

Van Arty Association and RUSI Van Members News Jan 19, 2021

Newsletters normally are emailed on Monday evenings. If you don't get a future newsletter on time, check the websites below to see if there is a notice about the current newsletter or to see if the current edition is posted there. If the newsletter is posted, please contact me at bob.mugford@gmail.com to let me know you didn't get your copy.

Newsletter on line. This newsletter and previous editions are available on the Vancouver Artillery Association website at: www.vancouvergunners.ca and the RUSI Vancouver website at: <http://www.rusivancouver.ca/newsletter.html>. Both groups are also on Facebook at: <https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=vancouver%20artillery%20association> and <https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=rusi%20vancouver>

Wednesday Lunches - Lunches suspended until further notice. Everyone stay safe!!

The 2021 BC Military Gala is CANCELLED. The Sheraton Wall Ctr is booked for Apr 23, 2022

Upcoming events – Mark your calendars (see Poster section at end for details)

- Jan 20** Wednesday ‘Zoom’ Lunch meeting
- Jan 27** Wednesday ‘Zoom’ Lunch meeting
- Jan 28** RUSI NS Presents - The Americas Series - Sealift and Merchant Marine & US Coast Guard
- Feb 03** Wednesday ‘Zoom’ Lunch meeting
- Feb 10** Wednesday ‘Zoom’ Lunch meeting
RUSI NS Presents - The Americas Series - Americas as a market & Mexican Naval Strategy

New Range Features More Realistic Enemy of Robots and Terrain

Paul Szoldra December 14, 2020



Marine infantrymen in the 2nd Marine Division can now face off against a more “realistic enemy” on a new range complex in North Carolina that features realistic terrain and robot targets. Range Golf-36 (G-36) at Camp Lejeune was certified on Dec 12 after a company of grunts from 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment was put through its paces. Officials say the range is unique and tougher than others for maneuver units and allows commanders to try out a variety of scenarios

to pit Marines up against equal or potentially superior adversaries — a big shift in thinking as the Corps looks to a potential future fight in the Pacific. “The majority of the current US Marine Corps population has not seen a world where the U.S. was not the dominant force,” division gunner Chief Warrant Officer 5 Joshua Smith said in a statement. “As the Corps transitions to the peer and near-peer fight, we strived to produce a live-fire problem set which removes the three-to-one advantage the Marine Corps typically enjoyed.”

At G-36, the Corps ditched static targets in favor of robotic targets (known as Trackless Motorized Infantry Targets, or TMIT) that can move freely around the range — just like the bad guys — while the range itself has uncut grass and trees along the way that make it more difficult to maneuver. “Typically, on most live-fire ranges, the trees are removed, and the grass is cut in order to allow for the safe execution and supervision of live-fire training,” Smith added. “G-36 adds the environment as part of the problem. In parts of the range, the trees play into the problem, as it is harder to see some of the enemy — just as it would be in real life.” Some targets are in areas that could easily be destroyed by Marine rocket fire, according to Smith, if not for the trees and grass in the way. Marine officials see a much different fight taking place in the future than its decades-long slog in the Middle East, with China presenting a more professional and technologically advanced enemy than its dealt with in the past. So, it has spent the past few years restructuring its force to be lighter and more agile, implemented more force-on-force training, and worked on pressing problems like countering drones and reducing units’ electromagnetic signature “before the adversary makes us pay the price,” as one Marine intelligence official put it.

To see the range in action go to:- <https://youtu.be/6ob-HoTxPH8>

Light Tank Competitors BAE & GD Head for Soldier Tests

BAE and General Dynamics are vying to build 504 Mobile Protected Firepower vehicles to support light infantry units, especially in places the massive M1 Abrams cannot go.

Sydney J Freedberg Jr *October 19, 2020*



BAE Systems' prototype for the Army's Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) light tank.

BAE

WASHINGTON: After 24 years without a light tank in Army service, soldiers will climb aboard brand-new Mobile Protected Firepower prototypes this January. “It’s not just PowerPoint” anymore, Maj Gen Bryan Cummings, the Army’s Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems (PEO-GCS), told me in an interview. “On Jan. 4th, we will have ... vehicles arriving at Fort Bragg.” Army experts have already started safety testing on prototype MPF vehicles, officials told me. Actual combat soldiers will start training on two platoons of prototypes in January – four MPFs from BAE, four from rival General Dynamics – with field tests scheduled to begin in April. A formal Limited User Test will start in August or September, with the Army choosing the winning design in 2022 and the first operational unit of

MPF entering active service in 2025. A General Dynamics spokesperson told me they've already delivered five MPF prototypes to the Army, with two more in final checkouts and another five being built for delivery by the end of the year. BAE Systems is also building 12 prototypes, but they declined to say whether they'd delivered vehicles yet or not.

*General Dynamics prototype
for the Mobile Protected
Firepower (MPF) vehicle*



While the Army can't comment on either contractor while the competition is ongoing, Cummings said, "both are on track to meet the major milestones" – despite the disruptions of COVID-19. After three months of training, the troops will start what's being called the Soldier Vehicle Assessment (SVA): four to

five months of intensive field testing, including force-on-force wargames. It's all part of the Army's new emphasis on getting real soldiers' feedback on new weapons early and often. "The soldiers actually get to drive the vehicles around, shoot them, train with them," BAE business developer James Miller told me. "Their feedback [is] likely to be the most critical factor ... in the decision the Army's going to make about who wins this contract." The soldier assessment isn't just testing out the vehicles, however, Cummings told me: It's also a test of the Army. Specifically, how can light infantry brigades, which today have few vehicles or mechanics, sustain and operate a 20-plus-ton tank?



M551 Sheridan

The crucial distinction: MPF is *not* going to the Army's heavy brigades, which have lots of support troops and specialized equipment to take care of tracked armored vehicles. Instead, 14 MPFs per brigade will go to airborne and other light infantry units, which haven't had tracked armor since the M551 Sheridan was retired and its replacement cancelled in 1990s. Now, MPF won't be as fuel-hungry or maintenance-intensive as the massive M1 Abrams, America's mainstay main battle

tank. Even with add-on armor kits for high-threat deployments, it'll be less than half as heavy as the M1. That's because MPF isn't meant to take on enemy tanks, at least not modern ones. Instead, it's designed to be light enough to deploy rapidly by air, simple enough to sustain at the end of a long and tenuous supply line, but potent enough to take on enemy light armored vehicles, bunkers, dug-in machineguns, and the like. That's a tricky balance to strike. In fact, the Army has never found a light tank it really liked despite decades of trying. Only six M22 Locusts actually fought in World War II, the M41 Walker Bulldog was too heavy for airborne units, the M551 Sheridan was plagued by technical problems throughout its service from Vietnam to Panama, the M8 Armored Gun System and the Future Combat System were both cancelled.

So how do BAE and General Dynamics plan to square this circle? General Dynamics emphasized lethality in their interview with me. Their Lima tank plant builds the M1 Abrams, and while the MPF is smaller – though the company didn’t divulge details, GD’s version reportedly has a 105mm cannon, compared to the Abrams’ 120mm – it will have the same fire controls and electronics as the latest model of its big brother. “If you sat in a Mobile Protected Firepower turret, you would think you were sitting in a [M1] SEPV3 turret,” a GD spokesperson told me. “It’s all the same displays, architectures, power distribution, etc.” GD’s design evolved from their Griffin demonstrators, prominently displayed for several years at AUSA annual meetings. It’s got automotive components derived from the ASCOD/Ajax family widely used in Europe and an 800-horsepower engine. GD didn’t tell me how much their vehicle weighed, but depending on the armor package installed, the demonstrators ranged from 28 tons to 50 tons. Those figures would give horsepower/weight ratios ranging from 28 hp/ton, better than any model of the Abrams, to 16, which would make MPF much more sluggish. BAE, by contrast, emphasized their design’s compactness and ease of maintenance – considerations as critical as firepower for a light infantry unit. BAE actually built the M8 AGS cancelled in the ’90s drawdown, and while they’ve thoroughly overhauled that design for MPS with a new engine, new electronics, and underbody blast-proofing against roadside bombs, they’ve tried to preserve its airborne-friendly qualities. “The old M8 fit inside a C-130; in fact, it was air droppable,” Miller told me. “There’s no requirement for that in the current MPF program, but we decided to stick with that as a design constraint: [Our MPF can] fit inside a C-130; we can do three on a C-17.”

BAE’s engine is less potent than GD’s, with only 550 horsepower. With the base configuration coming in at under 30 tons, that equates to over 18 hp/ton, with heavier armor packages reducing performance from there. But the big selling point of the engine is ease of access, Miller argued. Engine maintenance on a tank requires a crane and partially disassembling the armor, but a mechanic can slide the BAE MPF’s engine in and out of the chassis with a hand crank. If the MPF breaks down or gets stuck, it can be towed away by a truck, without requiring a special heavy recovery vehicle as an M1 does. “The infantry brigades are light. They don’t have long logistics tails. They don’t have a ton of mechanics and recovery vehicles,” Miller emphasized. “The vehicle has to be as mobile as them and fit inside their organization.” The Army estimates the life-cycle cost of MPF, from development to procurement to maintenance and retirement, at \$16 billion. Whichever vehicle wins the Army contract will have an edge in sales worldwide – including, potentially, to the Marine Corps, which is retiring its M1s as too heavy for modern amphibious warfare.

CF Military Efforts at Home are Increasingly the Norm.

A Joint Task Force Canada is the next logical step.

Christian Leuprecht The Globe and Mail January 10, 2021

Christian Leuprecht is Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership at the Royal Military College, cross-appointed to Queen’s University and senior fellow at the Macdonald Laurier Institute. Two years ago, few could have imagined that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) would end up managing a global supply chain for national vaccine distribution and backstopping the provincial mismanagement of 54 long-term care homes. The pandemic also showed that no one in government fully understands national supply chains across Canada. Still, no part of the country

ran out of personal protective equipment even when supply was critically short because CAF logisticians had the managerial savvy to locate it, CAF planners executed without having to rely on other partners or equipment, and the Royal Canadian Air Force transported it where it needed to go.



A Canadian soldier aids a senior citizen on May 10, 2020, at the Queen Elizabeth residential and long-term care centre in Montreal.

Genevieve Beaulieu/Canadian Armed Forces /Afp Via Getty Images

Time and again, the Department of National Defence has been called on as the only federal organization with the highly trained, well-educated and experienced roster of specialists and assets to plan and execute complex and large-scale operations in short order. Under Operation Laser, the CAF had a COVID-19 plan that it was able to execute while coming to the assistance of other government departments. Major General Dany Fortin’s cross-appointment as the Public Health Agency of Canada’s VP Operations and Logistics speaks volumes to the government’s confidence in the CAF to deliver on the vaccinations that are now a top priority for Canadians. The Canadian defence policy document “Strong, Secure, Engaged” has technically and effectively enshrined concurrent foreign and domestic operations. So why has no part of the Forces been designated exclusively for domestic operations? In 2006, then-chief of the defence staff Rick Hillier re-organized the CAF into Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command and Canada Command. Once the Olympics and G7 had passed, in the pursuit of staffing economies to support the Afghanistan mission, both commands were collapsed into the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). As the only force employment headquarters across the CAF, CJOC manages everything from UN observers in North Korea to floods in Manitoba. The pandemic experience is a prompt to reprise retired general Hillier’s vision for the CAF in the 21st century.


Over the past decade, Canada has become more reliant on the CAF to respond to domestic emergencies: the number of CAF’s domestic taskings has doubled and tripled over the two previous decades. These operations have proven well within the capabilities of the CAF. But in the event of floods, forest fires, or a grave international crisis, CAF assets currently dedicated to the pandemic may have been unavailable. Climate change is bound to multiply the frequency of crises such as wildfires and floods in the coming years, and that will increase demand for CAF resources. The pandemic is a harbinger of future CAF domestic operations that are more frequent and complex, longer and larger without the ability to rely on help from allies. Although the CAF has been able to deliver, after 15 years of efforts focused on counterinsurgency and building partner capacity, Canada’s military still has much to learn and re-learn about large-scale operations. For decades, the CAF has prioritized a strategic culture premised on Army expeditionary operations despite the fact that Afghanistan represented the only such mission in the past 60 years. Since the late 1950s, CAF leaders have vehemently resisted anything seen as diluting the combat role: they argue that it is easier to “scale down” from combat than to “scale

up” from domestic operations. But that is a false dichotomy, and politicians are looking for a broader contribution to national security from their annual defence investment of \$22-billion.

This is an opportunity for the CAF to reflect on its operational logic. Is the current command and control construct sufficient? On the one hand, Operation Laser headquarters were built for overseas operations, not domestic ones. On the other hand, the mission apportioned 24,000 troops, about 14 times the CAF’s total allocation to its domestic Immediate Response Units. Evidently, domestic operations are no longer a part-time sideshow, yet the CAF still responds to emergencies with pick-up teams. CJOC needs a dedicated Joint Task Force (JTF) for domestic operations, composed of regular and reserve forces. The newly appointed Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Art McDonald, is experienced at conducting domestic operations: he was the commander of JTF Pacific from 2016 to 2018 and ran humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations as maritime component commander of JTF Haiti in 2010. That background should come in handy as the CAF ponders how to optimize its force structure in response to growing domestic, continental and international demands on its limited assets.

Democracies Need to Re-learn the Art of Deception

Although countries continue to spy, propagandise and sabotage, military deception appears to be declining. *The Economist*. Dec 16, 2020



Five hundred dummies descended on the French coast on the night of June 5, 1944. The crack of gunfire sounded from each one, courtesy of a small pyrotechnic device. As they thumped to the ground, explosive charges mimicked paratroopers setting their parachutes ablaze. The hessian invaders were the vanguard of a phantom army, the most ambitious conjuring trick in military history. The Allied powers wanted to invade France but did not want

Germany to know where or when. So, they put George Patton, a real general, in charge of the 1st US Army Group, a made-up unit. The deception campaign was named Bodyguard, a sly reference to Winston Churchill’s remark that: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” Wooden landing craft, inflatable tanks and fake radio traffic hinted at a landing in Pas-de-Calais, some 300km (186 miles) from the Normandy beaches where the real troops would land. Set designers constructed a mock fuel depot in Dover, lent an air of authenticity by visits from King George and Dwight Eisenhower. An actor resembling General Bernard Montgomery, commander of the Allied land forces, was sent to North Africa to show that nothing was afoot. The trickery worked. Germany was taken by surprise on D-Day. Weeks later it still believed that Patton’s imaginary force was poised to strike elsewhere.

Deception is still practised in war. In its conflict with Azerbaijan, Armenia has bamboozled drones with dummy missiles. During a stand-off with India, China published images of missile launchers that, on closer inspection, turned out to be wobbly inflatables. Indian and Chinese forces alike covered equipment with multispectral nets, which block visible light and other electromagnetic emissions. Engineers keep working on new gadgets. BAE Systems, a defence

firm, boasts that its ‘Adaptiv’ camouflage—a set of thermoelectric tiles that change temperature to match their surroundings—amounts to a “cloak of invisibility”. But the operatic legerdemain of D-Day seems unlikely to be repeated. “Deception in the West has become something of a lost art,” laments General Sir Richard Barrons, who commanded Britain’s joint forces until 2016. “We’ve done some of these things in the past, like in World War II for example,” reflected General Charles Q Brown, the head of America’s air force, in December 2019, “but it’s not something that we think about as much anymore.” The last major American effort was in the first Gulf war, when America tricked Saddam Hussein (and its own sailors) into expecting an attack from the sea. That comparatively simple feint involved showy amphibious exercises and the use of agents to spread misleading stories.

Although countries continue to spy, propagandise and sabotage, military deception—meaning fooling adversaries into doing things that harm their interests—appears to be declining. Three developments are to blame. Material factors have trumped human ones in war, technology has improved, and liberal democracies have become squeamish. Modern war is a profession, waged by complex machines and officers capable of wielding them. By contrast, deception is closer to an artistic enterprise. It was zoologists, equipped with the lessons of animal colouration, and artists, inspired by Cubism and its shattering of perspective, who developed the avant-garde patterns of early camouflage. The most striking was the zebra-like dazzle applied to warships during and after the first world war, which obscured their speed and heading. Pablo Picasso claimed credit for the French army’s adoption of dazzle camouflage.

During the second world war, Britain’s Camouflage Development and Training Centre gathered what Peter Forbes, author of “Dazzled and Deceived: Mimicry and Camouflage”, calls “a strange medley of characters”, including architects, naturalists, Surrealist painters and a magician. In America, a “Ghost Army”, whose work was classified until 1996, hired actors and artists to generate special effects on the battlefield, such as speakers to simulate the sound of approaching tanks. Many went on to careers in art and fashion, says Jennifer McArdle of the Centre for a New American Security, a think-tank in Washington, DC. But melding such madcap experimentation with the discipline and order of military culture is difficult. The ending of national service and conscription in most large Western armies has deepened the fissure between military and civilian life. And America’s sheer power has led it to a direct way of war. “The US has the tendency to use technology and brute force in the absence of creativity,” says Ms McArdle. At the same time, technology has made grand ruses harder to sustain. Warfare is increasingly “a competition between hiding and finding”, noted Britain’s chief of defence staff in September. The ability to find has advanced considerably. Satellites and drones gaze down, antennae-laden soldiers and vehicles Hoover up electronic emissions and amateur plane-spotters track military movements on social media.

Had today’s commercial satellite industry existed 30 years ago, Saddam could have purchased high-resolution images that would have revealed American troops massing on his border. And today’s sensors see details that human eyes miss. A thermal infrared camera on a drone can easily tell a cool rubber decoy from a hot metal tank; long-wavelength infrared sensors can detect buried weapons by the different reflectance of disturbed soil. Even sophisticated decoys could become vulnerable to machine-learning algorithms that, fed with sufficient examples, tease out anomalies

too subtle for a human analyst to spot. And a deceiver must successfully deceive in more ways. Conjuring a phoney battalion now requires generating not only fake radio traffic but also social-media activity. Would-be deceivers can also invest in technology, perhaps by putting temperature-changing tiles on tanks. But human errors are a perennial problem. “If a soldier gets bored and walks out from their position with thermal screens to go to the toilet, an enemy will find it very amusing to suddenly have someone appear from nowhere,” says Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, another think-tank in the UK. Western armies are particularly dependent on radio communications, he says, leaving a tell-tale map of electronic signatures. Yet some of the old ruses still work.

As late as 1999, during the war over Kosovo, when NATO jets flew at high altitudes to avoid being shot down, Serbia showed that they could be fooled into wasting bombs on fake tanks. Russia’s forces have platoons that spray smoke and aerosols designed to block ultraviolet, infrared and radar. And as BAE’s ‘Adaptiv’ shows, active camouflage is improving. Instead of achieving security through obscurity, the best hope for modern deceivers may be to drown their pursuers in noise, forcing them to waste expensive precision weapons on cheap decoys. Flocks of drones and ground robots might spew forth electromagnetic emissions, challenging enemy sensors to pick the wheat from the chaff. Armies might even seek to exploit what is called “adversarial” artificial intelligence to generate camouflage patterns and designs that confound object-detection algorithms.

The biggest problem is not that brute force is supplanting artistry, or that technology is denuding secrecy. The complaint heard most often in Western armies is simply that rivals have more of a stomach for deception. Perhaps, they suggest, open societies that prize the rule of law and transparency at home are inherently less good at trickery. European and American military officials describe Russian and Chinese practices with a mixture of distaste and envy. Whereas America’s use of decoys “is currently at a low after two decades of neglect”, notes Walker Mills, an officer in the US Marine Corps, China has invested in them, including a 35kg tank that fits in a backpack and inflates in four minutes. One report by America’s army says that Chinese forces “have the highest fidelity decoys seen to date”. The laws of armed conflict are fairly clear about battlefield deception. Whereas “perfidy” (such as faking surrender to lure an enemy into an ambush or disguising a tank as a Red Cross ambulance) is forbidden, “ruses” like decoys, feints and ambushes are fair game. But other laws can be bent or bypassed. Russia snatched Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 by cleverly using unmarked personnel—the so-called little green men—and a synchronised blitz of disinformation. The entire campaign was a deception: an invasion masquerading as a nationalist uprising.

Western armies want to catch up, in some ways at least. “We’ll re-learn deception,” promises General David Berger, head of America’s Marine Corps, who is reforming his force to better evade Chinese sensors in the Pacific. But this cuts against the grain. “There’s a cultural problem here,” says a veteran CIA officer who specialised in deception. “I do think you’ll find generals who would feel that it’s fundamentally not a very respectable activity.” Such anxieties point to a deeper fear that despotic rule-breakers will steal an edge. In 1943 Britain tricked Germany into believing that the Allies would invade Greece by dressing a dead homeless man as a Royal Marines officer and releasing the corpse, stuffed with misleading orders, onto the coast of neutral

Spain. “We’d still be prepared to use a dead enemy soldier,” says a NATO officer. “But the Russians and Chinese would be prepared to kill him to do it.”

Vancouver Artillery Association Yearbook Updates

Yorke Island War Diaries Volunteers – We’ve started transcribing the War Diaries and associated Orders of the 85th Heavy Battery on Yorke Island into a digital format. Any volunteers willing to lend a hand?

<https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/whats-new/yorke-island-war-diary-project>

Gunner Wallace Reece Brunt - Paul Rochler, the Danish collector who parted with his Gunner Brunt memorabilia, has received his regimental coin and button as a gesture of our appreciation. Thanks Paul! And thanks to Ross Keller for his devotion to all things Yorke!

<https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/whats-new/yearbook-update-20216614358>

Reference Page New Material – Following downloadable items have been placed on our website reference page:

CFP 266 - Canadian Forces Museums - Operations and Administration

Guidelines: Roles and Responsibilities of Museum Boards of Trustees

The Military Aspect of Canada 2 May 1879 <https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/references.html>

Gunner Stewart Isley Howard Wylie has been added to our nominal roll. Check out his story here. <https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/whats-new/honours-and-awards-update9633064>

The Guns of the Regiment presentation is available here.

<https://www.vancouvergunners.ca/guns-of-the-regiment.html>

British Columbia Magazine - Forgotten Yorke Island, History From The Second World War. Story by Michaela Ludwig, photos by Kevin Krogstad

A short story on Yorke Island, it's history and a link to our Vancouver Gunner's website. Check out the story here. <https://www.bcmag.ca/forgotten-yorke-island/>

VAA Virtual Lunch every Wednesday at Noon PDT - <https://zoom.us/j/710845848> - Drop in for 10 minutes or stay for an hour. Remember – Stay healthy and stay safe!

Who (or What) Is It?



Last Week: Marie Ana Aurelia (Mariana) Drăgescu, the White Angel (7 September 1912 – 24 March 2013) was Romanian military aviator during World War II. She was the last surviving member of the White Squadron, a team of female aviators who flew medical aircraft during World War II. Romania was the only country in the world to allow women to pilot medical missions during the war.

The White Squadron was equipped with three small planes, painted white, with the red cross sign on the fuselage and on the wings. Once Romania was entered the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the squadron started flying wounded soldiers from the front lines to Bucharest for medical care. Drăgescu recounted later, "We were flying in the sky

with the planes to the front line. And if we didn't have aerodromes near the place where we had to pick up the wounded, we had orders to land anywhere ... " The white planes were hunted by the enemy, but not in the sky because they flew a maximum of 50 meters above the ground, and the pursuing pilots were afraid to fly so low. But that didn't stop them from targeting the planes once they were on the ground. After the first month, the squadron's aircraft were repainted in camouflage colors. Once on the ground, the young pilots, dressed in white overalls, startled some wounded soldiers as if they were hallucinating. One, on seeing Drăgescu, "started shouting at the orderly that was watching him: "John, an angel!" The poor man thought he had already died and was waiting to see Heaven ... " Drăgescu flew in the siege of Odessa, the Crimean campaign, and the Battle of Stalingrad, and, after the other pilots' resignations and illnesses, she remained the only female Romanian pilot on the front.

This Week: As you read in a recent edition of this excellent, award-winning, internationally distributed newsletter, the Canadian Army is about to replace its older-than-most-of-us Browning Hi-Power 9mm pistol. While some press reports state it is vying with the Brown Bess musket for title of "longest serving firearm", our knowledgeable readership knows that this title goes to the .50 cal M2 HB machine gun, which has been in use in various forms for almost 100 years. Indeed, our esteemed editor well remembers the day it was first manufactured.



So, what will our expert and quick-acting military authorities choose as a replacement pistol? With their usual lightning-like response, the answer might well have been announced before this goes to press. If not, I could recommend the firearm shown in this week's photo. It certainly packs a punch and looks just the ticket to intimidate any future opposition. Moreover, DND could earn a bit of spare change by renting these out to producers of science fiction movies.

So, dear reader, do you recognize this potentially lethal device? If you do, you are either a total firearms nutter, or someone who has spent all of the pandemic watching obscure YouTube videos. Let us know what it is by contacting, by the electronic post element of your computational engine, our editor, Bob Mugford (bob.mugford@gmail.com), or the author, John Redmond (johnd.redmond@telus.net). Bang!

From the 'Punitary'

Why can't you lie to the x-ray tech? They can see right through you.

Murphy's Other Laws

A conclusion:- Simply the place where you got tired of thinking.

Quotable Quotes

Loyalty to the Nation all the time, loyalty to the Government when it deserves it. *Mark Twain*

Dues 2021

As of Jan 1, memberships dues are payable for, Vancouver Artillery Association, the Royal United Services Institute - Vancouver Society and 15 Fd Regt Officers Mess Associate Members. Details below.

VAA

Dues for the **Vancouver Artillery Association** are \$25, payable to the Vancouver Artillery Association.

VAA dues can be paid by etransfer (preferred method):- by sending payments to:- president.vcrgunners@gmail.com

Dues cheques can be mailed to:

Vancouver Artillery Association
27048 35B Avenue, Langley BC V4W 0C3

RUSI Vancouver

Dues for **RUSI Vancouver** are \$50 (\$25 for students), payable to RUSI Vancouver.

By eTransfer (preferred method):- richmark@telus.net

By mail:-

Treasurer, RUSI Vancouver
1998 Ogden Avenue, Vancouver BC V6J 1A2

15 Fd Officers' Mess

Dues for **15 Fd Officers' Mess Associate Members** are \$60, payable to 15 RCA Officers Mess. Send to:

Treasurer, 15 Fd Regt Officers Mess
2025 West 11th Avenue, Vancouver, BC V6J 2C7

Wednesday Digital Video Lunch

No need to worry about COVID-19 when you go digital. Pop into our video lunch **at noon** on Wednesdays and say hi. All you need is a laptop, tablet or smartphone. These sessions are being hosted by the Vancouver Artillery Association and are **open to all – especially those who attended our Wednesday lunches.**

Join us to check up on your old lunch buddies.

<https://zoom.us/j/710845848>

Password:- Ubique



Zoom is the leader in modern enterprise video communications, with an easy, reliable cloud platform for video and audio conferencing, chat, and webinars across mobile, desktop, and room systems. Zoom Rooms is the original software-based conference room solution used around the world in board, conference, huddle, and training rooms, as well as executive offices and classrooms. Founded in 2011, Zoom helps businesses and organizations bring

their teams together in a frictionless environment to get more done. Zoom is a publicly traded company headquartered in San Jose, CA.

[Join our Cloud HD Video Meeting now](#)

Use the link above on your computer Zoom program or dial in on your phone
778 907 2071 Meeting ID: 710 845 848

Invite 2 friends! We have room for 100! See you on Wednesdays at noon. Bring your own lunch and beverage of choice.

UBIQUE 150 “Good Shooting” Video Contest



UBIQUE 150 “Good Shooting” Video Contest

In conjunction with the commemoration of 150th Anniversary of A & B Batteries, The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery is pleased to announce a video production contest.

Prizes will be awarded to 3 winners: 1st place winner receives \$2,000; 2nd place winning entry receives \$1000; 3rd place prize is \$500.

Important dates

Submissions accepted between	1 January – 30 April 2021
Judging starts	1 May 2021
Winners announced	26 May 2021

Eligibility

Submissions are open to **teams** consisting of **current and/or retired members of The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery**. Each team can submit more than one entry but only one prize will be awarded to any unit.

*If you missed it, the **Free webinar** recording and accompanying resources are available on our website.*

Learn about:

- Part 1: Pre-Production (Planning for Your Shoot)
- Part 2: Production (Getting the Shot You Need)
- Part 3: Post-Production (Bringing Your Vision Together)

All details on the contest and the free Webinar are at
ubique150.org

RUSI Nova Scotia Presents: -

The Americas Series

You are cordially welcomed to attend this virtual conference series on transatlantic maritime security and strategy challenges! It pairs experts on naval strategy and maritime security from North, Central, and South America with European colleagues to exchange thoughts and perspectives on pressing security issues. Specifically, it will discuss selected American navies, be they naval warfighting forces, maritime security & logistics providers, or third parties. Speakers from South, Central, and North American countries discuss recent naval strategic developments from their national (regional) point of view (15'-20'), such as capstone documents, major naval operations, procurement, major threats, and challenges. Where applicable, panelists from Europe will be invited. Speakers are specifically asked to focus on implications for NATO, the EU, Europe as a whole, and European navies. Followed by moderated Q&A. Length of event 75'-90' (max.). Open for all who are interested. The event will be recorded and is on the record. Engage with the speakers using the hashtag #AmericasNavies.

Session 1 | 28.01.2021

Sealift and Merchant Marine & US Coast Guard

Session 1 kicks off with two quasi-navies: Our distinguished speakers will present an overview of the US Coast Guard, the 12th largest navy in the world if calculated by tonnage, and the sea-lift and merchant marine capabilities of the United States of America.

Speakers: Prof Sal Mercogliano & Captain James Howe

Please click [here](#) for the registration or register at:

https://eveeno.com/AmericasSeries_Session1

Session 2 | 10.02.2021

Americas as a market & Mexican Naval Strategy

Session 2 brings together two items of interest: First, the discussion will center on the North, South, and Latin America as a naval market. Second, an often-overlooked maritime force and its strategy will be covered.

Speakers: TBA & Christian Ehrlich

Please click [here](#) for the registration or register at:

https://eveeno.com/AmericasSeries_Session2

Session 3 | 18.02.2020

Canada & USA

Session 3 covers the two North American countries with rich naval tradition and sizeable navies. Canada and the United States are NATO navies and, as such, of utmost interest and relevance to transatlantic security.

Speakers: Timothy Choi & Prof Peter Dombrowski

Please click [here](#) for the registration or register at:

https://eveeno.com/AmericasSeries_Session3

Session 4 | date TBA

Seapower from a South American Perspective & Colombian Naval Strategy

Session 4 brings us further south in the Americas. Our panelists will discuss maritime security challenges in Latin America and in particular the Colombian naval strategy.

Speakers: Dr Samuel Rivera Páez & Rafael Uribe-Neira

The registration link will be provided shortly

Session 5 | 11.03.2021

Brazilian Naval Strategy & China and IUU problems in South America

Session 5, our final session, pairs a perspective on China's maritime influence in South America with a perspective on Brazilian naval strategy.

Speakers: Andrea Resende & Prof Tabitha Grace Mallory

Please click [here](#) for the registration or register at:

https://eveeno.com/AmericasSeries_Session5