
B 6718	Gnr	Goldering	C. S.	M 43523	Gnr	Hoppus	L. L.
L 18434	Gnr	Gordon	L. J.	K 9008	Gnr	Hopton	L. J.
M 3420	Gnr	Gordon	W. D.	M 3725	Gnr	Hoyle	G. R.
M 43470	Gnr	Gray	R. E.	M 43941	Gnr	Hoyles	F. J.
L 26286	Gnr	Green	C. H.	M 633	Gnr	Hughes	G.
L 26400	Gnr	Green	D.	L 6295	Gnr	Hull	L. W.

M 43557	Gnr	Hunter	L. J.	M 3777	Gnr	Logan	D. W.
L 26374	Gnr	Hunter	N. S.	M 43967	Gnr	Loiselle	M. D.
L 18458	Gnr	Isbister	C. R.	M 3832	Gnr	Lorenzen	E.
L 26236	Gnr	Isbister	D. K.	M 43966	Gnr	Lowther	J.
M 54549	Gnr	Iversen	H.	M 43552	Gnr	Lund	P. A.
M 3834	Gnr	Jerdam	J.T.S.	L 26388	Gnr	Lychak	M.
L 26288	Gnr	Johnson	G.	M 3428	Gnr	Lyle	J. R.
L 26538	Gnr	Johnson	S. E.	L 26396	Gnr	MacDonald	C. A.
K 73908	Gnr	Johnson	W.	M 59091	Gnr	MacDonell	A. J.
M 3747	Gnr	Johnstone	R. D.	M 45694	Gnr	MacDonell	T. R.
M 59089	Gnr	Jones	C. E.	M 43500	Gnr	MacLean	A. A.
M 3796	Gnr	Jones	H. G.	K 13024	Gnr	MacLeod	A. A.
M 3858	Gnr	Jones	R. J.	M 59073	Gnr	Malonek	G.
M 3411	Gnr	Josephson	A. H.	L 27871	Gnr	Marion	J. J.
K 9061	Gnr	Kaese	B.	M 3803	Gnr	Masinda	F.
M 626	Gnr	Kalicki	K.	M 50060	Gnr	Mason	H. D.
M 43996	Gnr	Kane	R. P.	M 44037	Gnr	Mattie	C.C.F.
L 35070	Gnr	Karkanen	N.	K 78825	Gnr	Mayea	H. J.
K 22057	Gnr	Kay	R.D.L.	L 26258	Gnr	Mayer	J. A.
M 397	Gnr	Kehn	A.	M 3886	Gnr	McBride	J. N.
L 26252	Gnr	Kennedy	T. W.	L 26277	Gnr	McCarthy	C. J.
L 26266	Gnr	Kennedy	W. J.	B 6801	Gnr	McCord	T.
L 26282	Gnr	Kenny	D. A.	M 43569	Gnr	McCrimmon	A. F.
L 18450	Gnr	Kenyon	S. H.	M 3794	Gnr	McCune	H. G.
M 44012	Gnr	Kerr	R. D.	M 59315	Gnr	McDonald	D.
M 61660	Gnr	Kind	A. W.	L 26274	Gnr	McDonald	T. C.
L 9253	Gnr	Kindopp	J.	M 29059	Gnr	McDougall	H. G.
M 43537	Gnr	King	B. W.	L 26327	Gnr	McDougald	J. A.
M 43539	Gnr	King	L. G.	L 26280	Gnr	McDougald	T. L.
M 379	Gnr	Kushnieryk	R.	C 1246	Gnr	McFarland	J. G.
L 26296	Gnr	Kyle	R. J.	M 3765	Gnr	McLaren	A. B.
L 26402	Gnr	Lafond	C.	M 29054	Gnr	McLaren	P. R.
M 43477	Gnr	Lahd	O. L.	M 43419	Gnr	McLaughlin	J. K.
M 3776	Gnr	Langton	B. O.	L 26324	Gnr	McLeod	R. S.
M 43467	Gnr	Langton	R. J.	M 3785	Gnr	McLevin	D. J.
L 23044	Gnr	Lantz	V.D.R.	M 3778	Gnr	McMullen	J. T.
L 26363	Gnr	Latowski	V.	C 1224	Gnr	McNally	L. C.
M 43964	Gnr	Laurence	A.	K 25565	Gnr	McNeil	C.
M 62209	Gnr	Lawrence	S. M.	M 61627	Gnr	McNeil	R. F.
K 92478	Gnr	Lawson	W. F.	M 43451	Gnr	McQuillin	H. A.
L 18466	Gnr	Leary	A. L.	L 18454	Gnr	McRostie	G. H.
E 1175	Gnr	LeClerc	R.	L 26265	Gnr	McRann	W.
M 43541	Gnr	Leicht	H. F.	M 446	Gnr	Meadowcroft	N.
K 10183	Gnr	Letchford	E. J.	L 26537	Gnr	Meadows	L. R.
M 43934	Gnr	Lewis	D.	M 65730	Gnr	Mekolychuk	S.
L 26290	Gnr	Liston	J. H.	M 43415	Gnr	Merrick	H. O.
F 77333	Gnr	Llewellyn	R.	M 43563	Gnr	Messinger	G. E.
M 29144	Gnr	Loewen	W.	M 3434	Gnr	Michaud	A.
L 26399	Gnr	Loftus	T. E.	L 26368	Gnr	Mikitiuk	J.

M 60885	Gnr	Mitchell	R. E.	M 43510	Gnr	Powers	K. S.
M 3407	Gnr	Moffat	J. O.	M 43423	Gnr	Prestwich	N. H.
L 26533	Gnr	Moodie	W. J.	L 26367	Gnr	Price	R. D.
M 3768	Gnr	Moody	M.	H 41431	Gnr	Pridgen	W. H.
M 65992	Gnr	Moore	H.	K 92120	Gnr	Pudsey	D. A.
L 26220	Gnr	Moore	R. T.	M 43531	Gnr	Pugh	G. R.
L 26287	Gnr	Moran	T. S.	L 26382	Gnr	Quinn	W.M.
M 27154	Gnr	Morehouse	W. H.	M 3410	Gnr	Radocy	C. M.
A 34905	Gnr	Morely	C. M.	L 18444	Gnr	Rambo	L. O.
L 26232	Gnr	Morris	H. J.	L 26370	Gnr	Ramm	G. R.
F 905	Gnr	Morrison	J. F.	L 22682	Gnr	Randall	H. A.
L 18465	Gnr	Mount	C. J.	M 66030	Gnr	Ranostay	L.
M 43930	Gnr	Mowat	D.	M 43975	Gnr	Ranson	J. W.
M 43516	Gnr	Mowbray	W.	M 3659	Gnr	Read	D.
K 12110	Gnr	Muirhead	D. M.	L 26394	Gnr	Reed	G. N.
L 26248	Gnr	Murphy	J. A.	K 13019	Gnr	Rees	L. C.
L 6287	Gnr	Murray	J. T.	K 9071	Gnr	Reid	E. L.
M 3749	Gnr	Murray	W. J.	L 12056	Gnr	Retvedt	T. H.
M 3764	Gnr	Nail	C.	M 45408	Gnr	Reynen	W.
L 26508	Gnr	Natrass	E. C.	M 43578	Gnr	Richard	J.
M 43421	Gnr	Neil	J. C.	D 118346	Gnr	Richard	J. A.
L 26524	Gnr	Nelson	A.	M 43939	Gnr	Riddoch	C. K.
H 36747	Gnr	Nevin	C. J.	C 1203	Gnr	Rines	E. G.
M 6570	Gnr	Neubauer	A.	D 109397	Gnr	Roach	G.
L 10419	Gnr	Neuert	G. K.	K 47603	Gnr	Robert	E.
L 26246	Gnr	Newberry	E. K.	M 43462	Gnr	Roberts	G.
M 3786	Gnr	Niblock	R. A.	L 26308	Gnr	Robertson	C. P.
L 26517	Gnr	Nicol	R. A.	M 3418	Gnr	Robertson	W. L.
M 44014	Gnr	Nile	A. J.	M 29237	Gnr	Robinson	C. S.
M 66035	Gnr	Osborn	H. E.	K 10058	Gnr	Romans	S. D.
L 18457	Gnr	Ouellette	A.	M 29202	Gnr	Roth	F.
M 59096	Gnr	Ozdoba	S.	L 26392	Gnr	Ruston	A. L.
L 26403	Gnr	Parker	P.B.G.	M 43945	Gnr	Ryall	A. R.
M 3775	Gnr	Parkins	E.	M 43575	Gnr	Sabastian	R. G.
M 43974	Gnr	Parnell	H. B.	L 18377	Gnr	Samborski	D. L.
C 860	Gnr	Patterson	D. A.	M 3790	Gnr	Sanderson	W. H.
C 861	Gnr	Patterson	J. E.	M 3829	Gnr	Saunders	C. A.
M 65867	Gnr	Peck	V. L.	K 73189	Gnr	Scaplen	W. E.
C 1609	Gnr	Pecord	A. G.	M 59085	Gnr	Schauer	E.
L 18461	Gnr	Pell	R. A.	M 59106	Gnr	Schell	N. A.
M 61625	Gnr	Pellant	R. A.	L 18439	Gnr	Schulmeister	F.
D 6971	Gnr	Pelletier	A.	A 28342	Gnr	Scott	J. R.
M 3419	Gnr	Perkins	R. B.	M 3578	Gnr	Scott	S. G.
L 26392	Gnr	Peterson	P.	M 35603	Gnr	Sedar	A.
L 18440	Gnr	Pilz	P.	L 18442	Gnr	Serhyenko	A. P.
M 3463	Gnr	Pinnell	L. C.	M 3424	Gnr	Sewell	H. J.
M 43477	Gnr	Poland	J. W.	C 1618	Gnr	Sharp	RAM.
L 26311	Gnr	Porter	J.	L 26318	Gnr	Shaw	O.
L 26310	Gnr	Porter	R. J.	M 59100	Gnr	Shennan	W.

H 55689	Gnr	Shepherd	N. W.	L 26330	Gnr	Thorsen	R. L.
M 43465	Gnr	Sherrer	G. A.	L 26381	Gnr	Thrasher	F. W.
M 43976	Gnr	Shoemaker	L. E.	M 43499	Gnr	Tisdale	S. G.
L 26278	Gnr	Short	J. L.	L 26377	Gnr	Toles	E. O.
M 3831	Gnr	Shoults	W. R.	L 26378	Gnr	Toles	H. R.
M 43933	Gnr	Siddals	A. E.	L 18365	Gnr	Tregaskis	C. A.
M 43572	Gnr	Siddons	F. H.	M 3661	Gnr	Trout	H. E.
M 43977	Gnr	Siddons	R. A.	L 18429	Gnr	Tuley	J.
L 26372	Gnr	Siefert	L. G.	L 26531	Gnr	Turner	A. E.
M 43568	Gnr	Simpson	J.A.B.	L 6289	Gnr	Turner	H. J.
L 6282	Gnr	Skene	R. T.	M 3734	Gnr	Underhill	A. G.
M 3719	Gnr	Sleen	J. W.	M 3763	Gnr	Underhill	J.
L 18471	Gnr	Slingsby	G. T.	K 10006	Gnr	Vancooten	J.M.E.
M 43918	Gnr	Slyter	W.	K 9076	Gnr	Vanderlip	A. L.
L 26214	Gnr	Smith	C. H.	M 43503	Gnr	Vannebo	P. M.
M 44023	Gnr	Smith	J.	M 60899	Gnr	Varcoe	R. W.
M 66026	Gnr	Smith	L. K.	L 26383	Gnr	Vawter	L. J.
M 43905	Gnr	Smith	L. W.	M 43997	Gnr	Wagner	L. E.
L 22554	Gnr	Smith	R.	L 26397	Gnr	Walchuk	W.
M 44020	Gnr	Smith	T. E.	M 43985	Gnr	Walker	S. D.
M 43497	Gnr	Snyder	B. A.	M 3413	Gnr	Walters	T. E.
M 3875	Gnr	Sommerville	A. R.	M 3414	Gnr	Wangler	J.
M 29146	Gnr	Sorenson	C.N.B.	L 18406	Gnr	Ware	C. W.
L 1846	Gnr	Spence	L. A.	L 18413	Gnr	Warren	W. J.
M 34468	Gnr	Spielman	J.	L 13433	Gnr	Watt	J. E.
M 43981	Gnr	Spurrel	W.	M 43509	Gnr	Webster	E. W.
M 3748	Gnr	Stalberg	J. A.	M 43504	Gnr	Wrener	B.
L 26389	Gnr	Stapleton	R. G.	M 3412	Gnr	Wetmore	L. C.
L 26371	Gnr	Staves	G.	L 18436	Gnr	Wick	A. C.
L 26515	Gnr	Steele	G. W.	M 59186	Gnr	Wiley	J. W.
L 18480	Gnr	Stefan	E.	L 18427	Gnr	Williams	P. T.
K 29113	Gnr	Stevens	C. J.	M 29100	Gnr	Willisko	S.
L 18422	Gnr	Stewart	W. E.	L 26516	Gnr	Willson	W.
L 26501	Gnr	Stringer	S. W.	L 6284	Gnr	Willway	F.E.E.
L 26281	Gnr	Stromquist	J. R.	D 6967	Gnr	Wilscam	F. G.
H 59504	Gnr	Summer	A. O.	K 98253	Gnr	Wilson	C. F.
L 26522	Gnr	Swaby	W. R.	P 7522	Gnr	Wilson	G.
M 3659	Gnr	Syren	I. E.	M 43983	Gnr	Wilson	G.
L 26299	Gnr	Tanner	W.	M 43446	Gnr	Wilson	K.
L 26250	Gnr	Taylor	J. A.	M 12441	Gnr	Wilson	M.
L 26256	Gnr	Taylor	R. F.	L 2685	Gnr	Wilson	T. I.
M 62105	Gnr	Teale	L. F.	K 8014	Gnr	Wilson	T.W.E.
M 43469	Gnr	Templeton	J. A.	M 629	Gnr	Winter	H. A.
L 26519	Gnr	Thompson	A.	K 9100	Gnr	Wise	W. F.
M 44031	Gnr	Thompson	G. E.	M 3890	Gnr	Woltucky	J.
M 65949	Gnr	Thompson	I.	L 26401	Gnr	Wurtz	O. N.
M 44029	Gnr	Thompson	J. W.	L 18486	Gnr	Yandt	J. B.
M 43943	Gnr	Thompson	M. W.	L 18476	Gnr	Young	R. M.
L 26527	Gnr	Thompson	R. J.	L 26384	Gnr	Zemimchuk	B.
L 26262	Gnr	Thompson	W. A.				

NOMINAL ROLL — 2

Embarkation United Kingdom and Disembarkation

France (Normandy) June 1944

(Extracts from Part II Orders Nos 33, 33A d/ 13 & 18 Jul 44)

EMBARKED 4 JUN 44

Lt-Col F. le P. T. Clifford
Major J. D. Baird
D 12537 L/Bdr Learmouth W. A.
H 54753 Gnr Calder W. N.

DISEMBARKED 6 JUN 44

Lieut G. H. Milsom
M 3886 Gnr McBride J. N.
M 43516 Gnr Mowbray W.

EMBARKED 3 JUN 44

Major R. K. MacKenzie
Major G. F. Rainnie
Capt J. W. Bennett
K 9027 RSM Harman A.E.V.
P 7500 RQMS Harmston M. J.
L 26206 BSM Atkinson C.
M 43490 BSM MacRae D.
M 44016 BSM McIntyre E. E.
K 9112 S/Sgt Wheeler J.N.B.
L 26234 Sgt Fox L. W.
K 24070 L/Sgt Hopkins E. A.
L 26337 L/Sgt Somers D. W.
L 26240 Bdr Blackwood R. D.
M 43919 Bdr Brown A.L.C.S.
M 44025 Bdr Foreman J. A.
M 43469 Cpl Gates A. G.
M 43969 Bdr Moore A. K.
L 26335 Bdr Olsen L. E.
L 26231 Bdr Porter A. L.
M 43404 Bdr Thorburn L. R.
M 59186 Bdr Wiley J. W.
M 43951 L/Bdr Cartwright R.
L 18437 L/Cpl Dean F. S.
M 3745 L/Bdr Einarson I.
K 7119 L/Bdr Ferguson D. H.
L 26280 L/Bdr McDougald T. L.
M 3785 L/Bdr McLevin D. J.
M 61627 L/Bdr McNeil R. F.
L 22682 L/Bdr Randall H. A.
P 4621 L/Bdr Robertson L. B.
M 3418 L/Bdr Robertson W. L.

DISEMBARKED 6 JUN 44

Capt W. M. Dirks
Capt J. Else
Capt W. T. Wilson
L 26315 L/Bdr Young W. C.
C120088 Gnr Adams W. V.
G 50556 Gnr Albert L.
D118362 Gnr Auger E.
B124006 Cfn Bacola N.
C 1725 Gnr Beaudoin O. E.
L 59868 Gnr Beaumont W. H.
K 23091 Gnr Birtch J. L.
L 26520 Gnr Bird C.H.A.
L 61769 Gnr Birney J. F.
L 35019 Gnr Blair I. J.
H 69658 Gnr Brickenden C. F.
B 21640 Gnr Brock J. B.
M 3784 Gnr Brown W.
H102003 Gnr Buhr H.
F 55851 Gnr Burke A. F.
M 43534 Gnr Butcher F. T.
M 3900 Gnr Chatwood W. H.
L 26360 Gnr Chernik J. W.
B 56248 Gnr Christie C. T.
M 43417 Gnr Clark E. G.
F 5657 Gnr Cole J. O.
B 45233 Gnr Cook J.R.E.
B111529 Gnr Cowan J.
F 45832 Gnr Cresine E. R.
M 43577 Gnr Dankwerth W. L.
F 95857 Gnr Davison H. H.
L 61298 Gnr Debruyne J. G.

L 10121	Gnr	DeKoven	P.	L104883	Gnr	Mann	J.
M 29094	Gnr	Demenuk	W.	A 32051	Gnr	Maynard	B. A.
H 92433	Gnr	Diamond	W. T.	M 446	Gnr	Meadowcroft	N.
C 33345	Gnr	Donahue	J. L.	H 69830	Gnr	Meyers	G. A.
M 43953	Gnr	Decherme	M. E.	G 4479	Gnr	Milner	W.
K 62698	Gnr	Durrell	G.	B 41043	Cfn	Mitchell	R. D.
P 4540	Gnr	Edwards	J. R.	L 26533	Gnr	Moodie	W. J.
H 67434	Gnr	Falkevitch	M.	B 72126	Gnr	McCarthy	G. T.
L 26528	Gnr	Falstead	G. M.	B 45392	Gnr	McRae	E. B.
A 60135	Gnr	Fry	D. E.	H 77369	Gnr	Nattrass	S. D.
L 26509	Pte	Gamelin	H. J.	M 42137	Gnr	Orr	E. R.
M 536	Gnr	Gillies	C. T.	C 10550	Gnr	Parent	J.G.A.
B143714	Gnr	Gillis	A.	B144410	Gnr	Payson	D. J.
D 14530	Gnr	Greavel	O. F.	K 92120	Gnr	Pudsey	D. A.
L 18438	Gnr	Hall	R. G.	L 18444	Gnr	Rambo	L. O.
M 4309	Gnr	Halliday	J. F.	L 35043	Gnr	Reid	J. A.
C 4957	Gnr	Hicks	M. H.	M100165	Gnr	Robinson	J. F.
H 59534	Gnr	Higgs	W. A.	C 1567	Gnr	Rowden	H. A.
M105083	Gnr	Hill	C. R.	L 26393	Gnr	Ruston	A. L.
C 859	Gnr	Hill	R. T.	M 3829	Gnr	Saunders	C. A.
L 26387	Pte	Hnatow	W.	A 28342	Gnr	Scott	J. R.
M 43916	Gnr	Holtzman	J.	L 26318	Gnr	Shaw	O.
M 43941	Gnr	Hoyles	F. J.	M 43933	Gnr	Siddals	A. E.
L 26236	Gnr	Isbister	D. K.	L 6282	Gnr	Skene	R. T.
D 11168	Gnr	Johnson	A. P.	M 44023	Gnr	Smith	J.
H 87971	Gnr	Jones	F. J.	L 18422	Gnr	Stewart	W. E.
L 26252	Gnr	Kennedy	T. W.	B113016	Gnr	Strychalski	M.
B 21478	Gnr	Kubay	J. G.	L 26299	Gnr	Tanner	W.
B 21472	Gnr	Lack	W.R.J.	B112849	Gnr	Taylor	F. C.
L 26363	Gnr	Latowski	V.	M 65749	Gnr	Thompson	I.
M 43964	Pte	Laurence	A.	M 44029	Gnr	Thompson	J. W.
D 7194	Gnr	Lebel	S.	M 43934	Gnr	Thompson	M. W.
M 43966	Gnr	Lowther	J.	L 11022	Gnr	Tracey	A. G.
B 23781	Gnr	Lynn	N. A.	B 21523	Gnr	Urquhart	L. F.
M 59091	Pte	MacDonell	A. J.	H 66775	Gnr	Usunier	F.
C 9315	Gnr	MacIntosh	A.	M 60899	Gnr	Varcoe	R. W.
M 43500	Gnr	MacLean	A. A.	L 13433	Gnr	Watt	J. E.
K 46155	Gnr	MacLellan	A. A.	C 9927	Gnr	Weymark	J. T.
M 59073	Gnr	Malonek	G.	D 6967	Gnr	Wilsam	F. G.
A102696	Gnr	Malott	O. E.	M101192	Gnr	Woodman	A. J.

EMBARKED 2 JUN 44

Major	J. D. Young
Capt	E. W. Pickel
M 50060	Cpl Mason H. D.
L 26265	Cpl McRann W.
L 26260	L/Bdr Hendry W.
M 43451	L/Bdr McQuillin H. A.

DISSEMBARKED 6 JUN 44

Capt	H. L. Thorne
Capt	A. F. Wrenshall
L 26311	L/Bdr Porter J.
L 18420	Pte Andrews E.
L 26326	Gnr Andrews L.
M 3884	Gnr Barbee E. F.

B 9757 Gnr Beirness E. A.
 L 26532 Gnr Felfry F. R.
 L 26375 Gnr Brown R. W.
 B 58881 Gnr Cochrane W.
 B 44954 Gnr Collyer K. R.
 A 35208 Gnr Currie J. H.
 L 26272 Gnr Darnell R. V.
 H 64761 Gnr Funnell W. L.
 D126890 Gnr Gatz G.
 H 95467 Gnr Glasman G. F.
 K 41247 Gnr Hamilton D. P.
 B101630 Cfn Henderson D. W.
 M 3705 Gnr Hnatiuk I.
 M 105108 Gnr Hill J. W.
 K 9008 Gnr Hopton L. J.
 M 3858 Gnr Jones R. J.
 L103159 Gnr Lacy G. F.
 L100933 Gnr McRitchie O. J. D.

C 861 Gnr Patterson J. E.
 M 43423 Gnr Prestwich N. H.
 L100476 Gnr Rezansoff P.
 D118346 Pte Richard J. A.
 D109397 Gnr Roach G. C.
 K 75406 Gnr Robinson R. W. A.
 D 7774 Gnr Roy J. R. A. A.
 M 3790 Gnr Sanderson W. H.
 M 59085 Gnr Schauer E.
 M102900 Gnr Soucy P.
 B 58165 Gnr St Amand W. L.
 L101021 Gnr Steele A. L.
 L 26256 Gnr Taylor R. F.
 M101196 Gnr Verag W.
 K 69267 Gnr Varcoe C.
 H 60073 Gnr Webb A. J.
 M100219 Gnr Whitehead C. G.

EMBARKED 1 JUN 44

Capt J. C. Dale
 Capt J. Draffin
 Capt G. S. Griffith (RCAMC)
 Capt G. C. Langille
 Capt A. K. Poussette
 Capt W. J. G. Steele
 Lieut F. L. Aylward
 Lieut R. D. Baugh
 Lieut W. I. L. Brock
 Lieut J. T. R. Brownridge
 Lieut P. P. F. Clay
 Lieut J. A. Crutcher
 Lieut F. J. Davis

K 9029 BSM Chown L. J.
 M 43938 BSM Hillman L. M.
 M 43917 BSM Matheson D.
 M 43925 BSM Ray K. E.
 L 26204 BSM Turner J.
 M 44015 S/Sgt Ladwig F. P.
 L 26207 Sgt Brooks R. M.
 D 11812 Sgt Bull E. C. J.
 L 26241 Sgt Burkosky J.
 M 3767 Sgt Cannon R. J.
 K 9055 Sgt Chown R. K.
 M 44030 Sgt Cunningham H. G.
 M 3789 Sgt Dale D. C.
 M 2045 Sgt Dobbie J. C.
 M 43956 Sgt Gautier B

DISSEMBARKED 6 JUN 44

Lieut J. M. Doohan
 Lieut R. A. Fraser
 Lieut R. F. Gibson
 Lieut T. C. Greenless
 Lieut W. L. Hogg
 Lieut F. R. Holmes
 Lieut R. J. MacDonald
 Lieut W. M. McNabb
 Lieut T. J. O'Brennan
 Lieut F. O. Sexsmith
 Lieut W. Simcock
 Lieut R. J. Waldie

K 9063 Sgt Gilman R. G. A.
 M 43961 Sgt Hartley J. C.
 L 26323 Sgt Henderson C. F.
 C 585 Sgt Hooper E. B.
 L 26332 Sgt Jones A. E.
 L 26266 Sgt Kennedy W. J.
 M 43422 Sgt Kingsmith E. G.
 K 9114 Sgt MacFarland T. D.
 M 43532 Sgt Miller E.
 M 3407 Sgt Moffatt J. O.
 L 26220 Sgt Moore R. T.
 M 44011 Sgt Morris R. A.
 K 9067 Sgt Muir J.
 M 43416 Sgt Powell F. T.
 M 43514 Sgt Raymer B. V.

K 73340	Sgt	Reif	M. H.	K 9076	Bdr	VanDerlip	A. L.
L 26317	Sgt	Rich	G. B.	H 67132	Bdr	Watkins	W. J.
M 43907	Sgt	Roberts	H.E.R.	M 43446	Bdr	Wilson	K.
M 43911	Sgt	Sim	M.	M 43913	L/Bdr	Bevan	J. N.
L 26227	Sgt	Sinkler	E. G.	L 17062	L/Bdr	Buswell	R. D.
L 26214	Sgt	Smith	C. H.	L 26257	L/Bdr	Callaghan	T. R.
K 20028	Sgt	VanAggelen	C. H.	M 3770	L/Bdr	Cipperley	L. S.
M 43411	L/Sgt	Clennell	J. P.	M 43562	L/Bdr	Conaty	L. M.
L 26312	L/Sgt	Davidson	G. T.	M 632	L/Bdr	Dear	F. J.
L 26276	L/Sgt	Fox	E. L.	M 3751	L/Bdr	Foote	C. E.
K 19022	L/Sgt	Fox	R.	L 26238	L/Bdr	Henderson	O. J.
M 3231	L/Sgt	Hoskin	T.	L 26302	L/Bdr	Heyer	J. H.
L 26239	L/Sgt	Humphrey	G. E.	M 633	L/Bdr	Hughes	G.
L 18280	L/Sgt	Kenyon	R.	L 26282	L/Bdr	Kenney	D. A.
M 43401	L/Sgt	Kilcup	J. C.	L 2696	L/Bdr	Kyle	R. J.
M 43993	L/Sgt	Montgomery	C.J.W.	U 1847	L/Bdr	Metcalfe	F.
M 3768	L/Sgt	Moody	M.	L 26324	L/Bdr	McLeod	R. S.
M 43575	L/Sgt	Sebastian	R. G.	L 26369	L/Bdr	Price	R. D.
M 43566	L/Sgt	Vars	B. A.	M 43462	L/Bdr	Roberts	G.
M 43923	L/Sgt	Waldren	C. C.	L 26522	L/Bdr	Swaby	W. R.
M 44033	Bdr	Bos	W. H.	L 26262	L/Bdr	Thompson	W. A.
M 3750	Bdr	Brown	C. R.	M 43503	L/Bdr	Vannebo	P. M.
L 26247	Bdr	Campbell	K. T.	M 8014	L/Bdr	Wilson	T.W.E.
L 26297	Bdr	Chester	J.	K 8014	L/Bdr	Wilson	T.W.E.
L 26506	Bdr	Currie	J. K.	L 18476	L/Bdr	Young	R. M.
L 26329	Bdr	Davis	A. S.	M 3806	Gnr	Albrecht	L. D.
K 5002	Bdr	Evans	D. S.	L 18467	Gnr	Allen	J. N.
H 12073	Bdr	Farrell	N. G.	B113861	Gnr	Allinson	G. R.
M 43475	Bdr	Franklin	J. W.	M 66621	Gnr	Allison	A.
K 13143	Bdr	Gaffney	J. R.	K 9041	Gnr	Anderson	T.A.
M 35543	Bdr	Gilbertson	A. E.	L 18423	Gnr	Archibald	H. G.
L 26264	Bdr	Hadley	J. A.	G 7161	Gnr	Arsenault	A. J.
M 43915	Bdr	Hays	M. C.	L 26380	Gnr	Backus	J. J.
M 43912	Bdr	Hockin	J. E.	H 67408	Gnr	Bailey	H. E.
L 26244	Bdr	Holmes a'Court	W. C.	K 14018	Gnr	Barton	E.
M 43920	Bdr	Hoopfer	J. F.	L 18419	Gnr	Bear	J.S.F.
M 43996	Bdr	Kane	R. P.	F 86904	Gnr	Beauprie	J. E.
D118716	Bdr	King	C. C.	C 821	Gnr	Beaver	A. A.
H 67395	Bdr	Kivisto	A. A.	D 10771	Gnr	Becker	J. P.
L 26396	Bdr	MacDonald	C. A.	L 18402	Gnr	Black	J. A.
M 43908	Bdr	Morice	J. F.	L 26334	Gnr	Blake	A. E.
L 26517	Bdr	Nicol	R. A.	M 43929	Gnr	Bohn	B. J.
M 3775	Bdr	Parkins	E.	L 26536	Gnr	Boulding	J. A.
C 860	Bdr	Patterson	D. A.	D 27438	Gnr	Bowen	W.W.
L 26310	Bdr	Porter	R. J.	B 11492	Gnr	Bowes	W. J.
M 44001	Bdr	Scott	J. R.	L 35328	Gnr	Boyko	P.
M 43479	Bdr	Templeton	J. A.	K 47687	Gnr	Braham	P. L.
				H 60056	Gnr	Brennand	A. J.
				L 11233	Gnr	Brewster	C. V.

M 495	Gnr	Brooks	S.	M 3426	Gnr	Gingell	H. D.
L 18470	Gnr	Brown	W.M.	F 21284	Gnr	Grandy	O. C.
L 7164	Gnr	Buckingham	T. A.	L 26400	Gnr	Green	D.
M 66116	Gnr	Byer	L. M.	L 2658	Gnr	Green	T. W.
M 44034	Gnr	Campion	E.	C 33676	Gnr	Griesse	A. A.
B 45377	Gnr	Carter	J. R.	M 43995	Gnr	Guard	H. D.
C 50792	Gnr	Casselman	R. C.	L 26283	Gnr	Halcro	T. W.
M 37063	Gnr	Casson	E. W.	I. 92103	Gnr	Hall	C. L.
M 3758	Gnr	Chadwick	A.	H 59684	Gnr	Hall	G. A.
D119628	Gnr	Chevalier	M. P.	M 43959	Gnr	Hall	R. P.
F 79809	Gnr	Chisholm	D. J.	L 26309	Gnr	Harper	H. E.
H 67033	Gnr	Clayton	J.	M 3771	Gnr	Hawick	J.R.S.
G 48502	Gnr	Colquhoun	A. W.	H 87364	Gnr	Hayes	W. J.
M 43931	Gnr	Connon	W.	B 9869	Gnr	Heath	W. C.
L 64994	Gnr	Cook	J. A.	B146817	Gnr	Henderson	A. F.
B 98041	Gnr	Cookson	G. P.	L 26279	Gnr	Hiltz	P. C.
B 44373	Gnr	Coon	L. O.	L 26254	Gnr	Hiltz	P. J.
M 43547	Gnr	Corrigan	P. J.	M 43991	Gnr	Hockin	R. E.
M 3688	Gnr	Cotterill	D. J.	M 3725	Gnr	Hoyle	G. R.
C 9515	Gnr	Cousineau	D.	B 53871	Gnr	Huffman	G. F.
L 18443	Gnr	Cowx	T.	L 6295	Gnr	Hull	L.W.
H 66556	Gnr	Cox	H. R.	M 63885	Gnr	Hunter	J. F.
L 26222	Gnr	Crossland	J. R.	L 26374	Gnr	Hunter	N. S.
M 28390	Gnr	Curliss	F. B.	L 64431	Gnr	Hystad	H.
L 26255	Gnr	Dahl	H. C.	L 26215	Gnr	Ireland	K. W.
M 43407	Gnr	Davenport	L.	M 462	Gnr	Isbell	A. J.
M 43999	Gnr	Davidson	R. W.	H 54823	Gnr	Jeffrey	J. K.
L 26513	Gnr	Davies	J. T.	L 26538	Gnr	Johnson	S. E.
M 43535	Gnr	Davis	M.	M 3796	Gnr	Jones	H. G.
M 451	Gnr	Desjarlais	M.	M 3411	Gnr	Josephson	A. H.
M 43902	Gnr	Duffy	M. F.	L 26307	Gnr	Joubert	J. G.
C 9971	Gnr	Eady	I. C.	L 35070	Gnr	Karkanen	N.
F 87220	Gnr	Eaton	G. H.	M 44012	Gnr	Kerr	R. D.
M 43518	Gnr	Edgar	L. M.	L 9253	Gnr	Kindopp	J.
L 26273	Gnr	Edwards	R. E.	M 498	Gnr	Knapp	J. A.
H 59723	Gnr	Elder	L. M.	M 379	Gnr	Kushnieryk	R.
L 26504	Gnr	Evans	A.	L 67496	Gnr	Laing	S. R.
M 65800	Gnr	Farquharson		M 35058	Gnr	Landry	E. J.
			D. W.	M 3776	Gnr	Langton	B. O.
A102496	Gnr	Farr	J. H.	M 43467	Gnr	Langton	R. J.
L 18404	Gnr	Ferguson	W.G.H.	K 92478	Gnr	Lawson	W. F.
H 37019	Gnr	Forbes	L. I.	M 43541	Gnr	Leight	H. F.
L 74646	Gnr	Fosseneuve	C. J.	D 140395	Gnr	Lewis	J. M.
L 26291	Gnr	Frederickson	V.L.	H 59820	Gnr	Lind	J. C.
H 67182	Gnr	Frobisher	P.	M 621	Gnr	Litster	J. N.
L 18425	Gnr	Germescheid	D. J.	M 43552	Gnr	Lund	P. A.
H 64974	Gnr	Gershuny	P.	F 13159	Gnr	MacInnis	A.
L 18451	Gnr	Gettis	D. G.	B129560	Gnr	Maggio	L. J.
K 22030	Gnr	Gillman	D. L.	U 1787	Gnr	Manning	H. W.

B 27871	Gnr	Marion	J. J.	H 194906	Gnr	Richardson	F. J.
K 15247	Gnr	Marsland	H.	M 43945	Gnr	Ryall	A. R.
G 10337	Gnr	Martin	A. E.	L 18377	Gnr	Samborski	D. J.
C 38390	Gnr	Masters	C. J.	M 59107	Gnr	Schell	N.A.
L 26258	Gnr	Mayer	J. A.	M 43424	Gnr	Schultz	L. E.
M 43415	Gnr	Merrick	H. O.	H 35689	Gnr	Shephard	N. W.
B 47560	Gnr	Morgan	I.A.R.	M 43465	Gnr	Sherrer	G. A.
F 905	Gnr	Morrison	J. F.	M 43976	Gnr	Shoemaker	L. E.
M 520	Gnr	Munkholm	L.	M 43572	Gnr	Siddons	F. H.
M 3749	Gnr	Murray	W. J.	M 43977	Gnr	Siddons	R. A.
L 59771	Gnr	Meyers	O. L.	M 43918	Gnr	Slyter	W.
H 35681	Gnr	McCauley	G. J.	M 43905	Gnr	Smith	L. W.
A 104077	Gnr	McCrie	W. G.	G 3241	Gnr	Snow	A. J.
M 59315	Gnr	McDonald	D.	M 3875	Gnr	Sommerville	A.R.
L 26274	Gnr	McDonald	T. C.	H 59861	Gnr	Spence	G.
L 26327	Gnr	McDougald	J. A.	L 26515	Gnr	Steele	G. W.
C 1246	Gnr	McFarland	J. G.	L 18408	Gnr	Stefan	E.
G 14063	Gnr	McLaughlin	A.	M 43979	Gnr	Stilwell	T. E.
G 4391	Gnr	McMillan	F. A.	M 43456	Gnr	Stockard	B.
B 47540	Gnr	McMillan	J. J.	F 78568	Gnr	Stockley	G. H.
M 3778	Gnr	McMullan	J. T.	L 26281	Gnr	Stromquist	J. R.
K 25565	Gnr	McNeil	C.	H 67348	Gnr	Sullivan	F. T.
L 18454	Gnr	McRostie	G. H.	M 3659	Gnr	Syren	I. E.
L 26508	Gnr	Nattrass	E. C.	L 10386	Gnr	Tait	J. A.
M 65570	Gnr	Neubauer	A.	L 26250	Gnr	Taylor	J. A.
P 4618	Gnr	Newman	W. G.	L 26519	Gnr	Thompson	A.
D 21652	Gnr	Nicholson	F. R.	M 44031	Gnr	Thompson	G. E.
H 67347	Gnr	Otto	D. H.	L 26527	Gnr	Thompson	R. J.
K 21124	Gnr	Owen	J. S.	L 59716	Gnr	Toy	D. G.
L 26403	Gnr	Parker	P.B.G.	L 18429	Gnr	Tuley	J.
B 98118	Gnr	Parker	R. C.	L 26531	Gnr	Turner	A. E.
M 43974	Gnr	Parnell	H. B.	L 6289	Gnr	Turner	H. J.
M 65867	Gnr	Peck	V. L.	M 3734	Gnr	Underhill	A. G.
M 61625	Gnr	Pellant	A. A.	M 3763	Gnr	Underhill	J.
A 32031	Gnr	Pepler	R. D.	M 43997	Gnr	Wagner	L. E.
M 3419	Gnr	Perkins	R. B.	L 18406	Gnr	Ward	C. W.
L 26392	Gnr	Petersen	P.	M 43509	Gnr	Webster	E. W.
M 60702	Gnr	Peterson	W. J.	M 43471	Gnr	White	G. L.
L 328	Gnr	Prince	E. R.	M 43485	Gnr	Whitehead	A. W.
M 43531	Gnr	Pugh	G. T.	L 101454	Gnr	Wiggins	A. A.
B 98189	Gnr	Purdie	F.	M 29100	Gnr	Willisko	S.
M 43975	Gnr	Ranson	J. W.	L 26516	Gnr	Willson	W.
L 74370	Gnr	Raymond	L.	L 6284	Gnr	Willway	F.E.E.
K 9071	Gnr	Reid	E. L.	L 6285	Gnr	Wilson	T. I.
D 138968	Gnr	Renault	S. E.	K 9100	Gnr	Wise	W. F.
L 74274	Gnr	Reynolds	C. A.	B 16729	Gnr	Young	A. J.

EMBARKED 14 JUN 44

L 26514 LiBdr Hall H.

DISSEMBARKED 15 JUN 44

M 3834 Gnr Jerdan J.T.S.

L 23044	Gnr	Lantz	V.D.R.	M 3326	Gnr	Pack	R. C.
M 56596	Gnr	Morden	M. I.	C101040	Gnr	Trottier	R.

EMBARKED 21 JUN 44 DISEMBARKED 23 JUN 44

Capt W. S. Warwick (RCAPC)

L 26269	BQMS	Brakewell	R.	M 55787	Gnr	Forster	L. N.
M 43971	BQMS	Morton	R. W.	A106913	Pte	Franklin	A. M.
M 43992	BQMS	Stenback	W.	K 19015	Pte	Friel	W. T.
M 66036	Sgt	Ball	R. S.	B 58237	Gnr	Furler	R. N.
L 26333	Bdr	Dawson	R. T.	L 18428	Pte	Germerscheid	H. C.
L 26251	Bdr	Kettlewell	J. D.	B136855	Gnr	Glenn	H.
M 26059	Bdr	McDougall	H. G.	M 3420	Gnr	Gordon	W. D.
K 73189	Bdr	Scaplen	W. E.	G 1321	Gnr	Hall	D. C.
L 26383	Bdr	Vawter	L. J.	F 86943	Gnr	Harris	J. I.
L 35327	Bdr	Wood	J. A.	M 61653	Gnr	Harrison	A. J.
M 43942	L/Bdr	Hannen	R. M.	B143957	Gnr	Head	G. W.
M103854	L/Bdr	McCallum	D.	L 26271	Gnr	Hendricks	A. J.
M 43939	L/Bdr	Riddoch	C. K.	M 3769	Gnr	Hirsche	R.
				B 83001	Gnr	Hlywka	J.
F 79792	Gnr	Arbuckle	W. E.	M 43508	Gnr	Hobbs	D. C.
L 11136	Gnr	Arnold	A. B.	G 3701	Gnr	Hooper	G. E.
B 62975	Pte	Baker	N.	L 18458	Gnr	Isbister	C. R.
F 9464	Gnr	Baker	W. M.	C120430	Gnr	Isles	J. K.
M 43413	Gnr	Barabash	S.	K 9061	Gnr	Kaese	B.
B131457	Cfn	Barr	W. H.	M 457	Gnr	Kay	K.
B111677	Gnr	Besaw	L.	K 22057	Gnr	Kay	R.D.L.
L 59791	Gnr	Biro	W.	M 43909	Gnr	Kellar	E. L.
B 63075	Pte	Blackburn	R. L.	G 23688	Gnr	Kenny	W. J.
D118383	Pte	Bouchard	A.	M102537	Gnr	Kerik	N. M.
K 50139	Gnr	Brandon	A. B.	B 45179	Gnr	King	S. A.
M 3472	Gnr	Brown	J. K.	M 65860	Gnr	Kolenz	J.
L103123	Gnr	Brown	L. J.	H 95413	Gnr	Kydyk	W. B.
M 43538	Gnr	Butcher	W. L.	L103159	Gnr	Lacy	G. F.
L 18449	Gnr	Byhre	O. L.	C 51253	Gnr	Lamont	A.
L 26211	Gnr	Callaghan	P. W.	B111418	Gnr	Larivee	R. J.
C 63920	Pte	Campbell	D. F.	F 77333	Gnr	Llewellyn	E. R.
L 26366	Gnr	Chalus	J.	M 45694	Gnr	MacDonell	T. R.
E100684	Gnr	Chamberlain	L.	B 43945	Gnr	Mason	W. W.
H 3622	Gnr	Cooney	J.M.C.	M 3792	Gnr	Matheson	D.
L 26523	Gnr	Cross	B. W.	H100464	Gnr	Meyer	F.
F 78729	Gnr	Dean	R. R.	M 3434	Gnr	Michaud	A.
L 18373	Gnr	Diewold	A. W.	B110285	Gnr	Mitchell	G.
A 35385	Gnr	Dingman	W. O.	H 67032	Gnr	Moore	N. W.
L 26331	Gnr	Espeseth	G. O.	A 34905	Gnr	Morley	C. M.
B 15060	Gnr	Farley	G. H.	D140970	Gnr	McCullough	R.
D126757	Gnr	Fisk	H.	M102332	Gnr	McInnis	G. R.
L 26404	Gnr	Ford	L. G.	M 29054	Gnr	McLaren	P. R.
L 74645	Gnr	Fosseneuve	P. G.	K 41541	Pte	McMichael	J. R.

L 10434	Gnr	Neuert	G. K.	D 96386	Gnr	St. Louis	J. A. E.
M 44014	Pte	Nile	A. J.	L 26501	Gnr	Stringer	S. W.
G 50122	Gnr	Nowlan	F.	M 62105	Gnr	Teale	L. F.
L 18463	Gnr	Rasmussen	L. C.	L 26397	Gnr	Walchuk	W.
K 76210	Gnr	Reynolds	W. H.	M 43504	Gnr	Werner	B.
K 10058	Gnr	Romans	S. D.	F 66272	Gnr	Wheaton	M. H.
B139077	Gnr	Servos	D. A.	L 18436	Gnr	Wick	A. C.
M 59100	Gnr	Shennan	W.	F 89665	Gnr	Willett	L. C.
M 3831	Gnr	Shoults	W. R.	M103073	Gnr	Willment	E.
M 66026	Gnr	Smith	L. K.	M 43983	Gnr	Wilson	G.
L 22554	Gnr	Smith	R.	P 7522	Gnr	Wilson	G.
H 35593	Gnr	Solomon	G. H.	G 58039	Gnr	Wood	T. J.
D 86052	Gnr	Sorffer	A.	D135751	Gnr	Zadzora	J.
C 18684	Gnr	Stephens	S. E.				

EMBARKED 26 JUN 44

DISSEMBARKED 27 JUN 44

F 66440 Gnr Burns E. J.

EMBARKED 28 JUN 44

DISSEMBARKED 30 JUN 44

M 43483	BSM	Kauffman	P. R.	M 61651	Bdr	Hayes	J. H.
M 43521	Bdr	Carter	A. L.	L 41238	L/Bdr	Slingsby	G. T.
B 11295	Gnr	Allan	L. A.	B 6801	Gnr	McCord	T.
M 43528	Gnr	Barker	E.	M 3765	Gnr	McLaren	A. B.
L 26259	Gnr	Brown	L. M.	C 1224	Gnr	McNally	L. C.
B 9926	Gnr	Burnie	T. J. R.	K 76854	Gnr	Molley	W. R.
C 10143	Gnr	Cox	E. B.	C 48795	Gnr	Moore	H. A.
L 26534	Gnr	Edmondson	J.	M 614	Gnr	Munger	H. O.
M 43408	Gnr	Engstrom	O. S.	M 35237	Gnr	Myers	H. E.
B 6515	Gnr	Evans	W. D.	M 3764	Gnr	Nail	C.
B 44252	Gnr	Fawcett	W. H.	L 26394	Gnr	Reed	G. N.
M 65735	Gnr	Garford	F. J. C.	G 23907	Gnr	Spires	V. C.
L102675	Gnr	Hillier	D. S.	M 3748	Gnr	Stalberg	J. A.
L 65268	Gnr	Hooker	E.	M100054	Gnr	Thompson	D. L.
B 9914	Gnr	Johnston	S. W.	K 10006	Gnr	VanCooten	J. E.
M 59089	Gnr	Jones	C. E.	L 65264	Gnr	Waynert	E. T.
B 21450	Gnr	Lewis	E. A.	L102691	Gnr	Werbeski	J.
K 13024	Gnr	MacLeod	A. A.	B 11274	Pte	Wilson	T. H.

NOMINAL ROLL - 3

Cessation of Hostilities, 8 May 1945

Lt-Col	C. R. Ostrander, ED	Lieut	F. L. Aylward
Major	J. D. Baird	Lieut	F. A. Barley
Major	J. L. Etherington	Lieut	W. W. Barrett
Major	W. B. Hancock	Lieut	W. E. Bimm (RCCS)
Major	T. O'Shea	Lieut	E. T. Cantwell
Capt	D. F. Burrows	Lieut	J. A. Clarke
Capt	A. L. Campbell	Lieut	P. P. F. Clay
Capt	R. J. M. Ethier	Lieut	W. J. Crocker
Capt	E. C. Gothard	Lieut	L. A. Diller
Capt	W. L. Hogg, MC	Lieut	D. W. Falconer
Capt	G. E. Lennox	Lieut	E. T. Fletcher
Capt	J. R. Milani	Lieut	G. M. Green
Capt	E. A. Olmsted	Lieut	J. P. Grenier
Capt	A. Pennie	Lieut	D. W. Henderson
Capt	W. A. Shea (RCAMC)		(RCEME)
Capt	W. J. G. Steele	Lieut	M. V. Mailloux
Capt	D. G. Struthers	Lieut	D. W. Murray
Capt	G. B. Robinson (CDC)	Lieut	J. K. Roche
Capt	G. A. Rumble	Lieut	J. E. Powell
Capt	E. A. Ward	Lieut	R. Reirson
Capt	W. S. Warwick (RCAPC)	Lieut	G. W. Taylor
H/Capt	H. L. Chappell (CCS)	Lieut	H. J. Timms
Lieut	W. W. Adams	Lieut	J. R. Wright
		Spvrs	A. A. Lauzon (Aux Ser)

M 43490	RSM MacRae D.	DI18128	Sgt Bull E. C. J.
P 7500	RQMS Harmston M. J.	L 26247	Sgt Campbell K. T.
L 26206	BSM Atkinson C.	M 3767	Sgt Cannon R. J.
K 9029	BSM Chown L. J.	M 43411	Sgt Clennell J. P.
K 9055	BSM Chown R. K.	L 26312	Sgt Davidson G. T.
C 585	BSM Hooper E. B.	K 5002	Sgt Evans D. S.
L 26332	BSM Jones A. E.	K 19022	Sgt Fox C. R.
M 43917	BSM Matheson D.	K 13143	Sgt Gaffney J. R.
M 44011	BSM Morris R. A.	M 35543	Sgt Gilbertson A. E.
M 43925	BSM Ray K. E.	M 43961	Sgt Hartley J. C.
L 26204	BSM Turner J.	M 43912	Sgt Hockin J. E.
M 44015	S/Sgt Ladwig F. P.	M 43920	Sgt Hooper J. F.
M 43521	BQMS Carter A. L.	M 3231	Sgt Hoskin T.
M 43971	BQMS Morton R. W.	L 26266	Sgt Kennedy W. J.
M 43992	BQMS Stenback W.	L 18280	Sgt Kenyon R.
D 8202	Sgt Anderson C. A.	M 43401	Sgt Kilcup J. C.
L 6122	Sgt Archer L. G.	M 43422	Sgt Kingsmith E. G.
BI31457	Sgt Barr W. H.	H 67395	Sgt Kivisto A. A.
	(RCEME)	L 6296	Sgt Kyle R. J.

M 43489	Sgt	MacRae	W. J.	L 26264	Bdr	Hadley	J. A.
C 97308	Sgt	Marcellus	J. C.	L 26302	Bdr	Heyer	J. H.
			(CDC)	M 43938	Bdr	Hillman	L. M.
M 43532	Sgt	Miller	E.	L 26282	Bdr	Kenny	D. A.
M 3768	Sgt	Moody	M.	D118716	Bdr	King	C. C.
H 3803	Sgt	Morier	P. L.	M 43467	Bdr	Langton	R. J.
L 26517	Sgt	Nicol	R. A.	M 621	Bdr	Litster	J. N.
L 26231	Sgt	Porter	A. L.	B 23781	Bdr	Lynn	N. A.
L 26310	Sgt	Porter	R. J.	D 93597	Cpl	Marrazza	J.
M 43514	Sgt	Raymer	B. V.	M 3801	Bdr	Martell	T. A.
L 26317	Sgt	Rich	G. B.	M 50060	Cpl	Mason	H. D.
M 43911	Sgt	Sim	M.	L 26280	Bdr	McDougall	T. L.
L 26227	Sgt	Sinkler	E. G.	B 47540	Bdr	McMillan	J. J.
M 43479	Sgt	Templeton	J. A.	M 61627	Bdr	McNeil	R. F.
L 26240	L/Sgt	Blackwood	R. D.	L 26265	Cpl	McRann	W.
H 60056	L/Sgt	Brennand	A. J.	M 43908	Bdr	Morice	J. F.
M 3750	L/Sgt	Brown	C. R.	L 26335	Bdr	Olson	L. E.
L 17062	L/Sgt	Buswell, MM	R. D.	L 26403	Bdr	Parker	P. B. G.
H 59684	L/Sgt	Hall	G. A.	M 3775	Bdr	Parkins	E.
L 26244	L/Sgt	Holmes a'Court	W. C.	M 43974	Bdr	Parnell	H. B.
				H194906	Bdr	Richardson	F. J.
M 633	L/Sgt	Hughes	G.	M 43939	Bdr	Riddoch	C. K.
U 1787	L/Sgt	Metcalfe	F.	P 4621	Bdr	Robertson	L. B.
M 43969	L/Sgt	Moore	A. K.	M 3790	Bdr	Sanderson	W. H.
L 22682	L/Sgt	Randall	H. A.	M 59107	Bdr	Schell	N. A.
M 43462	L/Sgt	Roberts	G.	L 41238	Bdr	Slingsby	G. T.
L 26337	L/Sgt	Somers	D. W.	H 35593	Bdr	Solomon	G. H.
H 67348	L/Sgt	Sullivan	F. T.	L 26281	Bdr	Stromquist, MM	J. R.
L 26522	L/Sgt	Swaby	W. R.				
L 18476	L/Sgt	Young	R. M.	H 60144	Bdr	Titterton	R. J. F.
B 47675	Bdr	Barnard	M. R.	L 26519	Bdr	Thompson	A.
M 43913	Bdr	Bevan	J. N.	L 26527	Bdr	Thompson	R. J.
M 43929	Bdr	Bohn	B. J.	L 26383	Bdr	Vawter	L. J.
M 44033	Bdr	Bos	W. H.	L 18406	Bdr	Ward	C. W.
L 11233	Bdr	Brewster	C. V.	L 35327	Bdr	Wood	J. A.
M 43919	Bdr	Brown	A. L.	M 3806	L/Bdr	Albrecht	L. D.
L 26257	Bdr	Callaghan	T. R.	L 18467	L/Bdr	Allen	J. N.
M 43951	Bdr	Cartwright	R.	L 18423	L/Bdr	Archibald	H. G.
L 26297	Bdr	Chester	J.	M 43528	L/Bdr	Barker	E.
F 92759	Cpl	Croft	H. E.	L 59791	L/Bdr	Biro	W.
L 26329	Bdr	Davis	A. S.	L 26536	L/Bdr	Boulding	J. A.
L 26333	Bdr	Dawson	R. T.	B 11492	L/Bdr	Bowes	W. J.
L 18404	Bdr	Ferguson	W. G. H.	L 18443	L/Bdr	Cowx	T.
P 9833	Bdr	Ferris	W.	L 26222	L/Bdr	Crosland	J. R.
M 3751	Bdr	Foote	C. E.	K 48435	L/Bdr	Dagg	K. W.
M 43475	Bdr	Franklin	J. W.	M 632	L/Bdr	Dear	F. J.
M 43469	Cpl	Gates	A. G.	L 6298	L/Bdr	Debruyne	J. G.
L 2658	Bdr	Green	T. W.	M 43902	L/Bdr	Duffy	M. F.
C 33676	Bdr	Griese	A. A.	F 87220	L/Bdr	Eaton	G. H.

H 59723 L/Bdr Elder L. M.
 L 26331 L/Bdr Espeseth G. O.
 K 22030 L/Bdr Gillman D. L.
 L 26514 L/Bdr Hall H.
 M 43942 L/Bdr Hannen R. M.
 M 43508 L/Bdr Hobbs D. C.
 L 64431 L/Bdr Hystad H.
 M 44012 L/Bdr Kerr, MM R. D.
 L 67496 L/Bdr Laing S. R.
 M103854 L/Bdr McCallum D.
 M 3785 L/Bdr McLevin D. J.
 M 43451 L/Bdr McQuillin H. A.
 F 905 L/Bdr Morrison J. F.

M 3749 L/Bdr Murray W. J.
 A102814 L/Bdr Muzzin A. A.
 B 98189 L/Bdr Purdie F.
 K 73189 L/Bdr Scaplen W. E.
 L 26318 L/Bdr Shaw, MM, O.
 L 18408 L/Bdr Stefan E.
 M 44031 L/Bdr Thompson G. E.
 M 44029 L/Bdr Thompson J. W.
 C 1244 L/Bdr Tudor M. H.
 M 43503 L/Bdr Vannebo P. M.
 M 43471 L/Bdr White G. L.
 M 43983 L/Bdr Wilson G.

L104279 Gnr Abbott E. H.
 B 9626 Gnr Ace C. J.
 B 18271 Gnr Adams H. G.
 C120088 Gnr Adams W. V.
 G 50556 Gnr Albert L.
 B 11295 Gnr Allan L. A.
 L107343 Gnr Allen R. D.
 B113861 Gnr Allinson G. R.
 M 66621 Gnr Allison A.
 L 18420 Pte Andrews E.
 L 26326 Gnr Andrews L.
 F 79792 Gnr Arbuckle W. E.
 L 11136 Gnr Arnold A. B.
 M 50212 Gnr Aubrey R.
 D118362 Gnr Auger E.
 M 43413 Gnr Barabash S.
 M 8683 Gnr Barvir J. G.
 B 62975 Gnr Baker N.
 F 9464 Gnr Baker W. M.
 K 14081 Gnr Barton E.
 L 18419 Gnr Bear J. S. F.
 C 1206 Gnr Beattie R. M.
 D132326 Gnr Beaudin J. F. E.
 B144507 Gnr Beaulieu R.
 L 59868 Gnr Beaumont W. H.
 F 86904 Gnr Beauprie J. E.
 C 821 Gnr Beaver A. A.
 B 9757 Gnr Beirness E. A.
 L 26532 Gnr Belfry F. R.
 B111677 Gnr Besaw L.
 D 778 Gnr Black E. G.
 B 63075 Gnr Blackburn R. L.
 L 35019 Gnr Blair I. J.
 C100725 Gnr Blance R. S. J.
 B 27438 Gnr Bowen W. W.

M 43561 Gnr Bowyer H. E.
 K 23088 Gnr Bracewell R. D.
 K 24024 Gnr Bradstock B. H. H.
 K 50139 Gnr Brandon A. B.
 C 48835 Gnr Brant V. D.
 M 4372 Gnr Brown J. K.
 L 26375 Gnr Brown R. W.
 L 57656 Gnr Brown T.
 M 3784 Gnr Brown W.
 A116437 Gnr Brownlee G. B.
 L 18519 Gnr Brummond E. E.
 H102003 Gnr Buhr H.
 D 14649 Gnr Bullard E. F.
 F 55851 Gnr Burke A. F.
 B 9926 Gnr Burnie T. J. R.
 M 43534 Gnr Butcher F. T.
 M 43538 Gnr Butcher W. L.
 L 18449 Gnr Byhre O. L.
 B 12092 Gnr Caldwell C.
 M 43536 Gnr Calkins J. R.
 L 26211 Gnr Callaghan P. W.
 C 63920 Pte Campbell D. F.
 M 44034 Gnr Campion E.
 B147646 Gnr Carson R. S.
 B 98222 Gnr Cascanette E. H.
 M 37063 Gnr Casson E. W.
 M 3758 Gnr Chadwick A.
 B 9181 Gnr Chalk W. J.
 L 26366 Gnr Chalus J.
 E100684 Gnr Chamberlain L.
 C 1496 Gnr Charbonneau M. A.
 G 32555 Gnr Chase E. J.
 M 3900 Gnr Chatwood W. H.
 L 26360 Gnr Chernik J. W.
 F 79809 Gnr Chisholm D. J.

B 56248	Pte	Christie	C. T.	H 75264	Gnr	Elliott	W. D.
K 80033	Gnr	Christie	W. L.	M 43408	Gnr	Engstrom	O. S.
M 43417	Gnr	Clark	E. G.	C122014	Gnr	Esdon	A. M.
G 8121	Pte	Clarke	H. W.	B 6515	Gnr	Evans	W. D.
H 67033	Gnr	Clayton	J.	H 67434	Gnr	Falkevitch	M.
F 5657	Pte	Cole	J. G.	L 26528	Gnr	Falstead	G. M.
G 48502	Gnr	Colquhoun	A. W.	M 65800	Gnr	Farquharson	
M 43931	Gnr	Connon	W.				D. W.
B136235	Sigmn	Cooley	J. B.	A102496	Gnr	Farr	J. H.
L 64994	Gnr	Cook	J. A.	B 44252	Gnr	Fawcett	W. H.
B 45233	Gnr	Cook	J.R.E.	L 429	Gnr	Ferguson	A.
C121267	Gnr	Corkery	J. W.	Dr32315	Gnr	Fergusson	D. A.
M 43547	Gnr	Corrigan	P. J.	DI41622	Gnr	Field	F. W.
M 3688	Gnr	Cotterill	D. J.	A 65782	Gnr	Finlay	W. K.
C 9515	Gnr	Cousineau	D.	F 95727	Gnr	Fisher	F. A.
B111529	Gnr	Cowan	J.	L 57727	Gnr	Foran	T. P.
C 10143	Gnr	Cox	E. B.	H 37019	Gnr	Forbes	L. I.
L 41513	Pte	Cox	T. G.	M 55787	Gnr	Foster	L. N.
F 45832	Gnr	Cresine	E. R.	A106913	Pte	Franklin	A. M.
B 58881	Gnr	Cochrane	W.	K 19015	Pte	Friel	W. T.
L 26523	Gnr	Cross	B. W.	H 67182	Gnr	Frobisher	P.
B 47666	Gnr	Cumming	J. G.	A 60135	Gnr	Fry	D. E.
A 35208	Gnr	Currie	J. H.	K 69383	Gnr	Fudra	C. M.
M 43407	Gnr	Davenport	L.	H 64761	Gnr	Funnell	W. L.
M 43999	Gnr	Davidson	R. W.	B 68237	Gnr	Furler	R. N.
L 26513	Gnr	Davies	J. T.	M 65735	Gnr	Garford	F.J.C.
K 46183	Gnr	Davis	A. J.	DI26890	Gnr	Gatz	G.
F 95857	Gnr	Davison	H. H.	P 4642	Gnr	Gelinas	P. J.
B147278	Gnr	Day	W. M.	B117133	Gnr	Gentile	J. J.
G 7483	Gnr	Daye	E. C.	L 18425	Gnr	Germisheid	D. J.
F 78729	Gnr	Dean	R. R.	L 18428	Pte	Germisheid	H. C.
M 29094	Gnr	Demenuk	W.	H 64974	Gnr	Gershuny	P.
K 83987	Gnr	Deshaies	M.	H 59919	Gnr	Geslyer	L.
M 451	Gnr	Desjarlais	M.	L 18451	Gnr	Gettis	D. G.
B114803	Gnr	Deyman	J. A.	M. 536	Gnr	Gillies	C. T.
H 92433	Gnr	Diamond	W. T.	B143714	Gnr	Gillis	A.
L 18373	Gnr	Diewold	A. W.	K 74564	Gnr	Gillis	A. S.
A 35385	Gnr	Dingman	W. O.	H 95467	Gnr	Glasman	G. F.
M 1787	Gnr	Dodds	J. E.	B136855	Gnr	Glenn	H.
L 18312	Gnr	Dorn	R.	D 12094	Gnr	Goldstein	B.
B 44662	Gnr	Drexler	L.	L 55517	Gnr	Goodsey	J.
M.43953	Gnr	Duchermé	M. E.	L 18434	Gnr	Gordon	L. J.
DI35143	Gnr	Dupras	R.	M 3420	Gnr	Gordon	W. D.
B160529	Gnr	Dupuis	N. J.	B 21403	Gnr	Graham	R.S.M.
K 62698	Gnr	Durell	G.	G 52767	Gnr	Gray	L. A.
D 6672	Gnr	Dwyer	H. F.	B113445	Gnr	Gribbon	A. J.
G 53457	Gnr	Dykeman	J. E.	A 31285	Gnr	Groves	A. L.
L 26534	Gnr	Edmondson	J.	M 43995	Gnr	Guard	H. D.
P 4540	Gnr	Edwards	J. R.	B146758	Gnr	Gunnell	F. C.

K 15759	Gnr	Guy	G. H.	L 18450	Gnr	Kenyon	S. H.
L 26283	Gnr	Halcro	T. W.	M102537	Gnr	Kerik	N. M.
L 92103	Gnr	Hall	C. L.	M107399	Gnr	Kerr	M. D.
G 1321	Gnr	Hall	D. C.	D 72051	Pte	King	D. W.
M 3235	Gnr	Hall	N. P.	B 17752	Gnr	King	J. V.
M 43959	Gnr	Hall	R. P.	B 45179	Gnr	King	S. A.
M 3409	Gnr	Halliday	J. F.	B144653	Gnr	Knight	W. E.
F 82340	Gnr	Handrahan	J. H.	M 65680	Gnr	Kohlenz	J.
A106971	Gnr	Hanson	R. J.	B 21478	Gnr	Kubay	J. G.
L 26309	Gnr	Harper	H. E.	H 95413	Gnr	Kydyk	W. B.
F 86943	Gnr	Harris	J. I.	H 1219	Gnr	Labossiere	L. M.
M 61653	Gnr	Harrison	A. J.	B 21472	Gnr	Lack	W. R. J.
M 51529	Gnr	Hauck	B.	L103159	Gnr	Lacy	G. F.
B 8285	Gnr	Hawke	R. R.	M 43477	Gnr	Lahd	O. L.
H 67364	Gnr	Hayes	W. J.	H100140	Gnr	Laible	P.
L 26238	Gnr	Henderson	O. J.	D136899	Gnr	Lamarche	J. J. R.
L 26271	Gnr	Hendricks	A. J.	C 51253	Gnr	Lamont	A.
C 4957	Gnr	Hicks	M. H.	L 23044	Gnr	Lantz	V. D. R.
M105083	Gnr	Hill	C. R.	B112139	Gnr	Lariviere	C. A. J.
C 825	Gnr	Hill	G. N.	B111418	Gnr	Larivee	R. J.
M105108	Gnr	Hill	J. W.	C 33404	Gnr	Lavigne	L. J.
C 859	Gnr	Hill	R. T.	K 92478	Gnr	Lawson	W. F.
L 26279	Gnr	Hiltz	P. C.	L 18466	Gnr	Leary	A. L.
M 3769	Gnr	Hirsche	R.	E 30408	Gnr	LeBlanc	J. C.
M 43991	Gnr	Hockin	R. E.	M 43541	Gnr	Leicht	H. F.
M 51552	Gnr	Holloway	F.	D142013	Gnr	Lepine	W. C.
L 65268	Gnr	Hooker	E.	D140395	Gnr	Lewis	J. M.
D128051	Gnr	Houde	L.	D 28582	Pte	Lialiuk	P.
B148185	Gnr	Hric	P.	H 59820	Gnr	Lind	J. C.
B 53871	Gnr	Huffman	G. F.	F 77333	Gnr	Llewellyn	E. R.
L 6295	Gnr	Hull	L. W.	A 28436	Gnr	Lockery	H.
F 56921	Gnr	Hunt	W. E.	K 244	Gnr	Lockhart	J. B.
L 26374	Gnr	Hunter	N. S.	L 65224	Gnr	Loken	F. L.
L 35223	Gnr	Hutchinson	W.	M 43966	Gnr	Lowther	J.
L 18458	Gnr	Isbister	C. R.	M 43552	Gnr	Lund	P. A.
H 8565	Gnr	Jackson	F. B.	M 66662	Gnr	Lynch-Staunton	A. G.
B148397	Gnr	Jefferies	J.				
M 3834	Gnr	Jerdan	J. T. S.	B150299	Gnr	MacDonald	J. A. G.
A 86180	Gnr	Jones	R. A.	M 59091	Pte	MacDonell	A. J.
M 3858	Gnr	Jones	R. J.	M 45694	Gnr	MacDonnell	T. R.
L 26307	Gnr	Joubert	J. G.	M 43500	Gnr	MacLean	A. A.
K 9061	Gnr	Kaese	B.	K 13024	Gnr	MacLeod	A. A.
B 17708	Gnr	Kamke	R.	B129560	Gnr	Maggio	L. J.
L 35070	Gnr	Karkaner	N.	L104883	Gnr	Mann	J.
M 457	Gnr	Kay	K.	K 15247	Gnr	Marsland	H.
K 22057	Gnr	Kay	R. D. L.	K 3013	Gnr	Martin	E. G.
C 309	Gnr	Kelly	L. E.	B 43945	Gnr	Mason	W. W.
L 26252	Gnr	Kennedy	T. W.	C 38390	Gnr	Masters	C. J.
G 23688	Gnr	Kenny	W. J.	M 3792	Gnr	Matheson	D.

F 76525	Gnr	Mattinson	C. M.	L 59771	Gnr	Myers	O. L.
A 32051	Gnr	Maynard	B. A.	M 3764	Gnr	Nail	C.
B 18610	Gnr	Maynes	W. J.	DI39213	Gnr	Naimark	S.
H 35681	Gnr	McCauley	G. J.	L 26508	Gnr	Nattrass	E. C.
B 6801	Gnr	McCord	T.	H 77369	Gnr	Nattrass	S. D.
AI04077	Gnr	McCrie	W. G.	H 69748	Gnr	Nelson	J. R.
DI40970	Gnr	McCullough	R.	M 65570	Gnr	Neubauer	A.
C 1246	Gnr	McFarland	J. G.	P 4618	Gnr	Newman	W. G.
MI02332	Gnr	McInnis	G. R.	M 44014	Pte	Nile	A. J.
AI05242	Gnr	McIntosh	J. L.	L 64065	Gnr	Novakoski	W.
DI41531	Gnr	MacKay	W. G.	DI39262	Gnr	Ohlson	A.V.O.
M 3765	Gnr	McLaren	A. B.	B 23839	Gnr	Orsborn	G.
G 14063	Gnr	McLaughlin	A.	H 67347	Gnr	Otto	D. H.
K 41541	Pte	McMichael	J. R.	B 23688	Gnr	Overs	G. L.
G 4391	Gnr	McMillan	F. A.	K 21124	Gnr	Owen	J. S.
BI14252	Gnr	McMullen	D. A.	M 3326	Gnr	Pack	R. C.
G 61000	Gnr	McMullin	J. P.	DI32759	Gnr	Pascoe	J. G.
B 17311	Gnr	McNamara	T. H.	C 861	Gnr	Patterson	J. E.
K 25565	Gnr	McNeil	C.	H 87378	Pte	Partyka	W.
B 45392	Gnr	McRae	E. B.	G 1634	Gnr	Payne	C. J.
LI00933	Gnr	McRitchie	O.J.D.	M 61625	Gnr	Pellant	A. A.
L 18454	Gnr	McRostie	G. H.	L 84613	Gnr	Perrins	W.
M 446	Gnr	Meadowcroft	N.	M 3804	Gnr	Perry	M. M.
M 43415	Gnr	Merrick	H. O.	M 60702	Gnr	Peterson	W. J.
H100464	Gnr	Meyer	F.	H 37698	Gnr	Piedalue	L. J.
H 69830	Gnr	Meyers	G. A.	MI05310	Gnr	Piper	R. C.
H 18104	Gnr	Michaelis	T. H.	LI02081	Gnr	Polupski	P. K.
G 2519	Gnr	Michaud	E.	D 12187	Gnr	Poston	J.H.D.
M 8004	Gnr	Miller	B. R.	M 51556	Gnr	Powell	H. J.
DI32599	Gnr	Mills	F. E.	M 43423	Gnr	Prestwich	N. H.
LI03184	Gnr	Milne	W. J.	L 328	Gnr	Prince	E. R.
G 4479	Gnr	Milner	W. C.	B 47449	Gnr	Proust	G. E.
U 2049	Gnr	Mooney	A.	L 18444	Gnr	Rambo	L. O.
C 48795	Gnr	Moore	H. A.	L 18463	Gnr	Rasmussen	L. C.
H 67032	Gnr	Moore	N. W.	CI22594	Gnr	Raycroft	J. G.
A 57047	Gnr	Moore	R. F.	L 74370	Gnr	Raymond	L.
BI19378	Gnr	Morel	L. A.	AI07735	Gnr	Reading	F. W.
M 36596	Gnr	Morden	M. I.	L 26394	Gnr	Reed	G. N.
B 47560	Gnr	Morgan	I.A.R.	L 35043	Gnr	Reid	J. A.
DI41432	Gnr	Morkill	F. W.	L 74274	Gnr	Reynolds	C. A.
A 34905	Gnr	Morley	C. M.	A 3498	Gnr	Richardson	J.
M 8418	Gnr	Morrison	P. D.	DI09397	Gnr	Roach	G. C.
K 15843	Gnr	Mulcahy	R. O.	C 75668	Gnr	Roach	L. J.
M 35178	Gnr	Mulrooney	J. J.	BI07523	Gnr	Robinson	E. H.
BI18226	Gnr	Muma	F. C.	K 75406	Gnr	Robinson	R.W.A.
H 5	Pte	Munion	D. T.	K 10058	Gnr	Romans	S. D.
A 31101	Gnr	Munn	J. L.	L 26393	Gnr	Ruston	A. L.
M 35237	Gnr	Myers	H. E.	B 29983	Gnr	Ryder	J. W.
DI32219	Gnr	Myers	H. G.	L609824	Gnr	Sestaunir	H.

M 3829	Gnr	Saunders	C. A.	B112849	Gnr	Taylor	F. C.
E 46904	Gnr	Savoie	G.	L 26250	Gnr	Taylor	J. A.
M 43424	Gnr	Schultz	L. E.	B157118	Gnr	Terreberry	A. C.
A 28342	Gnr	Scott	J. R.	G 52792	Gnr	Thibodeau	V.
M105885	Gnr	Scott	M. K.	M100654	Gnr	Thomson	D. L.
B146732	Gnr	Scott	W. A.	M 43943	Gnr	Thompson	M. W.
B139077	Gnr	Servos	D. A.	M 35844	Gnr	Toma	M.
K 69912	Gnr	Sharock	T. H.	L 59716	Gnr	Toy	D. G.
L 26407	Gnr	Shaw	L. E.	C101040	Gnr	Trottier	R.
H 35689	Gnr	Shepherd	N. W.	L 18429	Gnr	Tuley	J.
M 59100	Gnr	Shennan	W.	L 6289	Gnr	Turner	H. J.
M 43976	Gnr	Shoemaker	L. E.	M 3734	Gnr	Underhill	A. G.
M 43933	Gnr	Siddals	A. E.	M 3763	Gnr	Underhill	J.
D132104	Gnr	Simpson	C.	B 21523	Gnr	Urquhart	L. F.
M 43918	Gnr	Slyter	W.	H 66775	Gnr	Usunier	F.
B146442	Gnr	Smart	D. B.	K 69267	Gnr	Varcoe	C.
M 66026	Gnr	Smith	L. K.	K 10006	Gnr	Vancooten	J.M.E.
M 43905	Gnr	Smith	L. W.	L101315	Gnr	Vaughan	J. E.
L 22554	Gnr	Smith	R.	M101196	Gnr	Verag	W.
M 44020	Gnr	Smith	T. E.	G 48979	Gnr	Waddelow	G. J.
A108586	Gnr	Sneider	W. C.	L 26397	Gnr	Walchuk	W.
M 29146	Gnr	Sorensen	C.N.B.	B114485	Gnr	Waldron	K. H.
D 86052	Gnr	Sorffer	A.	B162023	Gnr	Walker	A. D.
H 67678	Gnr	Sorflaten	E.	H 8989	Gnr	Walker	A. L.
M102900	Gnr	Scucy	P.	H 18381	Gnr	Weber	L. J.
A108633	Gnr	Scvie	G. M.	A103950	Gnr	Weiler	C. G.
H 59861	Gnr	Spence	G.	L102691	Gnr	Werbeski	J.
L 18462	Gnr	Spence	L. A.	M 43504	Gnr	Werner	B.
G 23907	Gnr	Spires	V. C.	F 66272	Gnr	Wheaton	M. H.
G 60863	Gnr	Stairs	E. O.	G 12060	Gnr	White	H. N.
M 3748	Gnr	Stalberg	J. A.	M 43485	Gnr	Whitehead	A. W.
B 98516	Gnr	St. Amand	W. L.	M100219	Gnr	Whitehead	G. C.
L101021	Gnr	Steele	A. L.	L 18436	Gnr	Wick	A. C.
L 26515	Gnr	Steele	G. W.	L101454	Gnr	Wiggins	A. A.
H 37725	Pte	Stewart	E. B.	L103861	Gnr	Williams	D. W.
G 6238	Gnr	Stewart	L. A.	L 26516	Gnr	Willson	W.
L 18422	Gnr	Stewart	W. E.	P 7522	Gnr	Wilson	G.
M 43979	Gnr	Stilwell	T. E.	B 11806	Pte	Wilson	R. R.
M 43456	Gnr	Stockard	B.	B143102	Gnr	Winfield	E. W.
F 78568	Gnr	Stockley	G. H.	G 58039	Gnr	Wood	T. J.
L 26501	Gnr	Stringer	S. W.	M101192	Gnr	Woodman	A. J.
B113016	Gnr	Strychalski	M.	H 22583	Gnr	Wright	R. G.
K 54557	Gnr	Sutherland	M. R.	B 16729	Gnr	Young	A. J.
M 3659	Gnr	Syren	I. E.	D135751	Gnr	Zadzora	J.
L 10386	Gnr	Tait	J. A.	B 47668	Gnr	Zuchkan	A. E.
L 26299	Gnr	Tanner	W.				

33 L.A.D., RCEME

A 70041	Armt/		B 77503	Cfn	Galloway	J.	
	QMS	Buttee	J.	D 96307	Cfn	Gibson	P. F.
K100073	Sgt	Forbes	E. M.	H100550	Cfn	Trach	L.
L 9224	Cpl	Sinclair	H. W.	C 340	Cfn	Warankie	S. M.
E 20405	L/Cpl	Boivin	G.	B 94885	Cfn	Wilson	W. E.
H 64563	L/Cpl	Weaver	E. F.	Dr66527	Pte	Charlebois	
Cr21388	Cfn	Catterill	T. G.				J.A.L.P.

"F" SECTION SIGNALS, RCCS

H 38540	Sgt	Pylypchuk	W.	M 38262	Sigmn	Kinchella	L. V.
L 26008	L/Sgt	Deck	J. S.	H 38544	Sigmn	Niven	G. R.
G 16022	Cpl	Barr	V. W.	F 36847	Sigmn	McPhail	J. W.
L 17206	Cpl	Bement	E.K.P.	M101314	Sigmn	Murphy	W. L.
B113453	Cpl	Gillespie	R. H.	M100522	Sigmn	Palmarchuk	A.
K 34775	Cpl	Hall	W.E.E.	K 35019	Sigmn	Paterson	V.
C 30882	L/Cpl	Albert	J.	K 1015	Sigmn	Pettigrew	D. V.
B 32467	L/Cpl	Cook	N. E.	L 26106	Sigmn	Reid	W. R.
M 55280	L/Cpl	Vandergrift	L.	M 65895	Sigmn	Seeley	T. J.
H 38723	L/Cpl	Wallace	G. R.	B 32758	Sigmn	Sedwick	E. J.
H102502	Sigmn	Berg	J. E.	K 66619	Sigmn	Smith	R. R.
C 33576	Sigmn	Champagne	J. P.	B132959	Sigmn	Taylor	C. B.
K 66098	Sigmn	Deeth	R.	B 39399	Sigmn	Weaver	A. W.
F 55934	Sigmn	Horton	R. N.	L 64308	Sigmn	Wells	R. S.
F 28999	Sigmn	Kavanagh	F. G.	B 32208	Sigmn	White	S.

NOMINAL ROLL — 4

Officers Not Included In the Other Three Nominal Rolls

Brig	F. D. Lace, OBE	Capt	J. C. Roberts
Brig	H. A. Sparling, DSO	Capt	R. I. Roberts
Brig	W. S. Zeigler, CBE	Capt	T. C. Rogers
	DSO, ED.	Capt	R. M. Russell
Lt-Col	A. J. B. Bailey	Capt	F. E. Scammell
Lt-Col	R. E. Hogarth, DSO	Capt	C. Shapera (CDC)
Lt-Col	G. S. Howard, ED	Capt	E. Stiles (RCAMC)
Major	S. A. Blakley	Capt	G. M. Swan
Major	J. F. Colclough	Capt	G. P. Tanton
Major	J. S. Darling	Capt	V. A. Thompson
Major	D. K. Dawes	Capt	E. L. Williard
Major	J. W. Dodds	Capt	R. C. M. Wyld
Major	R. W. Dunwell	Lieut	L. W. Anderton
Major	J. V. Emory	Lieut	A. L. Antcliff
Major	W. L. Lawson	Lieut	A. S. Appleby
Major	K. I. Levinson (CDC)	Lieut	L. Bedford
Major	A. Mendelsohn	Lieut	G. B. Bendikson
	(RCEME)	Lieut	B. L. Bowman
Major	E. Pickering	Lieut	W. J. Brennan
Major	J. D. Ross	Lieut	E. F. Carey
Major	J. Vereker	Lieut	J. Carswell
Major	W. Wilson (CDC)	Lieut	N. M. Cheater
Capt	H. E. Bowes	Lieut	W. D. Cook
Capt	R. H. Craig	Lieut	J. S. Corbett
Capt	W. T. Duncan (RCEME)	Lieut	J. S. Duncan
Capt	R. M. Ferguson	Lieut	K. S. Duncan (RCEME)
Capt	E. B. Fry	Lieut	H. J. Eche
Capt	J. Greenblat	Lieut	R. A. Evans
	(RCAMC)	Lieut	R. L. Fletcher
Capt	H. N. Heal	Lieut	J. S. Freeborn
Capt	A. T. Holmes	Lieut	E. C. Garrett
Capt	F. R. Holmes	Lieut	J. D. Gibson
Capt	C. E. Lavallee	Lieut	T. C. Keeffer
Capt	A. L. Lee	Lieut	J. D. Lafferty
Capt	J. B. Leslie	Lieut	H. E. Leith
H/Capt	C. L. Lewis (CCS)	Lieut	W. J. McGeachie
Capt	W. C. Miller	Lieut	C. W. A. McLean
Capt	W. E. McKinnon	Lieut	J. Morgridge
Capt	G. C. McLean, MC	Lieut	R. B. Murichison
Capt	C. E. Morric		(RCCS)
Spvr	L. M. O'Donnell	Lieut	V. C. Nelms
	(Aux Serv)	Lieut	F. A. Oliver
H/Capt	W. E. Perry	Lieut	J. S. O'Neill
Capt	J. B. Porteous	Lieut	P. E. Paillard
Capt	H. M. Quart	Lieut	R. D. P. E. Poirier

Lieut	J. C. Powell	Lieut	W. R. Spencer
Lieut	W. M. Ransberry	Lieut	G. R. Stretton
Lieut	B. W. Rideout	Lieut	H. D. Surplis
Lieut	W. G. H. Roberson	Lieut	H. J. Tamblin
Lieut	E. Sabo	Lieut	W. S. Tax
Lieut	E. R. Sexsmith	Lieut	F. C. Walls
Lieut	C. M. Sine	Lieut	R. C. Wilson

BATTLE SONG

OF

44 CANADIAN FIELD BATTERY, RCA.


(To tune of "John Brown's Body")

1. We are the 44th of the 13th RCA,
Which is the finest Regiment in the 3rd Div, by the way,
It's only modesty which makes us hesitate to say
"It's the best in the Army too".

Chorus:


- Ask the infantry about us,
Ask the Recce boys about us,
Tanks would never move without us,
And our guns to blast the way.
2. We came across the ocean blue to help to beat the Hun
We landed up in Scotland in November 41,
Then for years we trained for war and how to serve the gun
And we lived on army stew.
 3. Then came June of 44, our chance had come at last,
We landed on the beaches and our hearts were beating fast,
We buckled down to business, for we knew the die was cast
For Hitler and his Nazi crew.
 4. From then we've blasted Adolf's boys from France to Germany,
His tanks and guns and Para-troops, and other Infantry,
We helped to stop them shelling dear old Dover-by-the-sea,
And to set three nations free.
 5. We've lost a lot of fellows, due to bullets and to shell,
And mines and bombs and other things dreamed up in Hitler's Hell.
But they're not lost to mem'ry though, and we feel proud to tell
That their Spirits still are marching on.
 6. The war in Europe's over now, our guns can rest awhile,
While we relearn to soldier in that pre-invasion style.
But we can take the route march and parade ground with a smile
As we took the battle with the Hun.
 7. We've told in brief the story of the gallant 44
The things we've left unsaid, of course, are numbered by the score.
And if it happens that you'd like to learn a little more,
You can read it up in history.

Written by Major T. O'Shea.





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