# N.R.E.F.

16th Brigade C.F.A. 67th and 68th Batteries



IN NORTH RUSSIA SEPTEMBER 1918 TO JUNE 1919

### 16th BRIGADE C.F.A.

#### Killed in Action

313866	GNR. CONVILLE, W.	11-11-18	67th
41064	A/BDR, FRASER, D.	13-11-18	68th
87238	GNR. RUSSELL, F. H.	13-11-18	68th
42763	CPL. WAREHAM, S. B.	11-11-18	67th
312887	CPL. S.S. WORTHINGTON, C. J.	24-1-19	68th
	Died of Wounds		
CAPT.	O. A. MOWAT (M.C.)	27-1-19	68th
	Died of Sickness		
41842	GNR, McDONALD, J. J.	7.5.19	67th

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
#### OFFICERS tolk BRIGADE, C.F.A. SEPT. 1918.



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#### A WORD FROM THE COLONEL



In May, 1918, the Allies decided to seize the Murman Coast, far inside the Arctic Circle and the Port of Archangel on the White Sea. The main reasons for this decision were:

- To stop the heavy transfer of German Divisions from the Russian to the Western Front, which had been proceeding at the rate of six Divisions per month. In this they were completely successful as no further German Divisions were transferred after the landing of the Allies in Northern Russia.
- 2. The prevention, by seizing the Murman Port of KOLA, of the Germans using it as a submarine base and thus turning the flank of the immense antisubmarine mine barrage running from Scotland to Norway. This would undoubtedly have happened, as the Germans controlled the Bolshevik Government in Petrograd and had ample means of transport by rail to KOLA, which was an open port all the year round.

There were at least 60,000 German troops in Finland, on the West flank of the Murman Railway, and it is probable that but for the armistice, big efforts would have been made by them from the west, aided by troops shipped by rail and from Petrograd, to occupy the Port even after its seizure by the Allies.

3. To open up a channel of communication with England for the Czecho-Slovaks who were then in the interior of Russia, hostile to the Bolshevik Government and badly in need of arms and equipment. It was hoped that the Eastern Front might be reconstituted with the aid of the Czecho-Slovaks and the anti-Bolshevik Russians who were to be organized and trained by the Allies, and that the large quantities of war material shipped to the Russians via Kola and Archangel before the Revolution might be available.

Consequently in August, 1918, the Canadian authorities were requested to send a Field Artillery Brigade to Northern Russia as a part of the Allied Forces and I was offered the command.

Volunteers were called for from among the officers and men in the Reserve Artillery, who had had service in France and the applications were far in excess of the number required. Majors F. F. Arnoldi, D.S.O., and W. C. Hyde, D.S.O., were selected to command the two six-gun Batteries, the 67th and 68th respectively. A very large portion of the men selected were



chosen on account of their good fighting qualities in France under the same officers who would command them in North Russia.

The Brigade sailed from Dundee, Scotland, on September 21st, and on arrival at Archangel some ten days later was transhipped to barges and consigned some 250 miles inland up the river Dwina.

The "front" at this time was a curious one. Looking south from Archangel, the Allies held Onega almost due west, and Pinega to the east. On the railway which ran due south from Archangel, the front was some fifty miles away, while the force to which the Canadians were despatched was fighting along the Dwina River over 250 miles due south. Our force was, therefore, many miles in advance of the railway front and was more or less "in the air."

On the arrival of the Allies in Archangel the Bolsheviks had fled precipitately, but on realizing the size of the small forces opposing them had begun to rally and were definitely opposing any further advance, and as our forces on the River Dwina were aided by a monitor of the Royal Navy, they made correspondingly greater progress than was possible on the railway front, hence the great disparity in their positions. On the arrival of General Ironside to assume the duties of Commander-in-Chief at the same time as

the Canadians arrived, it began to be realized that the backing of the Royal Navy would be impossible during the winter and that the best method of ensuring the safety of the forces far inland was to insure the stability of the "fronts" in their rear. Consequently, a party of three officers and twenty-six men of the Brigade were sent to temporarily man an armoured train on the railway. They did not rejoin the Brigade until January, having performed their duties to the entire satisfaction of General Ironside.

On the way up stream, the Brigade also detached a party of the 68th Battery under Major Hyde, D.S.O., to take part in operations about to take place between the Railway and the Dwir a River. Much of the fighting here was at close range, the American Infantry in front of the guns were somewhat unaccustomed to at least that particular form of warfare, and as a result many of Major Hyde's men, particularly his Signallers, had extraordinary opportunities for the display of courage and resource which were heartily acknowledged and appropriately rewarded. It was not until December that Major Hyde and his Battery headquarters rejoined the Brigade, leaving one section in action, which did not rejoin until April, as it ran into a succession of fights wherever it went, even on the trip up river to join the Brigade.





Triumphal Arch in Archandel

An Ikon brought to the Front



Pianda Ladies Aid Society


Meanwhile the balance of the Brigade, consisting of the 67th Battery complete and the balance of the 68th Battery continued up stream until it reached the junction of the Dwina and Vaga Rivers and came under the command of Dwina force, which had a column fighting about forty and seventy miles respectively up each of the above mentioned Rivers. The 67th Battery was detailed to the Dwina River and the 68th to the Vaga.

Their respective adventures are well and accurately told in the Battery narratives by Majors Arnoldi and Hyde and published herewith, so it is not necessary for me to do more than roughly outline conditions in the Force as a whole during the winter, as while the Batteries were in separate columns the stirring events in one inevitably reflected its tactical results on the other.

After accompanying the 67th Battery to its front on the Dwina River, Brigade Headquarters and the reinforcement party proceeded to Piandar, eight miles north of Force Headquarters at Beresnik, where a system of blockhouse defence was evolved for the defence of the steamers, barges, etc., wintering in Piandar creek. Meanwhile, having been appointed C.R.A. to the Force, I accompanied that portion of the 68th Battery proceeding to Shenkursk, withdrew the Russian Battery serving there and sent them to an Artillery School which we established at UST, Vaga. Until Christmas the whole Brigade headquarters were busy on their defences, establishing courses for every one in machine guns, etc., and in getting a line on what Ordnance possessed in the way of Artillery Stores.

During this period I was fortunate enough to be paying a visit to the 67th Battery when the famous attack from the rear on Armistice Day took place and had an opportunity of congratulating the Section on their wonderful work. Strenuous efforts were also made to obtain further Artillery support from Archangel, including two sixty pounders, and by Christmas we had received a section of British 4-5 howitzers and some Russian Artillery.

Directly after Christmas, I was ordered to take command of the Force, and was away from Piandar until the end of January, during which time I visited the various columns and, being apparently a harbinger of ill luck, was at Shenkursk when the Bolo commenced his big attack which resulted in the evacuation of that town and the subsequent long retreat. As areas of the surrendered country were evacuated, very large numbers of refugees poured through our lines and it became a matter of extreme military urgency to get



them out of the fighting area and on to the line of communications when every horse and every pound of food or clothing were needed.

The Brigade Headquarters at Piandar, under Captain Bruce, during this period organized a most efficient relief and control service, arranging for the feeding of large numbers of refugees and their shipment back towards Archangel as empty convoy transport became available.

During March, two mountain howitzers arrived from the base, and these were at once manned by members of the Brigade Headquarters, with Russian drivers, and sent to the Vaga front where the evacuation of a portion of the front on the order of the O.C. the garrison during heavy fighting involved their destruction. During this period, I visited Archangel to see General Ironside about the general artillery situation as it was becoming obvious that the time was getting dangerously short in which we could hope to get four sixty pounders and any large quantity of ammunition. The boat sent from England with the sixty pounder ammunition was lost at sea and it was a matter of touch and go whether the duplicate consignment could, during March, get through the ice in the White Sea, while one section of horses could not make two trips to the front with guns in the time available.

I made a trade at Archangel whereby I agreed to take only three sixty pounders on condition that they sent them all up at once instead of making two trips, and saw the guns leave Archangel, while the Naval people were impressed with the vital necessity of getting the ammunition ship in. Every ice-breaker in the country was used and after three weeks' strenuous battle, the "Wardown" staggered into port almost in a sinking condition. Special trains and convoys were awaiting her and every one will remember how the ammunition reached the guns at absolutely the last moment before the trails became impassable.

During March and April, the enemy attacked our positions well in our rear where numerous and considerable quantities of our much tried troops, including artillery, had to be despatched in that direction to save us from complete isolation. Similarly on several occasions it was an exceedingly fine point whether the progress of the fighting on the Vaga warranted us in holding the Dwina front at a dangerous distance in advance, and every preparation was made for a withdrawal of the latter if forced upon us.

When spring arrived, we were able to contemplate with a certain amount of equanimity the fact that both fronts were intact, our artillery in good shape and reinforced by British and Russian artillery to whom



Typical Droshki

Typical Windmill

FIDA GE

Investiture of Pianda

they would eventually hand over, and that the Navy would soon be up. This period of waiting was distinctly enlivened on the Dwina by the mutiny of the Russian Infantry and I think it is one of the proudest things on which the 67th Battery can look back that the Russian Battery, which they had "mothered" and trained by precept and example during the winter, should stand firm when their own Infantry mutinied and remained true to their traditions and teaching, although completely surrounded.

During May, we were able to take the offensive in a small way and on both column fronts the enemy was attacked and many prisoners taken, so that on handing over to the relieving troops, the vital strategical points so jealously guarded all winter were still intact and a disheartened enemy in front.

On June 6th the Brigade left Dwina Force on barges for Archangel en route for home. At Archangel the Governor-General asked to have the Canadians paraded and informed them that his heartfelt thanks went out to the Government of Canada for the magnificent work of their troops. Although four of the officers had been awarded Russian Decorations during the winter, he stated that he would not allow a single officer of the Brigade to leave Russia without some mark of appreciation from his Government. All

officers not previously decorated were then awarded the Order of St. Anne or the Order of St. Stanislaus.

The Governor-General also presented to the Brigade ten St. George's Crosses and ten St. George's medals (the Russian equivalent to the Victoria Cross and D.C.M. respectively). These were given to the men in recognition of their splendid work and following the Russian custom, the men of each Battery chose the ten bravest from among themselves as the recipients.

General Ironside, the Commander-in-Chief, also paraded the Brigade and told them that they knew, more than he could tell, what the Canadian Artillery had meant to him during the winter. Over and over again the C.F.A. had saved the Force from destruction and the highest traditions of the Canadian Corps had been fully maintained.

After heartily cheering the Commander-in-Chief, the Brigade embarked and sailed for England on June 11th, where, on arrival on June 18th, every one was given ten days' leave and after a few hectic days (and nights) of preparing innumerable forms in quintuplicate, which was cheerfully undergone as a preliminary to getting home and into civilian life again, embarked for Canada, and, on arrival, all ranks, many of them after five years' absence, headed for home.

This album, after much unavoidable delay, has been prepared in order to preserve some record of the work of the C.F.A. Brigade in North Russia, and it is hoped that it will be read with interest by all former members thereof, to each and every one of whom I offer my sincere thanks and hearty congratulations for their splendid work under circumstances of great hardship and trial.


> C. H. L. SHARMAN Colonel







Log Gun Pits Kurgoman








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### DIARY OF THE 67TH BATTERY, C.F.A.

By Major F. F. Arnoldi, D.S.O., Officer Commanding



For the benefit of the men who were unable to keep a diary of our movements in North Russia and for any who may be interested in the activities of the 67th Battery in that region from October 1st, 1918, to June 5th, 1919, or during the time when we were actually in action, I am going to give a short synopsis.

The Brigade Commander has already told of our landing at Archangel and proceeding up the Dwina on a barge with our guns and full equipment, plus spare parts of H.M.T. Stephen. We arrived at a point on the Dwina River some 260 miles from Archangel, afterwards to be well known as Gunners Bridge on October 12th. We had a very uneventful but a pleasant trip, outside of having to threaten to shoot the captains of our tugs several times to stop them from deserting us. We also had the pleasure of meeting the Commandant of Bereznik, a Major of great renown, who, prior to our arrival, carried large supplies of coal-oil and gasoline.

It is from Gunners Bridge my story starts. The next day we got our first lot of horses, 25 in number, better described as ponies, the largest of them being no bigger than a fair sized Shetland pony, they required considerable harness fetting as you may imagine. We received orders in the afternoon to proceed to Seltzo with the full battery less Lieut. Bradshaw, with 50 men, who were to remain behind and procure our full complement of horses. We arrived at Seltzo at dark in company with the Brigade Commander, receiving orders to unload onto the beach, and prepare to go into action in support of the Infantry who were holding Seltzo at the time as our front line. We unloaded the six guns and twelve wagons all fully loaded, as well as all our baggage, a month's rations, harness, etc., having to man handle the guns over a hundred yards of wet sand beach. This was no sooner completed than we received orders to reload as the infantry were going to retire within 24 hours. The complete battery was reloaded, and left Seltzo again at 4.30 a.m., less the two guns of the centre section in charge of Lieut. Hague, which were to stay behind in support of the infantry and which were to come backwith the naval gun barge on the evacuation of the Infantry, with orders to place a sacrifice gun on a point which commanded the river, some ten milesbelow Seltzo.

\*D\* Sub. Gun was selected for this duty, and was left as directed in charge of Lieut. Edwards, with orders to fire on all boats attempting to come down the river after the naval gun barge had passed, no matter what flag they were flying, to stick to their gun until it was knocked out, and then to get

back the best way they could. At 10 a.m. we arrived back at Gonners Bridge with three of our own guns and joined there two of the 68th Battery guns, and Bde. H.Q. staff in charge of the Adjutant awaiting orders from the Colonel, who had gone to Bereznik to report the situation to the Force Commander. We remained i there during the 14th, awaiting further developments. Next morning at 2 a.m. we were awakened by the naval gun barge arriving back to say that the Infantry were coming back, that was all the information they could give us. A council of war was immediately summoned, and the right and centre sections put into action on the shore, with a screen formed of brigade Headquarter Staff thrown out in front to meet any eventualities until such time as we were able to determine just how the situation stood.


The naval barge brought the two guns of the centre section back with them, after having quite an exciting time of it the day before, as the Bolo had attacked shortly after the main body of the Battery had left. The guns had been in action all day, the Bolo being successfully repulsed after a sharp attack. The O.C. of the Column, however, had already decided to evacuate that night under cover of darkness. The gun barge with our two guns was practically the last to leave. They apparently passed "D" Sub. Gun during the darkness, as they had not seen nor heard of them.

About ten o'clock in the morning no word had been received nor any sound of firing heard, so we took one of our attending tugs and proceeded up the river Dwina bringing "D" Sub. Gun back as its role of sacrifice gun was ended, the Bolo having apparently not followed close on our heels. It was a very disappointed gun crew we brought home. They thought that their dream of France was going to be realized of fighting their gun to a finish over open sights, yet they had been withdrawn without firing a round.

Eventually, about three o'clock in the afternoon our Infantry commenced to arrive back along the bank in poor shape, having had a very bad time of it coming over almost impassable roads through the forest. They had lost most of their ammunition and equipment during the retirement.

It might be well here to give just a word about the country over which we had to fight. We found a heavily wooded muskeg country along each side of the river, with clearings at intervals where small villages were located.

The C.O. of the Force arrived back at Gunners Bridge with Col. Sharman in the evening and after a hurried conference and a change of the Column



command, we decided to establish ourselves on the line of Kurgomen-Tulgas, with a temporary position in Topsa. This was accomplished after several strenuous days' work. The right section under Lieut. Bradshaw went into action on the Left Bank in the village of Tulgas and the centre section under Lieut. Hague, took up a temporary position on the Right Bank in the copse in front of Kurgomen. However, next day, as the Infantry with: rew from Topsa they took up a position by the church inKurgomen.

The following day we made ourselves known to the Bolo. We found we had facing us some 22 armed water craft, including several gun-boats armed with 6" and 4.1" naval guns, which reminded one very much of our friend the "Silent Sue" of France. They had that habit of arriving, and then announcing the fact afterwards. The Bolo had three batteries of field guns, and as far as we could find out, approximately 3,500 troops facing our force of one six gun 18 pounder battery, which in other words was "we", one naval 5.1 gun mounted on an old iron barge, for which there were 150 rounds of ammunition left in North Russia, and a grand total of between 900 and 1,000 all ranks. Our Infantry, and all credit to them, consisted of three companies of 2/10th Royal Scotts, all class B-3, or a purely base battalion, and one company of our gallant neighbors, "The Yanks."

On the morning of the 18th, his gun boats commenced shelling our forward position, but were kept at a respectful range by our naval gun barge, his Infantry also became active, particularly on the right bank. On the morning of the 20th, our gun barge was sunk with a direct hit by a 4.1 from one of his boats, which left us powerless to deal with his water craft as they came down the river to within easy range for their guns, yet well out of the range of our 18 pounders, and cheerfully shelled us over open sights. To make us feel even worse he brought his field guns into action in Topsa and shelled our forward position. Even then we were hopelessly outdistained and further handicapped, as his field guns ranged up to 9,000 yards, while our old type oil buffer 18 pounder with which we were equipped, was not graduated above 6,600, though I am not saying anything against our good old 18 pounder. There is none like us if we only had the range.

We were subjected to several attacks during the next three weeks, all of which were successfully repulsed, our casualties being very light, while those of the enemy were very heavy. Most of the trouble was at Tulgas on the left bank, our guns getting in some very good shooting at times in the open in front of Tulgas.

The ice started to appear in the river on October 24th, getting thicker each day, and on the 28th all our tugs were withdrawn down the river. Also his navy had to withdraw up the river, for which we were very thankful.


On the morning of the 27th, we attempted a surprise attack on Topea, which was a failure, unfortunately, our troops being hadly cut up mainly due to lack of organization. Four of our men, Br. A. B. Calwell, an i J. A. Francis, Grs. C. Cordell and C. S. Wilson, accompanied the Infantry in this attack to man any enemy guns they might take. They were cut off twice in attempting to rally our troops, each time having to fight their own way out, all returning safely.

The condition of our Infantry on the right bank after this attack was very serious, having lost half of their fighting force. Our own men were in great fettle. Fortunately there was no enemy infantry action on this bank for the next few days.

The left section moved into action at Kurgomen on the 27th, and we commenced to settle ourselves for the winter. The weather turned milder round the 1st of November, and his Infantry began to show considerable activity on both banks, keeping our outposts worried.

A complete defence scheme for both banks was prepared for entircling the villages with a system of log blockhouses, connected up with wire entanglements, which proved very effective later when completed. The weather continued very mild, the ice practically clearing from the river again, till on November 9th his gun boats appeared and opened fire on both banks. On the 10th, he attacked the forward village of Kurgomen, driving in our outposts, but did not remain very long, our centre section doing some good work. His gun boats bombarded Tulgas heavily during the afternoon.

On November 11th, his gun boats opened up a heavy bombardment on Tulgas at daylight, and his Infantry attacked at 8 a.m. in front, our right section being heavily engaged in support of the Infantry. At 9 a.m., a large body of the enemy, 600 strong, who under cover of the woods had pushed round to the rear of our guns, were discovered by the drivers of the section, who were in their billets at the time, advancing from the village in their rear about 200 yards distant. The drivers, some 20 in number, rushed out, armed with their rifles, and met the Bolos' advance, temporarily checking it. They fell back in open order on their gun pits fighting all the way, giving the guns time to be somewhat prepared for the Bolo when he arrived. As already stated the guns were in action at the time, firing to their front. "B" Sub. Gun. was run out of its pit and reversed, opening up over open sights at the enemy. Unfortunately,



due to the nature of the ground, they were unable to clear a small rise in front of the gun, at less than 400 yards so that the Bolo was able to advance within 100 yards, forming a small circle about the pits, opening up beavy rifle and machine gun fire, while their gun boats kept up a continued bombardment from the river. The Infantry during this time were being hotly engaged from the front, but were successful in keeping him out of our main defences.

A platoon of A Company Royal Scots was dispatched to the assistance of the guns. They reached the guns, notwithstanding a heavy fire directed on them from the enemy, suffering heavy casualties. The Bolo made several attempts to rush the guns during the day. Our little force of 25 infantry and 50 odd gunners, however, held him at bay until four o'clock in the afternoon. When it became duak, they were able to reverse "A" Sub. Gun running it out into the open in rear of the pits, and opened fire over open sights at 75 to 100 yards, This had been impossible during daylight owing to heavy sniping by the enemy. On darkness falling, the enemy returned back into the woods, leaving some 60 dead and wounded in our hands, including one Battalion Commander. Many other wounded were also reported by the prisoners we collected later. The following message was taken from enemy signallers captured in rear of our guns: "We have taken two villages but not the guns, attack immediately in front and fire on upper town, unless you do this we cannot hold out, retreat impossible." signed, "Commander Faulks." We might add here that we had the satisfaction. of hearing later that of the 600 men who started on the attack, less than 100 ever returned to his own lines.

However, we paid a heavy price for our glorious day. Cpl. S. B. Wareham, our Signalling Corporal, was killed at the gun by a sniper, while trying to get to the signal hut to communicate with the other bank for assistance, and Dvr. W. Conville was killed while attempting to get out of his billet to meet the first onslaught, also ten of the gallant little platoon of Royal Scots who came to our assistance.

In the meantime the enemy had put on a light attack against Kurgomen, which was effectively dealt with by the centre and left sections. During the whole day communication was cut between the two banks, the remainder of the Battery in Kurgomen being helpless to assist in any way, not being aware of the exact situation, and the distance too great to distinguish the uniforms. Finally, at 4 p.m. they receive i a lamp signal from the right section, "We are surrounded," where upon the left section opened fire on rear Villages in assistance.

He continued a heavy bombardment for the next few days by boat and land batteries. Towards the evening of the second day we located the land guns, which were silenced forthwith. It commenced to turn much colder, the ice running very heavily in the river, his navy retiring on the 14th. On the 15th, his Infantry retired from forward Tulgas to Seltzo after a preparatory bombardment by our guns from both banks.

We commenced to settle ourselves down for the winter in earnest and completed our defences. We wired in all our gun positions, independently of the main outer defences, as a precaution against any further attacks of this nature.

The last tug went down the river on the 17th leaving us out off from the outside until such time as the snow roads opened up. We spent the remainder of the month laying in supplies for the winter, and general routine duty. We had one good day's sport, when we sent a patrol of 12 men out into no man, a land to capture sleighs from the enemy, bringing in hay. They brought back 16 of them. Unfortunately several of our men were badly frost-bitten owing to lack of proper footwear for the extreme cold of the day. The same night an officers patrol went out to investigate a Bolo patrol reported to be, between our defences, on the island in the middle of the river. Not finding the enemy patrol, they decided to put on a little show of their own advancing up under the banks of Topsa some 5,000 yards in front of our outposts and behind his. They opened up five rounds rapid into his billets, then sat back and watched the excitement, he went wild, opening up with his artillery and machine guns, apparently thinking we were trying a surprise attack. As soon as they quieted down they gave them another dose and came home without mishap.

We were continuously in touch with the enemy during this period, but outside of patrol encounters nothing of a serious nature developed. We found ourselves at a big disadvantage, as his field guns and 4.1's could sit back and shell us from Toosa, but owing to the range which was over 8,000 yards, we were unable to reply with our guns, and just had to take it. We decided such a condition was impossible for the whole winter. At dawn on December 5th. F. Sub. Gun went out into the open plain between Kurgomen and Topsa, 1,500 yards in front of our outposts and engaged his position over open sights in a very effective manner. After firing about 100 rounds they hooked up and drove back into our own lines. He stood for the bluff never firing a single round in reply, although we had our complete gun crew and team absolutely without any possible means of support out in the open. We kept up this performance at intervals until the snow got too heavy; when we took the guns as far as the end of the wood copse on the plain. This proved a very effective check against his guns, any time we were worried by them during the winter they were effectively dealt with in this way. We also carried out a



A half for Lunch

Centre Section
In action,
Outpost
Kurboman





combined shoot by the guns of both banks, the right section sending a gun out in front of Tulgas defences. With two guns on the right bank and one on the left carrying out a deliberate shoot over open sights into his positions from the open plain. The operation took about three hours, with no signs of his guns or any aggressive movement on the enemy's part.

We were able to put on a very good spread for Christmas dinner, the men having soup, wild fowl, beef, plum pudding, beer, candies and cigars, so that nobody suffered for lack of grub, every one putting in the cheeriest day possible under the circumstances.

The remainder of the month was taken up by routine, although our guns were in action, at least, on one of the banks every night against his patrols. Captain Gillis and Farrier Sergeant Dunford were sent to Archangel to build sleighs and bring up some 60 pounder guns which were sent to us for our defence in the spring against his navy, during the period when his navy could come down with the ice and assist in his infantry attack against our position, and the time when our navy could come up from Archangel where they had gone for the winter just before we arrived in the fall, leaving our force without any heavy guns. The Imperial Ordnarce having said that it was impossible to bring up the 60 pounders over the roads, it was up to us to get them there.

The next three weeks passed off without anything very much happening, we were in continual touch with his infantry, the guns being in action once every day at least. We were able to keep his artillery under control by taking our guns out in front of our outposts at intervals. He seemed to have moved in some 4.1 pieces which started to worry us in our forward defences.

A section of the 41st. R.F.A. 4.5 How. Battery in charge of Capt. Duff arrived from Archangel and was put into action at Tulgas. Unfortunately for offensive defence it did not assist us very materially, as we could out range it with our 18 pounders in a pinch, though later they proved to be very useful morally against his infantry. They were a very stout lot of fellows and game for a fight. The weather turned very cold, although the snowfall was slight until the end of January. This did not prevent our being able to have several football and baseball games between the sections, which proved great sport, and a means of whiling away the time. We also played several games with our good old friends the "focks."

Several interesting tests were carried out with the gues under the most severe conditions. Our 18 pounders fitted with the old oil buffers filled with ordinary ordinance non-freezing buffer oil, were fired at 35 below zero F., with the ammunition at the same temperature, and in spite of the cold we got perfect results after making normal corrections for temperature and ranges, the guns recoiling and running up without any jar.

We gave the native children a Christmas tree, something which was merely a legend to them. It turned out a huge success, the whole population of the villages turning out to see it, the men and women being just as enthusiastic as the children.

During the remainder of the month the enemy commenced to show considerably more activity, finally on January 27th he made a determined attack on Tulgas from the front and flank, proceeded by a foint attack on Kurgomen. We were heavily engaged for seven hours, the enemy being eventually driven off.


He moved his artillery up, becoming very much more active with them. We were still very badly outranged, and our guns were sent out each day in front of our lines in an effort to silence them, without success.

He attacked Tulgas again on the 31st, this time our right section with the Hows, getting a good bag and feeling very much bucked with themselves. The enemy clearing out leaving several dead in front of our wire. We concentrated our efforts for the next week in trying to silence his guns and after several days of pushing our guns out in front we were left in peace once more.

They attempted a third attack on Tulgas, but it never matured, we found out from prisoners taken after that we had disturbed them by dropping a 4.5 with a 106 fuse in their midst, just as they were preparing to debouch from the woods to the attack. A Soldiers and Sailors Council had been immediately called, decided that they had had quite sufficient in their last two attempts, and returned home.

On February 15th, the left section was dispatched 10 miles to the rear to Pless to take up a defensive position there, as we feared he might try to attack our lines by circling through the forests. We learned that he had prepared a road through the forest over which to move his guns with this object in view. A section of Russian gunners armed with 18 pounders, had arrived at Kurgomen to replace the left section. They proved themselves to be good fellows, the officers being excellent gunners.

The remainder of the month was taken up mostly by routine, we were continually in touch, however, with his infantry, but nothing important happened. His guns, were still outranging us. On the 5th of March, the centre section took a gun out in front of the outposts on the plain and engaged his guns, making our good old 18 pounder with oil and spring buffer fire at an elevation equal to 8,400 yards, which she stood nobly, proving effective in that we were not worried from that quarter for some time. We were forced during the remainder of the month to keep one gun out in front practically every day to keep his artillery from becoming too active, with effective results.



The month of March was perhaps the most trying month of our sojourn. owing to the uncertainty of our position, not so much with regard to our own front, but to conditions in our rear, his forces in large numbers having been reported to have cut our lines of communication several times, also owing to the serious condition of the Vaga front at this time, we did not know from day to day just how we stood. Twice during this period we were packed up ready to move, the powers that be not being able to give us any assurance as to whether we would hold our present line against the spring offensive, which from information received through our agents we expected him to put on with his combined land and naval forces. Finally on April 1st, we received orders that w would hold our present positions until the arrival of our navy. We commenced to prepare ourselves to be a self-contained force until that time if necessary, atrempthening our circular defences and preparing for the arrival of the long promitted 60 pounders, two of which were to be given to our Column. We also received a 3" Russian field gun with a range of 9,000 yards, similar to that used by the enemy, which had been captured from them in a previous action, It was put into action in the wood copse out (some 1,500 yard sout on the plain), in front of our defenses, in charge of the Sat. Major and 10of the "best," armed to the teeth with the little Russian gun, two machine guns, bombs, rifles and grub. There was also an outpost of seven infantry occupying a blockhouse at the front end of the copse.

The Russians who up until this time we had scattered amongst us for safety and training purposes and of whom we now had a complete battery of 4 guns and some 800 Infantry, had been continually asking for an independent command of their own. It was decided to give them the Tulgas side of the river, withdrawing all our own men to the Kurgomen bank. We still maintained tactical control and supervision of their actions.

The 31st of March we saw signs of a break in the winter for the first time since the beginning of December, there was a slight thaw in the sun.

On April 3rd a relief was carried out between the centre and left sections, the centre section going to Pless, and being relieved by the left section. This was a most eventful day, the 60 pounders actually arriving in Kurgemen to the great joy and relief of all of us. They were manned by Russian gunners who had never seen the gun before, but afterwards proved themselves to be made of good stuff. We gave them a stiffening of our own men, and the work of getting the guns into position was got under way.

The following two weeks, up until the 14th of April, was taken up by the rebuilding of our gun pits and the strengthening of the whole position. On

the 20th all sections reported ready for Mr. Bolo's party, each section and the forward gun being a veritable arsenal, each carrying three machine guns, rifles, bombs, as well as their own 18 pounders. We were pretty well taxed for men at this juncture, although up to strength. We had two sections in action at Kurgomen and one at Pless, there were ten men and the S.M. in the copae with the 3" Russian gun, and six men with the 60 pounders, the remainder being with the horses and stores at the wagon lines at Kurgomen forming part of the rear defence. Everybody was in wonderful shape and pleased to let him have a try at us now that we were all set, and knew that we did not have to move, unless—well we did not figure on any "unless" until our navy arrived. During the next few days the river started to rise, making crossing very difficult, until on April 24th it was impossible to cross the river without a boat. We sent a patrol out to examine the water ways in front of Topsa which proved successful, returning without mishap.

There was considerable activity in the enemy lines, and movements of troops from time to time, but no actual contact reported during the last week

At 5 a.m. on the morning of the 25th, we were awakened by heavy rifle and machine our fire from the Tulgas bank where the Russians were, and upon investigation found all communications cut from the other bank, the wireless not being able to get any answer. I might say here that we had wireless stations established on either bank, as we were not able to depend on our cable communications at any time, due to spies, etc. We also tried lamps without success. The guns seemed to be firing at almost point blank range to their front, year and right flank. We were compelled to remain inactive until such time as we could obtain some word as to what was going on. The river was impassable by this time, the ice having started to shift. This situation continued until 6.30, when we decided to put a light box barrage about the whole situation, so as to keep any person from getting in or out of the position if possible. Finally, a Russian Artillery Officer and three gunners arrived from the other bank after a very perilous journey by means of pulling a boat across the broken ice under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the river bank. He reported that the Russian infantry had shot their officers and gone over to the Bolo, who were coming to their support from Seltzo, that the guns were surrounded by hostile troops, the Russian gunners remaining loyal, and that they required assistance and supporting fire immediately. We opened a supporting fire immediately on the front and flanks only, as we did not know the whereabouts of our British personnel, composed of Liason Officers, wireless staff, and A.S.C. The 4.5 How., now opened up from the village in front of the 18 pounders, firing apparently point blank. Finally, at 8.45 a.m., the following message received by lamp from 18 pounders position: "Fire on all villages except Artillery



Village, will have to withdraw if you do not send supports immediately. immediately opened heavy fire on all villages, except Artillery and headquarter villages, where the 4.5 was, as it seemed to be shooting true to us. A further message was received asking for support on special targets, also that the Bolos completely surrounded them, attacking from five places. We endeavored to get a platoon of Infantry and section of machine gunners across the river to their support, without success, owing to the condition of the ice. At 9.30 a.m. message received, "Cannot hold out any longer, give us support in withdrawa! of our guns," which was promptly carried out and to our great amazement the two 18 pounders and the 4.5 limbered up and withdrew right through Hospital village which they had reported as being in the hands of the Mutineers, who were apparently cowed by our fire in front of the guns or overawed by the loyalty of the Russian gunners. They let them pass through in safety, the guns getting back to Shushega some 12 miles to the rear, taking up new positions there, our centre section making a determined effort, without success, to get ammunition to them, across the river from Pless.

We maintained fire on the other bank during the day and night, but next morning the Bolo had himself well established in Tulgas.

This indeed was one of the most amazing instances of our experiences in Russia, a serious catastrophe in which we were powerless to assist, owing to their having chosen the time when it was impossible for us to interfere, on account of the condition of the river. It left us, as you may see, in a most precarious position, with Mr. Bolo firmly established on our flank, some 2,500 yards away, and also some 10 miles to our rear on the other bank. The moving ice was to our advantage this time. The centre section in Pless prepared to support Shushega getting their guns into action on the river bank.


The work done by our drivers during this time, getting up 60 pounder, 18 pounder and 3" Russian gun ammunition from Rostovskoe to the guns in Kurgomen, a distance of 20 odd miles, after the roads had broken, was a great accomplishment, particularly considering that our horses were forced to live on 10 pounds of straw and hay mixed, and a quart of oats a day. When the roads finally became impassable, we were well set with ammunition for all the guns. The morning of the 26th the Bolo attacked Kurgomen at 2.30 a.m., but was forced to retire by our guns before actually in touch with our Infantry, and moved guns into action in Tulgas during the night, and opened fire in the morning without doing us any damage. He had us rather dead to rights as the Tulgas positions were considerably higher than our positions in Kurgomen and could see all our guns without any difficulty. The centre section at Pless also engaged an enemy attack on Shushega with good results.

April 27th. Enemy attacked Kurgomen in force at 4 a.m. from the front and flanks. It might be well to mention that we were having continuous daylight at this time 24 hours a day. The guns got in some very good shooting on the party attacking on our flank in the wood, killing many and making the remainder retire in disorder, leaving their machine guns and equipment. He fired on our guns from Tulgas with 3" guns. We spotted him and turned our 18 pounders on and heard no more from that quarter. The S.M. and his party did some excellent shooting from the wood post, with his 3" Russian gun. silencing the enemy's guns at Topsa, also during the enemy infantry attack developing heavy machine gun fire on their flank. He had trouble with our infantry machine gun detachment, who were his support, and had to supply a Lewis gun and three men to assist the N.C.O. in charge. The day finished all in our favor and everybody much bucked with themselves. The enemy continued to be very active on the other bank. We carried on a harassing fire on Tulgas, the centre section carrying out a defensive fire for our troops in Shushera.

April 28th. Just a patrol encounter in the morning. We carried out sniping on the other bank all day with our artillery.

April 29th. Ice clearing in the river. First enemy gun boats appeared in the afternoon coming down the river. No action.

April 30th. Considerable enemy activity on the river during the day in vicinity Troitza, but no action as yet. Heavy movement of troops in Topsa, Patrol encounter with our outposts, in front of Kurgomen also at Shushega. The 60 pounders were reported set and ready for action. We did not fire them. not wishing to disclose the strength of our armament, as we believed he had received many rumors of the great guns we had in position, which we took good care to help along. The opposing forces, from information we had gathered at this time, were as closely as we could find-Kurgomen bank, or right bank, 3.000 infantry and some 12 land guns, including 6" How, 4.1, 3" field guns, all of which outranged our 18 pounders. On the Tulgas or left bank, some 2,500 troops, 8 guns and two heavier pieces which never came into action. four of his 3" pieces taking positions in Tulgas itself, a distance of some 2,500 yards from our guns, looking down into our positions, and last but not least, 29 armed river craft, including nine regular river gun boats, armed with 6" and 5.1 naval guns, which ranged up to 17,000 yards, and smaller craft armed with 4.1. Our force, some 550 all ranks, including 75 Russians, 160 odd of our own infantry (British) 140 of us and two 60 pounders, maximum range supposed to be 14,000, 4-18 pounders, range 6,600, one Russian field piece range. 9,000, located in front of our defences, 13 wooden block houses, and a little wire around us.



May 1st. We were jarred out of our sleep by his navy opening a heavy bombardment at 2 s.m. on our guns, his land guns from both banks joining in simultaneously, an i his infantry attacking from the direction of Topsa. His guns in Tulgas fired on our own 18 pounders, making it utterly impossible for anybody to get in or out of the gun pits. However, they were able to handle the infantry attack from their pits, cetting in some great work, notwithstanding the rough passage they were getting from all sides. He concentrated all his fire on the small area of the gun positions. We finally got the 60 pounders into action at about 2.20, the first round with 106 Juse, lighting plumb in the middle of the Bolo fleet, then both guns got going with excellent effect against his navy, who seemed to hesitate. It was then that he made his big mistake, he lifted the fire of his Tulgas guns from the 18 pounders to the 60 pounders. It was no sooner done than the 18 pounders popped out of their pits and in three minutes Tulgas was silent. The whole situation changed from that moment. The 60's drove the navy back, his infantry was forced to retire. and the S.M. and his crew silenced the guns in Topea; by 3.30 a.m., the situation was ours for the time being.

He made another similar attempt about 5 s.m. which only lasted half an hour.

He made a last attempt again at 7 a.m., which we were well set for, getting some very good shooting on his infantry, clearing them right back into Topsa. He was finally mastered and silenced by 10 a.m.

Notwithstanding the fact that our gun pits were knocked about and that several heavy shells had broken in the lips of the 60 pounders pits, throwing dirt over the crews, who were exposed except for a small circular pit, with head cover, there was not a single man scratched. It was nothing less than a miracle. The Russian crews on the 60 pounders proved themselves to be absolutely fearless, serving their guns in the open without hesitation, throughout the whole attack, notwithstanding the rough passage. Everybody was very much bucked now they had met the enemy in full force and mastered him.

We had to build new positions, and move the left section during the night, so as to be able to handle the Tulgas gons, in case they got on us again. The situation was such that as long as we could be quick enough to stop him from getting the drop on us everything was alright. If he once got the idea that he bad us for a minute he would jump at the opportunity offered to overwhelm us. Luckily he did not get it before our navy arrived, otherwise, it is hardly necessary to remark, this story would not have been written.


The next few days were the stickiest part of our show. He did not give us time to rest, his navy carrying out concentrated shooting on our position,

while he showed considerable activity on the far bank of the river, where he had finally established himself in front of Shushega, some ten miles in our rear, his infantry showed considerable activity on our front. They were not able to develop their attack into anything serious, the guns getting them before they came to close quarters. On the afternoon of May 3rd it was touch and go for superiority of fire. He got four of his six inch guns on barges, established behind the cliff at Troit:a which, assisted by his navy, who kept moving in and out of range on the river, had us at our limit for two hours, until finally by good luck we seemed to get the better of him with our 60 pounders, which, it must be understood, were being asked to give between 15,000 and 16,000 yards to compete with his ranges. To appreciate the situation it should be understood that, had we been silenced for the space of half an hour, in my opinion, it meant a fight to the finish with odds against us, as there was no way out, his whole 2) armed ships standing waiting to rush our positions.

On May 6th our first monitor appeared and fired, much to our joy and relief. They had had to pass by ten miles of the left bank of the river which was occupied by the Bolo to reach us, so that they were not able to remain and had to return to Pless. However, it was a great relief to know there was something behind us at last. In the meantime our centre section at Pless co-operated with our Infantry in Shusbega in several successful raids into his position on their front.

May 7th. Two of our river gun boats mounted with two 6" naval (the same ships used on the Tigris) came up as far as Kungomen and carried out a small shoot on Tulgas and Topsa. The next ten days went by without anything serious taking place. He tried his hand at least once a day without success. With the co-operation of our boats which came up each day from Pless, we were able to keep him in hand. The right section was taken out of action on the 11th, being relieved by the 2nd Russian Battery.

The situation was still impossible, however. If we were to hold Kurgomen, it was essential that we should clear him off the other bank beyond Tulgas, as the position there completely commanded our position, although we had been able to force him to withdraw his guns from there after the first few days. The question was how to take it, as we could not spare the men from either bank to put on any kind of an attack. From the 14th until the 17th we carried out an active campaign on his lines between Tulgas and Shushega, sending out patrols from the latter place, assisted by the navy and land guns, also the gun boats and monitors were passing up to Kurgomen from Pless daily. Finally, on the 18th May, our Infantry advanced from Shushega on Tulgas, which was put under a severe bombardment from both our navy and our 18 pounders in



Kurgomen. It was more than he could stand, our Infantry retaking Tulgas without loss. During the day we got in some great open shooting, when he withdrew in disorder. The left section and the Sergt. Major's outpost gun had the best day's sport of our whole trip. It was a fine sight for us to at last have our big guns come to our assistance and let us pound time out of him for once after our long winter's experience. What those 7.5 on the monitor did to the village of Tulgas was a shame. By 5 p.m. of the 18th May, we held our original line of Kurgomen and Tulgas, exactly as it was before the mutiny on the 27th April, without thel oss of a man.

The remainder of our time until we came out of action on the 27th was taken up with baseball and sports, although the guns were in action daily.

On the 28th May, after firing two last rounds we came out of action, turning over the same line to our successors as we had been given to hold in the fall.

We embarked on a scow with our guns and moved down the river to Pless,

where we picked up our centre section arriving at Beresnik during the night. Next morning we turned in our guns and stores to the ordnance and as happy and as cheery a crew as ever stepped, proceeded on down the river to Pianda, where Brigade Headquarters were, to take up billets awaiting our final voyage down the Dwina to Archangel.


I would like to add a word about our men. Many times in France, I had talked with other chaps and discussed what a corker of an outfit one could make if one had the choice of men from the whole Corps. Well, I had them. Men from every unit, at least every brigade, including new men from Canada. Picked from a reserve of some 8,500, including the cream of the School of Gunnery. The men were even beyond my expectation and never during our eight months' existence on the front were there any signs of discontent among them. Always game for a fight or a laugh and it was generally both.

F. F. ARNOLDI, Major.



#### DIARY OF THE 68TH BATTERY, C.F.A.

By Major Walter C. Hyde, D.S.O., Commanding



The O.C. Brigade, in the preface to this book, having explained the reasons for the dispatch of a force to Russia, and the manner in which the work done by the Brigade was appreciated by the Imperial General Staff; as O.C. of the 68th Battery, I will endeavour to tell the story of the activities of the Battery while in Russia.

As all know, diaries of our daily work were kept but few in the Battery had access to these diaries and it is with the hope that the following will be of interest to the many who only knew of events of which they themselves were witnesses, or of which they heard by hearsay, that I will try to set down the whole story of the 68th in Russia.

On our arrival in Archangel, minus centre section guns and wagons and left section wagons which had been left at Dundee in order that we might carry with us to Russia sufficient onions to keep up our spirits during the winter, we were not looked upon by the powers that be as a complete battery. Hence, in spite of all I could do, the 68th Battery was split up before it had had a chance to act as a unit or to give an account of itself as such.

The Brigade Commander's synopsis carries us to that point on the Dwina river miles South of Archangel where the right section, part of the B.C. party and myself, left to undertake work with the Seletskoe detachment and it was from this point that my narrative must start.

#### This will be handled as follows:

- In pursuance of instructions issued at 6 a.m. on October 9th, I left the Brigade at Dwina Priestan with right section complete, Lieut. N. and twenty gumers of left section and my own Headquarters party to proceed to the Vologda Force, whence Lieut. McRae, O.C. left section had preceded us as reconnoitering officer.
  - 2. Seletskoe Detachment Operations, Jan. 9th. to March 29th, 1919.
  - 3. Synopsis of operations of Main body with Vaga Column Dec. 12th, 1918 onwards.
  - 4. Operations of Railroad Detachment by. Lieut. T. C. McConkey,

Our first destination was Yemetskoe. Arriving at 8.30 a.m., we collected mail and orders, and at 9.30 a.m. proceeded up the Emptsa river on two flat-bottomed barges to join "D" Force at their Force Headquarters at Seletskoe.

We reached Seletskoe on the morning of October 10th, and immediately proceeded to the Front, about twenty-one versts south. The story of that twenty-one verst march will have been well told by those who took part, so I must not waste space by dwelling upon it here.

Mejnovskaya, the forward Headquarters was reached at 8.30 a.m. on Octobe<sup>7</sup> 11th. Here McRae rejoined us and conducted us to our positions. Taking over two guns from a S.B.A.L. detachment, whom we made responsible for our horses, and having placed the two right section guns, we immediately registered and took part in our first show with this Force on October 13th.

This action had as its objective the displacement of the Bolo at the River crossing on the Mejnovskaya-Plesetskaya Road and by nightfall our Force was in possession of the high ground about afteen hundred yards south of the tiver crossing. Lieuts. McRae and Newton were forward and with them, Sigs. Halliday and Samson who did excellent work.

In this attack, Bdr. O'Connell and Dvr. Watters distinguished themselves in their handling of a very difficult liaison task which necessitated coolness and ingenuity in which they were not found lacking. They were both recommended for their work and later each received the M.M.

Generally speaking the work in which we had become involved was, to put it in the Irish, play. Two small attacks on the river crossing had been accompanied by a great deal of noise, but by very little damage to personnel or material.


The new, untried infantry with whom we were associated in our work, were very green and it was very difficult to arrive at a proper understanding of conditions.

After the two attempts at the river crossing, and the village of Kadish beyond, had failed to bring about the complete fall of Kadish, Lieut. Roberts and the O.C. of U.S. Infantry calmly took the village themselves and later returned to lead the infantry in. This incident made us scratch our heads and wonder whether our enemy was merely a myth or not. There was certainly an enemy, for he had fired on us with rifles and with artillery, but we could not quite see why he should run away from us,—and it was a long time before we fully realized the extent of the impodent bluff which was being pulled on the Bolo and appreciated the reasons for his falling for this bluff.





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Refudeens



68/2 Signallers

Railroad Detachmen

During my stay on this front (till October 23rd) we merely assisted in a succession of anti-wind-up shoots which, however, seemed as effective as any other means we might have adopted in the driving of the Bolo southward along the Plesetskaya Road and did finally result in the total rout, for a time at any rate, of the enemy.

Our positions during this work were—first—one section in our original position on the Mejnovskaya-Kadish Road about one verst north of the river crossing. This was a purely open bush position the men and officers living in whatever brush shelters they could devise, and these, to say the least, were not comfortable.

The other section was located with the Battery Headquarters in a farm house in the village of Kadish itself—guns in the cow-shed, men in barns and house, officers in the bath-house, signallers, batmen and the select few in pigpens, grain bins, etc. Generally speaking all fared quite well in spite of all manner of creeping things. An attempt was made to clean up the dirtiest surroundings troops have ever been called upon to occupy, but it seemed a hopeless task. Preparations had, however, to be made against winter occupation and all managed to keep busy in this way.

Cpl. Debney took charge of a small party in the preparation of maps of the surrounding country which were later to prove of inestimable value to ourselves and to those who finally relieved us.

On October 23rd we received instructions to withdraw Headquarters and one section 68th to Yemetskoe to await orders to rejoin main body with Dvina Forces.

So on October 24th I left Kadish with complete right section and Headquarters party leaving Lieut. McRee with twenty-one men of his left section to man Russian guns.

We arrived at Seletskoe that same night expecting to be sent right on to Yemetskoe the next day, but it was two days later before we were able to arrange for a barge to take us down river.

Finally on the 28th we reached Yemetskoe and after considerable difficulty with the O.C. Area, and with a very recently dug-out-over-night, Lieut.-Col. who thought he was O.C. Area, we found ourselves in very comfortable and fairly roomy billets.

I will not go into detail, for various reasons, about the stay in Yemetskoe-All those who were there know the reasons. For those who were not lucky enough to be included in the Yemetskoe party, I will simply explain that no official diary of the period was kept. If any further information is required, they may ask Bdr. Whitnest about the price of cigarettes; Bdr. Brieter about

his alliance with the N.A.C.B. and what came of it; or they may even ask Sgts. McCabe and Osborne what caused the pile of cord wood to fall and what that had to do with a tin of bully beef and a hard tack. Some one might even be found to explain how it was that everyone had two pairs at least of breaches M.S. Bedford Cord or why it was that S.B.A.L. sentries did not relish night duty on the ordnance stores. The whole story is most interesting—even if you get the truth which I am sure I never did.

On November 12th we received word of the Armistice in France and all celebrated in different fashions, but as it meant little or nothing to us the celebrating was half-hearted.

In the meantime, Lieut. McRae and his twenty-one men at Kadish were being kept on the alert by one sort of an attack after another and Col. Haseldon, the O.C. of the Seletskoe detachment, did all in his power to have the other section at Yemetskoe and the Headquarters returned to his command.


At the same time I was doing all in my power to arrange for receipt of final orders of some kind as to the disposition of the Battery as a whole.

Finally on November 13th the situation at Seletskoe had become so acute that I received orders from our Brigade Headquarters to send the right section back to Kadish and to report forthwith to Headquarters at Pianda with my own Headquarters party.

These moves were carried out and on November 15th I arrived at Pianda on the last boat before the freeze-up, with Sgt. Mir. Tompkinson, Sgts. Beddow and Fisher and six signallers ready to proceed at once to rejoin the main body at Shankhursk. Owing to the cessation of river transport on account of ice, and the fact that the overland route was impassable until such time as we should get more ice, we did not get to Shankhursk until about one month later having spent the intervening time with the Brigade Headquarters at Pianda.

This seems a good point in the narrative to insert Lieut. McConkey's summary of the activities of the sections left behind at Seletakoe. I would just like to say, however, that we have found it very difficult to prepare any sort of comprehensive account of the work of these two sections. On account of the mixed-up nature of the work they did, and the fact that no one officer (or O.R., for that matter) is conversant with the whole of the story of their work, it will appear that their interests have been overlooked. I hope that the reason for this will be realized and that allowances will be made.

I actually have no notes of the work of Lieut. McRae and his twenty-one men between the 23rd of October and the time when they were joined by the right section again, so can only draw attention to such incidents as I remember.



Of these incidents the most outstanding seems to be in connection with the defence of Kadish. The twenty-one found themselves in sole possession of the Kadish position one day when the woods surrounding the village suddenly came to life and poured forth Bolos from all directions. The section was taken completely by surprise, but all that need be said of their gallantry is this-that they did not surrender the position, they did not suffer a single casualty, and they did completely drive off the enemy. Work on this front was one long succession of similar incidents necessitating the greatest vizilance and coolness at all times and the manner in which these men when alone and also together with the right section fulfilled the work allotted to them was, according to personal letters I received from Col. Haseldon and Mir. Gilmore, officers commanding on this front, without parallel. The main body missed them at all times and did everything possible to hasten a reunion of the 68th, but the elements of the Battery as divided proved of too great use to the various forces to which they were attached to permit of an earlier re-assembly. From this fact we had to derive what satisfaction we could.

## SELETSKOE DETACHMENT—JANUARY 9TH TO MARCH 20TH 1920 From the Wor Diary of Lint. J. Roberts M.C.

The left section left Seletskoe with the railway detachment for Beresniki on January 9th, the right section remaining at Kadish.

General Ironsides decorated Sigs. Dowling, Halliday and Gnr. Perryman for their work on this front.

Things were very quiet at this time preparatory to evacuating Kadish and occupying the new line of blockhouses on the north side of the river Emptse.

During this time we were busy improving the men's huts and building barricades. This work was brought about as a result of the "stand to" we had when a rifle shot was heard just in rear of Canadski village. While investigating the shot, two of the Russian patrol wishing to increase the excitement fixed another couple of rounds. In the general confusion, "Dad" accidentally discharged his rifle and wishing to hide the fact crouched down and imitated an Indian scout which was followed by all the drivers in turn.

Meanwhile, orders were given for the guns to be run out and everyone was busy. Just about the time everyone was wondering what all the excitement was about, a Liverpool threw a cartridge clip in the fire in the mess but and the arrow immediately went vertical again. However, the mystery was never solved.

Canadski village was built by the right and left sections at the 10th first post on the Av. a Road and the quarters built by the subsections were very comfortable, with a central mess hut, officers! but and stables for the two subsections. The mess but was not used as such for long as it was handed over to an infantry party detailed to the guns.

There was intermittent firing during this time, but nothing of great importance happened, except that Kadish was evacuated on January 22nd and the buildings burned.

On January 28th orders were received to fire all ammunition before procreding to Seletskoe and the move was made the next day.

While getting squared away for the hike to Yemetskoe, orders were received to move to Shredmakrenga on the left wing, as we had been driven out of Tarasava and a stand was to be made at Shredmakrenga.

We moved off the next morning and reached Shredmakrenga about five o'clock. On the way in we passed a continuous stream of refugees with what belongings they could take away.

At Shredmakrenga, we found that it would be necessary to cover a full circle with our two guns and this was found possible, and positions made and also alternative positions were built.

About the time we had the positions ready the Bolo brought his guns up within range and opened up. We had been able to make surveys of the main roads within our range and this proved to be of great use to us.

In addition to our two 18 pounders there were two mountain guns manned by Russian gunners.

On February 9th Bolo started registering on the village and ended with incendiary shell. The next day he shelled continuously and we replied until late in the afternoon his infantry were sighted advancing along the river bed. The mountain guns opened up and shortly after an attack developed. The village was covered by eight blockhouses, three of which were attacked and two occupied. These were taken back in a counter-attack.


From information from prisoners, it was learned that an attack was to take place the next day and that the Bolo was to assemble in Krwetz, a village on which we had registered.

At I a.m. we fired on this village and later a patrol brought in the information that the village had been evacuated.

Both subsections worked splendidly and deserved a great deal of credit for their behavior under trying circumstances.



Grave of Capt. Mowat M.C. At Pianda



Reinforcements were rushed to Lhud from Morge on the Dwina, but the Bolo remained quiet. Any excitement for the remainder of our stay in Lhud being caused by friction between the Russian cavalry and the partisans; the billet next to A Sub. being bombed by the partisans and causing great excitement.

A number of prisoners were taken who stated that our shelling of the Gora Road had caught their transports and caused confusion among them. They also stated they had received orders to withdraw.

At Lhud, we had good fun skiing down the river banks, and besides enjoying the sport ourselves, appeared to amuse the Americans and others also.

General Ironsides wired his compliments on the successful defence of Lhod under difficult circumstances and advised that British reinforcemen tswould shortly be sent.

Late on March the 2nd machine gun fire was heard in our rear and the telephone line to Seletskoe was cut. Cpl. Seaman went out with cavalry patrol to investigate of a lineman who said he had bumped a machine gun at the 11th V.P. A break was discovered at the 9th V.P.

On March 6th we left Shredmakrenga for Seletskoe over very difficult roads and arrived about 7.30 p.m.

After two days' stay in Seletskoe, cleaning up stores, etc., we pulled out for Togesobaymaga, where we billeted for the night. The next day we moved on to Yemetskoe. On this trip our little mascot dog "Teddy" whom the boys brought from England was run over by one of the guns and was a great disappointment to everyone in the section. When we arrived in Yemetskoe, we had difficulty in arranging billets as everything was taken.

After a rest of one day we moved on to "Nicola," where we had to rest one day on account of horses.

The next day we moved on to Kadish where we were informed that there was fighting in progress in the next village. After taking the usual precautions we endeavored to phone through to Morge, but the line was dead, but we were successful in getting "Nicola." They reported that the line had been out aff afternoon.

We moved on the next day with a patrol in advance and heard maching gun and rifle fire ahead. We entered Morgegorskaya and found that the Bolo had attacked the day before, but had been driven off having a number of dead and prisoners. There was one 18 pounder manned by a Russian detachment firing when we arrived. The O.C. Morge held us over, and with ammunition obtained from the Russian detachment, and ammunition sent down from Pianda, we were able to assist.

Reinforcements were rushed to Morge from Shredmakrenga and were on hand when he attacked on March 17th. This attack was driven off. The Bolo was reported to be bringing up two field guns, but both were lost through the ice. The remainder of our stay in Morge was quite quiet.

From October 23rd, the date of arrival in Shankhursk of three subsections of the Battery under Capt. O. A. Mowat, until the middle of January was a period of little or no activity on either the Bolo side or our own. Small patrol encounters had taken place from time to time, none of which were of sufficient importance to record. The life had been very monotonous in spite of some winter sports and a certain amount of gaiety in Shankhursk itself.

On December 18th the Battery Headquarters moved to Shankhursk from Valogda Force and was obliged to take over the administration of all the Column Artillery which consisted of a motley assortment of guns and howitzers. There were four 18 pounders, one naval 12 pounder, three 3<sup>n</sup> Russian Naval bowitzers, one 6 pounder A.A. gun, and four pom-poms. The personnel responsible for the manning of this assorted armament consisted of three subsections and Headquarters, 68th Canadian Field Artillery, and 1st Russian Light Battery. It will be noted in view of later developments that the 18 pounder guns were the armament of the Russian Field Battery and that we had left our guns at Force Headquarters in Beresnik in compliance with orders received.

The Vologda Column Artillery had been completely in the hands of the Russians prior to our arrival, but they were too weak numerically to arrange for the care and operation of all the various guns. Therefore, when we took control, the following dispositions were made. The two 18 pounders at our advanced outpost at Ust Padenga would be handled alternately by a section of the Russian Light Artillery and one section 68th Canadian Field Artillery. The section in rest or reserve in Shankhursk would with the surplus Russian personnel man and be responsible for the guns in Shankhursk for which positions had been selected with a view to the defence of any part of the town. On January 19th, during an inspection in Shankhursk by Maj. Gen. E. Ironside and Col. C. H. L. Sharman, heavy gun fire was heard from the direction of Ust Padenga. The Russian section was manning the guns there at the time, and I very soon received a message from the Ust Padenga Garrison Commander to the effect that he would feel more confident if I could send an officer and some of my own men to be with him in case of emergency. Accordingly, I sent Lieut. Winslow with Cpl. Greaves and eight gunners.

On the 20th Ust Padenga was subjected to the heaviest bombardment yet experienced, followed on the 21st by strong and well organized infantry attacks from three directions. During this attack the guns were so heavily



helled that one was abandoned by its Russian detachment and Lieut. Winslow and his men'took over the gun running it up to the crest just in front of their position and firing over open sights at the enemy. They continued firing the gun throughout the day, and at the same time supplied Gnrs. McLean and Kennedy to operate a Lewis gun to guard the left flank of the position. Gar. Thompson, G.B.P., was wounded in the back early in the engagement, but only submitted to evacuation after considerable persuasion. That night orders having been received to withdraw from Ust Padenga to lines of pre-arranged resistance, Lieut. Winslow handled the Artillery details completely. With great difficulty he reorganized the Russian personnel and horses and finally succeeded in withdrawing the guns a short distance out of the town. Here, however, the Russian drivers who were not equal to the task of managing horses half crazed by shell fire decided that the roads were too bad and the allotted task too impossible, and therefore ceased to function. It was immediately apparent that if either of the guns was to be saved it would have to be done by Lieut. Winslow's men most of whom at that time were manning Lewis guns in the rear guard. However, he at once collected as many as could be spared and took charge of one of the guns which with great difficulty was successfully withdrawn to Shaloska, the next line of defence. The other gun was abandoned on the roadside by the Russians and rendered useless by Lieut. Windlow.

A short halt was made in Shalosha, but no artillery action took place there, it having been decided, on account of casualties, fatigue, and topographical disadvantage, to withdraw at once from Shalosha to Spaskoe. Therefore, Lieut. Winslow and his detachment was ordered to return to Shankhursk, arriving there at 2.30 a.m. on January 23rd. While this operation at Ust Padenga was developing an attempt was also being made by the enemy to pierce the Shankhursk defences from a northwest direction through Tarnia and Nicolovskaya and with a view to frustrating this attempt, Capt. Mowat had taken a gun to Nicolovskaya. This gun was in position on January 21st, but was not called upon to fire and on the afternoon of January 23rd, upon relief at Nicolovskaya by a newly arrived subsection of 1st Battery Russian Light Artillery, he proceeded south to Spaskoe so as to be able to cover the withdrawal of our Ust Padenga Force from that town. He reached Spaskoe at 6.30 p.m., established communication with Shankhursk at once and put his gun in action in a position which permitted of an arc of fire of 360°.

The enemy had followed up our retirement far more quickly than was expected, and at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, he launched about seven hundred men supported by two 4.1 howitzers andthree 3" guns against our positions. The attack developed on three sides of the town and in spite

of support which we were able to give from Shankhursk with two 18 pounders and the Naval 12 pounder, it soon became evident that we could not hold the position. From the outset the enemy directed his artillery fire almost solely on to Capt. Mowat's sun, and it was no surprise to those of us who were forced of be mere spectators at Shankhursk to hear at II o'clock of the death of above ing. mith Cpl. Worthington, and of the fact that Capt. Mowat, Bdr. Lawrence and Capt. Odjat, O.C. the Garrison, had been wounded. These casualties were reported to me at Headquarters by Cpl. Hughes, No. 1 of Capt. Mowat's gun, who at the time found himself in charge of the whole force. While Cpl. Hughes waited for orders our signalling Sgt. Beddow arrived in Spaakoe and immediately took charge of affairs. The gun had been hit several times and was permanently out of action. The very measure infantry sacrison had suffered considerably in casualties and were of necessity so scattered over the extent of the position that it was impossible to find an officer. Therefore, Col. Graham gave orders for retirement upon Shankhursk to Set. Beddow who carried them out until Lieut. Mead, "A" Co., U.S.A., was found who relieved him of the responsibility. It was impossible to remove the gun on account of damage to carriage and limber by shell fire so sights and bre ch block were removed and the whole force withdrew to Shankhursk. Largely owing to able arrangements made by Sgt. Beddow and Cpl. Hughes, all wounded and dead as well as ammunition and equipment were successfully evacuated before the retirement took place.

Coincident with the withdrawal from Spaskoe our force at Nicolovskaya withdrew and a new enemy attack developed from Kodema southeast of Shankhursk. This attack, accompanied by shelling of Shankhursk itself, necessitated artillery retaliation on our part. The 12 pounder Naval gun and one 18 pounder, both manned by Canadians, were at once trained in the direction indicated by rough sound bearings of the enemy battery and greatly to our surprise and satisfaction about twenty rounds from these two guns completely silenced the enemy battery and forced it to find a new position.

This occurred at 2 p.m., just as the transport and wounded of our Spaskoe force was entering Shankhursk and from then on throughout the afternoon there was little or no activity on any of the sectors of attack. The time was spent in attending to wounded and arrangements for a protracted defence of Shankbursk itself. Capt. Mowat had been admitted to Hospital immediately on arrival of Spaskoe and had been operated on successfully. When I saw him in the evening he was resting apparently comfortably. None of the other men who had been wounded were in any immediate danger and were being well looked after.



All "Issue" but the Mitts



Vostatka



On the march from Seletskoe - Feb. 1919

At 2 o'clock Col. Graham received a wire from Force Headquarters which completely altered our plans and was to the effect that if possible the Shank-hursk Garrison would withdraw to Shegovary at once. This order was communicated to me in confidence immediately after its receipt, but was not promulgated to the Garrison until 9.30 p.m. that evening. The hour stated for departure was 11 and shortly after that time, all Units were ready to start. However, the work of caring for and providing transport for the wounded took longer than was expected and it was not until 2.30 o'clock on the morning of the 25th that the Column actually moved off.

To fully appreciate the situation in Shankhursk at that time and to fully realize the difficulties to be overcome in a successful evacuation of the town. it must be remembered that to our certain knowledge the Bolo Forces were in possession of every exit from the town but one; that the population of the town which at all times had been more prosperous than any other in the area of the Allied activity, had been increased in the summer and full of 1918 by a great number of refugees from Petrograd and the districts between Shankhursk and Petrograd: that this largely increased population was, generally speaking. pro Ally, but that at the same time there existed the Pro Bolo element and of course a number of agents and spics. Had any indication or hint of our proposed evacuation been allowed to leak out it is clearly obvious that the last. exit from the town would have been denied us and whereas the Force was sufficiently large to cope with any hostile force which might be met with on any one road, hampered as we must be by ninety sleigh loads of our own wounded it would have been sheer folly to have even attempted the withdrawal had any warning of it been allowed to leak out.

For these reasons it was impossible for us to destroy by blowing up or by fire any guns or material which on account of shortage of horses it was impossible for us to bring with us. As it was the Canadian Field Artillery had to supply the Russian Battery with a hitch of twelve horses to enable to withdraw one of their guns. The other guns before departure were rendered useless by one means and another.

And still when we started to withdraw from the town without having been able to warn any friends that might have been made in the town or to offer them an opportunity for flight we one and all felt that any undertaking was nothing more or less than the better of two evils the staying in Shankhursk in an attempt to withstand a siege from which there could be no hope or possibility of relief, or attempting to slide out in the dead of night along a single road which by chance might not be in the hands of the enemy. No one entertained any doubts as to what the outcome would be had we met with enemy opposition and, therefore, it would be readily understood why the order issued

to all troops to take nothing with them but three days' rations was so universally obeyed.

En route to Shegovary we passed within eighteen hundred yards of the Bolshevik Forces and were not challenged and in fact arrived in Shegovary at 4.00 o'clock on that afternoon not quite sure whether we had hoodwinked the enemy or whether we had been led into another trap. There we were met, however, by Lieuts. McRae and Newton with the left section who placed their guns in positions of defence and undertaking guard duties whilst the men who had been through all the Ust Padenga to Shankhursk fighting were allowed to get some much needed sleep.

At 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th, Col. Graham issued orders to us to withdraw northwards along the road to Kitsa. One gun was ordered to be left with the rear guard which was commanded by Lieut. Col. Montford. This gun went into a position on the left bank of the Vaga at the town of Kerchela from which point it covered the retirement of the rest of the Column across the river northwards along the Kitsa trail.

At II o'clock that night the main portion of the Battery on arrival in Bolshaya Vistavka were met by Col. Graham and ordered to take up positions in that town and in another four versts west in such a manner as to assist in a stubborn and protracted resistance against further enemy progress. The two left section guns were therefore placed in temporary positions between Bolshaya and Malaya Vistavkas whilst Lieut. Winslow's one gun on arrival with the rear guard from Kerchela was taken to the town of Yevsievskaya, to protect the right flank of this new front.


The night of January 27th found the various elements of the Column disposed for defence as follows.

Russian Cavalry on extreme right flank in village of Ust Suma supported by Russian infantry in village of Lekhovskaya.

One gun 68th Battery Canadian Field Artillery under Lieut, Winslow with fifteen American Engineers in Yevsievskaya. Two companies American Infantry and forty-five American Engineers supported by two guns 68th Battery Canadian Field Artillery in the two Vistavka villages.

Lieut.-Col. Graham had visited all positions during the day and on arrival at Yevsievskaya about 4 o'clock in the evening had ordered me to assume command of all forward troops with Headquarters at Malaya Vistayka.

On the following morning our outposts which had been established on the Vistavka-Shegovary Road about two versts south of Vistavka were forced to retire on the village by a strong enemy patrol which advanced to the edge of the wood surrounding the villages and swept them with machine gun fire.



This patrol was soon scattered, however, with a few rounds from the 18 pounders.

On January 27th Lieut. Col. Poignant, M.C., relieved me of the forward area and at once made further infantry dispositions with a view to consolidation of the position.

During the following days we made every effort to make ourselves self-supporting as to ammunition and commissariat even to the extent of collecting deserted cattle and fodder from nearby villages which work was carried out with no more than usual interferences. Patrol encounters and occasional sniping kept us always on the alert and merely added to our determination to consolidate with all possible speed. The heaviest action of this type occurred on February 4th, when a large enemy party, supported by artillery, advanced and subjected the forward village to a very hot fire for some time. Before our retaliation produced required results, some casualties and considerable material damage had been caused in the infantry positions.

The centre section under Lieut. Winslow had by this time been re-equipped and refreshed at Kitsa and on February 5th crossed Vaga at Kitsa and went into position one verst west of Kitsa at Ignatofskaya, thus deepening our defence line. Lieut. Martin, D.S.O., M.C., of 421st Howitzer Battery Royal Field Artillery having arrived the previous day with one subsection complete, his gun was placed and registered in our forward area and it is a peculiar psychological fact that the acquisition of the one lone "Heavy" gave us all renewed faith and a more cheerful feeling than we had had for some time.

The disposition of our two sections now made relief possible between the "Rear" section at Ignatofskaya and the forward section at Vistafka; and inasmuch as the rear position was at this time a quiet one the section on duty there was able to get some real rest and much needed baths, changes of clothing and some recreation.

For the rest of the month it might almost be said that the front was normal and during this period until February 28th the only events worth recording are.

First, the removal of Battery and Column Artillery Headquarters to Ignatofskaya in compliance with request of O.C. Column and so as to be in a better position to administer the various elements of the Column Artillery that now comprised the two sections 68th Battery Canadian Field Artillery the Russian section at Yevsievskaya and the 421st Howitzer subsection.

Secondly, the first visit of our Y.M.C.A. Officer to the Battery and the resulting reappearance of almost forgotten luxuries such as tooth paste and soap.

Thirdly, the firing of an American billet in Ignatofskaya and the arrival of Major Delahaye, C.R.A., General Headquarters, on a tour of inspection.

Fourthly, the arrival of Capt. Collison and his section of mountain guns which were immediately made ready for use, and shortly afterwards put into position at Ye ievakaya.

Lastly. I must report the arrival of Capt. Schwalm complete with all his instruments of torture and air of cheerfulness and goodwill towards all men. He also immediately went into action.

During this period we may say that in so far as military operations are concerned, "all was normal on the Vaga Front," and this having been the case, gun pits capable of withstanding reasonably heavy shelling had been completed at Vistafka and living conditions bettered in both forward and rear positions, but this quiet spell was not to last for ever and new problems presented themselves at about 2 p.m. on February 28th, which turned out to be the opening chorus of the spring offensive on the Vaga. But it was the other chap's offensive and he announced this fact by means of a heavy, sustained and very comprehensive bombardment of all our forward positions adding the element of the unexpected from time to time by the employment (for first time in history of N.R.E.F.) of latchrymatory shells.

The month of March was destined to be our most trying month as far as the Vaga Column was concerned.

Starting early in the morning of March 1st, the Bolo launched attacks supported by plenty of fairly well-directed shell fire on our positions at Vistafka Yevievskaya, and at the same time attempted to out-flank us on the right by an advance down the Nelenga River on our Garrison at Maximofskaya. During this fighting, Gar. Robertson was slightly wounded in the leg.

All the attacks failed and on the following day our patrols found that our defence had cost the enemy many men and a quantity of material.

Skirmishes of one kind or another were the order of the day throughout the week, and were nothing more nor less than the prelude to a grand attack which they launched on our positions on May 9th.

This was to be a master stroke. Shelling started early in the morning on all our positions, ten guns being concentrated on Vistafka which place of course received the most attention throughout. After a couple of hours of shelling infantry attacks developed and were pushed with maximum Bolo determination until nightfall. After all the shouting was over our positions were still intact, but considerable damage had been done at Vistafka and the enemy was in too close proximity to our actual positions. Had he, at any time, summoned up sufficient courage to rush any position, weight of numbers would have carried him to victory. But he didn't, and in view of the extreme precariousness of our forward guns it was decided to withdraw the Vistafka section to Kitsa.



that night. This was accomplished safely and a new position was taken up at Ignatofskaya so that four of the 68th guns were under Battery control again.

During this day's fighting, Gnr. Webster, acting as observer at Maximofskaya was wounded in the back by a piece of H.E. shell, while Bdr. Birkett was shot in the arm while engaged in same duty. These were the only casualties suffered in the Battery in this battle in spite of fact that Cpl. Hughes had such good sport picking off Bolos from the trees in the immediate vicinity of his gun pit.

A message received on this date advised us of the departure of the right section from Seletskoe to rejoin the Battery and this was most welcome news.

For the next few days we had comparative peace. On March 10th, I selected position at Malaya Beresnik and sent Lieut. Martin, D.S.O., M.C., with his Howitzer section to take position there.

It was also thought advisable to construct fairly elaborate defences there with a view to future occupations so a Base or rear Headquarters was established with Lieut. Crossley, O.C., and all spare rations, stores, equipment, etc., were withdrawn there.

Daily patrol activity kept all on the gw' wie, but nothing of importance happened to hinder our preparations of and removal to concealed position in the wood just in rear of Ignatofakaya. This move was completed on March 13th, the Battery taking up its new abode in transplanted log shacks of one description or another which at the rate of four to six per day were unbuilt, pieces numbered, and, by numbers, rebuilt in new locations. In this way we soon had constructed a fairly comfortable village in a concealed position, the location of which was not given in any map nor even known to the most recently informed spy. And as later events proved, this system was one which saved many a casualty for the old village sites were in every case systematically shelled flat.

During the visit of Col. Sharman and Capt. Bruce on the 14th, we were ceased a few moments' uneasiness on account of patrol encounters near Vistafka and at Maximofskays, but this was soon cleared up and the rest of the day spent in sorting and swapping horses.

The next morning we gladly welcomed Capt. Bradshaw who reported from the 67th Battery Dvina Force to replace the late Capt. Mowat.

During these days we unfortunately were compelled to evacuate a few men to the hospitals in rear. The strenuous work was beginning to tell and it is a marvel that in such extreme cold, working long hours under most severe conditions did not result in a greater toll on the vitality of the Battery. In fact, of the few who left us for hospital, only three were not able to return again within a very few days.

The next entry of any importance in the diary was made on March 25th, and I will quote it and the entries for the 27th and 28th, knowing that Bdr. Schiller's summing up of events will recall to the minds of all the interesting episodes of our work quite as clearly as any one else's.

March 26th. 'Bolo commenced shelling 10 a.m. Infantry advanced in skirmishing order driving in our outposts. Forward post manned by ————withdrew without orders. Bolo took possession immediately. Fired 140 rounds A. covering advanced post and 'Half-way House.' Attack broken up."

March 27th. Fired 198 rounds in front of "Half-way House" on Bolo parties. No attack made on our positions.

March 28th. 'Moved Officers' Mess and quarters down to new bush position. Stove in Knowles Headquarters creating quite a fog. Orderly room very chilly. 'Y' arrived with gramophone with which whole Column from Ust Vaga to 'Half-way House' was entertained."

"Pay arrived."

With these notes we come to the end of the month of March and although privation and hardship is not expressed very clearly in them, I have no doubt that all these present will be reminded of the circumstances under which they were made and will add whatever further details are required when any rank outside asks: "Did you really do any fighting in Russia?"

April 1st. To quote from the diary again, "Quiet except for the usua! dodges to catch the 'Fools."

On the third of the month the long promised 60 pounder gun actually arrived at Malaya Beresnik and it was astonishing the sense of extra security that the possession of one such gun gave to the Column even though most of us had been in France where the presence or absence of one or more guns was not of sufficient importance to mention. But this was a distinct event in our life in Russia as it meant that at last we had range supremacy and could "talk back" however weakly, a thing we had not as yet been able to do.


It did not take Lieut. Wetmore and his mixed crew long to assemble the gun and get it into action and the day it fired its first shell, on the 14th, was a memorable one.

During this period there is very little of importance to report,

Our outposts were holding positions at Maximofskaya and the 'Half-way House' against the break up of the river when we planned to withdraw to the left bank and make Ignatofskaya our front. The Battery therefore had little



Lieut BMH Martin DS.OM.C.



60 Pdr. Dun, it's O Cound our Fifter



12:How.Battery attached C.F.A. Mala Beresnick

actual fighting to do, but a great deal of hard work in the preparation of new positions at Malaya Beresnik against our withdrawal. And of course there was always a Bolo patrol to be dealt with, or else an attempt on our part to kidnap a Bolo outpost, to be supported. Also from time to time someone would accidently discharge a rifle which necessitated a thorough investigation of our surroundings for our defences were very aketchy and it was impossible to tell from what direction the enemy would attack.

Gen. Graham visited the Battery on April 10th and decorated Sgt. Beddow, Bdr. Brieter, Gnr. McLean and Lieut. Winslow, and the "first rain of the year fell during the night."

The diary goes on to say of April 11th, "Front quiet. Weather very warm and bright. Snowball engagement between Officers and O.R's resulted in win for officers. Mr. Newton led pro-anti-pro-bolo section—one subsection, centre section, moved from Ust Vaga to Malaya Beresnik. And on the following two days the right section arrived at Malaya Beresnik and so the reunion of the whole Battery was again brought about."

Although this incident receives little notice in the diary it was in reality a big event. The right section had been separated from us since October the 3rd, and the history of their exploits is a story all in itself. In spite of all I could do and in spite of sincere efforts on the part of Gen. Ironside it had been impossible to effect this reunion sooner. However, the Battery was again complete and as a unit was still to be called upon to do some of the most severe fighting the Column encountered.

Schiller reported that on April 15th, the "arrival of two Russky Barishnias to do the Battery laundry caused Lieut. Col. Poignant considerable anxiety."

After inspection of defences and river conditions on the 18th, Gen. Graham finally decided to order the evacuation of Kitsa and the right bank defenses. This was carried out safely on the 18th, the Bolo taking immediate possession of the evacuated positions where he received a warm welcome at hands of our booby traps. In connection with this move the following day our last section in Ignatofakaya position was withdrawn to position at Malaya Beresnik and the 60 pounder in covering this withdrawal had so incensed the Bolo that we had an exciting afternoon during which Lieut. McRae was wounded by shell fire.

Following this incident the section was withdrawn to Malaya Beresnik to prepared positions, where, together with the 60 pounders, the 4.5 and the right and centre sections we massed the Vaga Column Artillery and dug-in.

Spring weather had come in earnest however, and any day we might expect the enemy gun-boat and river craft down upon us. Against this we made feverish preparations for we knew that we would have to protect ourselves for some time before we might expect our own naval support to be released from the ice in Archangel Harbor.

And the river was moving out bodily each day. On April 22nd three barges and a couple of dead Bolos passed sedately down stream in the flow.

In spite, however, of the gradually nearing offensive of which we all felt very sure, and in spite of endless work on huts, dug-outs, gun pits, alternative positions, and horse lines, time was still found for sport. Of course as the days grew longer less and less time was wasted sleeping and it was far from unusual about this time to play basket ball or baseball till 10 p.m. in perfect light. The men had also rigged up an out-door gymnasium complete with horizontal and parallel bars and someone was always stunting on one or the other.

And this—save the usual daily strafe, patrol encounter, or wind up—was the order of things throughout the remaining days of April.


May Day was celebrated in bang up style. The river had cleared above us, thus enabling the Bolo to bring down reserves, guns, material, etc., and he was ready for trouble at 5 a.m.

Lieut. Roberts was at our left bank outpost in the "Summer House" and put in a very exciting and busy day.

The show opened with a very beavy bombardment fairly well directed on to our chief points of defence and also on to billets and Headquarters in Malaya Beresnik. The shelling caused fires in the village, a general "dishing" of communications, and consequent confusion. At about 10 o'clock, an infantry attack developed from the direction of our right flank and was pushed with such perseverance that almost a whole company of the enemy penetrated our wire to a piece of dead ground between the "Pimple" and the "Summer House," and here the Infantry Machine Gunners, the T.M's, and Martina 4.5 bottled them up.

Our Infantry, the Liverpools, did magnificent work in breaking up frontal attacks and were with difficulty prevented from mixing it up generally with the enemy bottled up in the hollow.

Although the Artillery was firing all day long from barely concealed positions, little or no damage was done to us. Random shots landed frequently within our positions the 60 pounders and 4.5 Howitzers being particularly unlucky in this respect, but throughout the whole day we had only one casualty, which fortunately was very slight. A heavy thunderstorm at about 9 p.m. was accepted by both sides as the "Stand Down" signal and after it had passed over we took stock of our position. Summarizing the various reports we found that



to all intents and purposes our position was unchanged. Billets were more scarce, and defences slightly weakened but our casualties were negligible, whereas the enemy had suffered an actual counted loss of 66 killed and 38 taken prisoners.

The following day was quiet and I decided to take advantage of it to divide up our eggs, the foolishness of having them at in one basket having been proved to me in the May Day Show. Accordingly the left section was withdrawn to the newly prepared river position slightly in rear of our main defenses. This was the best artillery position we had yet occupied from every point of view and in the few remaining shows in which we were to take part, the guns in this position were able to do all that was required of them without the least fear of the position being located by the enemy.

On May 5th the second phase of the May Day Battle took place and continued, an Artillery Duel, from dawn to dusk with no result either way unless we may accept as an indication of victory the fact that the Bolo morale was worn so thin that he could not press an attack home.

Deserters, of whom numbers drifted into our lines and even wandered back to Ust Vaga to surrender themselves, told of most elaborate plans for concerted attacks which had been broken up in one case by the location and silencing of one of their batteries by our artillery (a fluke) and in another case by our chance shelling of their assembly point. This apparently had proven the last straw for reports all indicated that all hope of shifting us from the M.B. position was then given up. As a grand finale to the day's excitement the most marvellous whirlwind pip-squeak bombardment was put on against us. The thing was so sudden, so surprising in every way that it is a great wonder that disaster to us did not follow. At about 9.30 or 10 p.m. when the light had almost gone and when all were of the opinion that "cease fire" had been generally ordered we heard a succession of whistles, discharges and immediately after, detonations of light stuff up in the tree-tops all around us. Going forward to the creat in front of our position to see what was happening, we could just dimly see two barges outlined from time to time by the yellowish glare caused by about eight field guns firing for all they were worth from these barges. They had come so far down the river that when they opened their range was too short for the shells to be effective and after our first surprise had worn off it was amusing to watch and listen to the veritable hell of noise these guns were causing. The show lasted about twenty minutes till a 106 fuse FLE. from Martin's "Bull" caused them to scuttle back up the river as fast as darkness and their tues would let them.

Although we considered it quite probable that they might try the stunt again in conjunction with an infantry attack, nothing happened and when on

May 7th, H.M.S. Cricket and Cicala with our old friend Commander Worsley, or "Shack" in charge of the latter, arrived we didn't care whether a hundred barges came down the river.

The arrival of the navy was the beginning of the end as far as our work in the Vaga Column was concerned. For almost immediately, that is on May 12th and 14th, Russian personnel reported to the Column to take over from us.

On the 16th, the right section handed over its guns to the Russians and with exception of one or two men per subsection who remained behind to help the Russians for a day or two, they were withdrawn to Ust Vaga.

It having been thought advisable to let the Russians, Infantry and Artillery, put on a show while Allied troops were still there to give them backing, a show was arranged and successfully carried out on the 20th. This resulted in capture of 2 O and 69 O.R., and in the killing of at least 22 of the enemy. "Shack" also took part with the "Cicala" in this show and nearly got stranded on a bar near Kitsa for his daring.

The right and centre sections and the 4.5 having been relieved by Russians, the Battery Headquarters moved to Ust Vaga on the 25th, and on the 27th. Lieut. Martin and his crew who had been with us since our darkest days in Malaya Vistafka and who were looked upon as part of the battery, were recalled to the Dvina Force to rejoin their own unit. They took with them the sincere good wishes of all and I hope felt that the wonderful work they had done while with us had been fully appreciated.

The left section was withdrawn to Ust Vaga on the 28th, and the following day at 2 p.m. the 68th held a Battery parade for the first time since October 8th. A football, "soccer," game was played in the evening against the Royal Scots, who much to their surprise were defeated at their own game by the Canucks. "Shorty" Ross of the cook house staff produced the laughs of the game while Halliday, as back, produced the thrills.

The next few days were spent in getting kit ready for embarkation, stores and equipment ready to turn in to Ordnance and in sorting out and disposing of our horses.

The arrival on June 4th, of an extravagantly decorated staff of the relieving infantry cleared away all doubts about relief, and excitement knew no bounds.

The 67th, who had assembled at Pianda, had forwarded a very confident challenge to us to play outdoor ball, so the 68th team was limbered up, the challenge accepted, and the team sent to Pianda to do battle.

The game took place in the evening of June 5th, and I am sorry to have to record that the 67th team was not in our class. The final score was 14 to 2 in favor of the 68th Battery.

A British Mountain Battery long over due, arrived on the 6th, and with them the new Column C.R.A. who on taking over, released us from further responsibility in Vaga Column Artillery troubles.

So, after holding a final parade, at which Lieut.-Col. Poignant, M.C., spoke to us about the work we had done for him while he commanded the Column, we made final preparations for departure and at 3 a.m. on June 7th, left Ust Vaga en route for Archangel and home.

Of our trip to Beresnik and Pianda, where we joined the rest of the Brigade, and of the lazy, tiresome, mosquito plagued trip down to Archangel little can be said. We were on our way home and all else mattered little.

But before we leave Russia altogether. I would add a word in direct connection with our experiences there.

First of all. No finer group of men, no finer Battery, ever supported a Battery Commander in any theatre of war.

Secondly, no Battery Commander was ever more loyally supported under conditions as trying as could well be imagined; conditions which called for utmost trust, endurance, and strength of character; conditions which almost hourly made Battery esprit de corps more impossible. Yet the Battery spirit in the end prevailed and when the Brigade again paraded in England, the 68th was as definitely a Battery as the Brigade was a unit and I think I can safely say that the day I said good-bye to my Battery on the dock at Liverpool will be looked back upon by every man in the Battery with as much regret as it is by their Battery Commander.

We had volunteered for unknown work in a strange land where unusual conditions prevailed.

We hardship together, accepted new experiences together, and stood together under conditions so adverse as to be almost hopeless.

But after all is said and done we enjoyed our experiences and will long remember our sojourn with the N.R.E.F. But Russia will always mean a great deal to us because—Capt. O. A. Mowat, M.C., Cpl. Worthington, Bdr. David Fraser, and Dr. Russell did not return.

# EXHIBIT "F" RAILWAY FRONT

On disembarking from the "Porto" at Archangel, a party of three officers, twenty gunners and six telephonists were detailed from the reinforcement party to take over an armored train on the railway front then manned by a detachment of Royal Marines.

The party were taken to the front in the daily supply train, a distance of about 100 versts. Very little could be seen of any villages as the railway ran through densely timbered land not unlike parts of our northern country.

On arrival at the Headquarters of the front at "Oberzerkaya," it was found that the armored train was under the command of a naval officer, Commander Young, and that only one officer and the gunners were to report to him, the balance of the party to report to the C.R.A.

The train consisted of, first, a flat car with sand bag machine gun emplacement followed by an American pattern coal car with an 18 pounder and machine guns, the locomotive (wood burning) which had some pretense of being armored, a second coal car with two small naval pieces and machine guns. This constituted the fighting train, while in rear were the officers and men's quarters and mess and kitchen cars.

The party at once commenced to get things in shape and soon had the train wired and protected with sand bags to the fullest extent.

The other artillery consisted of a second train with an 18 pounder manned by a detachment of Polish officers, a 155 Mm. Howitzer manned by Russian gunners and a Russian naval gun manned by three British Sergeants.

The front at this time was on the edge of an open muskeg which was impassable, except on the extreme left where our patrols after many attempts found a way round. Previous to our arrival, an attempt was made to take the Bolo position which was in the edge of the woods on the opposite side of the muskeg, but the attack failed.

After an outpost had been established on the very edge of the muskeg and known positions registered an attack was planned for October 14th.

On the 13th a party consisting of 2 Platoons of French and 2 Platoons of Americans proceeded around the muskes to attack the Bolo from the rear.

On the 14th the Artillery opened up on the Bolo positions and after firing for some time the armored train went forward and fired with open sights on Bolo parties.

The attack was a complete surprise and we kept the Bolo on the run for three days. The train did very effective work in driving back the Bolo trains and direct hits were reported. Progress was delayed by his burning the bridges and blowing up the track as he retired. Our objective was a siding about twelve versts in advance and was obtained on the third day, and held during the time we were on the front.

From October 17th to November 4th, improvements were made in the positions and outside clashes of patrols and intervals of shelling things were usually quiet.

On November 4th, the Bolo attacked our positions, coming down in the woods along the railway and attacking from the flank. Fortunately, they were heard in the woods and the machine gunners withdrew to the opposite side of the river and waited for them to appear in the open. The train did good work in shelling this flank and the machine gunners finished the job.

An outpost had been built in the roof of one of the station buildings from which the Bolo line could be observed, this building was in plain view of the Bolo and it was always wondered why he had not destroyed it by shell fire.

It was not until the end of December, when an attack by us had been called off that he eventually opened up on it and registered twelve direct hits in as many minutes.

Great difficulty was experienced in operating the trains on the single track, and the locomotives were constantly in need of fuel and water very often due to the Russian engine crew's desire for a change of position. These men were not always to be relied on, as on one occasion, a crew ran their engine up the line at full speed and smashed into the sleeping cars of a detachment of Russian gunners manning a 155 Howitzer. The cars were a total wreck, the majority

of the gunners were injured. The armored train which was stationed just in front of these cars had a very narrow escape but was able to get under way before the impact.

At a later date there were some French gunners added to the Artillery with 75 Mm. Howitzers mounted on cars. Due to misunderstanding of orders, there was a collison between their train and the armored train in which Lieut. Evans narrowly escaped being crushed.


The gunners on this front did excellent work and by their willingness did much to keep things going.

At the Headquarters' siding everything possible was done to shorten the long evenings and by Christmas even Mary Pickford was to be seen on the creen in a fair sized hall.


Early in January, orders were received to proceed to Seletskoe to join the left section of the 68th and to move on with them to Dvina Force.

The party went back to Oberserkaya by train and the next day sleighs were provided for kits and the start on a three day hike of seventy odd versts was made.





## HONOURS



## BRITISH HONOURS

C.M.G.

Col. C. H. L. Sharman, C.B.E.

BAR TO D.S.O.

Major F. F. Arnoldi, D.S.O.

### MILITARY CROSS

Capt. W. J. Bradshaw

Capt. O. A. Mowat (deceased).

Lieut, J. S. McRae

J. D. Winslow

I. Roberts

W. S. Newton

S. C. Evans

#### BAR TO D.C.M.

302618 Bdr. W. Birkett, D.C.M. 42253 B.S.M. A. Frame, D.C.M., M.M.

#### D.C.M.

302618 Dvr. W. Birkett.

34728 A/Sgt. F. J. Frape 41438 Sgt. W. F. Armstrong 303812 Cpl. F. Wheeler

87933 Cpl. R. L. Seaman

2100340 Sig. J. N. Jordan

40103 B.S.M. T. Thompkinson.

43800 Sgt. C. D. Winegard

85697 Bdr. C. H. Colwell

#### BAR TO M.M.

42869 Sgt. J. A. Beddow, M.M. 890% Bdr. L. W. Dippell, M.M.

#### M.M.

335115 Sig. R. A. Dunbar

85743 Gnr. F. Meehan

446031 " W. Maxwell

 V. J. Cunningbarn 43840

83866 C. Maloney

1250730 Sig. A. E. Halladay

415400 Sig. W. M. Dowling

301697 Sgt. E. R. Skaife

305601 Cpl. P. L. Debney

334824 Gaz. T. J. O'Connell

91580 Bdr. J. M. Crockett

1251864 Car. C. Robertson

340248 Dyr. G. Watters

300364 Gnr. W. Perryman

335297 Gnz. J. McLean

40060 Sig. J. P. Breiter

301771 Col. T. B. Greaves

304085 Dvr. W. J. Donahus

41445 Set. A. S. Hicks

40186 Sgt. W. G. Higgins

305605 Cpl. W. Hughes

300746 Bdr. J. A. Francis

506279 Gnr. C. C. Cordell

332881 Gar. C. S. Wilson

304579 A / Bdr. W. O. Cook

41459 Gnr. G. F. Atherton

65657 Gnr. J. W. Murphy

334756 Sig. W. R. Harrison

2040627 Sig. D. W. Buchanan

318988 Gng. F. C. French

415354 Dvr. M. Kennedy

87350 Bdr. L. Armitage

85988 Sgt. E. Marshman

42091 Dyr. C. Hainer

315949 Sgt. C. A. Hughes

42613 Dyr. G. Worthington

### M.S.M.

42050 B.Q.M.S. W. Rudge 5424 R.S.M. T. Hewitt 42944 F/Sgt. W. G. Fisher 40905 F/Sgt. E. Dunford

#### RUSSIAN HONOURS

## ORDER OF ST. APOSTOLIC AND GRAND DUKE VLADIMIR

(4th Class with Swords and Bow) Col. C. H.\*L.\*Sharman. C.B.E. Major W. C. Hyde, D.S.O.

## ORDER OF ST. ANNE

Capt. J. A. Bruce, M.C. (3rd Class) Lieut. J. D. Winslow, M.C. (3rd Class) Capt. W. J. Bradshaw, M.C. (3rd Class) A. A. Gillis, M.C. (3rd Class) A. McCausland, M.C. (3rd Class)

R. H. Gale (3rd Class)
 H. V. Schwalm (3rd Class)
 T. H. Hungerford (3rd Class)
 W. J. Holliday (3rd Class)

#### ORDER OF ST. STANISLAS

Major F. F. Arnoldi, D.S.O. (2nd Class)

"W. C. Hyde, D.S.O. (2nd Class)
Lieut. G. Y. L. Crossley (3rd Class)

"W. F. L. Edwards (3rd Class)

"S. C. Evans, M.C. (3rd Class)

"G. W. Hague (3rd Class)

"T. C. McConkey (3rd Class)

"J. S. McRae, M.C. (3rd Class)

"W. S. Newton, M.C. (3rd Class)

"J. R. W. Papineau (3rd Class)

J. R. W. Papineau (3rd Class)

"J. Roberts, M.C. (3rd Class)

"A. E. L. Wetmore (3rd Class)

## ST. GEORGE'S CROSS

8567! Bdr. K. A. Walker, 67th 87292 Sgt. H. N. Taylor, 67th 89764 Bdr. E. A. Ingram, 67th 85988 Sgt. E. Marshman, 67th 42253 B.S.M. A. H. Frame, 67th 305605 Cpl. W. Hughes, 68th 348287 Gnr. E. G. Kerr, 68th 43799 A/Cpl. A. R. Winegard, 68th 337879 Gnr. T. Gray, 68th 302375 Cpl. W. P. Davy, 68th


## ST. GEORGE'S MEDAL

323951 Bdr. D. J. Morris, 67th 42691 Gnr. C. Hainer, 67th 301550 Cpl. E. J. Peto, 67th 86009 Cpl. Ftr. D. M. Slipp, 67th 301957 Whr. J. McMaster, 67th 341272 Dvr. H. A. R. Wood, 68th 90128 Dvr. H. Stewart, 68th 336829 Sig. L. W. McCaw, 68th 324000 Gnr. J. M. Watson, 68th 336845 Bdr. G. E. Windsor, 68th


MEDAL OF ST. STANISLAS (1st Class) 5424 R.S.M. T. Hewitt, Headquarters

MEDAL OF ST. ANNE (2nd Class) 42119 S/Sgt. F. Forsyth, Headquarters

MEDAL OF ST. STANISLAS (2nd Class) 300620 A/Sgt. E. A. J. Wicks, Headquarters 304492 A/Sgt. M. J. E. Hudson, Headquarters 3131094 Sig. C. V. Walters, Headquarters



## NOMINAL ROLL



## OFFICERS, N.C.O.'S and MEN, 16th BRIGADE, HEADQUARTERS, C.F.A.

Col C. H. L. Sharman, C.M.G., C.B.E. Lieut. (a/Capt.) J. A. Bruce, M.C. Lieut. A. E. L. Wetmore. Capt. R. H. Gale. Capt. A. McCausland, M.C. Lieut. T. H. Hungerford. Capt. H. V. Schwalm.

42119 Bdr. Forsyth, F 85523 Gar. Ireland, C. W. 2045542 Dvr. Cromwell, F. 40456 Dvr. Miller, T. 300600 Dyr. Robertson, J. V. 195599 Ger Parker, F. 116428 Gre. McDanald, E. A. 43801 Gar. Winn, C R. 300620 Gar. Wicks, E A. 2557537 Gar. Johnston, W. C. 341238 Sig. Westcott. D. B. 2100467 See Jago, R. D. S. 2115182 Sig. Baster, A. 853405 Sig. McLean W. (M.M.) 2557534 Dwr. Turner, H. 2557485 Dvr. Casey, E. J. 2557493 Dvr. Elsey, C. E. 1250891 Sig. Baker, C., 334357 Sig. LaBel, A. M. 334548 Sty. Pewroon. W. E. 1250656 Sig. Barker F. W. 2303879 Sig. Boyer, C. R. 1250620 Sig. Ferris. R. 3131094 Sig. Waltres. C. V. 343048 Dvr. Bryan, C. R. E. 2085423 Gar. Keith H. 2021950 Dvr. Scott. A. W. 338302 Sig. Virgo. R. D. 1251499 Sig. Robinson, F. G. 2650607 Sig. Pugh. W.C. 345022 Grr. Grey. S. 851752 Gre. Martuori, H. 2557460 Dvr. Wilby, T. R. 5424 B. S. M. Hawitt, T. (M.S.M)

331820 Gpr. Henderson, J. D. 34723 A/Sgr. Frage, F. J. (D.C.M.)

183969 A Set. Lawson, F.S. 1030802 A/Armt/ 5/Sgt. Lund. J. 340928 Tetr. Healey, S. S. 60212 Gnr. LaChappelle, B. 604 A Sqt. Seaton, D. C. 326 A/Set. Coldrey, G. 2557364 Gar. Dinamer, B. C. 446015 A/Set. McCallum, P. 335322 Dvr. Bell, A. W. 2522396 Der, Cavanagh, C. W. 2650/08 Dvr. Erickson, F. L. 1250/85 Cer. Goold, W. A. 2100315 Sig. Myles, F. N. 2100465 Sig. McConnell R. S. 345125 Sig. O'Donnell, J. V. 52944) Dvr. Berrican, J. 340494 Gnr. Davis, M. J. 341393 Dvr. Gibson, J. B. 334003 Dvr. Keiley J. M. 345149 Gnr. McCallum, T. B. 90103 Ger, McDonald. A. 339711 Gur. Ste ple. A. A. 2040631 Sig. Allen. D. J. 1251272 Sig. Denny. J. 335115 Gar. Dunbar, R. A. (M.M.) 344917 Cirr. Halpenry, R. M. 2100340 Sig. Jordan, J. M. (D.C.M.) 1250772 Sig. Stevens, G. A. S. 3033520 Ger. Barber, J. C. 302618 Ger. Birkett, W. (D.C.M. & Bar) 2050657 Dvr. Burton, A. T. 340097 Gas. Forster, M. M. 304492 Gar. Forster, M. B. 304492 Gar. Hudson, M. J. C. 663311 Dvr. King, J. W. 65657 Gra. Murphy, J. (M.M.) 349600 Dvr. Readman, G. R. 2005999 Dvr. Readman, G. R. 313011 Gar. Thompson, J. A. 345109 Gar. Turner, H. M.

334645 Ger. Boutwell, Z. L. 86701 Ger. Clark, W. R. 2650692 Dyr. Franklin, J. L. 343154 Dyr. Kenney, T. V.

40206 Car. Lavoic. W. F.

91336 Cnr. McAullife. D. V.

348234 Dvr. Rennick, S. 342333 Dvr. Stuart, ). W. R.

544998 Dwr. Thompson, T. A.

## 67TH BATTERY, C.F.A.

Major F. Arnoldie, D.S.O. Capt. A. Gillis, M.C. Lt. W. L Bradshaw M.C. " G. W. Hagen. I. R. W. Papineau.
C. Y. L. Crossley.
W. F. Edwards " S. C. Evana, M.C. D.C.M. 22:253 B.S.M. Frame, A. H. 41445 Sat. Hicks. A. S. 41436 Sgt. Armstrong, W. F. 44992 Sgt. Armstrong, J. B. 42050 Q.M.S. Rudge, W. 40905 Sgt. Dunlard, E. 40186 Sgt. Pliggens, W. G. 37292 Sgt. Taylor, H. N. 35968 Sgt. Macdronn, E. 315949 Sgt. Hughes, C. A. 510664 Set. Book, F. B. 40005 Cpl. Ouilter, G. 41028 Cpl. Wallace, T. 42572 Cpl. Phodes, H. A. 300812 Cpl. Wheeler, F. E. 301550 Cpl. Peto, E. J. 41849 Cpl. McLernan, D. J. 36009 Cpl. Slipp, D. M. 90132 Cpl. Leislane, J. A. 6277 Cpl. Ferwick, J. E. 87350 Bdr. Armitage, L. 320668 Bdr. Allison, A. N. 326018 Bdr. Arnold, M. J. 43027 Belr. Benetish, G. 1251104 Bdr. Brooker, W. R. 339250 Bdr. Brown, E. C. 85697 Bdr. Colwell, C. H. 89096 Bdr. Dippell, L. W. 83975 Bdr. Gillion, E. W. 89704 Bdr. Ingram. E. H. 339668 Bdr. Laundy, J. 329951 Bdr. Morris, D. J. 87277 Bdr. McDirmid. J. 89280 Bdr. McDonald, D. A. 307728 Bdr. Page, E. A. 302438 Bdr. Rowbettom, E. L. 337881 Bdr. Sanderson, G. F.

85671 Bdr. Walker, K. A. 300246 Bdr. Francis, J. A. 302371 Gar. Akar, W. J. 43819 Gar. Anderson, E. R. 91939 Car. Atherton, G. J. 125076 Dvr. Anderson, E. J. 2650264 2650264 Gar, Ackerman, N. 89651 Gag. Baker, S. 41350 Dvr. Beaudoin. P. 86695 Gar. Bennett, J. T. 432974 Gar. Benton, F. 340043 Gar. Blout, H. 317864 Dvr. Boyce, J. W. 348935 Gnr. Brooks, W. 2085342 Dvr. Burgess, A. R. 346816 Gar. Bond, A. F. 2650625 Dvv. Brocklehurst, B. 1557383 Dvr. Beentien, E. 324002 Gar. Bernard, A. F. 42865 Gnr. Boyes, J. 335322 Dvr. Bell. A. W. 529411 Dvr. Berrigan, J. 534401 Dvr. Bates, F. 302618 Cnr. Bickett, W. 2163392 Gnr. Brazendale, R. 2845056 Gar. Camenter, F. 49058 Gnr. Cing Mars. O. 1260016 Dyr. Chamashouse, T. H. 13617 Dwr. Charleton, T. 85930 Dvc. Clark, E. L. 348419 Dvr. Clinch, O. 86185 Dvr. Claugh, T. 4082522 Car. Contes, H. 334341 Dvr. Conlin. B. 506279 Gar. Cordell, C. C. 2522474 Sig. Coshead, P. E. 43840 Dvr. Cunningham, V. J. 86701 Dvr. Clark, W. R. 300864 Gar. Cowling, E. M. 3050643 Dvr. Convers, R. J. 2522390 Dvr. Cavanaugh, C. W. 311420 Dvr. Davidage, F. P. 2327461 Dvr. Davidson, W. 344909 Sig. Dawson, J. A. 316862 Sig. Debenn, J. M. 1261165 Dvr. Doucette, G. S.

338215 Dvr. Douglas, F. L.

## NOMINAL ROLL

331629 Gur. Dowie, J. M.	83866 Gnr. Maloney, C.	349839 Dyr. Warman, A. H.	301176 Dvr. Currie, T. C.
85604 Dvr. Davis, H.	2100459 Sig. Matthews, R. F.	334817 Sig. Weber, G. H.	273062 — Davey, W.
1251272 Gnr. Denny, J.	2100315 Sig. Myles, F. M.	86786 Dvr. Whitehead, E.	341349 — Davis, A. J.
335115 Gnr. Dunbar, R. M.	310652 Dvr. McCormick, L.	314259 Dvr. Whitlock, A. M.	340494 Gar. Davis, M. J.
83943 Gnr. Edgar, G.	341439 Dvr. McGahey, C. E.	1250499 Dyr. Williams, F. R.	302375 Cpl. Davy, W. P.
181 Gar. Estey, N. H.	338030 Gar. McKay, A. J.	83966 Car. Wilms, W. S.	305601 A.Bdr. Debney, P. L.
2650708 Dvr. Erickson, F. L.	651317 Gnr. McLeed, P.	332881 Car. Wilson, C. S.	335260 Gnr. Dent. W.
1250440 Dvr. Farguson, F. L.	2557411 Dyr. McLeod. W.	91244 Dyr. Worthington, A. W.	540019 - Derrick, R. G.
340262 Gnr. Field, J. L.	301957 Whl. McMaster, J.	42613 Dyr. Worthington, G.	341256 Dvr. Dick, C.
1250204 Day, Finley, A.	334957 Der, Keer, J. W.	2100374 Gnr. Young, E. M.	304085 - Donahue, W. J.
		ATOMAT CHELL THRING IN THE	336034 Gor. Donovan, J. D.
200148 Day, Finnigan, G. E.	90103 Gar. McDonald, A.		415400 Sig. Dowling, W. M.
77063 Der. Force, V. R.	345149 Gnr. McCallum, T. B.	68TH BATTERY, C.F.A.	2522585 Ftr. Dubey, J. F.
41506 Der. Front. W. R.	2100465 Sig. McConnell, H. S.		2522305 For Dubey, 3, F-
2650692 Dvr. Franklin, J. L.	91336 Carr. McAuliffe, D. P.	Major W. C. Hyde, D.S.O.	2522391 Gnr. Ede. A.
41580 Gre. Gammon, H. C.	301468 Gar. Nicol. G. &. S.	Capt. O. A. Mewat. M.C.	513350 Dwr. Enright, R. G.
89332 Cor. Godin, A. A.	344881 Gar. O'Conner. E. J.	Lt. T. C. McConkey.	312860 Ger. Enlett, O. G.
41302 Dvr. Gayette, G. W.	342295 Dvr. Orr. E. W.	" J. S. MeF ay M.C.	308611 Bdr. Fairweather, D. B.
41276 Dvr. Graham, A.	333865 Dvr. Orton, J. W.	" W. S. Newton, M.C.	1250820 Sig. Ferris, p.
476609 Sig. Green, A.	345080 Dvr. Overm, M. C.	" J. hoherts, M.C.	42118 Gnr. Finglah, B.
324920 Gar, Grunder, N. A.	314234 Dve. Ogar, P. A.	" J. D. Winnlow, M.C.	305519 A.Bdr. Finley, J. H.
341393 Dvr. Gibson, J. B.	87221 Dvr. Parker, J. B.	51005 Sgt. Archdale, G. H.	43944 F.Sut. Fuher, W. G.
340055 Dvr. Hacker, W. J.	2041581 Dvr. Parker, G. J.	41131 A.Bdr. Armin, L. A.	338988 Gar. Follis, W. 1.
42691 Dvr. Hainer, C.,	2650661 Dvr. Paraena, F. T.	338216 Sig. Austin. H. B.	340697 — Farster, M. M.
333825 Sig. Harrison, W.	89931 Dyr. Patterson, E.	348164 Gnr. Ayres, J.	5902 Dvr. Fex. C.
41518 Dvr. Hannesey, C. H.	346157 Dyr. Pearson, N. A.	3033520 Gnr. Barber, J. C.	318988 Gar, French, F. C.
	309135 Dyr. Polosk, W. J.	1251318 Dvr. Bannon, A. F.	344038 Sdir. Gardner, B. R.
300626 Gar. Hobsen, J. H.		42869 Sgt. Beddow. J. A.	340865 Tetr. Gavoor, G. E.
77091 Gar. Holmes, C. D.	344974 Sig. Porter, J. 211534 Dvr. Powell, C. W.	320018 Set. Bell, B. H.	1250385 Dvr. Gould. W. A.
2100801 Sig. Horn, C. J.			
86026 Dvr. Harrison, G.	3400420 Dvr. t-emy, P.	42183 Car. Benz, S.	337879 Gar. Gray, T.
300309 Dvr. Hawthorns, T. W.	121 S.S. Pussell, A.	339417 Car. Bilton, H. W.	301771 Sgt. Greaves, T. B.
533931 Gnr. Hultman, A. N.	86626 Dyr. Sales, T. H.	359127 Gee. Bird, H.	347629 Grr. Grimadele, H. D.
344917 Sig. Halpenny, p. F.	91230 Sdl. Sampson, W. C.	109054 Gar. Blair. S. R.	86656 Bdr. Hager, A. E.
339007 Dvr. Irwin, W. H.	349270 Gnr. Selfridge, H. B.	335054 A.Bdr. Bond, S. J.	1250730 Sig. Helladay, A. E.
341051 Gnr. Johnson, T. L.	400243 Gnr. Sinclair, N.	273933 Dvr. Boyd, J. C.	340421 Dir. Hare, F.
2591079 Dvr. Keyes, E. A.	340213 Dvr. Smith, D.	40000 Bdr. Breiter, J. P.	349818 Gnr. Hare, G. E.
334003 Dvr. Keiley, J. M.	2040550 Gar. Smith, G. E.	1251356 Dvr. Brian, U. A.	341427 Dvr. Harnden, F. H.
The state of the s	335836 Car. Somers, C. B.	305558 Dvr. Brimley, A. G.	334706 Sig. Harrison, W. N.
41387 Car. Landry, J.	2601924 Gar. Spiers, C. E.	907893 Gnr. Brown, B. F.	59433 Gat. Harvey, H. J.
345013 Dvr. Latter, A. G.	678926 Sig. Stanley, A.	1251393 Gar. Bryne, O. E.	42135 B.Q.M.S. Hearn, A. E.
341374 Divr. Leakey, to . H.	83976 Gar. Strong, W. J.	2040027 Sig. Buchanan, D. W.	308694 Gar, Hemenway, H. H.
2327544 Dvr. Lewis, N. G.	90977 Dwy, Sutherland, R.	534404 Bdr. Burchell, C.	1251422 Dvr. Henderson, A.
310784 Gar. Lougheud, A. J.	348235 Cor. Shillington, W. R.	335251 Sig. Burnside, F. W.	2001329 — Herstad, J.
349683 Dvn. Larby, G. H. F.	349060 Sig. Stephenson, C. A.	2650657 Dvr. Burton, A. T.	2522497 Holden, M. H.
237518 Gar. Lurd, R. N.		316662 Dvr. Bushey, K.	89754 Bdr. Howard, A. W.
42384 Gar. Liviney, P.	334900 Sig. Taylor, F. N.	340511 Sig. Bunchart, I. F.	85622 Dvr. Howes, A. E.
364659 Dvr. Mansheld, C. O.	328902 Gnr. Thompson, C. W.	1251367 Dvr. Campbell, T. E.	336947 Ger. Hubley, T. M.
	339376 Gnr. Thompson, D.	345006 Dvr. Carmichael, A.	318895 Bdr. Hudson, W. C.
1260417 Sig. Marling, S. F.	6323 Dwr. Thorpe, B.	273845 Gar. Chase, C.	305605 Cpl. Hughes, W.
323989 Gnr. Matherson, A.	338234 Gnr. Tolmic, D. A.		259 Gnr. Hunt. A.
446031 Gnr. Maxwell, W.	855454 Sig. Turner, C. H. 1250298 S.S. Turner, J. D.	89310 Sig. Cook, G.	
85743 S.S. Meehan, F.	1250298 S.S. Turner, J. D.	304579 Bdr. Cook. W. O.	300215 A.Bdr. Ingerson, G.
1251339 Dvr. Miles, H. W.	324894 Gag. Thomas, F. S. P.	42100 Sig. Cooney, P.	304075 Dyr. Jackson, F. K. J.
348556 Grer. Miller, B. H.	85439 Sig. Vaughan, F. G.	348076 Dvr. Coulter, E.	2850030 Gne. Jamieson, J.
2591040 Gnr. Meore, G. A.		334387 Gnr. Cox. W. A.	1030634 Dvr. Jensen, A. F.
2557446 Dvr. Murrey, G. J.	2327624 Dvr. Wait, R. D.	91380 Cpl. Crockett. J. M.	1250231 Johnston, W. F.

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316010 A.B.dr. Jones, F. 340180 Dwr. Jones, R. H. B 301920 Sig. Keith, S. J. 183 Dwr. Kally, W. 313887 Dwr. Kally, W. 313887 Dwr. Kemp, H. H. H. 415334 Dwr. Kemp, H. H. H. 415334 Dwr. Kemp, H. H. H. 415334 Dwr. Kemp, H. H. H. 348287 Gar. Karr, E. G. 665311 Dwr. Klag. J. W. 334695 Gar. Knowles, E. A. 2043085 Dwr. Lang, E. W. 40206 Bdr. Lavou, W. F. 50044 S.S. Law, C. 300222 Grr. Lloyd, E. B. 6130 Cpl. S.S. Law, C. 301925 Gar. Maloney, D. H. 301926 Gar. Marlon, D. H. 301926 Gar. Marlon, E. J. 322914 S.S. Mastices, H. A. 345090 Dwr. Mathesson, E. J. 322945 Grr. Mercer, R. M. 302502 — Middleton, J. 2522463 Dwr. Mills, W. C. 304684 Gar. Mollard, C. W. 333656 Grr. Mollard, C. W. 333656 Grr. Mollard, C. W. 333656 Grr. Mollard, F. B. 333656 Grr. Marro, A. H. P. 65657 Cpl. Marphy, J. W.	305533 A. Cpl. McCabe. J. K. 33629 A. Bdr. McCaw. L. W. 67413 Gar. McDonald, A. R. 339094 Dvr. McGibbon, A. 301302 Gar. McGillivray. W. M. 534417 — McIntonh. A. 343280 Dvr. McIntonh. A. 343280 Dvr. McIntonh. A. 335297 Gar. McLaren, R. 335297 Gar. McLaren, R. 335297 Gar. McLaren, R. 336400 Dvr. McLaren, R. 336400 Dvr. McMorrow, J. J. 306764 Cpl. McPhenson, T. 42714 Grr. McRue, J. E. 534529 Sig. O'Connell, T. J. 349404 Dvr. O'Connell, W. 345125 Sig. O'Connell, J. V. 342055 Sig. O'Donaul, J. V. 34606 Grr. Oktore, J. W. 40696 Grr. Oktore, J. W. 40696 Grr. Oktore, J. K. 336920 Sig. Paddon, J. E. 89936 A. Bdr. Pare, P. 321004 Grr. Paton, W. G. 334927 Sig. Payne, E. F. 349373 Gar. Perrigo, K. 300364 Grr. Perryman, W. J.	3056721 Der. Rheaume, O. 341376 Der. Rivern, H. 1251864 Gar. Robertson, C. 345114 Der. Robertson, L. 205999 Gar. Robertson, L. 205999 Gar. Robertson, L. 205999 Gar. Robertson, J. F. 348976 Der. Rose, H. 1251332 Gar. Russell, J. DeV. 300275 Der. Ryan, P. 343261 Der. Ryan, P. 343261 Der. Ryan, W. E. 301742 Der. Sadler, W. 349173 Sig. Semson, G. 348320 Bdr. Schiller, D. V. 88733 Sig. Semson, G. 348320 Bdr. Schiller, D. V. 88733 Sig. Semson, R. L. 335846 Der. Sheller, D. V. 343045 Der. Sherthom, W. G. 301697 Sgt. Skaife, E. R. 319914 Der. Shalling, A. B. 333833 Gar. Shater, J. H. 336205 Der. Smith, H. W. 1251090 Der. Socemon, A. A. T. 349016 Gar. Smith, H. W. 1251090 Der. Socemon, A. A. T. 349016 Gar. Stavent, H. 342838 Gar. Thistlethwaite, C. 2001019 Sig. Thomas, G. N. 344009 Der. Thomas, G. N.	41013 B.S.M. Temkinson, T. 42045 Gar. True, T. 339277 Gar. Unher, C. 1257776 Gar. Vaughan, E. A. 2590710 Dvr. Walters, R. M. 1251556 Gar. Wardle, T. A. 342287 Gar. Warren, T. R. 315916 Gar. Warkins, W. H. 32900 Gar. Watton, J. M. 4774 Dvr. Watton, R. C. 340248 Dvr. Watton, R. C. 301614 Gar. Webster, W. 300340 Gar. Wenn, W. G. T. 306462 Sgt. Whidden, W. G. 345131 Dvr. White, C. 45936 A. Bdr. White, C. 45936 A. Bdr. White, C. 340248 Dvr. Wilcon, F. J. 34666 Dvr. Wilcon, F. J. 33665 Bdr. Windson, F. J. 33665 Bdr. Windson, G. E. 63799 A. Cgl. Winegard, A. R. 63800 Sgt. Winegard, C. D 83752 Dvr. Wilcon, F. J. 349005 Gar. Winters, E. E. 6023 Dvr. Windsar, S. 341222 Dvr. Windsar, S. 341222 Dvr. Windsar, S.

